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PREFACE 
 
Work directly related to this thesis started, I think, when I read the first of Ezra Pound’s 
Cantos, during my post-graduate studies in Comparative Literature, in Montreal. My M.A. 
dissertation compared Pound’s translation and Heidegger’s transposition of the figure of 
Odyssean return (Pound et Heidegger, lecteurs d’Homère, Université de Montréal, 1992). I 
subsequently requested and was granted permission to pursue doctoral work focusing on 
Homer’s Odyssey – which involved transferring to the University of Geneva. The turn to the field 
of Homeric studies brought along the inevitable: not only the systematic reading of the original in 
canonical modern editions, but also an inquiry into the history of these editions and of the 
correlative Homeric Question. This led me to Wolf’s Prolegomena – and to the question of the 
manuscript tradition. A first draft of the doctoral dissertation comprised two relatively distinct 
parts: an overview of the philological debate on Homer, and a re-reading of selected passages of 
the Odyssey, especially those that poetise figures of language, humanity and memory. There only 
seemed to lack a brief middle part, bridging what was sensed as a gap between the two. Paul de 
Man provided that bridge – more specifically, his approach to reading and history, as evinced in 
his lecture on Walter Benjamin’s “Aufgabe des Übersetzers”. A careful re-reading of other related 
writings by Benjamin was soon called for – a brief excursus, so I thought. However, Benjamin’s 
late and, on retracing my steps, earlier work introduced me to a field hitherto unsuspected, 
obscured rather than explored under de Man’s guidance. Wolf persisted, but the “middle part” of 
the thesis extended to what is now the main body, displacing my reading of the Odyssey. I thus 
remain, for the time being, with more prolegomena to yet another return to Homer – on grounds 
far more slippery than the ones that sustained and suspended my initial return. The deManian 
bridge did its job. 
I have great difficulty envisaging how I could ever adequately acknowledge the debts I 
was fortunate enough to have accrued throughout this process, expressing my gratefulness in 
return. I only wish that the result were better, so that my thanks would not seem to fall so 
ironically short of doing justice to on-going relations that, I am afraid, do, fortunately, exceed 
words. 
 
The presence of Wlad Godzich, supervisor of the thesis, has marked my work and 
intellectual development. He has been, for me, a figure worth both following and resisting – with 
effects, in both cases, as unexpected as they were welcome. He accepted, to begin with, my 
Master’s and Doctoral projects, in Montreal and Geneva. He further supported my work by 
offering me research and teaching positions at the University of Geneva. His lectures and 
seminars, which first attracted me to the field of comparative literature, I have attended avidly; 
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and I do not recall myself reacting to their ideas otherwise than with enthusiasm or exasperation. 
Everything always had to be thought all over again. Our discussions, usually over beer or coffee, 
never missed a point without gaining another. The conditions of our institutional affiliation were 
coupled with that feeling of engaging intellectual independence which is, in itself, a challenge 
both practical and theoretical. I have tried to cope with it, measuring my limits. 
 
My gratitude also goes to the government of Quebec, which offered me a two-year FCAR 
scholarship, along with a supplement that enabled me to travel from Montreal to Geneva in order 
to continue my work – from Pine Avenue to Pension Saint-Victor and then to Petit Castel, before 
landing in Valeria’s neighbourhood. 
 
Rick Waswo kindly accepted to preside over the thesis committee. Moreover, he has 
offered help and encouragement most effective.  
I also thank Jenaro Talens and Jeff Opland for accepting, on a short notice, to be members 
of the committee – thus making it possible for me to defend in July. 
 
The Département de Littérature Comparée of the Université de Montréal, provided me with an 
institutional setting in which, as a belated student of literature exhausting his youth, I found 
intellectual stimulation as well as the warmest human surroundings. I mean to keep on 
addressing to my fellow-students the same thanks I have already expressed elsewhere – while 
cherishing, with them, the memory of Bill Readings, whom I had the chance to meet, debate with 
and learn from, in Montreal. 
My life and studies in Montreal depended a lot on the support and company of my 
Greek-Canadian relatives – especially of Sophia Florakas-Petsalis, who has always been, for me, 
an inexhaustible source of inspiration. 
 
The English Department and the Comparative Literature Program of the Université de 
Genève offered me the possibility to engage in further apprenticeship, as well as in that other form 
of learning we call teaching. The experience was invaluable and determinant in many respects, 
owing both to the students that attended my seminars and to the colleagues with whom I shared 
privileges and responsibilities.  
Christine Bétrisey, whose mémoire de Licence on Benjamin’s Aufgabe I supervised, helped 
me to realise, through her excellent work,  how much better one can indeed come to know a text 
one thinks one has learned by heart.  
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The doctoral seminar on old and new Humanisms allowed me to enjoy clashes and 
reunions of viewpoints in an engaging academic forum – dovetailing into talk over soup at 
Chausse-Coqs.  
André de Muralt’s courses on ancient and medieval philosophy showed me what it 
means to work with texts whose historical remove makes their reading inescapably close. The 
course on papyrologie that I attended, in the Classics department, has been strikingly enlightening. 
 
Valeria Wagner is the closest neighbour I have had in my life. I have discussed with her – 
and need to go on discussing – almost everything relating to our academic life, as well as to what 
lies beyond its confines. Together we coped with the thesis, in many respects, including its 
practice, its theory, its politics – as well as its part on philology, which Valeria carefully read.  
Brian Neville, whose knowledge of Benjamin well precedes my own, has sustained our 
connection from Montreal to London, in a way that made innumerable instances of intellectual 
offering and exchange resound with friendship unbelievable. He read the first version on Aufgabe 
– and no subsequent version went untouched by his comments. My introduction would sound 
very different without his corrections. He keeps me real company during these difficult few days 
of final editing work.  
 
Simone Oettli knows well how to combine intellectual and moral support, with the 
wholehearted hospitality that I enjoyed so much. 
The fellowship of Agnieszca Soltysik, coupled with her smiling initiatives for work-in-
progress meetings, has been precious.  
To Saba Bahar, I owe things as important as the roof over my head – and lots of useful 
advice that were always more than accurate. 
Agnese Fidecaro, Lorenza Coray, and Ward Tietz were important parts of many of the 
most animated moments of my life and thought in Geneva. 
Beba Sasiç has made all things, in and out of the Department, familiar and real 
unforgettably so. 
 
Family and friends in Greece have been withstanding comings and goings, unfulfilled 
promises and deferred restarts, distances unbearable and closeness overwhelming. It would be 
vain to talk of gratefulness towards those whose names are practically indistinguishable from 
mine, in many respects.  
Since old Parisian days, Anna Tabaki has tenaciously insisted that I can and must have a 
thesis – doing all she could, to keep me on track. She did it with that reassuring smile of 
complicity, which could not help suggesting that, after all, it’s not the thesis that really matters. 
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To Rania Astrinaki, with whom we have talked so well over so many changing years, I 
wish the best for the imminent defence of her own thesis. 
To Apostolis Diamandis I wish the same. Through the turbulence of our discussion, 
together with Lena Prokopiou, I have learned an awful lot – and we’ll see what next  
Giorgos Tsarbopoulos is not only the oldest of friends; he also practically financed part of 
my work at a crucial stage in its trajectory.  
I have constantly counted a lot, and know I can always count, on Mina Louizos and 
Yannis Zorzovilis. 
The company and care of Titsa Kalogri is steady and soothing.  
The acute understanding of Kalliope Patera has been a reference since old times of 
different engagements.  
 
Hélène Antoniadis-Bibicou, of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, has long 
been an example for me, in many ways, certainly including but also drastically transcending 
academics. 
 
One way or the other, everything I write is addressed to Eliane Pauwels, from Nulpar. We 
have gone a long way since the first two pages she once greeted. 
 
With Nikolas Nikolakopoulos we did not discuss the thesis much. Our letters, however, 
have been telling things that the thesis only strives to retell. 
 
I was privileged to have had Fofi Gouloussi-Protonotariou as the first reader of my text, 
in its entirety and detail. This makes me a happy man. 
 
To the perseverance of my mother, the comradeship of my brother and the memory of my 
father I owe everything, anyhow. 
 
Frankly, I think this thesis would not have finished, were it not for John Varsos Jr. His 
presence has cordially urged me to reflect on how one can make a living worthy of the name. 
Katerina had to leave John for a while, during Easter holidays, to come to me and read the 
whole thing through, correct it as much as possible, round it up – and put it aside. So she 
continues, and helps me to continue, by her side, that conversation in Danakos, with Kostas. 
 
 
Geneva, 21.5.02 
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Post scriptum 
 
For Thanassis Tsimekas. In Greece, it was to Thanassis, rather to the library, that I ran for 
bibliography – and chat. I have known no one who can discuss interest of books better than him. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The abbreviations listed bellow stand for works that constitute the primary sources of my work 
and are thus most often quoted (in the original and in English or French translation). This list 
provides, for each abbreviation, the title of the corresponding work; in parentheses, it refers to the 
relevant entry of the bibliography presented at the end of the thesis. All the abbreviations listed 
here occur in my text in italicised format. 
 
 
By Friedrich -August Wolf: 
 
PRE Prolegomena to Homer (Wolf 1985) 
 
PRL Prolegomena ad Homerum (Wolf 1963) 
 
By Wilhelm von Humboldt: 
 
Considérations 
 
Considérations sur l’histoire mondiale; Considérations sur les causes motrices dans 
l’histoire mondiale ; La tâche de l’historien (Humboldt 1985) 
 
Language 
 
On Language: The diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the 
mental development of mankind  (Humboldt 1988) 
 
WRK Werke in fünf Bänden (Humboldt 1980) 
 
Sprachbau Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die 
geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts (Humboldt 1880) 
 
 
By Walter Benjamin: 
 
Aufgabe “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers“ (Benjamin 1989, IV, 1: 9–21) 
 
Begriff 
 
“Über den Begriff der Geschichte“ (Benjamin 1989, vol. I, 2: 691–704) 
 
GS Gesammelte Schriften (Benjamin 1989) 
 
Kunstwerk 
 
“L’oeuvre d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction mécanisée” including 
 “Paralipomènes et variantes”  (Benjamin 1991, 118–192) 
 
Mimesis 
 
“Über das mimetische Vermögen” (Benjamin 1989, vol. II, 1: 210–213) 
 
OE Oeuvres (Benjamin 2000) 
 
Passagen 
 
Das Passagen-Werk (Benjamin 1989, V, 1) 
 
Préface 
 
“Préface épistémo-critique“  (Benjamin 1985, 23–57) 
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Programm “Über das Programm der Kommenden Philosophie“ (Benjamin 1989, II, 1: 
157–168) 
  
Sprache 
 
“Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen“ (Benjamin 
1989, II, 1: 140–157) 
 
Vorrede 
 
“Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”  (Benjamin 1989, I, 1: 207–237) 
 
 
By Paul de Man: 
 
Conclusions “Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s The Task of the Translator” (De Man 1986) 
 
 
On the oral tradition: 
 
Lord The singer of tales (Lord 1960) 
 
Peabody 
 
The winged word: A study in the technique of ancient Greek oral composition as seen 
primarily through Hesiod’s Works and Days (Peabody, 1975) 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Old questions persist in those newly raised. This thesis rests on the 
assumption that it would be useful to revisit sites and modalities of this 
persistence. Very fast, new formulations become habitual or overly familiar; in 
their very strangeness, older ones can acquire a rejuvenating actuality. The more 
preposterous old questions sound to modern ears, the stronger their shock may 
be, to the degree that preposterus means untimely: age questioning time. Pre-
posterity can thus have puzzling epistemological effects – it may upset reason, 
pure or practical, and even the possibility of judgement, in ways comparable to 
those of the sublime. 
I am thinking primarily of questions arising in the field of this thesis. 
Amongst the names that this field usually bears, my own preference is for 
“theory of literature” rather than for “comparative literature”. The latter does 
little more than restate an obvious methodological principle. The former better 
indicates the stakes: theorising from the study of literature at large, that is, in 
relative independence from the established theoretical frameworks and divisions 
of intellectual labour. By literature, I understand not only “the writings of a 
country or period or of the world in general” (OED) but all formations of 
language that persist, in any medium of verbal production or reproduction. More 
precisely, literature would be what calls for attempts to reckon with a persistence 
that defies explanation by current categories of use or value, whether practical or 
speculative, individual or collective. Literature, in fact, is a lasting presence that 
risks being deemed philosophically trivial, ethically dubious, aesthetically 
distasteful and even indifferent to knowledge. There would be some 
unaccountable residue, which defines the specificity of the theoretical challenge 
proper to literature. In that sense, literature confronts theory with the enigma of 
the preposterus.  
In the notion of literary persistence there resonates the question of the 
temporality of ageing – the temporality of things that are and will have been 
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what age has made them. It is the question otherwise known as that of history. It 
has very little to do with life as measurable duration. Its potential emerges most 
tellingly, in fact, only when the threshold of death has been crossed. This would 
be very much the same way as the dead emerge for Odysseus – utterly dead, yet 
invoked, addressed, conversant. In the first Canto, Pound has well exposed the 
riddle. He translates the “ajmenhna; kavrhna” of “nekuvwn katateqnhwvtwn” 
(Odyssey l: 29, 37, 49) by the redundancies of his “sickly… cadaverous … 
impetuous impotent dead”. These would be the dead long-gone. Yet, first to 
come and uncalled-for, is Elpenor, the companion most recently lost and 
forgotten “since toils urged other”. He is the one who stakes the claim to 
persistence most explicitly and, as the scholiasts observed, most unjustifiably so. 
He asks for a tomb – literally, for a sh``ma: a sign. “A man of no fortune and with a 
name to come” stresses Pound in place of the Homeric “ajndro;ß dusthvnoio 
kai; ejssomevnoisi puqevsqai”(l, 76) [ejssomevnoisi: those who will be; 
puqevsqai: to overhear, as with tidings, to hear and tell of news or things going 
on, mostly about persons]. In Homer, Odysseus reassures Elpenor: “teleuthvsw 
te kai; e[rxw”(l, 80): I will do and accomplish. Pound cuts. Rather, he 
transposes. The Canto does reassure its own Elpenor: “Lie quiet Divus” – 
meaning Andreas Divus, translator of Homer. 
History is a characteristic concern of the larger field that we call humanities 
or sciences humaines, and to which the study of literature is affiliated. Science, in 
the strict sense of the term, deals with time as a co-ordinate, under a perspective 
very different from that of the temporality of ageing. Of course, there have long 
existed philosophical or otherwise speculative currents, which dispute the all-
encompassing significance of historical temporality for the humanities. They do 
so on various grounds – rationalist, aestheticist or mystical. Correlatively, there 
have been standpoints, largely predominant, which affirm the importance of 
history by relying on premises we can broadly call historicist. These approaches 
concentrate on factors or attributes that assume a determinant role in time, 
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through causal relations between beginnings and endings, foundational origins 
and accomplished dynamics. 
My thesis intends to toil a theoretical site that refutes the very choice 
between the negation of historicity and the reduction of history to its historicist 
configuration. Indeed, persistence posits the question of history as irreducible to 
the one of becoming. To use an (admittedly awkward) terminological convention 
that I adopt in my work: one can venture to understand temporality as historic 
rather than historical. 
Work in this direction is neither recent nor scarce, and it encompasses a 
variety of theoretical positions – like those of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to 
mention only the most influential. Connected, in varying degrees and ways, to 
the legacy of these two names, is an awareness that has gained critical 
momentum since the end of the 1960s. Language (especially writing) is seen as 
exercising a destabilising function with respect to problematics of ontological 
determination and causality, as well as with respect to assumptions concerning 
the dialectics of signification and communication. The workings of historical 
temporality may retain some significance, but only on the dubious grounds of 
the pervasive traces of linguistic indeterminacy and textual defacement. There 
would be stories, but not histories – much less a history. Rather than enacting the 
presumed historical dynamics, story-telling would undo the potential of 
historicisation. 
Exemplified in the work of Jacques Derrida, this awareness could be 
identified as that of deconstruction. Its insights are an acquisition in the present 
moment of literary theory; whether implicitly or explicitly, we are being 
measured by their intelligence. Nonetheless, I intend to test their adequacy and 
contest what I sense is a proclivity to rest upon their accomplished breakthrough. 
In many respects, what was critically deployed in the 1970s and 1980s can now 
be seen as having anticipated and even dovetailed into the broader political and 
social developments, which establish the order of a new modernity. Like all 
modernities, the present one also invariably raises the Lyotardian question of the 
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post-modern. Current theories of the post-modern, however, tend to overlook 
the fact that the question is aporetic. One can never tell which are the elements 
that work for the sake of preserving a dominant order of things, and which are 
those that signal its critical re-appraisal and eventual change. The theoretical 
implications and political bearing of recurrent old figures, outworn and outdated 
as they may sound, in their relations to the figural outbursts of experimentation 
and novelty, are highly uncertain.  
 
More often than not, we tend to consider that metaphysics is a sort of 
credo or world-view that globally characterises an era of Western civilisation that 
has exhausted its historical potential. In this, we follow Heidegger and Derrida 
(more than Nietzsche, I believe), especially aspects of their writing and thought 
which echo historicist tendencies. We thus forget that the term metaphysics names 
a field of theoretical speculation, which resists anthropological and 
phenomenological premises, such as those sustained by intellectual traditions 
predominant in Western modernity. Form, in the sense of essence (juxtaposed to 
and combined with matter, rather than with content) would be an intellectual 
device crucial to this resistance. 
Let us briefly survey how old questions of metaphysics persist today. The 
deconstruction of the institutional and epistemological order of the humanities is 
coeval with the dismissal of Humanism and of the latter’s way of understanding 
man as subject of history, be it collective or individual. This gesture of 
displacement does not always seem to be fully cognizant of the fact that 
Humanism itself occurred as an analogous gesture with respect to non-
anthropocentric approaches to the question of the human. Religious experience 
and its theological theory, were the immediate target of Humanist criticism, but 
metaphysics at large were at stake. An effective critique of Humanism, today, 
cannot overlook this gesture – or its epistemological presuppositions. Unless one 
is more Hegelian than Hegel himself (as Paul de Man has put it), one cannot 
pretend to overcome the Humanist tradition, through some new, presumably 
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post-modern awareness, without also confronting what the latter has constructed 
as its outdated alternative. Indeed, the writings of Derrida and Lyotard address 
problems, develop arguments and enact rhetorical devices which are, more often 
than not, much too reminiscent of metaphysical and even theological debates, to 
be seen as inaugurating a fundamentally non-metaphysical or even a-theological 
perspective. 
Within academia, one could also consider cultural studies, so often seen as 
an alternative to the Humanist tradition. We tend to understand the term cultural 
as critically replacing the term literary. The most significant opposition, however, 
is rather to the two main attributes that dialectically qualify literature within the 
modern tradition of the humanities: namely, national and universal. Cultural 
studies insist on the deconstructive light that anthropological attributes 
ideologically neutralised by Humanism, may shed on conventionally modern 
ways of understanding the human. They thus enable the effective critique of the 
thriving and demise of the modern nation-state and its international order1. The 
notion of culture, however, is typically historicist. Michel Foucault’s archéologie du 
savoir and Hayden White’s meta-history were intended, perhaps, as signposts to 
guard against this fact; but rather than solve the problem, they indexed it. Along 
with the interrogation of the attributes of state-national particulars and 
international universals, one should question the very logic of their attribution, 
including the basic gesture of reducing human practices to the anthropological 
characteristics that define the culture in question and the interests of its agents. 
                                                   
1 It appears that the notion of culture has always maintained a critical thrust. This was 
largely the case, for instance, with the ethos of the Athenian sophistike, whose conception 
provoked Platonic critique and Aristotelian compromise. It was also the case with the rediscovery 
of culture as Bildung in an intellectual setting (developing throughout the 19th century) which 
favoured the crystallisation of the modern political order: German historicism, implies a critique 
of the universal ratio and of the concomitant notion of civilisation. 
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Problematics along these lines must address metaphysical considerations – 
which is indeed what happens in the case of gender studies.  
I understand gender as critically referring not only to grammatical 
distinctions but also to the notions of genus and generic in their articulation with 
species and individual. These notions can lead us back to the old topoi of Aristotle’s 
Categories, which have been the subject of intense debate in both medieval 
theology and early modern philosophy. Aristotle’s treatise concerns the way in 
which categories of “essence” or “substance” – in juxtaposition to categories 
elsewhere qualified as “contingent” or “accidental” – are attributable to that 
which lies-there as their sub-ject. The problem has often been identified 
(misleadingly, I might add) with the question of how different kinds of abstract 
universalia are related to, and perhaps even exist through, the particular res which 
they qualify. A long-standing (and equally misleading) related query has been 
raised over the very status of the corresponding problematics: nominalist or 
realist, ontological or logico-semantic? In its typically Aristotelian, elliptical 
rhetoric, the treatise, as I understand it, designates metaphysics as a primal 
domain of thought, which cannot take for granted the current distinctions 
between being, thought and word. Later, through the excursus of Neo-Platonic 
and, more specifically, Plotinian writings, the idea of temporality became 
metaphysically indistinguishable from that of essence. Essences would not be a-
temporal abstractions; rather, they are modes of being temporal while remaining 
irreducible to phenomena of duration and change.  
In what sense would something temporal be of one or the other gender or 
genus? Could there be a thing independently from and prior to the attribution of 
such categories? Would the very fact of being anything, depend on how things 
are said to be of one or the other kind? Clearly referring to such metaphysical 
questions, Judith Butler responds as follows: 
What is the metaphysics of substance, and how does it inform thinking 
about the categories of sex? In the first instance, humanist conceptions of 
the subject tend to assume a substantive person who is the bearer of 
various essential and nonessential attributes. A humanist feminist position 
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might understand gender as an attribute of a person who is characterised 
essentially as a pregendered substance or ‘core’, called the person, 
denoting a universal capacity for reason and moral deliberation, or 
language. The universal conception of the person, however, is displaced as 
a point of departure for a social theory of gender by those historical and 
anthropological positions that understand gender as a relation among 
socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts. This relational or 
contextual point of view suggests that what the person ‘is,’ and, indeed, 
what gender ‘is,’ is always relative to the constructed relations in which it 
is determined. (1999, 14-15) 
I have two reservations with respect to the above. The first, which could 
be considered theoretical, concerns the status attributed to the notion of 
construction. It seems to beg the question. There is a circularity of argumentation 
in juxtaposing relational to ontological problematics; the premises of the latter 
remain untouched, rhetorically veiled rather than critically undone. The question 
that remains pending is that of the instances operating the construction, usually 
designated as agencies of particular interests and poles of antagonism. How does 
one account for the fact that some sets of attributes, and not others, emerge as 
long-standing bones of contention in struggles or tensions of identity 
construction? My other reservation is, in some sense, methodological. I do not 
see how words that have themselves long been objects of ideological and 
theoretical construction and deconstruction, can be reduced to their eventual 
“conception” by such entities as “humanism” or “social theory”. I am referring, 
in particular, to substance and essence, as well as to person – all of which relate 
directly or indirectly to form. They existed well before and outside the confines of 
Humanist and socio-anthropological scholarship, as crucial knots in an extremely 
wide range of theoretical and ideological controversies, often incommensurable 
to each other, concerning, directly or indirectly, the relations between language, 
humanness and temporality. Rather than impose closure on such issues, in one 
or the other direction, these words have, instead, sustained the openness of the 
corresponding debates. We would learn more by attending to their oldness, than 
by curtailing it according to the dimensions of our novelty. 
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Metaphysics retain an epistemological bearing, precisely because they 
contend with the very distinction between ontology and phenomenology. 
Metaphysical speculative endeavours can, of course, only be undertaken in and 
through language. Now, what if language is essentially both human and historic? 
One could then no more extricate oneself from humanity or history, than one 
could from language. The problem would be, not how to stand on any one of 
these three vantage-points, pretending to survey the other two, but how to cope 
with their inescapable nexus. For literature, this would imply investigating 
whether and how persistent literary formations can be essentially linguistic, 
human and historic, without entirely depending on the characteristics of those 
human lives that put them into semiotic circulation and temporal use.  
Stories, indeed, are not histories. Persisting in and through their endless 
metamorphoses, they may, however, tell the unending history of their own story-
telling. They would, accordingly, run through the cultural perspectives and 
relational practices of tellers and listeners, authors and readers – carrying them, 
rather than being carried by them. 
 
There is literature that we call ancient. Its reading brings most 
perspicuously to the fore the problem of literary persistence. It is, in other words, 
a paradigmatically preposterus literature. Its value has never gone without saying, 
notwithstanding the impression that centuries of invoked sayings may create to 
latecomers. What is often felt as a novel crisis affecting the discipline of classics 
perpetuates tensions that have resounded ceaselessly, throughout the long 
process of the institutional domestication of poignantly old literatures – from the 
times of the European res publica literaria et christiana to those of the national 
disciplines of philology. Both the neo-classicist images of perennial antique 
models and the historicist figures of distant foundational origins, may have been 
timely, and thus exhaustible, devices of rhetorical hyperbole, offered as means to 
explain and contain what might otherwise defy understanding. Historicist 
philology has ventured to account with critical reasoning for what neo-classicist 
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aesthetics kept designating as co-extensive with the very limits of modern 
scholarly rationality.  
Cutting through modern dialectics, Nietzsche provides us with a 
suggestive characterisation of the interest that old literature presents, as it 
persists, outliving the settings of the institutional and political management of its 
challenge. “L’éminente valeur de l’Antiquité tient à ce que ses oeuvres écrites 
sont les seules que les hommes d’aujourd’hui lisent encore avec exactitude” 1. As 
is customary with Nietzsche, the term left suspended in the aphorism indicates 
where the theoretical challenge lies: what kind of exactitude is at stake in the case 
of this literature? Nietzsche still speaks, here, as a philologist – one, however, 
bent on circumventing philological problematics regarding textual history and 
criticism. This literature encourages exactitude in its capacity as language, rather 
than text. Exactitude comes not from its being historically situated, but from it 
situating the very problem of historicity – including the use of notions such as 
past and present, antiquity and modernity. As the post-philological Nietzsche put it 
a few years later, “je ne sais quel sens la philologie classique pourrait avoir 
aujourd’hui, sinon celui d’exercer une influence inactuelle, c’est-à-dire d’agir 
contre le temps, donc sur le temps et, espérons-le, au bénéfice d’un temps à 
venir”2. The kind of exactitude earlier invoked would thus be one proper to the 
idiosyncratic distances across which a Nietzschean reading may effectively 
connect to literary pre-posterity. Could old literatures present a challenge 
equivalent to the one implied, for instance, by how we qualify certain languages 
as dead? In which case, how would this challenge compare to that of living 
languages foreign to one’s own? The untimely is also the outlandish: it has as 
                                                   
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sur la personalité d’Homère suivi de Nous autres philologues, trad. Guy 
Fillion, Nantes, Le Passeur, 1992: 52. 
 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, “De l’utilité et des inconvénients de l’histoire pour la vie”, in 
Considérations inactuelles I et II, trans. Pierre Rusch, Paris, Gallimard-Folio, 1990: 94. 
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little to do with a geographically identifiable foreign country as it does with a 
historically circumscribed antiquity.  
In many respects, this thesis is the result of groping around Homer. Much 
has changed since I first began trying out different ways. One thing, however, 
has been there since the beginning, underlying the quest even in its present, 
otherwise quite removed, form: the feeling that, along with reading, Homer 
confronts us today with a particularly acute issue of readability. Readability 
pertains to the enabling conditions of reading: to the interest that sustains the 
impetus to read. This includes translatability.  
 Raising questions of readability and translatability implies that one is 
uneasy about or unhappy with current readings and translations; one does not 
find them convincing enough, considering their avowed definitions of the stakes; 
there is something missing between the reading or the translation, and the 
rhetoric that configures their rationale. To put it more bluntly, I find that Homer 
in translation lags, in many respects, behind its purported interest or value for 
the contemporary reader. On the other hand, I find that Homer, in the original, is 
enigmatic in ways and degrees that constantly exceed the range of problems that 
philology raises and resolves. Would this not be the case for any literary 
formation, whenever the imagery of some more or less distant original stands 
behind the closeness of a recent edition or translation? Indeed, it would. Homeric 
literatures, moreover, expose with particular vigour how the concomitant 
problems must not simply be taken for granted, as facts of literary life; their 
theoretical implications need to be addressed. Exceptional translations of such 
literatures work very much in the same direction1.  
                                                   
1 This is the case, to my mind, with Pound’s “Canto I”, and its poetisisation not so much 
of Homer as of the conundrum of Homeric persistence. The fact that this Canto translates only 
parts or fragments of passages that are, what is more, philologically dubious, only adds to the 
significance of the endeavour. Likewise, adding to our interest, are the multiple ways in which, 
explicitly or implicitly, the Canto exposes or even enacts the mediation of a previous, Latin 
translation. 
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The task, then, is first to revisit how Homer has persisted in readable and 
translatable form. Correlatively, one should venture to envisage how one might 
deal with the prospect of this persistence in one’s own moment, distinctions 
between past and present, antiquity and novelty, notwithstanding. One could 
thus try to understand this moment as indistinguishable from prospects of 
literary persistence. 
 
The thesis does not advance a reading of Homer. It presents, instead, a 
comparison between two characteristically divergent approaches to the issue of 
the readability of old literature. Only the first approach concerns Homer directly, 
as it is the one of modern philology and its historicist reformulation of the 
Homeric Question, inaugurated by Friedrich August Wolf’s neo-Latin 
Prolegomena ad Homerum (Prolegomena to Homer), first published in 1795 (Part A 
of the thesis). This text has been little read outside the field of philology, with 
respect to which it has assumed a paradigmatic role: its German translation came 
long after the original Latin, while an English edition has only recently been 
available. It attracted my attention, as being far more interesting and insightful 
than our current idea of philological trivia allows us to suspect. The other 
approach that I discuss in detail, is Walter Benjamin’s critique of the historicist 
configuration of art and literature, as developed in his relatively early writings 
(Part B). Benjamin deals with the issue of readability of literature from a general 
theoretical perspective, the focus of which is no longer the philological 
reformation of originals, but the translatability of their given formations. The 
perspective, which has been qualified by Benjamin as that of a “metaphysics of 
form”, explicitly connects to metaphysical notions and problematics, in a way 
that not only undoes historicist premises, but also resists deconstructionist 
alternatives. The comparison between Wolf and Benjamin takes place on grounds 
partly delimited by the role that the notion of form comes to play in both. I 
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follow the emphatically different ways in which this notion is configured in each 
case. This leads me to the formulation of a number of propositions and remarks 
concerning the readability and translatability of Homeric literatures in our 
present moment (Parts C and D).  
The first part of the thesis begins with a close reading of Wolf’s 
Prolegomena. Chapter A.1 discusses the role of this work as paradigmatically 
historicist: how it anticipates and exemplifies avant la lettre the development of 
nineteenth-century German historicism, inviting us to rethink the corresponding 
theoretical and methodological premises. These premises concern the relations 
between historical and textual form, under a quasi-normative perspective, which 
might justify my recurrence to the term formness. In chapter A.2, I read 
Prolegomena more closely. Human life, as historical, would essentially be cultural 
form, enacted in readable literature as (and only as) textual form. This does not 
entail a positivist quest for facts as they occurred in the past. As opposed to the 
recovery of presumably oral originals, Wolf claims the perspective of a present 
sense of historicity, under which quasi-formless scriptural remains can be 
reformed into validly readable textual constructs. Historical knowledge would 
thus presuppose a critique of the deficient operations of memory, which are at 
work in pre-textual writing practices. Chapter A.3 turns to a selection from 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s essays on history and language, situated around 1820. 
The essays provide us with more explicitly theoretical and typically historicist 
formulations of how essentially national cultural forms are enacted through the 
inner forms of equally national languages. My discussion of the philological 
paradigm closes with an overview, in chapter A.4, of the philological debate on 
the Homeric Question throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I 
concentrate on the issues that have proven most tenacious: the establishment and 
transmission of a relatively standardised text through manuscript traditions; the 
extent and significance of its variants; the problem of the status and the learning 
of the Homeric language in its relations to more recent forms of Greek. 
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The second part of the thesis centres on Benjamin’s essay on translation: 
“Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers [The task of the translator]”, originally published 
in 1923. Systematic attention is also given to other essays, the writing of which is 
situated within the same early period of Benjamin’s work. I closely examine, in 
particular, “Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”, the epistemological-critical preface to 
his work on the origins of the German drama (Die Ursprung des Deutschen 
Trauerspiels). I also insist on the posthumously published “Über Sprache 
überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen [On language in general and on 
the language of the human]“. I read these essays as conjoined and multifaceted 
attempts to rethink the historical outside historicism, the human outside 
anthropology, and the linguistic outside linguistics – that is to say, essence 
outside ontology and phenomena outside phenomenology1. I thus understand 
them as precariously dovetailing into Benjamin’s more widely read later work. I 
try to follow Benjamin’s characteristic, indeed singular, way of thinking through 
historically and conceptually incongruous intellectual traditions – such that it 
forbids identification with any of these traditions, much less with the religious or 
mystical ones with which Benjamin’s early concerns have often been associated2.  
I read Benjamin’s essay on translation in close connection with de Man’s 
reading of the same: his 1983 lecture titled “Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s ‘The 
task of the Translator’”. I draw on de Man’s text for the way it exemplifies, 
through the blind spots of its very insights, how Benjaminian problematics resist 
their domestication by deconstruction. Benjamin inquires on the kind of 
                                                   
1 One of the threads on which this thesis does not elaborate, are the implications of 
Benjamin’s divergence from philology, with respect to the tradition of hermeneutics. The 
extremely interesting question of both the kinship and the conflict between Benjaminian and 
Heideggerian rhetoric and problematics, is only addressed in passing footnote remarks. 
 
2 Benjamin’s rhetoric and way of thinking should actually drive us to rethink a notion, 
which this thesis insists on, namely, that of “criticism”. One should rethink the enabling 
conditions as well as the very possibility of “critical” standpoints. Valeria Wagner has brought up 
this point in our most recent discussions. 
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theoretical pertinence borne by notions such as those of history and humanness – 
figures that de Man is too eager to contain on the grounds of his all-
encompassing configuration of language.  
An excursus through Aristotle’s Categories intends to expose, against a 
supplementary background, the specificity of Benjamin’s problematics about 
form. I underscore, in this respect, Benjamin’s notion of literary formation 
(Gebilde), which he seems to prefer systematically to that of text, and which 
displaces historicist problematics of cultural form (Bildung). 
I establish the framework of the above in chapter B.1. I then investigate, in 
chapter B.2, how Benjamin reconfigures basic aspects of current problematics 
about history, including notions central to historicist rhetoric. I examine 
Benjamin’s understanding of historic life and survival (Überleben) taking place 
through the recollection of temporally perfected or aeonic forms. I further inquire 
how his notion of humanness disputes the confines of phenomenological 
anthropology. I then turn, in chapter B.3, to the Benjaminian notion of a purely 
human language (reine Sprache) which bespeaks the very communicability of human 
essence. On the grounds of this notion, human language-wholes can be seen as 
irreducible to phenomena of linguistic semiosis and cultural specificity – and 
thus as effectively connectable to each other in history. Literary formations 
would be modes of indexing human-linguistic essence, surviving as original ideas. 
This entails an understanding of how a literary original persists as readable and 
translatable through the change and variance of reproducible semiotic constructs. 
This is clearly at odds with the philological understanding of transmission and 
restoration of textual formness. Chapter B.4 passes from the question of the 
original to the one of translation. Translative occurrences would involve the 
recollection of the formational ideas of original literary works, and would thus be 
paradigmatic of historic events of human-linguistic life and survival. 
For Benjamin, the persisting original establishes the law of its 
translatability. The temporally perfected (Gewesene) thus assumes a somewhat 
over-determining role with respect to the translative gestures of the on-going 
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moment (Jeztzseit). In other words, the current tendency to regard the past as the 
offspring of relational gestures of social construction, governed by the 
perspectives of the present, would be closer to Wolf than it is to Benjamin. At 
stake, obviously, is not a rehabilitation of the past with respect to the present but, 
rather, the reconfiguration of temporality as historic, beyond the historicist 
dialectics of pastness and presentness.  
The third part of the thesis begins by presenting, in chapter C.1, the 
epistemological implications of Benjaminian problematics, especially with 
respect to the question of categories designating essential and non-essential 
attributes of literary formations. Ideational form would be standing between the 
formational substance of a literary work and its purely human-linguistic essence 
– no further categories being pertinent as to the essence of the formation in 
question. The problem is how to identify and describe an idea through reading – 
or, in other terms, how to turn concepts into ideas. Conventional historical and 
aesthetic categories, when not used to name ideas, would pertain to contingencies 
that mark the semiotic instantiations, through which ideational forms emerge 
and survive as such. In other words, concepts such as those of antiquity and 
modernity would not be necessarily essential to literature. This does not erase 
entirely the importance of such categories; it puts them under a different 
perspective, historic rather than historical.  
In chapter C.2, I return to some basic aspects of the Homeric Question. The 
assumption is that Homer names the idea of a formation that persists through the 
socio-historical conditions of the production and reception of variable semiotic 
constructs, to which it would be essentially irreducible. I suggest, in other words, 
that the Homeric Question be somewhat reformulated. Instead of asking what 
text would be properly Homeric, one could ask what kind of thing Homer could 
be, given the entire range of the written constructs that enact its formation. I 
survey the conditions under which Homer has been connected to different living 
languages entertaining drastically different relations to the Homeric language-
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whole. I then address the question of the extent and variance of the semiotic 
material through which Homer persists, today, as a readable original.  
Chapter C.3 discusses two different cases of non-Wolfian approaches to 
the readability and translatability of the Homeric formation. The first, cursorily 
addressed, is that of the twelfth-century Byzantine exegesis of Eustathius of 
Thessaloniki. The second is the somewhat post-philological reading of what has 
come to be called the “oral theory” of Homer and has somewhat displaced the 
Wolfian paradigm since the 1960s. Albert Lord’s Singer of Tales and Berkeley 
Peabody’s Winged Word posit the readability of Homer beyond the confines of 
Wolfian principles of textual formness. Their insights, I suggest, pertain less to 
the historical or pseudo-historical question of the oral and traditional nature of 
original Homeric poetry, than to the specific challenge presented to the 
contemporary reader by the kind of writing that makes up our Homeric vulgate. 
I subsequently consider certain theoretical implications of this approach with 
respect to the very notion of textuality and to the concomitant distinction 
between scribal and vocal semiotic media, written and oral traditions.  
The last part of the thesis drives the question of theological problematics 
in an additional direction. After an initial discussion of de Man’s resistance to 
Benjamin’s position on the issue of theology, chapter D.1 turns to a text by 
Vladimir Lossky, concerning the use of the theological notion of prosopon for an 
understanding of the human1. I probe the pertinence of this notion with respect 
to the theoretical problem of literary form and readability. The closing chapter 
D.2 ventures to conclude on the specificity of the Homeric prosopon: the heroic 
epos would be a mode of indexing humanness as linguistic and historic – a mode 
surviving and always remaining to recollect.  
One should not view the last two parts of the thesis as applying Benjamin’s 
mode of thought to the Homeric Question: I transpose rather than apply. Nor 
should they be understood as an attempt to determine the principles of a 
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putative post-philological approach to Homer: the critique of philology exposes 
the fallacy of schemas of historical overcoming.  
 
How does Homer persist as readable and translatable, engaging our own 
present moment? I understand the first person plural to be relatively 
independent from communal frameworks, whether national, social or 
professional. It refers to languages in their living multiplicity, stimulated by the 
recollection of Homeric literatures. Editions or translations of Homer today must 
be expected to foreground the variety of linguistic lives and perspectives that are 
at work in such toils. They have done so when they affected Greek or Latin at the 
times of their respective oecumenicities. They will continue to do so in the 
present setting of the marching globalisation of English, thereby exposing how a 
global linguistic field is as little a neutral medium of academic communication as 
it is a nationally homogeneous language.  
Let me also add the following final remark. Homer, or, more generally, 
literatures of the Homeric type, acquire their current actuality not because of 
their historical position in the past of specific languages, but by virtue of their 
potential recollection by any living language. The correlative events of 
recollective connection would be emergences out of constantly changing fields of 
linguistic connectability, coping with varying modes of distance or closeness, 
kinship or foreignness. They would not be phenomena generated by more or less 
orderly and predictable dynamics of historical development. As such, they have, 
in certain respects, less to do with a Wolfian Altertumswissenschaft, than with the 
field of study that the relatively recent notion of emergent literatures strives to 
configure. These, as Wlad Godzich has suggested, are literatures emerging and 
claiming persistence under conditions of changing modes of literacy. The 
understanding of emergent literatures may profit more, I believe, from the 
recollection of old scriptures, than from the recycling of modern textual 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 Around the notion of the prosopon we have discussed a lot with Apostolis Diamantis 
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traditions1. The reading of old languages that retain our interest the way one’s 
dead do, may be an exercise that enhances our capacity to respond to living 
linguistic formations that solicit interest even though ill-fitting any pre-
established historical or textual paradigm. Indeed, the problem of emergence 
presents us with the same kinds of challenging aporia as does the problem of 
persistence. In both cases, one has to break through tightly woven networks of 
conceptual and textual configurations, in order to reach sites and moments of 
humanity yet to mourn or to predict. This also holds for the persistence of 
scholarly works, the actuality of which lies buried under mounds of historicist 
categories – taxonomies that turn these works into objects of an antiquarian 
rather than historic interest, by situating them in epochal and intellectual 
contexts purportedly irrelevant to our own moment. A historic return to the 
traditions of neo-Platonism and scholasticism, for instance, could be as 
theoretically challenging, today, as the virtual actuality of advanced sites of 
contemporary science and technology.  
My thesis cannot pretend to have made great strides in the direction of 
these suggestions. It only testifies to a gradually heightened but still preliminary 
awareness of a condition of illiteracy (or of overly conceptualised literacy, which 
could amount to the same) inhibiting our relations to languages that are 
poignantly topical precisely because of their preposterous persistence. I have 
gone not much further than underscoring Benjamin’s signposts in this respect – 
without yet fully assuming the consequences of the endeavour. 
 
The presentation and methodology of my work express, I presume, the 
meanders of its problematics. Each of the four parts of the thesis is divided into 
chapters comprising a series of relatively short sections, which constitute the 
elementary components of the thesis. Parts, chapters and sections stand, with 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Lena Prokopiou. 
1 My discussions with Brian Neville have often addressed notions such as the ones of 
recycling and waste, in their relations to history and recollection. 
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respect to each other, as relatively autonomous units. Usually, however, they 
build on elements previously exposed or discussed, interlacing threads of 
argumentative progression, even if only tentatively or precariously.  
My close reading does not always follow the original articulation of the 
texts. Rather than describing semiotic structures, I have preferred to index 
language-wholes, highlighting particularly telling or (as Benjamin puts it) extreme 
instances of the corresponding ideas. I quote extensively1. Quoting passages that 
are thus resituated outside their initial context is a constituent part of my work2. 
My reading takes the form of commentary, which could be characterised as 
exegetical: conceptual, figural and argumentative topoi are exposed and 
discussed, particular stress being laid on rhetorical modes that reconfigure 
theoretical notions or statements. To what degree can different rhetorical devices 
be read as configurations of the same notion or idea? What do such differences in 
configuration tell us about the very self-sameness of what thus appears to be 
persistently at stake? In this respect, I try not to forget the lessons of Paul de 
Man. 
The multilingual character of the material with which I have dealt was a 
major determinant of my overall work. I have worked jointly on Latin, German 
and old Greek originals – as well as on available English and French translations. 
The distances through which I connect to these languages vary, but are 
considerable for all of them. They are largely conditioned by Modern Greek, 
which stubbornly assumes the function of an exclusive mother-tongue in my 
linguistic life, on the grounds of which I learn, read and work with foreign or 
dead languages. My relationship to English and French, being stronger than a 
                                                   
1 When I add emphasis myself, I do it by underlining. 
 
2 The large number of quotations of original and translated versions necessitated a 
system of parenthetical references and abbreviations, which I hope is functional and helpful to 
the reader.  
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learning one, also intervenes in ways quite determinant. This relatively multi-
focused perspective marks the way I connect to the rest of the tongues that this 
thesis ventures to cope with. It also marks, I presume, the English into which I 
transpose the corresponding experience.  
Keeping this in mind, I use different means or strategies to present my 
quoted material and expose the implied translative challenge. I had to take into 
consideration the translations I worked with, as well as the linguistic economy of 
the discipline I address. In the case of Wolfian Latin or Eustathian Greek, I quote 
in English translation, interpolating limited parts of the original. The systematic 
juxtaposition of the original and the translation was deemed indispensable only 
for German. With few exceptions, then, I quote the German original as well as 
translated editions, often adding my own translation in the commentary that 
follows the quotation. For Benjamin and Humboldt, the translation and the 
original face each other in a tabular form that emphasises the transposition at 
work. I have allowed myself to quote from French translations – especially for 
Benjamin. These translations have greatly influenced my own reading. The tense 
exactitude with which French follows Benjamin’s German is extremely 
suggestive, I think, both for its insights and eventual blind spots. As my work is 
partly on translation, this mediation might not be detrimental to how the thesis 
says what it intends to say. 
 
The thesis was put together when I decided to cut the trails of successive 
deployments and regressions, ventures and relapses – toils that even the figure of 
“trial and error” fails to account for, as the certainty of error was a luxury. 
Consequently, this introduction does not expose some overall conception further 
elaborated in what follows. It only tries to identify sites to which my trails seem 
to have led, for the time being.  
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PART A. THE PHILOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
 
 
A.1. PHILOLOGICAL HISTORICISM 
 
A.1.1. Antique Homer 
 
The name of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff is well known to 
scholars of classical antiquity as a major and highly innovative intellectual figure. 
It is close to a metonymy for the very institution of German academic philology, 
in the phase of its growth and maturity, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. To philosophers or theorists of literature, the name, if ever 
encountered, has quite different connotations. It stands for the obscure 
philologist who, in defence of academic orthodoxy, issued two pamphlets of 
polemical criticism against Friedrich Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth 
of Tragedy), soon after its publication in 1872. Nietzsche was, at the time, 
professor of philology at Basle – twenty-six years old, four years Wilamowitz’s 
elder. A sustained debate over his work ensued, which may have significantly 
contributed to Nietzsche’s abandonment of an academic career and turn to 
eccentric philosophical writing1. The different fortunes of the protagonists 
exemplify how classical philology, in its early development, involved crucial 
theoretical and ideological issues, against the tensions of which it was eventually 
sheltered. 
At stake was, amongst others, the very notion of antiquity. In close 
connection to 19th century historicism, antiquity gradually established its status as 
a properly modern historical category, attributable, to begin with, to Homeric 
                                                   
1 Material from this debate (mainly dating from the years 1872-73 and including 
correspondence and articles or pamphlets by Nietzsche, Wilamowitz, Rhode and Wagner) has 
been collected and published in German (Nietzsche 1989) and French (Nietzsche 1995). 
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and classical Greece1. According to Wilamowitz, in his canonical Geschichte der 
Philologie (History of philology2), philology3 aims at bringing back to life a bygone 
culture forming an essential historical unity. Studied by philology would be: 
[…] die griechisch-römische Kultur in ihrem Wesen und allen 
Äußerungen ihres Lebens. Dies Kultur ist eine Einheit, mag sie sich auch 
an ihrem Anfang und ihrem Ende nicht scharf abgrenzen lassen. Die 
Aufgabe der Philologie ist, jenes vergangene Leben durch die Kraft der 
Wissenschaft wieder lebendig zu machen […] Weil das Leben, um dessen 
Verständnis wir ringen, eine Einheit ist, ist unsere Wissenschaft eine 
Einheit. (Wilamowitz 1959, 1)4 
                                                   
1 The notion of antiquity had, of course, already acquired its conceptual weight as a 
correlative of modernity, through the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, which marked French 
and English intelligentsia in late 17th and early 18th centuries. The development of philology and 
the debates over its status operated, however, a significant reconfiguration of such historical 
categories. One could relate this process to the emergence of what Foucault (1966) designates as 
the epistemic or discursive formation of the characteristically modern âge de l’hstoire in the 
understanding of the human. The perspective of temporal depth, implying the notion of 
historical origins, breaks with earlier formations of representational and exchange order. For a 
general historical approach to German historicism, see Iggers (1968). For a rhetorically informed 
epistemological analysis of its premises, within the wider setting of 19th century conceptions of 
history, see White (1973).  
 
2 First published in 1921 (but translated into English only in 1982), Wilamowitz’s 
Geschichte has been characterised as “the great history of classical scholarship by the one man 
most competent to write it” and “still the best history available in English by far” (Calder 1992, 
58). Its main predecessor was the bio-bibliographical: J.E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 
Cambridge, 1903-1908.  
 
3  “Classical scholarship”, according to the English translation. 
 
4 The English translation reads: 
“Graeco-Roman civilisation [culture] in its essence and in every facet of its existence. This 
civilisation is a unity, though we are unable to state precisely when it began and ended: 
and the task of scholarship is to bring that dead world to life by the power of science […] 
Because the life we strive to fathom is a single whole, our science too is a single whole.” 
(Wilamowitz 1982, 1) 
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The notion of such a cultural entity was closely connected to the idea of 
Renaissance and to the correlative tradition of Humanist scholarship, of which 
modern historical science would be the critical heir and culmination1. 
Wilamowitz’s Geschichte narrates the “marching” development of a modern 
historical approach to antiquity. This mature approach would enable the re-
evaluation of a “cultural heritage”, uncritically received by previous heirs: 
Die Geschichte der Philologie hat die Aufgabe darzustellen, wie auch aus 
der griechischen Grammatik, die wissenschaftlich, aber noch keine 
geschichtliche Wissenschaft war, und wie auch immer verkümmert in 
Rom und Byzanz fortlebte, unsere Wissenschaft herausgebildet hat, die 
sich jetzt ihres Wesens und ihrer Aufgabe bewußt ist.  Vollzogen hat sich 
diese Entwicklung gemäß dem Gange der modernen Geistesgeschichte, 
auf den die Aneignung von Kulturschätzen des Altertums sehr stark 
eingewirkt hat, fördernd, zuweilen auch Hemmend. (Wilamowitz 1959, 1)2  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 The term Renaissance, designating the revival of the study of antiquity after the obscure 
interregnum of middle-ages, was not systematically used as a historical concept before the 19th 
century (Jules Michelet enacted it in his Histoire de la France, which started appearing in Paris, 
1933; the concept was further used and canonised by Jacob Burckhart in Die Kultur der Renaissance 
in Italia, Basel, 1860). The term Humanism was first applied as a historical concept by Georg von 
Voigt in his Die wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums oder das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus, 
1859). Recall that Petrarchan scholarship had redefined the field of the old trivium  (grammar, 
rhetoric, didactic) in terms of a studia humanitatis (umanista, in the Italian student slang of the 
period). The Romans (Cicero in particular) had qualified the Greeks as a genus humanissimum, 
excelling, that is, in humanitas – human nature or, in a sense, humanness, but also philanthropy 
and education or moral cultivation (Pfeiffer 1976, 15-16; Reynolds &Wilson 1968, 122). 
 
2 The English translation reads: 
“The business of the history of scholarship is to show how the science, which now is 
aware of its true nature and function, developed out of the grammatike of the Greeks 
which, though scientific, was not yet a historical science but lived on in Rome and 
Byzantium, in however atrophied a form. This development has kept in step with the 
modern march of mind [spiritual history or history of ideas] on which the assimilation of 
the cultural heritage of antiquity has had a powerful influence – beneficial, but also at 
times inhibiting.” (Wilamowitz 1982, 1) 
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The stakes of the modern philological conception of historical knowledge 
had already been significantly exposed in the debate over Nietzsche’s Geburt. 
They were signalled with particular clarity by Wilamowitz in remarks and 
comments concerning the Nietzschean approach to Homer. Homeric poetry, in 
fact, enters the discussion only incidentally, but quite tellingly. It assumes the 
role of an early emergence anticipating essential characteristics of the spirit that 
would be proper to Greek antiquity at large1. According to E. Rhode, friend and 
supporter of Nietzsche, philologist himself, Geburt intended to show “den frohen 
Glanz der homerischen Welt als einen nicht über Nacht vom Himmel gefallenen 
sondern als einen schwer errungenen Sieg über ganz anders geartete, schrecklich 
finstere Vorstellungen alter Vorzeiten“ (Nietzsche et al. 1989, 80)2. Under this 
turbulent representational perspective, the Homeric poems broke with 
Wilamowitz’s idea of what should stand at the origins of Greek antiquity and 
poetry. Wilamowitz insists that Homer, as an object of historical knowledge, can 
only be a figure of innocent and youthful inauguration of classical Greekness:  
                                                   
1 Nietzsche had excelled in academic philology as an offensive heir to Wolf’s philological 
tradition. Note, in this respect, his 1869 lecture on Homer und die classische philologie (1906, I: 1-26). 
While praising the significance of Wolf’s insights, he declares that “Homer als der Dichter der 
Ilias und Odyssee ist nicht eine historische Überlieferung, sondern ein ästhetisches Urteil 
[Homer, as the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, is not a historical tradition but an aesthetic 
judgement]” (20). The statement is double-edged. On the one hand, the properly historical 
philological sense rejects the idea of Homer as the individual author of the poetry that bears the 
name. On the other hand, the aesthetic idiosyncracy of Homeric poetry remains pending as an 
object of inquiry, in spite of its eventual historical irrelevance. See also Nietzsche’s notes on the 
task and profession of philology, dating from the years 1874-75 and posthumously published 
under the title Wir Philologen (1906, II: 319-402). 
 
2 Rhode’s defence of Nietzsche was originally published under the title Afterphilologie, 
Leipzig, 1872. The French translation reads: 
“ […] que l’ éclat du monde homérique n’ était pas tombé du ciel d’un coup mais résultait 
d’une violence difficilement obtenue sur les représentations très différentes, effrayantes 
et sombres, des époques reculées qui les ont précédées […].“ (Nietzsche et al. 1995, 189) 
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[…] denn kennte er ihn, wie wollte er wohl jener jugendfrischen, im 
überschwang des wonnigen lebensgenusses jauchzenden, eben durch ihre 
jugend und natürlichkeit jedes unverdorbne herz erquickenden 
homerischen welt, dem frühling des volkes, das wahrlich des lebens 
traum am schönsten geträumt, pessimistische sentimentalität, greisenhafte 
sehnsucht nach dem nischtsein, bewusstes selbstbetrügen zuschreiben.  
und was sind seine beweise für die leiden, die, nun gar in jener zeit, die 
griechen, die ewigen kinder, die harmlos und ahnungslos des schönen 
lichts sich freuenden gelitten, nein genossen, in impotenter wollust 
genossen haben sollen? (Nietzsche et al. 1989, 36-37)1 
In the sequel to his first pamphlet, Wilamowitz sets the stakes even higher. He 
designates the danger inherent in Nietzsche’s view (especially in his refusal to 
acknowledge the primacy of word over music in early Greek poetry) in 
indistinguishably existential and epistemological terms, ironically foretelling 
Nietzsche’s fate. When reading antique texts, abyss is what the competent 
philologist should strive against, otherwise risking to follow Nietzsche’s fall into 
it: 
[…] die herren blicken eben mit wolgefallen in abgründe, nicht blofs 
dionisische, und wo alles eben und einfach ist, geraten sie in wut, und 
wühlen so lange in des gegners worten, bis ein abgrund da ist.  Mir ist das 
zu gefärlich. Neben abgründen packt zu leicht der schwindel: des 
schwindels ende aber ist, dafz man tief, sehr tief hineinfällt. (Nietzsche et 
al. 1989, 126)2  
                                                   
1 Wilamowitz’s first critique of Nietzsche’s Geburt was published under the title  
Zukunftphilologie!, Berlin, 1872. The French translation reads: 
“En effet, si [Monsieur Nietzsche] connaissait [Homère] comment pourrait-il attribuer au  
monde homérique éclatant de jeunesse, exultant dans l’exubérance et les délices du 
plaisir de vivre, et qui, précisément à cause de sa jeunesse et de son naturel, réconforte 
tout cœur innocent, comment pourrait-il attribuer à ce printemps d’un peuple, qui a 
vraiment rêvé de la plus belle manière le rêve de la vie, des sentiments pessimistes, une 
aspiration sénile à l’anéantissement et une volonté consciente de se tromper soi-même? 
Et quels sont les arguments qu’il avance pour justifier des souffrances que, à cette époque 
même, les Grecs, ces éternels enfants que la belle lumière emplissait d’une joie innocente 
et inconsciente, sont censés avoir éprouvées – non, dont ils sont censés avoir joui, et ce 
avec une volupté impuissante?” (Nietzsche et al. 1995, 35-36) 
 
2 Wilamowitz continued his critique with a sequel to his first pamphlet, also entitled 
Zukunftphilologie!, Berlin 1872.  The French translation reads: 
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For Wilamowitz extracting form (and, more specifically, the essential form 
of a unified cultural entity) out of formlessness is a crucial task undertaken by 
the philological conception of antiquity – including its Homeric beginnings. 
Later, in his Geschichte, Wilamowitz questions the neo-classicist 
idealisation of antiquity, overtones of which seem to persist in his attack on 
Nietzsche. He stresses the need for a historical “understanding” (in both an 
epistemic and a quasi-moral sense of the term) of otherwise deplorable 
idiosyncracies. He probes the very limits of the philological task, when he 
designates the “inner form” of antique texts as an open issue, remaining to be 
addressed beyond the accomplished restoration of the “external form” of textual 
material. We thus read, towards the end of his essay (concluding a section on 
methodological issues of textual criticism):  
Dabei lernt Man das Individuelle achten, statt ein absolutes ideal zu 
fordern, und daß statt der Forderung absoluter Vollkommenheit, die mit 
der kanonische Geltung der Antike gegeben war, die historische 
Auffassung alles durchdringt, führt zum Verstehen von vielem, was man 
vielleicht nicht loben wird, aber verzeihen muß. Auch wer meint, daß für 
die Textkritik nicht mehr viel zu machen sei, wird bei einiger Umschau 
gestehen, daß zu den individuellen und geschichtlichen Verständnis 
immer erst der Anfang gemacht ist, selbst bei den meistgelesenen 
Dichtern. Und wenn die äußere Form der Schriften auch leidlich 
festgestellt sein mag, die innere Form zu begreifen, haben sich erst ganz 
wenige als Aufgabe gestellt. (Wilamowitz 1959, 78)1 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Ces messieurs contemplent avec plaisir les abîmes, et pas seulement dionysiaques, et 
lorsque tout est plat et simple ils sont pris de colère et retournent en tout sens les paroles 
de leur adversaire jusqu’ à ce qu’ un abîme apparaisse. Je trouve cela trop dangereux. On 
est trop facilement pris de vertige devant les abîmes: mais la seule manière de mettre fin 
au vertige est de tomber profondément, très profondément, dedans.” (Nietzsche et al. 
1995, 261) 
 
1 The English translation reads: 
“Moreover, the scholars are learning to respect individuality, instead of insisting on 
conformity to a fixed ideal, and as a demand for absolute perfection implicit in the 
canonical authority of antiquity has given way to the historical approach, an 
understanding has arisen of much that one may deplore but must forgive. Anybody who 
is inclined to think that textual criticism has little left to accomplish must admit, if he 
looks about him, that the attempt to understand the idiosyncrasies and the historical 
significance of even the most widely read authors has only just begun. And though the 
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The understanding of the very pastness of the past, in terms of form read 
into or out of linguistic remains, marks the epistemic distinctness of philology as 
it develops under the auspices of Wilamowitz, excluding the Nietzschean 
alternative. In fact, both Nietzsche and Wilamowitz were attached to the 
academic tradition of Friedrich-August Wolf (1759-1824), often considered as the 
first to have registered in a University curriculum as a studiosus philologiae. This 
would be at the University of Göttingen – which he left in order to become 
professor at Halle and, later, at Berlin. His career was practically co-extensive 
with the process through which classical philology acquired its institutionally 
autonomous and authoritative position within the emerging Prussian University 
system. This development was connected to the broader educational reforms 
affiliated to the figure of Wilhelm von Humboldt – an important link among 
circles of academic historicism, philosophical idealism and romantic criticism of 
early nineteenth-century German intelligentsia.  
Wolf’s pedagogical Darstellung des Altertumswissenschaft, first published in 
1807, is often stated as having coined the German term for classical studies. His 
reputation, however, is mainly based on his earlier Prolegomena ad Homerum, first 
published in 1795 and often considered as having paradigmatically inaugurated 
the discipline of modern academic philology.  
Judging from the debate over Nietzsche’s Geburt, one can presume that 
Wolf’s paradigm opened a field of possibilities, quite larger than the one 
ultimately delimited by its institutional development1. 
                                                                                                                                                       
external form of their works may be tolerably well established, few have set out to 
fathom their inner form.” (Wilamowitz 1982, 174) 
 
1 Although hardly any history or survey of classical scholarship or Homeric studies ever 
fails to refer to Wolf and his Prolegomena, extended studies on his work are rather scarce. For 
basic and enlightening information, including bibliographical references, on Wolf’s career and 
intellectual role, as well as on the impact of the Prolegomena, see Grafton (1985; 1991a). The 
earliest English work on the subject appears to be M. Pattison’s, “F. A. Wolf”, in Essays, Oxford, 
1889. Recent contributions, other than Grafton’s, are few. They include A. Horstmann’s “Die 
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A.1.2. National Literatures 
 
Modern philology is closely connected not only to the idea of Greek 
antiquity but also to the remapping of literature as an integral part of the national 
component of universal history1.  
F. Schlegel, in his opening lecture on the Geschichte der alten und neuen 
Literatur (On the History of antique and modern Literature), originally dating 
from 1814) discusses the “Einfluß der Literatur auf das Leben und den Wert der 
Nationen [Influence of literature on the life and character of nations]” (1961, 9). 
Literature, he states, stores “alte National-Erinnerungen [old national-
remembrances]” that constitute “das ganze geistige Dasein einer Nation [the 
whole spiritual being of a nation]” (15). As such, it would not simply be subject 
to historical development. It would be co-extensive with national consciousness 
as historical and thus with history itself. “Dieses in betrachtenden und 
darstellenden Werken sich aussprechende Selbstbewußtsein einer Nation ist die 
Geschichte [This national self-consciousness expressing itself in works of 
contemplation and representation, is history]” (16). Under this perspective, 
Homeric poetry is acknowledged as extremely “wichtig für die griechische und 
für die ganze nachfolgende europäische Literatur [important for the Greek and 
the overall subsequent European literature]”. It holds the crucial position of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘klassische Philologie’ zwischen Humanismus und Historismus. Friedrich August Wolf und die 
Begründung der modernen Altertumswissenschaft”, in Berichte zur Wissenschaftgeschichte, I, 1978. 
 
1 The connection between philology and problematics of national history is presented by 
Turner (1997) as follows: 
“By the middle of the [19th] century philology had become one of the most powerful and 
all-embracing humanist sciences. Philologists were actively involved in the establishment 
of national literatures which might or might not have had a genuinely long existence, and 
by implication with the process of nation-building.” (141) 
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“Hauptquelle der gesamten Geistesbildung der alten Völker [capital source or 
fountain head of the overall cultural formation of antique peoples]”(30).  
Bildung is a key-concept of German historicism. Its etymology expresses 
the articulation between the idea of historical culture and the one of form. 
Literature, we can infer, acquires its historical significance precisely because it is 
the most telling enactment of this articulation. Philology assumes its own 
significance as a scholarly discipline to the degree that it addresses literary works 
as properly historical, that is, cultural forms. Schlegel’s posthumously published 
fragments Zur Philologie (1981), express in terms quite enigmatic, if not 
perplexing, the epistemological conundrums of the philological task. Through a 
philosophy of history based on a philosophy of philology1, the present moment 
would gain access to the classical antiquity it needs as a prototype for its own 
national literature2. The claim is thus advanced of a specifically philological 
philosophy. The “Theorie der historischen Kritik“3 would be something close to a 
critique of historical reason, conditioning or even overcoming non-historical 
philosophy and aesthetics4. Aestheticism and aesthetic mysticism are targeted as 
the basic shortcomings of Winckelmann’s neo-classical approach to antiquity – a 
crucial blindness marking the corresponding tradition5. So is the erudite concern 
for grammatical positivity, which would hamper the development of historical 
                                                   
1 “<Postulat: es soll kl. [lassische]Werke geben. Die ganze Fs [Philosophie] der Historie muß 
aus der Fs [Philosophie” der Fl [Philologie] postulirt und deducirt werden können”. (Fr. 
143) 
 
2 “Die Philologie besonders die alte ist gleichsam die Klassik, das Urbild für die 
Behandlung jeder besondern nazionalen, modernen Litteratur”. (Fr. 155) 
 
3 See Fr. 9. 
 
4 “Herrschaft des Philosophischen über das Historische würde der Philologie ein Ende 
machen wie die des Aesthetischen”. (From Fr. 18) 
 
5 See Fr. 35. 
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insights. Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum are explicitly referred to, as entailing the 
novel critical-historical perspective of the philological spirit1.  
In fact, Wolf’s Prolegomena has little place for concepts and arguments of a 
philosophical critique. It enacts its critical insights while examining 
methodological aspects of the age-old Homeric Question as an exemplary case of 
historically antique literature. Wolf’s treatise is thus paradigmatic, both because 
of its estimated impact2 and with respect to its epistemic status3. 
 
 
                                                   
1 “Studium der Prolegomena in Rücksicht auf den philologischen Geist. – Wird das 
Historische vernachlässigt so wird die philologische Kunst banausisch und grammatisch, 
wie sie es meistens ist.” (Fr. 25) 
 
2 My use of the term paradigm is close to the meaning it has acquired within the field of 
history of science, especially through its elaboration in Kuhn (1970). Wolf’s Prolegomena have, 
indeed, been acknowledged as “a model for future writers on the history of any ancient text” 
(Pfeiffer 1976, 214). Wilamowitz (1950) is rather reluctant to attribute prime importance to Wolf, 
but many recent studies insist on doing so. Grafton is even more emphatic, stating that “the 
Prolegomena became the model of philological criticism” (1991a, 42). It would have functioned 
both as the “manifesto of German historical spirit” and as a “model for historical investigations in 
other fields” (1985, 29). For Clarke (1981) Prolegomena has been “the preface to all books on 
Homer that would appear in the next 150 years” (160). Timpanaro expresses an equivalent 
opinion, in La genesi del methodo del Lachmann, Padua, 1981 – as cited by Grafton (1991a, 15). So 
does the relevant article in the recent New Companion to Homer, according to which Prolegomena 
“established the foundation of Homeric Question for the next century and transferred Homeric 
criticism into the expanding realm of professional scholarship” (Turner 1977, 125).  
 
3 According to Kuhn (1970), a scientific discipline emerges and develops on the grounds 
of exemplary approaches to reformulated old questions. Paradigmatic works would typically 
involve a strictly methodological or even technical breakthrough, without explicitly elaborating 
concepts or problematics at the level of theory or epistemology. These would be formulated later, 
within the process of development and institutionalisation of the corresponding intellectual field.  
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A.1.3. Prolegomena to Philology 
 
Like all old questions, the Homeric one has always mainly been about the 
problem of what it is about. One of its best general formulations is, perhaps, its 
most simple one: “this eternal problem, what are we to make of Homer” (Myres 
1958, 73). The statement is very precise, to the degree that we read it as referring 
not to Homer, as an individual author, but to the very notion of Homer, in its 
rhetorical transpositions. The term can be a reference to a presumed poet or 
aoidos of pre-classical Greek times. The question would be: has Homer existed as 
a distinct individual – and what exactly are we to make of him as the author or 
singer of poems such as the Iliad and the Odyssey? The term can also designate a 
scribal construct reproducing or transmitting a body of poetry. The question 
becomes: under what conditions were the corresponding poems initially written 
down, and how do their extant versions stand with respect to earlier ones, 
written or oral? A further transposition makes Homer into the figure of a whole 
era, historically preceding and immediately connected to classical Greece. We 
thus have the question: what is the value and significance of Homeric poetry 
within the overall setting of the literary tradition of Western modernity?  
All three aspects of the Question were (and were known to have been) 
addressed and debated, in different ways and intensities, since classical Greek 
antiquity. Wolf’s Prolegomena attributes to the second aspect, concerning the 
historicity of extant scribal material, a fundamental importance largely over-
determining the other two. Let us be more specific about this. 
According to Pfeiffer (1976), Wolf’s gesture consisted in the historicisation 
of the Homeric Question:  
In tracing the history of the transmission of the Homeric text from the 
Hellenistic age back to the age of the epic poets for the first time, he had to 
raise the question of the origin of the epic poems, of their unity and 
genuineness. Wolf opened the eyes of his contemporaries and of posterity 
to the unique historical position of the Homeric poetry. (14) 
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However, most of the elements of the history of the Homeric text that Wolf 
brings to the fore were objects of inquiry and debate long before his treatise. 
Wolf’s specificity has more to do with how the Homeric case entails a critique of 
the very notion of historical “unity and genuineness”. Grafton (1985) stresses that 
Prolegomena tackles the issue of textual history as part of a wider approach to a 
history of scholarship and culture. It would constitute the “first methodical and 
firmly based attempt at a history of an ancient text”, through which “ the history 
of the Homeric text, the origins and the development of scholarship in the 
ancient world, and the general history of Greek culture were inextricably 
interwoven ” (17). The approach that Wolf elaborates has, in fact, more to do 
with how this interlacing of historical perspectives affects the understanding of 
textuality as historical. 
The crucial significance of the Wolfian enterprise resides, more 
specifically, in the reconfiguration of the notion of form, as properly historical. 
The title of Prolegomena presents us with the most accurate formulation of the 
specific turn that Wolf gave to the Homeric Question: Prolegomena ad Homerum, 
sive de operum homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili 
ratione emendandi1. Forma is the keyword. Prisca et genuina is translatable into 
properly historical.  
The Homeric Question becomes the one of the criteria of form according 
to which the philological intellect can critically exercise an emendation (that is, a 
valid correction) of the scribal material that has been received as Homeric. 
Prolegomena thus turns the question of form into one of formness – if the coinage 
may be allowed. The immediate objects of this criticism were, more specifically, 
the Byzantine manuscript versions of Homeric poetry – that is, the oldest extant 
sources of Homer, which had served as a basis for the printed version of the text. 
                                                   
1 The English edition (Wolf 1985) translates: Prolegomena to Homer, or Concerning the 
original and genuine form of the Homeric works and their various alterations and the proper method of 
emendation. 
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The history of their production should enable the designation of their prisca et 
genuina forma and the correlative emendation of the received artefacts. The 
implicit postulate is that, prior to such an emendation, received documents are 
historically unreadable. With respect to the extant Homeric material Wolf raises, 
in other words, an issue of historical readability. This is not so much in the sense 
of how this material should be read, as in the sense of whether and under what 
conditions it can be read as properly Homeric.  
The Wolfian question can also be formulated as the one of how 
Textgeschichte, or the history of a scribal material, can justify and guide Textkritik, 
or the philological criticism and eventual reformation of the material. Note that 
the term that Wolf uses more extensively is the one of scripta or scripturae. By this, 
he means, if I read him correctly, written constructs of any sort or validity. Textus 
is only occasionally used, often designating these same constructs but from the 
point of view of their form. There is, furthermore, a tendency for the term textus 
to connote, in Wolf, the specific kind of form that would be readable as a 
historically valid one. One can advance the hypothesis that textus or textual form 
becomes, in Wolf, the condition of the historical readability of scribal material. 
Textual form would be somehow active, as a potential of formness, in scribal or 
other remains of historical life; nonetheless, it would not be immediately or non-
problematically present in the forms that they initially acquire and in which they 
are transmitted. It would be the task of the modern philological intellect to 
define, reconstruct and impose properly textual form on otherwise dubious 
scripta1.  
                                                   
1 Cerquiglini (1989) configures as follows the relations between philology and a 
specifically modern notion of textuality: 
“La notion de texte ainsi constituée s’ épanouit au XIXe s., régit les comportements 
intellectuels, et donne naissance à une science particulière et fondamentale, la philologie. 
Science moderne, à notre sense, quoique une jeune critique, impatiente et rétive, depuis 
les années 1950, ait tenté d’en secouer  le joug, sience moderne du texte moderne, 
appliquée à des objets anciens.” (28)  
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This approach invalidates a series of preceding approaches to the Homeric 
Question, which had been taking the received material more or less for granted. 
Long-standing debates over the value and interpretation of the poems are 
discredited, to the degree that they had not questioned the readability of what 
they were reading1. On the grounds of the Homeric Question, philology emerges 
                                                   
1 The following distinct (although not necessarily historically successive) modalities of 
reading or appreciating Homer, are identified by Clarke (1981). Romanticisation (medieval and 
later “novelistic” adaptations and imitations of Homer); allegorisation (from late antiquity, 
through middle-ages and Renaissance, to the present times); criticism (mainly ethical or aesthetic 
questioning of the value of the Homeric texts); textual analysis (culminating in the German 
philological tradition); interpretative anatomy (problematics of 20th century human sciences).  
As this thesis is not about the history of the Homeric Question, I will not elaborate on the 
issue. I will only be briefly referring to some aspects of this history, whenever necessary, in order 
to highlight the specificity of the Wolfian reformulation of the Question.  
For the history of antique and medieval readings of Homer see Lamberton (1997) and 
Lamberton and Keaney (1992). Bérard (1925), Mazon (1959) and Allen (1924;1931) are very 
informative with respect to older and more recent, especially editorial and philological aspects of 
the issue. Heubeck (1978) concentrates on contemporary developments. Myres (1958) and, 
especially, Clarke (1981) offers a broader view of different reading traditions of Homer. 
Collections of articles such as Platnauer (1954) and, especially, the two Companions to Homer 
(Wace and Stubbings 1962; Morris and Powell 1997) include numerous contributions on the 
history of the Question.  
For more detailed approaches to specific periods of modern Homeric studies see R. 
Weiss, The Renaissance discovery of Classical Antiquity, Oxford, 1969; D.M. Foerster, Homer in 
English Criticism: The Historical Approach in the Eighteenth Century, Yale Studies in English, 105, 1947; 
K. Simonsuri, Homer’s Original Genius: Eighteenth-century notions of the early Greek epic, 1688-1798, 
Cambridge, 1979. 
For systematic bibliographical references to the field see Packard (1974) and, especially, 
Heubeck (1988). 
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as the field through which the conditions of readability of antique literature are 
critically checked and established as the prerequisite of its reading1.  
                                                   
1 Philology at large, in its historical development, is another major issue on which this 
thesis does not intend to elaborate. Aspects of it will be addressed in passing remarks, whenever 
particularly pertinent to Wolf’s Prolegomena. The following elements could be noted here. 
In histories of classical scholarship, a certain number of eras or moments of evolution and 
change are almost invariably distinguished, forming the following periodological schema. 
Carolingian revival of the 8th century A. D. and “first renaissance” of the 12th century (with 
concomitant developments in the Byzantine East); Italian Renaissance proper, followed by the 
expansion of early Humanist philology, especially in France (14-16th centuries); distinctly 
scientific but also religiously animated philological sensibility moving from France to the 
Netherlands and England (16-17th centuries); generalisation and flourishing of Humanist 
scholarly traditions, during the age of the Enlightenment, combining neo-classicism with early 
romantic insights, especially in Italy and Germany (18th century); German historicism and 
philology, applied to classical and Biblical studies, setting the model of a distinctly modern 
academic profile (19th century). 
Each historian underscores a different socio-intellectual aspect or agency as particularly 
significant throughout the process – thus exposing particular components of the tensions which 
have run through the field, within the setting of the epistemic and discursive formation of 
modernity. Reynolds and Wilson (1991) is the most technical and informative, emphasising 
developing aspects of editorial and grammatological experience. For Pfeiffer (1968; 1976), 
classical scholarship emerges out of a gradual heightening of critical awareness of poets and 
literary writers (1976, 4), while developing in relative distance from the rather secluded field of 
religious hermeneutics (1976,  90 and 130).  Diverging from the former, Gusdorf (1988) retains 
polemical overtones in stressing the direct connection between the advancement of textual 
criticism and the Protestant hermeneutic tradition. Wolf would, more specifically, be 
inaugurating an era of “athéisme homérique” particularly critical with respect to the tradition of 
catholic or counter-reformational Humanism. Myres (1958) also connects the beginnings of 
modern scholarly philology to the “essential Protestantism” of English and German intellectual 
traditions (38 and 69) but is far from Gusdorf’s polemical tones. Grafton (1991) also relates Wolf’s 
methodology to 18th century Biblical textual criticism, but views German philology as the 
outcome of a much wider tradition of modern scientific sensibility. Humanist scholarship would 
have gradually broken with scholasticist and allegorical practices or religious polemics, 
developing, especially since the 16th century, as an expression of a properly scientific culture, 
elaborating its “fundamentally historical approach”. For a concise analysis and historical 
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A.1.4. The Wolfian Paradigm 
 
As I have already noted, Wolf’s Prolegomena, although explicitly 
programmatic and often polemical, is not theoretical in scope and character. We 
do not have an elaboration of ideas or concepts immediately pertaining to a 
philosophy of history or theory of literature. We are closer to a tentative 
enactment of implicit epistemological suggestions.  
The reading of Prolegomena should, in this respect, seriously take into 
account two closely interconnected components of its language, which have 
attributed to it a largely esoteric status – namely, its Latin idiom and its acutely 
ironic rhetoric1. Both these characteristics draw Wolf’s treatise close to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
presentation of the more general role of early Humanist intelligentsia and scholarship in the 
formation of Europe, see also Pomian (1990). 
One could also recall the relatively recent debate (of a political rather than theoretical 
interest) launched by Bernal (1987) and his critique against the “eurocentric” or “racist” 
ideological premises of classical scholarship and philology, especially during the 19th century. See 
the reactions recorded in Lefkowitz and MacLean Rogers (1996).  
For a particularly interesting and theoretically pertinent epistemological critique of 
traditional philological premises, centred on the notion of text, see Cerquiglini (1989).  
Foucault (1966) remains, in my opinion, the most insightful and imposing general 
approach to an “archaeological” history of the modern Humanist episteme, up to the emergence 
of what we know as “human sciences”. 
For an annotated bibliography of the history classical scholarship see Calder and Kraner 
(1992). See also Hummel (2000), in which the history of philology as a field in itself becomes the 
object of an informed bibliographical and historical approach. 
 
1 According to Turner (1997, 125), Prolegomena was the “last major work of European 
intellectual history to be composed and published in learned Latin”. Philology, it should be 
recalled, is the scholarly field that has retained the most lasting working knowledge of the 
Humanist neo-Latin idiom. Wolf’s text circulated for use by philology scholars and students only 
in Latin for more than a century. Its first German translation, to my knowledge, was the one 
published by Herman Muchlau in Leipzig, 1908. Its first translation in English is as recent as 1985. 
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Humanist tradition, against which it mostly directs its critique. They also 
distance it from the academic field that subsequently drew on its paradigm – as 
well as from more explicitly theoretical statements of German historicism.  
Wolf’s Latin, it should be remarked, is not easily translatable into notions 
formed by modern national and academic languages. Wolf’s gens or populus 
relate to but are not the exact equivalent of Nation. His cultus vitae or habitus are 
vaguer than Kultur. His forma may resist the passage from Bild to Bildung. The 
terms writing and text interconnect differently than scripta and textus do. 
The neo-Latin rhetoric of Prolegomena also accounts, at least in part, for the 
“sort of unresolved internal dialogue” (Grafton 1985, 35), which has been seen as 
characteristic of Wolf’s discourse. This is not simply a matter of style. It amounts 
to a mode of open-ended or inconclusive argumentation which marks Wolf’s 
writing. Note that Wolf’s Prolegomena adds one more title to the list of 
paradigmatic works that remain “unfinished”. Closing the introductory section 
of his treatise, Wolf announces an “inquiry, by which the internal critical history 
[interior historia critica] of these poems will be brought down to our own time 
through the study of six stages of uneven length and character” (VII)1. Wolf’s 
Prolegomena, however, stops at the middle of the third stage, forgetting the times 
from Longinus to “the last three centuries”. In the same introductory section, a  
“second part” of the whole work is announced. It would deal “with the 
principles on which the emendation of Homer rests, and with its most important 
and peculiar rules, and with giving an account of our project” (VII). The treatise, 
concludes, indeed, with the indication “End of volume I” – but no further 
                                                   
1 I will be referring to Prolegomena by citing the Latin numeral used as a title of each of the 
relatively short LI chapters that comprise its first edition. I will be adding page references, 
whenever necessary or useful, to its 1985 English translation (abbreviated as PRE) and to the 1963 
Latin edition I have used (abbreviated as PRL) . 
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volume ever appeared or even seems to have been prepared after its 1795 first 
edition1.  
What we have, can thus be described as the prolegomena to the landscape 
of a task, the general horizon of which remains a question as open as the 
Homeric one2. The connection of Prolegomena to the theoretical and 
methodological premises of historicist thought, as subsequently elaborated 
within the field of German idealism and historical sciences, cannot be doubted – 
and we can safely qualify, I think, the Wolfian paradigm as “historicist”. This, 
implies that the corresponding connections, often including tensions, or even 
incompatibilities, need further investigation3.  
                                                   
1 From the anticipated “second part” of Prolegomena, we only have two fragments, 
posthumously published for the first time in the 1876 Bekker edition – and included in PRE but 
not in PRL. 
 
2  Grafton (1985) remarks:  
“The Prolegomena, a partial and fragmentary treatise demonstrating the partial and 
fragmentary nature of a classical text whose canonical unity and perfection have not 
ceased to dominate our imagination, opened up a discipline that has not yet been entirely 
closed off in our time: classical philology.” (35) 
 
3 Here is a short outline of the whole, in groups of chapters – which I present so that the 
reader can better situate the different points I will be raising or passages I will be quoting:  
· on the state of the standardised printed version of the Homeric “vulgate” and the significance 
of the edition of recently discovered Homeric manuscripts (I-VII);  
· preliminary methodological remarks and exposition of basic hypotheses concerning the 
original oral form and subsequent writing-down of the Homeric poems (VIII-XI);  
· external evidence, from the history writing in pre-classical Greece, corroborating the 
hypothesis of an originally oral form of the Homeric poems (XII-XXVI);  
· internal evidence, from the received Homeric text, suggesting that the poems as wholes are 
the result of post-Homeric compilation and transmission processes based on originally 
smaller orally composed songs (XXVII-XXXI);  
· “critical history” of the Homeric manuscript tradition; first age: from Solon to the first written 
synthesis of a Homeric corpus in Pisistratidean Athens (XXXII-XXXV);  
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A.1.5. Byzantine  Vulgate 
 
What was the state of the scribal material to which Wolf addressed his 
criticism?  
During the middle-ages, the western part of the old Roman Empire knew 
and possessed only a few Greek manuscripts, mostly of ecclesiastical nature1 –  
amongst which there was no Homer. It is only with the “manuscript hunt”, 
undertaken by early Humanist scholars2, that manuscripts of poems known as 
Homeric arrived in the West3. They came from Byzantine monasteries and 
                                                                                                                                                       
· second age: from Pisistratus to Hellenistic Alexandria, an age of proliferation of variant 
copies and early exegetical readings of Homer (XXXVI-XL); 
· third age: Alexandrian criticism as an antecedent of modern philology; detailed examination 
of the extent and general spirit of the contribution of each of the three major Alexandrian 
critics, namely Zenodotus, Aristophanes and especially Aristarchus; brief remarks on the 
regression of genuine critical spirit in the school of Pergamus (XLI-LII);  
· “Second Part”: two chapters containing mainly methodological remarks, including a 
comparison of the Homeric case to that of  the Masoretic text of the Old Testament. 
 
1 For more details see Reynolds and Wilson (1991). 
 
2 The “manuscript hunt” (just as often referred to as the “rescuing” of manuscripts of 
Greek texts from the decaying Byzantine Empire) begun around the middle of the 14th century 
and continued for more than a century, involving different methods and mediators of transfer. 
Cardinal Bessarion, neo-platonist scholar originating from Byzantine Trapezounda, contributed 
about 500 Greek manuscripts to the Republic of Venice around 1468; Janus Lascaris, as agent of 
Lorenzo di Medici, transferred  another 200 from Mount Athos to Florence ( Reynolds and Wilson 
1991,  48-49). 
 
3 Histories of philology often name the man who, in 1354, is recorded as having received, 
from the hands of Nikolas Sigeros, envoy of the Byzantine empire to the papal court at Avignon, 
the first (relatively recent) manuscript of a Homeric text, in its original language. Not 
surprisingly, the man was Petrarch, the very prototype and initiator of renaissance Humanist 
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libraries; they were known to be a relatively recent offspring of a long process of 
copying and annotating. Each manuscript or group of manuscripts has since 
followed its own trajectory, usually leading to a major Western European library, 
in which it can still be found today.  
The Byzantine manuscripts are quite idiosyncratic scriptural constructs. 
Some manuscripts contain the whole of either the Iliad or the Odyssey, but others 
are fragmentary. Many appear to have been composed by a multiplicity of 
hands. Their material support is predominantly paper or parchment, in the form 
of a codex (which started replacing the papyrus or parchment scroll after the 
second century A.D.). The script is of a minuscule type (an invention of the ninth 
century A.D., both for the Latin West and the Greek East, replacing older uncial 
scripts and drastically altering and facilitating copying work). The poetic corpus 
is written in verse-lines (which was not necessarily the case in antiquity). The 
words are separated and systematic accentuation and punctuation is the rule 
(foreign to older writing and copying practices). The overall corpus of each poem 
is usually divided into 24 books or rhapsodies, numbered and entitled by each of 
the letters of the Greek attic alphabet (a division which remains, today, of 
uncertain origin). In some cases, further titles or summaries (also of uncertain 
origin) occur at the beginning of each rhapsody. Occasionally, interlinear 
translation into Byzantine Greek is added.  
At the margins of the poetic corpus, annotations are often adjoined, 
concerning passages occasionally repeated in a lemma. These scholia are mainly 
comments grammatical, pragmatic or exegetic; they may also include recorded or 
suggested alternative versions of passages – that is, variant readings. Some of 
those comments or variants are ascribed to scholars of Hellenistic or early Roman 
times, occasionally cited by name. Most of them are drawn from older 
manuscripts, which had drawn them, in turn, from various sources, such as 
                                                                                                                                                       
scholarship – to whom Greek was still unreadable and who encouraged a Latin translation of the 
text (Pfeiffer 1976, 14).  
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Roman compilations of older commentaries or grammatical treatises, recording 
the work of such scholars1.  
Humanist scholars were actively engaged in the task of editing and 
printing Greek manuscripts, including Homer – in co-operation, often tense, with 
typographers. The editio princeps of the Homeric poems appeared in Florence, in 
14882. Editions of Homer proliferated, based on what was later criticised as a 
rather hasty and little informed collation of most recent manuscripts. They often 
accompanied the poetic corpus with commentaries attributed to older scholiasts 
of Homer. More recent commentaries on Homer, such as the one of Eustathius, 
Archbishop of Thessaloniki (1193-1197), were also published autonomously. In 
1566, Henry Estienne (Stephanus) established a new editorial standard for 
Homer, based on the collation of a 13th century manuscript of the Iliad3. In 1656, 
the edition of Schrevelius set the model of printing the Greek text with a parallel 
Latin translation and a set of systematic editorial notes. In 1707 the edition of 
Barnes inaugurated the practice of a more or less organised recension and 
collation of a relatively large number of manuscripts4. An important editorial 
event occurred in 1788, when the French scholar J. B. d’ Ansse de Villoison edited 
the oldest extant manuscripts of the Iliad, known as Venetus A and Venetus B, 
                                                   
1 For a recent overview of the Homeric scholia, their origins and characteristics, as well as  
their editions and significance,  see Nagy (1997). 
 
2 The edition was composed by Demetrius Chalcondyles and printed by Demetrius 
Damilas, both of Byzantine origin. It was based on a manuscript, probably destroyed by the 
editors, which Allen identifies as a practically contemporary one, belonging to a family the 
earliest extant exemplar of which dates from the 13th century (Allen 1931, 249). 
 
3  This manuscript was later identified as the Genevensis 44. It is stored, today, in the 
Bibliothèque Publique Universitaire of Geneva – where I have had the chance to consult it. 
 
4 For more details on early editions of Homer see Allen (1931,  chap. VI). 
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discovered in the library of St. Mark in Venice. Venetus A dates from the 10th 
century of our era and had been probably transferred to Venice at the beginning 
of the 15th century (Pfeiffer 1976, 48).  
Villoison’s edition included the long-awaited marginal scholia of the two 
manuscripts, especially Venetus A. These marginalia are unique in their quantity, 
detail and citation of sources1. They transmit information on how scholarly 
authorities of Hellenistic Alexandria (mainly of the third and second centuries B. 
C.) had critically evaluated the Homeric text they had received and collected 
from different, albeit never unambiguously identified, sources. The information 
suggested that Alexandrian scholars  – such as Zenodotus, Aristophanes and, 
ultimately, Aristarchus – could be acknowledged as the first systematic editors of 
Homer, although much remained unknown as to the exact extent and status of 
their editorial work.  
The hypothesis of an Alexandrian editorial intervention offered a 
historically plausible explanation of a phenomenon that would otherwise be 
quite paradoxical, given the uncertainty and complexity through which the 
Homeric scripta were known to have been produced. I am referring to the fact 
that the Byzantine copying tradition carries a relatively uniform poetic corpus, in 
spite of occasional variant readings adopted or marginally recorded in different 
manuscripts or groups of manuscripts. The exact extent and significance, as well 
as the authority of each of these variants are, of course, a major issue of editorial 
contention. Nevertheless, Byzantine manuscripts as a whole have been 
presenting the modern reader and editor with what has long been considered as 
a Homeric vulgate2. All modern editions of Homer have been reproducing (with 
minor lexical and grammatical variations, depending on specific manuscript 
                                                   
1 One of the specificities of the Venetus A is that its scribes cite, in endnotes, by name of 
author and title of work, the sources from which they drew the information they record.  
 
2 The term is also used extensively, although mostly ironically, in Wolf. 
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sources and editorial choices) this vulgate, with its given sequence of lines, 
according to a numbering established in early editions of Homer. Modernity has 
always had to deal with the same 27803 verses for the two major Homeric poems, 
of which 15693 for the Iliad1. 
The term vulgate alludes, of course, to the kind of authority enjoyed by the 
Latin vulgata of the Bible. Wolfian philology questioned this authority on the 
grounds of its historical sense of textual form. The manuscript construct does, 
perhaps, transmit a unitary poetic corpus, but does it also provide us with a text 
readable as historically one and a valid one?  
Prolegomena is largely based on a systematic investigation of the Venetus 
scholia. Wolf does not read them, though, as a confirmation of the authority of 
the Byzantine vulgate. On the contrary, the scholia could prove that its corpus is 
the outcome of a long and varied process of recording and copying, different 
phases and components of which are deprived of historical validity. 
Consequently, its offspring would be historically questionable, in need of further 
and definitive textual reformation, as a condition of its readability. 
                                                   
1 The figures for the total sum of verses are from Clarke (1981, 264) and for the Iliad from 
Mazon (1959, 62).  
44 
A.2. Textual Form 
A.2. TEXTUAL  FORM 
 
A.2.1. The Modern Voice of History 
 
The following passage states a basic hypothesis of Prolegomena and names 
its authority: historia is the instance that sustains the Wolfian discourse. 
The Homer that we have in our hands now is not the one that flourished 
in the mouths of the Greeks of his own day, but one variously altered, 
interpolated, corrected and emended from the times of Solon down to 
those of the Alexandrians. Learned and clever men have long felt their 
way to this conclusion by using various scattered bits of evidence; but 
now the voices of all periods joined together bear witness, and history 
speaks [in anima coniuctae voces omnium temporum testantur et loquitur 
historia] . (XLIX; PRE, 209; PRL, 204-205) 
The voice of Wolfian history does not repeat or echo older, equally historical 
voices. It is the voice of the ratio referred to in the sub-title of the treatise: a new 
kind of scholarly judgement, through which older voices are reworked and 
reactivated assuming the status of useful or insurmountable, yet dubious 
testimonies. It emerges against and out of a background of chaotic darkness that 
marks all historical origins: 
One who seeks ancient authority in the midst of all this uncertainty 
confronts the obscurity [tenebrae originibus] that often crops up around the 
origins of ancient arts. But antiquity saw the origins and slow progress of 
many more things, the slender beginnings of which were witnessed by 
few and the utility of which to posterity was of concern to none [nemo 
curaret]. (XIII; PRE, 75; PRL, 35) 
Historical ratio is explicitly qualified as distinctly modern. Modern historians 
break out of a pre-modern realm of rudimentary memory, which has been 
generating invalid opinion or fable-like stories. They re-arrange its tenebrae into a 
field of historically developing national cultures. These cultures Wolfian Latin 
names habitus or cultus vitae – and the corresponding nations gentes or populi:  
The mature race [gens adulta] examined its origins only at a late date, when 
the memory of the first inventions had been obscured by the long time 
that had elapsed, and divergent reports had given rise to different 
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opinions and new stories [variis opinionibus et novis fabulis]. Nor did 
historians employ that philosophical ingenuity [sollerti philosophandi] with 
which we have investigated the progress and capacity of the human mind 
in inventing things, now that we have learned to take a wider view of the 
world [post quam orbem terrae latius circumspicere] and to compare the 
habits and customs [habitus et consuetudines comparare] of different peoples 
[plurium populorum]that enjoy a similar level of material culture [simili 
cultu vitae utentium]. After all, this is the new light of our times [nova lux 
nostrorum temporum], which was denied to or of little interest to the 
Greeks. (XIII; PRE, 75; PRL, 36) 
Greek antiquity would be the very example of a state of mind 
characterised by a defective, if not lacking, sense of historical judgement. Greek 
ajkrisiva (akrisia, XIII) governs the initial stages of production and circulation of 
Homeric poetry (or of antique Greek culture as a whole)1. This postulate is as 
important to Prolegomena as the hypothesis of original Homeric orality.  
Historical akrisia would mark a people “oblivious of its own infancy 
[infantiam suam obilti populi]” (XVII). Its main symptom would be the incapacity 
to think of the past in terms of a distinction “between stages of development 
[progressus non distinguerent]” (XIV). It lacks the propensity to raise questions 
over the authentic ascription of books, as opposed to those of their off-hand 
usability:  
I refer especially to the times when Greece was free, when the conditions 
of studies [studiorum conditio] was very different from that which followed 
with the rise of the Alexandrian polymathy [polumaqeiva]. Those earlier 
men lived in the forum, not in literary retreats; they were busy smelling 
out the deceptions involved in false records and forged wills, and more or 
less ignored the need to deal with forged books. For in the texts of this 
kind that had appeared they investigated less whether they belonged to 
those to whom they were commonly ascribed than whether they offered 
anything useful and worth reading. (XIII, n. 12) 
                                                   
1 Herodotus would provide the prototype of a characteristically non-historical telling of 
stories, in spite of an eventual concern for a kind of truth. Wolf considers him as an “equally 
zealous lover of truth and eager teller of falsehoods [veri amanintissimus et fictorum cupidus 
narrator]” (XIV). 
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Alexandrian polymathy marks, for Wolf, the first instance of a novel 
intellectual concern over the historical appreciation of old book material. The 
juxtaposition between modesty and creativity, which serves to describe it in the 
following passage, retains a distinctly Wolfian ironic twist. Modest would be a 
sense of measure and order – that is, of formness – of which creative beginnings 
would be deprived. Apart from the excesses of its decorum, this sense would 
involve the emergence of interpretative concerns, directly connected to those of 
formational emendation: 
In place of the agora, the speaker’s platform, the stage and the public 
festival appeared museums and libraries; in place of genius rich in its own 
resources appeared timid imitation which undertook only modest tasks; in 
place of a very elevated spirit of poetry and elegance appeared sober and 
sometimes chilled erudition [sobria, saepe frigida eruditio], reading spread 
over all areas of learning [in omnesque partes doctrinarum diffusa lectio]; in 
place of original ideas appeared thoughtness, care, and a certain polish of 
arrangement and poetic diction [pro inventionis sollertia sedulitas et cura et 
nitor quidam dispositionis poeticique sermonis]; in place, finally, of the 
magnificent native bloom of  all the arts appeared garlands composed of 
the blossoms from everywhere. Among the studies aroused at just this 
time by the desire to imitate antiquity was the art of interpretation and 
emendation [ars fuit interpretandi et emendandi], a subject that had heretofore 
been sluggish – and none of the ancient poets supplied greater fodder for 
it than Homer. (XLI; PRE, 167; PRL, 167) 
At stake, in Wolf, is a critique of historical reason, as the faculty that 
sustains judgement over the properly historical form of the past. 
 
 
A.2.2. A Sense of Reading 
 
It would be wrong to identify Wolfian historicism with a naive or 
positivist quest of facts telling, as such, what has actually happened. The 
following quotation (with which Wolf passes to the distinctly philological part of 
his essay) tells us that the crucial task is the elaboration of conjectures or 
inferences on the grounds of general principles of historical reasoning. Historical 
ratio sustains a conjectural, rather than simply hypothetical reconstruction of the 
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past as properly historical. The historical res is a case to be made, not a fact to be 
recorded: 
This whole detailed investigation about the time when writing was first 
received among the Greeks, about the way in which poems were 
composed and made public in the most ancient times, about the 
rhapsodes, their sole guardians is, as it were, a preliminary [protevleia] to 
a different and deeper investigation [diversae et altioris questionis]. Here 
suddenly the whole field of arguments changes [omnis campus disputationis 
mutatur], historical evidence [vestigia historica] practically vanishes, and 
conjecture and inference [conjectura et ratiocinatio] tremblingly [trepide] take 
its place. These do not seek after the testimony [quid … afferat] of 
Herodotus, Plato or Aristotle himself, but rather follow out [efficiatur] with 
rigorous judgement [severo iudicio] and compare with nature itself [ipsa 
natura comparans] the conclusions that can be drawn from carefully 
thought-out principles [quid ex principiis bene provisis cogatur]. Conjectures 
[coniecturas] of this sort the mob nowadays tends to defame by calling 
them hypotheses [hypothesium]. A sad fate: but after much hesitation, 
having waited for someone else, more confident than we, to make the 
attempt, we need no longer be apprehensive of outgrown reputation. 
Instead, let us say at once, in all clarity [planissime], what the case is [quod 
res est]. (XXVI; PRE, 114; PRL, 83) 
Conditional is the rhetorical mode of existence of the Wolfian res. Note the 
oxymoronic twists of the following formulation – in its original and English 
versions. What is beyond doubt is that things could have happened as historical 
rationale proves they have happened:    
All these considerations, based upon the genius and character of those 
times [ex illorum temporum ingeniis ac moribus existimata] leave no room or 
doubt about how what historical arguments prove to have happened 
could indeed have happened [fieri potuerit illud, quod factum esse historicae 
rationes pervicerunt]. (XXIV; PRE, 111; PRL, 79) 
Historical ratio thus functions as a mechanism of a complex epistemic 
control and correction exercised on common-sense intellectual operations such as 
those of memory – often supposed to sustain uncertain knowledge of what has 
actually happened. At the same time, the exact epistemological status of the 
historical ratio is presented by Wolf as quite ambiguous and, in a sense, non-
definable. Its intellectual authority is said to stem from a “certain kind of sense” 
that transcends argumentative conviction or certainty: “for these matters one 
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needs a certain sensibility [sensu quodam] which arguments do not provide” 
(XXXV). A series of tropes shed more light on the Wolfian notion of philological 
sensus. There is, for instance, eruare. The figure metonymically refers to 
archaeological excavation; it also connects, metaphorically, to an act of digging 
out with a certain degree of violence, as when tearing or plucking away. The 
philological sense excavates historical form out of a-historical story-telling. It 
entails a methodical deconstruction of memorial fabula: 
We, who think that we know the difference between fable and history 
[quid inter fabulam et historiam intersit], recognize here the history which is 
hidden under the fable [historiam sub fabula occultatam] and which has to be 
excavated by a method similar [simili eruendam modo] to that used by 
scholars for Jewish inventions about the seventy-two translators. (XXXIII; 
PRE, 141; PRL, 114) 
Equivalent tropes mark the rhetoric of the first chapter of Prolegomena, which is 
on the inadequacy of older practices of recension and emendation of 
manuscripts. The metaphor of the “good doctor”, but also the synecdoche of a 
“conscientious judge” configure the philologist in his task. Implied, in both 
figures, is the legitimate questioning of the obvious  – the authority to designate 
what stands in need of cure or regulation, even and especially when everything 
seems to be in perfect health or order: 
Not uncommonly then, when the witnesses require it, a true recension 
replaces attractive readings with less attractive ones. It takes off bandages 
and lays bare the sores [emplastris solutis ulcera nudat]. Finally, it cures not 
only manifest ills, as bad doctors do, but hidden ones too. […] we must 
strive above all […]  to judge each of the various witnesses, once they are 
set out by classes and families, by its character; and to learn to follow their 
voices and gestures [voces et nutus excipere], so to speak, with cunning, but 
without bias [calliditate …  nec … cupida]. Indeed, in many cases both the 
critic and anyone who would undertake an historical investigation, must 
emulate the prudent custom of a good judge [boni judicis consuetudo et 
prudentia], who slowly examines the testimony of the witnesses, and 
gathers all the evidence for their truthfulness before he ventures to put 
forward his own conjecture about the case. (I; PRE, 44-45;  PRL, 2-3) 
Readability is at stake: the conditions under which any reading would 
address a historically valid scribal object. Prolegomena concerns, not the methods 
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or techniques of interpretative understanding but their epistemic prerequisite. 
Indeed, the philological sensus questions the validity of transmitted scripta even 
and perhaps especially when their language and scripture are perfectly accessible 
to current reading practices: 
But what sort of book do we call “pure” [integrum librum] in the critical 
sense [critico sensu] of the word? Clearly not one which can be read 
without displeasure, and in which nothing violates elegant usage and the 
other laws of correct writing. Granted that there is nothing of that sort on 
the vulgate text, it should not on that account be considered pure and 
correct throughout. On the contrary, sometimes the very fact that it 
contains nothing of that sort may make it appear all the more devoid of 
genuine purity [germana integritate sua fraudatus]. (VIII; PRE, 59; PRL, 18) 
Historical reason does not solve old problems of reading: it creates novel 
ones, which posit reading as an act of historical knowledge. In other words, the 
Wolfian critique of historical reason is a critique of the conditions of reading. 
Wolf targets, most persistently, two main instances of non-historical or 
historically suspect reading, which he sees as commonly predominating. The first 
would be the sophisticated version of reading exemplified by earlier debates on 
the value and significance of Homer. It would stem from the aesthetic or 
philosophical problematics akin to the neo-classicist understanding of 
Aristotelian poetics. The philologist should take  “Aristotle’s laws and throw 
them into disorder” (XXIX) so that the issue of historical readability may be 
effectively addressed: 
[…] the question is one which must be attacked not from the standpoint of 
what is in accordance with poetic laws [poeticis legibus consentaneum] or 
what we believe sheds honor upon the poet, but rather from what appears 
to be probable on historical and critical grounds [ex historicis et criticis 
rationibus verisimile esse]. (XXX; PRE, 127; PRL, 98) 
Prior (but also parallel) to neo-classical approaches, there would be the more 
popular tradition of allegorical or otherwise figurative interpretation. The 
allegorica et anagogica somnia (XXXVI), as Wolf puts it, mistake problems of 
historical criticism for exegetical enigmas, especially in the case of particularly 
influential or sacred books. 
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It would be wrong to consider that Wolfian philology wholly erases 
concerns of interpretative understanding or aesthetic adequacy. It is, rather, a 
way of containing them and putting them under the new, over-determinant 
perspective of historicae et criticae rationes. Wolf can thus retain, even if only 
ironically so, the conventional figure of Homer as the “prince of poets”: 
But what shall I say of the cases that reveal that ‘literal inspiration of the 
Muses’ [illam Mousopneustivan] is spoiled by human carelessness and 
ignorance [produnt humana negligentia et inscitia vitiatam], by barbarisms 
and solecisms [barbarismis et soloecismis], and by corruptions of thought 
and language [depravationibus sententiae et orationis] that no one could 
accept with equanimity in any writer, much less in the best of all writers 
[in hoc omnium principe]? (X; PRE, 65; PRL, 25). 
 
 
A.2.3. Form: Historical 
 
The main theoretical interest of Prolegomena lies, as I have already 
suggested, in the relations that it posits between history and form. These 
relations are treated in terms more complicated than we usually suspect when 
thinking of “historicism”. 
For Wolf, form would be necessarily historical in two distinct but 
interrelated ways. On the one hand, the vestigia of the past (especially linguistic 
remains) would be inherently connected to the form of their historical origin, that 
is, of the cultus vitae from which they spring. This connection would not entail 
relations of immediate or non-problematic expression or representation. It would 
be mediated and problematised by the evolution of historical awareness, which 
determines whether and how, the genuinely historical forms of life are readable 
through the constructs they have generated. An even stronger claim is implicitly 
made by Wolf in this respect. Properly historical forms can only emerge a 
posteriori, out of constructs that, however close to the reality that generated them, 
are necessarily deficient from a strictly formal-historical point of view. Wolfian 
history is a process of gradual but also painstaking affirmation of formness. The 
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accomplishment of this process would depend on the intellectual perspective and 
the formational capacity of the present, and, ultimately, on the historical sense of 
philological modernity.  
The Homeric Question provides, for Wolf, the opportunity for an 
exemplary quest of principles of historical formness, in view of the imposition of 
properly historical form onto the formally deficient scripta of a manuscript and 
printed vulgate.  
According to the historical ratio, the initial Homeric compositions must 
have been rudimentary in form, as compared to the constructs that recorded and 
transmitted them as poetry. There must have initially been compositions of 
limited scale, loosely connected amongst them, subsequently articulated into 
new lager wholes, of which they became integral parts. Historical ratio discards 
as an absurdity the idea of a sudden emergence of a formed whole, like the one 
that the transmitted Homeric scripta present us with: 
But as for me, whether I contemplate the progress of Greeks themselves or 
of other races [gentium], I find it impossible to accept  [illud minime credibile 
videtur]the belief to which we have been accustomed: that these two works 
of a single genius burst forth suddenly from the darkness [ex tenebris 
splendescere] in all their brilliance, just as they are, with both the splendor 
of their parts [nitore partium] and the many great virtues of the connected 
whole [summae perpetuae]. (XXXV ; PRE, 148 ; PRL, 122)1 
The origins of Greece, just as those of the cultus vitae of all gentium, are 
historical tenebrae. No forms of summae perpetuae can be assumed to have 
emerged all at once, under such conditions of almost pre-historical beginnings. 
According to historical sense, an inaugural ingenium cannot have been capable of 
producing forms of extended articulated wholes and to have thus already 
                                                   
1 cf. Pope who, almost a century before Wolf, was happy to acknowledge a quasi-
miraculous offspring of Homeric poetic invention. Wolf sounds as if directly contradicting Pope’s 
“Essay on Homer”, especially the following statement: “Thus he [Homer] rose over the Poetical 
World, shining like a Sun all at once, which if it sometimes makes too faint an appearance, ‘tis to 
be ascribed only to the unkindness of the Season that clouds and obscures it” (Pope 1967, VII: 67). 
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reached formational perfection (limitissimus et omni arte perfectissimus: XXVI). In 
the following passage, the same premise is formulated in terms of a 
philosophical, if not metaphysical, principle governing historical formness – 
ironically juxtaposed to instances of Godly creation: 
There once were philosophers who decreed that this universal framework 
of all things and bodies [hanc omnium rerum ac corporum compagem et 
universatem] was not made by a divine mind and will [mente numineque], 
but instead was born and developed by accident and chance [forte et casu]. 
I do not fear that anyone will accuse me of like temerity if I am led by the 
traces of an artistic framework [vestigiis artificiosae compagis] and by other 
serious considerations to think that Homer was not the creator of all his – 
so to speak – bodies [quasi corporum suorum], but rather that this artistic 
structure [hanc artem et structuram] was introduced by later ages. For we 
find that this was not done suddenly by chance [neque enim id repente 
fortuite factum], but that instead the energies [studia] of several ages and 
men were joined together in this activity. (XXXI; PRE, 131; PRL, 102) 
There must have been a Homer, Wolf says, who created initial 
compositional units, singing “different songs separately and without regard for 
the uni-formation of the whole [nulla spectatione universae formae]” (XVIII). These 
songs must have been joined as parts of an artistic whole only later, through the 
studious travail of a different kind of creative genius. Wolf’s ambiguous and 
ironic rhetoric enables him never to dimisss the value of either of the two states 
of form marking the evolution of Homeric poetry. Homer remains, as we have 
seen, the princeps of poets; but the artistry of those who have eventually formed 
his poems into wholes is persistently acknowledged as also admirable. Let us 
examine more closely the Wolfian figure of the original Homeric genius. 
I will not insist on the rhetorical concessions Wolf grants to the neo-
classicist appreciation of the Homeric talent. It suffices to note that Wolf’s Homer 
is a youthful yet supreme natural genius whose praise-worthy poetry (iuvenilier 
ludensi populo) combines subtlety of judgement  (iudicii subtilitatem), and divine 
intellectual power (cum divina ingenii vi ac spiritu)1. Cutting through such 
                                                   
1 See especially chap. XLIX. 
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rhetorical clichés, Wolf insists that the historical position of Homer disallowed, 
not genius as such, but the specific kind of artistry necessary to the formation of 
articulated compositional wholes:   
But I submit that it is not so much wisdom and preeminence in artistic 
skill [sapientiam et praestantiam artis] that are foreign to the historical 
position and inner talent of Homer [ab Homeri loco et indole alienam esse], 
but rather the planning of a continuous story which is so long and so 
varied in its episodes [tante et tam varie epsodiis distinctae perpetuitatis 
cogitationem]. (XXVIII; PRE, 123; PRL, 93-94) 
Post-Homeric artistry, on the other hand, would have the skill to turn original 
poetic compositions into parts of a new monumentum: 
Later, in an age which was more polished and richer in the arts [politiore et 
abundatiore artibus aevo], someone noticed that by forcing these episodes 
into a single great continuus body  [ad unius magni corporis redacta] by a 
few excisions, additions, and changes, they could be made as it were into a 
new and more perfect and splendid monument [novum quasi et perfectius 
splendiusque monumentum fore]. (XVIII; PRE, 122; PRL, 2) 
The English “forcing”, in the above quoted passage, is not in Wolf’s 
redacta. In the same chapter, Wolf remarks that the initial songs were not 
necessarily deprived of a basic theme (argumentum) or plot (ordina fabulae). The 
overall narrative thread was already present in them, even if only as a potential: 
“the thread of the legend [filum fabulae] appears to have already been spun out 
[ductum esse] at some length by its first author”. One can thus envisage that an 
individual named Homer produced the larger and earlier part of what we know 
as Homeric poetry. He would be “the man responsible for the larger part and the 
order of the earlier books [priorum rhapsodiarum series]” (XXXI).  
This answer to one of the basic components of the Homeric Question does 
not close the issue that Wolf intends to raise: it opens it. Since this issue resides in 
the exact relations between the initial Homeric songs and their subsequent fate, 
the probing of these relations would reform our transmitted material in a way 
that renders it historically valid. 
An important postulate in this respect is that the artistry that turned 
Homeric songs into articulate wholes is not historically alien to its precedents. It 
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would be connected to them, under a perspective of historical formness. The 
corresponding “redaction” would even be the condition under which the form of 
originally Homeric cultus vitae can be eventually addressed in its historical 
specificity. Turning Homer into a historical monumentum would be the first, 
albeit insufficient or even fallacious step towards forming Homer into an object 
of historical appreciation and knowledge.  
There is a Wolfian sense in which the form of original Homeric songs is as 
defective or problematic, historically, as that of their initial articulation into 
larger wholes. Neither original Homer nor subsequent articulators should be 
expected to have provided history with the proper forms of the historical life 
they strove to express or represent. Historical formness presupposes the advent 
of philological sense, the lack of which marked, one way or the other, all 
linguistic expressions of antique akrisia. 
Wolf’s task consists in the critical reconstruction of the long historical 
process leading from original oral compositions to their first written recording as 
articulated wholes, and from there to the emergence of more mature scribal 
forms. Let us see how Wolf understands, from the perspective of historical 
formness, the relations between original orality, initial written recording and 
eventual textualisation.  
 
 
A.2.4. Writing over Orality 
  
Wolf’s analysis from chapter XII to XXXI, presents evidence according to 
which Homeric works initially emerged as songs before the invention or 
extended use of writing. Wolf also examines evidence “internal” to the vulgate, 
corroborating the hypothesis that the vulgate results from a subsequent 
compilation of orally composed precedents. I will not elaborate on how Wolf 
endorses and re-valorises (not without reservations against older arguments) the 
current idea of a first writing down of Homeric poems under the reign of the 
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Pisistratidae  (sixth century B.C.)1. I will concentrate on the claim that the 
articulation of larger poetic wholes, as we know them, presupposes writing.  
This claim implies a more general theoretical postulate: historical 
formness would be connected to a historical passage from oral to written culture. 
We are dealing, in other terms, with the typically historicist standpoint, 
according to which history, as an object of valid knowledge, is co-extensive with 
writing. Orality assumes the problematic status of a pre- or a-historical condition 
of tenebrous formlessness. With the advent and expansion of written culture, the 
faculty of historical knowledge (more particularly, its formational sense) would 
control and over-determine the faculty of memory, which governs oral practices.  
It would be within the very nature of original Homeric genius not to be 
able to articulate forms of large artistic wholes. This, as we have seen, is a basic 
postulate of historical reasoning. The hypothesis that corroborates the conjecture 
is that the oral-aoidic cultus vitae lacked an “artificial aid to memory”. This aid 
acquires a crucially important weight, as it lays the very grounds on which forms 
of compositional whole can be envisaged:  
It seems to follow necessarily from what we said above that works which 
are so large and are drawn out in an unbroken sequence [tam magnorum et 
perpetua serie deductorum operum formam] could neither have been 
conceived mentally nor worked out [nec designari animo nec elaborari 
potuisse] by any poet without an artificial aid for the memory [artificioso 
adminiculo memoriae]. Say that Homer had a genius [ingenium ] sent down 
from heaven, capable of the most lofty cogitations [altissimarum 
cogitationum] with which he could try the knowledge [scientiam] of all 
things, divine and human; say that he is for us, as Velleius says, the very 
greatest, without model and without rival – and surely the splendour of 
his light will never arise again, unless the globe should see a second 
Greece come to birth; say that he who surpassed all others in natural 
genius possessed at the same time – what is contrary to nature [praeter 
                                                   
1 Homer as the composer of original songs is thus pushed back to a quite early date,  
while writing, together with book-culture and the written recording of the songs, are moved to a 
relatively recent one. The absence of reference to alphabetic writing in the Homeric texts would 
corroborate this schema.  
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naturam]– every art in its most polished and most perfect form 
[limatissimus idem et omni arte prefectissimus]. Not even to a man like this 
can we attribute something that quite exceeds the grasp of mankind 
[prorsus humanitatis captum superat] something for the mere conception 
[mente complectendo] of which the space, the material and the foundation 
[locus et materia et fundamentum] were all lacking.” (XXVI; PRE, 114-115; 
PRL, 83-84) 
Writing, as an artificiosus adminiculum memoriae opens and secures the 
space, material and foundation required for the conception and elaboration of 
historical form. Prolegomena also attributes to this “artifical aid” the status of a 
necessary supplement: a necessarius subsidius with which natural talent should be 
coupled, in order to produce articulate compositional wholes (XXVIII). Wolf thus 
brings to the foreground the famous and once more confirmed supplément of 
writing (Derrida 1967).  
It should be noted that the status of writing, in Wolf, is not at all that of a 
subsidiary device, dominated by the figure of fundamentally oral logos. Wolf’s 
supplément is a crucial occurrence that permits historical formness to deploy 
itself, eventually reaching a point in which forms of historical knowledge 
predominate over the quasi-formless products of memorial orality. In short, 
Wolfian logocentrism is not phonocentric in the rather simplistic way in which 
we often tend to think of modernity and its metaphysics. The referential 
connection between written forms and their oral precedents does not entail the 
reduction of the former to the latter. The opposite would be closer to Wolf. 
Orality, in order to be historically formed, would be largely dependent on the 
formational potential of writing. Writing, Wolf tells us, is what drives humans to 
explore and enact the possibility of forming articulate wholes:  
One motive among others [praeter alias causas] for seeking out that 
uninterrupted sequence [tenorem] could have been the very activity of 
writing [ipsa cura continua scriptionis], in which each poem had to be 
assigned its place [suus locus assignandus erat]. (XXXIV; PRE, 142; PRL, 115) 
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The formation of articulate literary wholes is also seen as conditioned by the 
emergence of reading activity, which would stimulate the written use of 
language : 
Since Homer lacked readers [lectores deerant], then I certainly do not 
understand what in the world could have impelled him to plan and think 
out [in consilium et cogitationem] poems which were so long [tam longorum] 
and were strung together with an unbroken connection of parts [continuo 
partium nexu consertorum]. (XXVI; PRE, 116; PRL, 86) 
The passage from orality to literacy would be co-extensive with the passage from 
a poetic to a prosaic culture1. This would be coupled with the establishment of 
the writing of books as a common custom (vulgarem consuetudinem scribendi 
librorumque conficiendorum curam) connected to the cultivation of prosaic 
discourse (cultura prosae orationis: XVII). We would have a book-culture, entailing 
the liberation from the constraints of poetic norms and from the corresponding 
limitations that memory imposes on linguistic form: 
For it seems clearly necessary that at the time when the Greeks seized the 
impulse to tear away the chains of meter and create prose [vincula metrica 
revellendi et prosam condendi] the art of writing [scriptoria ars] was 
sufficiently manageable, and a supply of instruments [copia 
instrumentorum] was ready which they could use for it without serious 
difficulty. […} I do not understand how on earth it could occur to anyone 
to compose anything in prose, unless he had available some storehouse for 
his composition other than his own memory [aliam  custodiam compositi... 
quam memoriam suam]. For memory is overwhelmed [obruitur] and the 
mind wanders and goes astray [vagatur et erat] in this free series of words 
[libera continuatione verborun], which is not bound by any fixed meter, nor 
set off, as it were, by any limits in which the speech must round itself off 
completely [orbem suum conficiat]. (XVII; PRE, 90-91; PRL, 54) 
The figure of an “overwhelmed” memory is quite noteworthy and persistent in 
Prolegomena. Later (XXIV), the learning (disciplina or discenda) based on writing 
(litteras) is elaborately juxtaposed to the faculty of memory. The early times of 
                                                   
1 “To attempt writing and to fit it to common use seems clearly to have been one and the 
same thing as to attempt prose and to set oneself to refine it” (XVII). 
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limited knowledge, Wolf tells us, allowed room for talents related to memory 
(brevior orbis duscendorum ingeniis quasi vacuitatem dabat). In the times of the 
activities of a more cultivated life (cultissima vita), involving broad learning 
through reading (multiplex doctrina, a lectiorum librorum revocata), overwhelmed 
the domain of memory (obruebant memoriam). Alluding to Phaedros, Wolf recalls 
the Platonic conundrum: 
[…] the discovery of letters had helped the branches of learning [inventas 
litteras profuisse disciplinis] but had hindered those who would learn them: 
in fact, the very invention that had been called the medicine of memory 
[medicament memoriae] might not unjustly be termed its injury and ruin 
[noxa …  et pernicies] instead. (XXIV; PRE, 109; PRL, 77) 
As it is usually the case with his rhetoric, Wolf here cites old authorities only to 
take measured distances from them. Nowhere in Prolegomena does he appear to 
regret, platonically, the obruere of memory by writing. On the contrary, he 
implicitly praises it. Instead, his criticism is directed against the persistence of 
poorly informed, memory-related habits preventing initial writing practices to 
fully accomplish their formative potential.   
Memory (rather than orality as such) and knowledge (enacted through 
writing) would thus be distinct epistemic realms, entailing tensions between 
initial emergences of formally defective constructs and subsequent attempts to 
recover historical forms of the past. History would be the field of such tensions, 
in which the latter eventually predominates over the former. Philology would be 
an agency crucially contributing to the culmination of the process.   
 
 
A.2.5. Scribal Vestigia 
 
Wolf warns, from the very outset of his Prolegomena, against  
[…] the wrong-headed view of those who even today seem to consider the 
text, which took its present shape little by little and as chance determined 
[textum, qualis paullatim forte fortuna factus est] as genuine and, almost, as 
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literally inspired by the Muses [genuinum ac prope Mousovpneuston]” (III; 
PRE, 49; PRL, 7). 
The idea that the Homeric vulgate was formed forte fortuna seems to be 
contradicted later. Recall that Wolf defends his approach against those who 
would understand it as saying that things or bodies have been created forte et 
casu1. Irony is at work, here, rather than contradiction. On its grounds, a 
historical dialectic tends to be articulated, through which the relations between 
the historical forms of the past and the expression of these forms in linguistic 
remains, are far from simple.  
As we have already seen, Wolf suggests that Homer’s original singing had 
already “spun the thread” of the subsequent articulation of larger artistic wholes. 
Specific characteristics of its diction would corroborate this suggestion: purity of 
structure, rhetorical moderation, narrative control. Homeric orality would be 
historically mature enough to have somehow anticipated its own written form 
and, through it, prosaic formness in general (quasi praenuncit pedestrem dictionem: 
XVII). This anticipatory praenuntiatio would explain why and how the original 
Homeric compositions are inherently related to their written reformation. 
Homeric scripta would thus retain and preserve the very formula of their 
historical origins:  
Nor indeed are the poems so deformed and reshaped [deformata et dificta] 
that they seem excessively unlike their own original form [suae formae] in 
individual details. Indeed, almost everything in them seems to affirm the 
same mind [ingenium], the same customs [mores], the same manner of 
thinking and speaking [formulam  sentiendi et loquendi]. (L; PRE, 210; PRL, 
205) 
Wolf questions the need of absolute representational similarity between 
originals and copies, as the guarantee of the validity of the latter. Differences of 
form between various oral or scribal versions of Homer are acknowledged by 
Wolf as an inevitable fact of historical life. Countering their disturbing mediation, 
                                                   
1 See quotation from chap. XXXI. of Prolegomena, in section A.2.3 above. 
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a genuine connection of historical knowledge can be established between the 
present moment and the remains of the past. The lurking threat of an overall 
chaos would be undone by the postulated advent of mature historical awareness, 
through which the dynamics of historical formness are accomplished, history 
ultimately affirming itself in its definitive and proper forms.  
A further figure enacted in Prolegomena displays more clearly the Wolfian 
reasoning: writing is a trace, a vestigium of historical form. Still marked by the 
akrisia of its overwhelmed memory, the antique past has been there, through its 
written constructs and remains, only as a trace of its own historical self. Early 
scripturae contribute, somewhat, to the exposition of the genuinely historical 
forms of their origins. Nevertheless, they also obscure them. Between the flying 
words of original Homeric orality and the imminent prospect of an effective 
textualisation of the Homeric poems, Wolf detects a long process of preliminary 
gestures of formation, gradually but also forte fortuna evolving towards 
maturation. The Homeric vulgate presents the modern philologist with the 
accumulated offspring of the corresponding toils. In it, writing retains its primal 
status of a vestigium, a trace of a history still mumbling or even silenced, 
incapable of clearly voicing its forms: 
[…] where history is silent or mumbles [tecet vel mussitat] [the true 
student] must be very willing to allow himself to be beaten by those who 
know how to interpret obscure report and uncertain traces of transmitted 
events [obscuram famam et incerta rerum traditarum vestigia] with more 
subtlety. (XI; PRE, 70; PRL, 31) 
Cutting through the obscure uncertainty of early scribal traces, the philologist 
investigates underground historical currents, eventually flowing forth as 
readable, textually restored forms:  
[…] it is necessary to investigate with the greater application the changes 
in the transmitted text, by examining those sources and currents [fontibus 
et rivulis] of them that either flowed forth in the past or are visible even 
today [qui vel olim manaverunt, vel etiam hodie patent]. (VII; PRE, 57; PRL, 16) 
Traces do not have an interest in and for themselves. They are pertinent 
only insofar as they can help us trace our way back or forth  (the two directions 
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being, in a sense, equivalent) to what they constantly risk obscuring by the very 
fact that they expose it only vestigially. In this sense, they are as provisionally 
necessary as they are necessarily imperfect – and ultimately dispensable, once re-
formed by the modern philological sense of historical formness. The prisca et 
genuina forma of the past, indistinguishably textual and historical, would thus 
emerge in and from the perspective of a presently imminent future. 
 
 
A.2.6. Tracing Textuality 
 
The analysis of early writing practices with respect to the oral precedents 
of Homeric poetry, is the first step of the Wolfian approach to the historical form 
of Homericity. The second step, to which I now turn, is the analysis of the 
consecutive modes of composing written artistic wholes qualified as Homeric, 
each presupposing a specific degree, more or less limited, of philological sense 
and historical awareness. Chapters XXXI-LI of Prolegomena present a “critical 
history” of the received Homeric manuscripts, reaching up to the Hellenistic 
ages. 
The Byzantine manuscripts were known, well before Wolf, to be relatively 
recent constructs, the production of which appeared to have entailed, for reasons 
unknown, the loss or destruction of all previous copies1. Wolf endorses, in this 
respect, the current view of four basic stages in the emergence and transmission 
of the Homeric poems2. The fundamental or foundational moment was the one of 
                                                   
1 Recall that Homer had constituted an object of indistinguishably aesthetic, moral and 
historical debate within the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. The debate had set the frame for 
Pope’s historical “Essay on the Life, Writings and Learning of Homer” answering, in measured 
erudite tones, the radical claims of the Modernes (1967, VII: 26-80.) 
 
2 R. Bentley, the only modern scholar whom Wolf acknowledges as a philological 
authority and a forerunner, had already operated a breakthrough in this respect, by formulating 
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the original emergence of some poetic artefacts, often considered, at least since 
Cicero, to have been oral compositions1. This entailed a second crucial moment, 
situated in early classical Greece: the first written version(s) of a corpus, 
especially of the Iliad and the Odyssey as two distinct poems by the same author2. 
The third moment was the one of the Alexandrian scholars, often assumed to 
have been the first to canonise and store in their Library (or Libraries) the ancient 
Greek written tradition as a whole. Finally, there would be a copying and 
circulation of a relatively standardised text, up to the Byzantine manuscripts 
themselves, as transferred to the West and eventually collated for printing. 
Wolf’s specificity lies in how he evaluates the contribution of each of these 
moments, under the perspective and criteria of modern philological sense and 
according to his problematics of textual formness. He innovates when, on the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the hypothesis of the “lost” Greek letter, the digamma. This suggested that the process of writing 
down and transmission of the Homeric poems had involved drastic linguistic changes. 
 
1 According to F. d’ Aubignac, in his 1715 Conjectures Académiques ou Dissertation sur l’ 
Iliade, Homer never existed; the transmitted Homeric poems are compilations of “tragedies and 
street-songs of beggars and wanderers à la manière des chansons du Pont-Neuf”, of around 300-
500 verses each. Wolf feels obliged to refer to d’Aubignac’s precedent, in spite of his indignation 
towards the “capricious temerity and ignorance of antiquity” of the French writer (XXVI, n. 84). 
G. Vico, R. Wood, J.-J. Rousseau were also well known to have raised, throughout the 18th 
century, the issue of a possibly oral original Homer having sung songs that bear a problematic 
relationship to the transmitted text. 
 
2A multiplicity of hypotheses, based on different ancient witnesses, were advanced in this 
respect, mostly situating this moment in 6th century Athens. One such hypothesis is that the 
writing-down of Homer took place under the instigation of Solon (who is recorded to have 
determined the correct order in which the poems should be sung in official festivals). Another, 
more influential hypothesis is the one to which we have already referred, as Wolf partly endorses 
it. A first written compilation of Homer would have occurred under the reign of Pisistratus – who 
is recorded, by late Hellenistic and Roman witnesses, as having ordered the assembling of the 
poems, in view of what came to be known as the “Pisistratedean recension”. 
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grounds of his analysis, he postulates that the entire process has produced no 
historically valid offspring in any one of its stages1. Specific instances of the 
process (namely, the largely hypothetical Alexandrian intervention) might be 
more reliable than the rest, providing the modern philologist with the grounds 
on which he could eventually perform his own critique and emendation of a 
readable Homer.   
The overall schema of Wolf’s historicisation of the writing and 
transmission of Homeric scripta2 is correlative with the elaboration of three kinds 
                                                   
1 On the divergence, in this respect, between Wolf and Villoison (who rather hoped for 
the discovery of a canonical antique original, though the investigation of the Venetus scholia) see 
Nagy (1997). 
 
2 Wolf distinguishes between the following phases:  
· circulation, compilation and perhaps partial and occasional writing down of different 
variants of Homeric songs by epic performers capable of remembering, possibly with some 
help of writing, not only specific poems but also wholes into which they were joined 
[raywdoiv] ;  
· some intervention on the part of political and cultural authorities, such as Solon and 
Lycurgos, imposing order or completeness on aoidic performances and thus implying a 
certain initial degree of canonization;  
· first official written recording of the poems coinciding with the first attempt to assemble 
them in the form of narrative sequences, under the Pisistratidae, but not reaching the 
authority of a canonised single authoritative text;  
· subsequent elaboration of a copying tradition parallel to the one of aoidic performance, 
involving systematic polishing but also corruption of the poems by revisers [diaskeuastaiv] 
whose work can be likened to the one of the repetitive staging and re-writing of plays);  
· centuries during which “nothing remained certain and constant” and no standard vulgate 
can be assumed to have been established;  
· critical correction or diorthosis if not edition in the modern sense of the term, operated by the 
Alexandrian scholars [grammatikoiv and filovlogoi who worked as diorqwtaiv], the first 
to have attributed to the texts an adequately historical form, substantially contributing to the 
eventual standardisation of a unified text; 
· post-Hellenistic copying by scribes [ajntigrafeivß]. 
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of distinct but firmly interrelated figures of scribal work. The figure of the poet as 
a primeval, almost a-historical genius, is preserved and well defended, 
rhetorically – no important faults ever being explicitly attributed to Homer 
himself, given the historical limitations of his natural genius. Formational 
deficiency or negativity is systematically charged to agencies of reproduction and 
transmission – from the antique rhapsodoi or diaskevastai to the Byzantine scribes 
or antigrapheis. Finally, there is the corrective authority of the informed scholar, 
from Alexandrian grammarians, grammatikoi or philologoi, to modern philologists, 
through which historical ties are eventually restored between the evolving 
human intellect and its poetic past.  
The notion of authorship, although retaining its nuclear significance 
through all of the above, undergoes considerable mitigation or even 
transformation. The author himself does not suffice to make history. Philological 
criticism becomes a necessary component of authorship, restoring literary works 
to their historical forms, countering formational deficiencies, not excluding those 
naturally and justifiably marking the original act of authorial creation itself. 
The overall process would include successive waves of progress and 
relapses of a tendency towards formative maturation. Wolf insists that between 
the initial writing-down of the poems and the Alexandrian intervention, starting 
no sooner than the third century B.C., “nothing remained certain and constant 
[nihil certum et constans fuit]” (XXV). As a result of the incompetence of early 
Greek compilations and recordings, the Alexandrians inherited, according to 
Wolf, a disparate and variable manuscript tradition composed of “several 
streams and different flavours” (XXXVIII). It is on the grounds of that hypothesis 
that the authority of the vulgate can effectively be circumvented by modern 
philology: there would simply be no identifiable Homeric original transmitted 
through writing. 
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The work of the Alexandrian scholars themselves is acknowledged by 
Wolf as having “long been the province of mildew and worms” of which “even 
the ruins have perished” (XLIX), leaving nothing but “scattered and wretchedly 
mutilated phrases” (XLV). Evidence concerning the reasoning or the rationale of 
the Alexandrian enterprise, or even its nature and extent, are, indeed, scarce and 
ambiguous1. Nevertheless, Wolf does risk the basic (and later much contested) 
conjecture that the Alexandrians drastically and positively affected the process of 
textualisation of the Homeric scripta. If no evidence or historical witnesses have 
survived to clearly prove it, this would be due to the fact that the Alexandrian 
heritage was transmitted to less competent hands, especially Byzantine ones. The 
Venetus marginal scholia, in their fragmentary status, would be of little essential 
value, precisely because they expose the incapacity of the medieval scribe to 
understand and appreciate his Hellenistic precedent. 
Alexandrians are considered by Wolf as having worked  “by cautery and 
surgery [urendo, amputando]” or “chopping and polishing [exasciando et poliendo]” 
(XLIX). They questioned verses (some of which have disappeared from the 
ensuing scripta, while others have persisted in some manuscripts) but never 
added anything to their received text (L).  
According to Wolf, only through this first outburst, however immature, of 
philological sense, a Homeric text of a more consistent form (constantior forma 
textus: XLI) emerged in history. The Alexandrian philologists, in other words, 
would be the first to have worked according to an idea, even if only a 
rudimentary one, of genuine textual form, a genuina forma textus, which would 
suit the poet: 
                                                   
1 As Wolf remarks  (XLVI) neither the scholia, nor any other source can help a modern 
reader to understand the exact nature of Alexandrian editorial work, or even the significance of 
the criticial signs, reproduced in manuscripts, which they had assigned to specific lines indexing 
a comment  of some sort concerning their authenticity or validity.  
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I should not wish all this to be construed as a denial on my part that good 
and careful emenders made use of ancient and choice manuscripts, and 
that by collating them they sought the genuine form of the text [genuinam 
formam textus]. Rather, for them the genuine form was that which seemed 
most to suit the poet [quae poetam maxime decere], and no one can fail to 
observe that in this respect everything revolves around the talent and 
judgement [ingenium et arbitrium] of the Alexandrians. (XLVII; PRE, 193-
194; PRL, 183) 
The Alexandrian audacia  and temeritas is seen as  having operated an 
insightful breakthrough, in spite of its correlative juvenile blindness. The Roman 
sequel is not systematically referred to, in Prolegomena. References are persistent, 
instead, to the relapse of the Byzantine times, the manuscript tradition of which 
is pictured as unable to sustain and transmit the Alexandrian progression. Wolf 
insists that the Byzantine scholia are not to be trusted either in their language or 
in their silences (XLIV). They should be used with extreme caution, solely as 
sources of dubious information on the Alexandrian commentary and editing 
practices (IV). The poetic corpus they have transmitted would need to be freed 
from their interpolations, which Wolf finds perfectly comparable to awkward 
modern imitations of Homeric style:  
Anyone would certainly find these verses and some others worthless, 
though by no means ridiculous, if Rhodoman had recently made them, or 
Barnes (for he now and then produces something de ménage [oi[koqen] as 
he says). But if they are the work of wits [ingeniis] buried centuries ago, 
will we not be permitted to reject them?  (XVIII; PRE, 61; PRL, 20-21) 
The erasure of the Byzantine component of the Homeric scripturae 
becomes a crucial step in the overall toil of the philological textualisation of 
Homer: 
But we do not even have that pure form of the Aristarchean text 
[Aristarchei exemplum integrum], the one of which the ancients most 
approved for a long time, but one reedited and reworked according to the 
views of different critics in the generations just after Christ’s birth, and 
finally smirched with new blotches by the barbarous times that soon broke 
in [postremo novis maculis per inguentia barbara saecula adspersum]. (XI; PRE, 
68; PRL, 28) 
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The vulgate that the Byzantines transmitted to modernity would thus be 
valuable only to the degree that it has been inescapably conditioned by its 
Alexandrian precedent. In spite of Byzantine incompetence, the manuscript 
tradition would have preserved a vulgatamque in eruditiore Graecia conformationem 
textus (XI), much better than the material that Alexandrians had themselves 
received.  
Wolfian philology thus undertakes the tracing of older threads of textually 
formative insights, while cutting through what it sees as the historically 
unreadable disarray of the Byzantine mediation. 
 
 
A.2.7. Restoring Textual Form 
 
Wolf implicitly questions both the possibility and the interest of a return 
to or recovery of originals in the form in which they initially emerged. He 
discredits, since the beginning of the Prolegomena, the possibility of re-composing 
(redigere) the truly integral texture (veritatem et integritatem textus) of Homeric 
compositions: 
This doubt [concerning the pertinence of recent manuscripts] may carry 
the implication that these sources cannot enable us to restore [redigi] 
Homer’s work [poeta nobis] to the genuine, pure form [ad veritatem et 
integritatem textus] which first poured from his divine lips [primum divino 
ejus ore fusi]. If so, I shall say later how willingly I follow this school of 
thought and line of reasoning. (II; PRE, 45-46; PRL, 3-4) 
The English translation corrects what it reads as a catachresis in Wolf’s Latin: a 
form has poured out of Homeric lips, not a textus. The notion of textus in the 
Prolegomena  is, however, interchangeable with forma. Wolf is saying that the 
textus which modern philology aims at reconstructing (the prisca et genuina forma 
to which the subtitle of Prolegomena refers), cannot be the same as the veritatem et 
integritatem texture that we can hypothetically attribute to the original Homeric 
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compositions. Historically genuine form would not rest on a strict compliance 
with the true and integral forms of original constructs.  
One can still hope, Wolf elsewhere affirms, to restore or re-call (revocare) a 
true form (vera forma), extracted from the Homeric scripturae and making a 
historically readable text out of their textus vulgaris: 
And these specimens of corrections in the vulgate text [vulgaris textus], 
selected from a great quantity without special care and suggested not by 
genius but by better manuscripts, may persuade anyone that by 
consulting purer sources [purioribus fontibus] the true form [vera forma] of 
the Homeric text [homericae scripturae] can be reconstructed [revocari] even 
today. (XI; PRE, 67; PRL, 27) 
The suggestion is only tentative. It is qualified and mitigated by what 
follows, where Wolf stresses the specificity of the Homeric scripta as juxtaposed 
to the manuscript traditions of other antique works. The early date of antique 
poetry, Wolf remarks, does not necessarily hamper the historical credibility or 
integrity of its scriptures (scriptorum integritatem). In fact, old manuscripts might 
be well preserved, provided copying is controlled and its offspring checked for 
inevitable mistakes. The initial conditions of the writing down of the Homeric 
scripta, however, were particularly uncertain and obscure. So much so that, if the 
notion of vera forma applies to Homer at all, it does so only in a sense that 
radically distinguishes its truthfulness from that of the works of Virgil, for 
instance. In the case of Homer, simple detection and correction of copying 
mistakes and forgeries would not be the main issue. The specificity of Homeric 
formness would reside in the fact that it compels the modern scholar to re-think 
what it means to restore historically a form nitorem et germanam: 
And if, finally, it can be shown by probable arguments and reasons 
[verissimilibus argumentis et rationibus] that this entire connected series of 
the two continuous poems [totum hunc contextum ad seriem duorum 
perpetuorum Carminum] is owed less to the genius of him to whom we 
have normally attributed it than to the zeal of a more polite age [sollertiae 
politioris  aevi] and the collective efforts of many [multorum conjuctis studiis] 
and that therefore the very songs [ajoidavß] from which the Iliad and the 
Odyssey were assembled [compositae sunt] do not all have one common 
author [ne... unum omnes auctorem habere]? If, I say, one must accept a view 
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different from the common one about all these things – what then will it 
mean to restore these poems to their original luster and genuine beauty 
[quid tum erit, hic Carminibus pristinum nitorem et germanam formam suam 
restituere]? (XI; PRE, 70; PRL, 30) 
What can it mean, to restore the textual formness of textually non-
determinate works? An answer is proposed in the posthumously published 
fragments of the unfinished “second part” of Prolegomena. The impossibility of 
restoring the original state of the poems is stressed, while the standards of 
“learned antiquity” are considered as setting the form philology should 
reproduce or imitate (reddere): 
For since it is quite impossible to restore this poet to his original state 
[hunc poetam nullo modo talem restituere liceat, qualis ab initio fuit], we must 
first relax to some extent the severe rule according to which, in other 
cases, we try to give nothing that did not come from the writers 
themselves [nisi quod profectum sit ad ipsis]; and we must be content if we 
can restore him to the form of which learned antiquity most approved 
[eam formam ipsi reddere licebit, quam erudita antiquitas maxime probavit]. 
(PRE, 220)1 
The Wolfian philological task is faithful, above all, to its own sense of 
historical formness – not to the forms of extant remains of the past, nor to their 
presumed originals. The philologically reformed text would be more valid, 
historically, than all initially produced and reproduced linguistic artefacts. It 
would expose more faithfully to knowledge the form of the cultus vitae, the 
historically situated essence that the original poet could only have enacted by his 
limited means. 
The objective of Wolfian philology would thus be to restore and continue 
the Alexandrian tradition of genuinely Homeric formness: not the original 
Homeric compositions but their textual potential. 
                                                   
1 The Latin version is drawn from the edition of Prolegomena by Bekker, Berlin, 1876, p. 
173. 
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And indeed, my single primary intention was to correct the text of Homer 
[textum Homeris] by the standards of learned antiquity [ad normam eruditae 
antiquitatis emendarem], and to display him in a text the wording, 
punctuation and accentuation of which, remade from the recensions that 
were once considered best, might – if one may properly hope for so much 
– satisfy some Longinus or other ancient critic who knew how to use the 
materials of the Alexandrians with skill and tact. (VI; PRE, 56-57; PRL, 15) 
It is through problematics such as the above that the notion of textus tends to 
acquire, in Wolf, the sense of a specific kind of validly readable form, effectively 
complying with norms of historical formness. The formative historical process 
substituting writing for orality would be accomplished by the further step of the 
definitive textualisation of writing. 
 
 
A.2.8. Constantior forma textus 
 
Renaissance scholars are known to have been persistent and systematic 
learners of languages, including Greek, and active readers both of printed texts 
and of manuscripts, stored in their private libraries. Their reading, as suggested 
by their own annotations or comments, often marked at the margins of their 
copies, involved not only hermeneutic and grammatical problematics but also 
questions about the conditions of formation of the received text1. At work were 
already basic components of editing techniques: recension and collation of 
manuscripts (collection and comparative examination of a large number of 
manuscript variants); emendation (readings of the editor based on inferences and 
eventually correcting the manuscript ones)2. 
                                                   
1 See Pfeiffer (1976), chap. 1 – and in particular p. 8 for the example of Petrarch’s 
manuscript Livy. See also Reynolds & Wilson (1968), chap. 4. 
 
2 Poliziano (1454-1494) is often acknowledged as the first to have formulated the principle 
of the preference of older to newer manuscripts.  
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This early Humanist textual work appears, to modern philological 
Textkritik and Textgeschichte, to have been insufficiently critical and historical. Its 
practitioners are often regarded as “self-satisfied polymaths filling enormous 
volumes with collected antiquities and reproducing in their editions of texts the 
accumulated notes of the last two centuries” (Pfeiffer 1976, 143). The fault would 
lie not so much in the rudimentary application of techniques, as in the lack of a 
rationale. Their “philology” was, in other words, far from Schlegel’s ideal of a 
philological philosophy and closer to his banausisch und grammatisch. 
The main concerns of early Humanist editors seem to have been to detect 
the degrees and loci of corruption with respect to a presumably original and 
faultless archetype. This archetype was seen as the beginning of a copying chain 
governed by intended fidelity to previous copies. Temporal distance counted 
only as a factor favouring the two main sources of corruption to be detected and 
controlled. The one was the very mechanics of the copying work or the 
inadequate knowledge of the language by the scribe. It would lead to 
unintentional and largely inevitable copying mistakes, mainly grammatical. The 
second and most poignant one was deliberate falsification, that is, forgery. The 
correlative question of authenticity of the textus receptus (especially in cases of 
texts of great religious or intellectual authority) was the crucial issue1. 
Philological history and criticism is often seen as having gradually 
matured through a series of philological endeavours preceding Wolf2. A few 
                                                                                                                                                       
On the history of textual criticism and editorial practices see: A. Dain, Les manuscrits 
Paris, 1964, 2d edition; B. A. Groningen, Traité d’ histoire et de critique des textes grecs, Netherlands, 
1963; G. Pasquali, Storia della tradizione e critica del testo, Florence, 1952, 2d edition. 
  
1 On authenticity and forgery in the field of modern Humanist scholarship, see in 
particular A. Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship, Princeton, 
1990. 
 
2 One could mention: R. Simon’s Critical History of the Old Testament, published in 1678; R. 
Bentley’s editorial work and historical inquiries into the history of the Greek language; J. G. 
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years before the publication of Prolegomena, J. G. Eichhorn  (a contemporary of 
Wolf and, like him, student of Heyne) had stressed that manuscript traditions 
raise questions of historical validity unsuspected by traditional problematics of 
forgery and authenticity. Their offspring would involve the merging of distinct 
moments of compositional activity, independently from the capacities and 
intentions of the scribes. Philological criticism would have to disentangle these 
moments, in order to arrive at historically homogeneous textual wholes:  
Were it now resolved to describe as forgeries all books whose every part 
and passage fell short of congruity in point of time, then truly very few 
genuine writings of the Hebrews would survive such a sentence; but at the 
same time this would be a great blow to the classics of both Greek and 
Roman antiquity. As with regard to the latter so in the case of the former, 
it behooves the higher criticism only to exercise its office and pronounce 
sentence after separating, from internal evidence, what belongs to 
different authors and times.1  
After a certain point of the transmission chain, the scribe would err not because 
of a lack of conformity to his originals but because of an excess of faithfulness to 
them – too unaware of their deceiving unity.  
The probing of Homeric scripta for the exposition of the different layers or 
components of their redaction, is also a basic postulate of historical readability in 
Wolf. However unified the vulgate appears as a literary construct, it would not 
be historically one. For antique texts to become historically readable, the notion 
of a historically valid textual unity had to be re-defined, against the impression of 
homogeneity given by scribal artefacts such as the one of the Homeric vulgate. 
It is a recurrent idea, in Prolegomena, that the Homeric scripta deceive by 
lending themselves to seemingly non-problematic reading as unified works by 
                                                                                                                                                       
Eichhorn’s Einleitung ins Alte Testament, published in 1787. Wolf’s Prolegomena refers to Bentley as 
its sole precursor. It also includes references to Eichhorn’s methodology (XXV and XXXIII). The 
case of Eichhorn as Wolf’s predecessor is particularly stressed in Grafton (1985).  
 
1 J. G. Eichhorn, op. cit., as quoted  in  PRE (229). 
 
73 
A.2. Textual Form 
the same author. Only the philological sense, in its most acute state, would cut 
through their deceiving uniformity: 
Ruhnken, indeed, said (having given the best verdict on the subject) that 
the point can be sensed by the expert but cannot be explained by the 
inexpert. Yet both of these [sensing and explaining] are much more 
difficult in those poems, separated as they are from one another by the 
space of only one or two centuries. They deceive us by their appearance, 
which is uniform in general and extremely similar to the rest [aequalibi im 
universum et ceteris simillima facie fallunt]. (XXXI; PRE, 133-134; PRL, 105) 
In spite of the fact that textual inadequacies could ideally be plainly felt by any 
reader, the common-sense reading would, understandably or even naturally, be 
misled by the vulgate, into constructing what should, instead, be deconstructed:  
True, not even the most erudite readers have felt difficulties of this sort for 
many centuries, though I would think no one of even average intelligence 
could avoid encountering them.  Perhaps one reason for this is that the 
poem’s continuous sequence deceived [perpetua series Carminum... fallens] 
their readers, thanks in part to their high reputation and in part to their 
own beauty, and thus banished any mediation on this matter [eius rei 
cogitationem longe amovebat]; and that we are almost all naturally more 
eager to join things together which are disconnected than to disconnect 
things which are joined together [dissoluta conjugere libentius quam juncta 
dissolvere]. (XXX; PRE, 127-128; PRL, 99) 
In a note to Prolegomena, concerning the famous “imperfect joints” 
detected in the vulgate, Wolf summarises his idea of historical or textual form as 
follows: 
[…] different men can follow different traditions in these matters, or the 
same man can follow different traditions in different writings, but the 
same man cannot vary in the same one [non idem in eadem variare], and 
indeed within the brief space of a single work [unius operis]. (XXX, n. 99) 
The main issue is the kind of wholeness and unity that the philological sense 
demands as a condition of validly readable textuality. For Wolf, relevant criteria 
stem from a culturally specific, historically situated authorial agency, the 
wholeness and unity of which sets the form that the text needs to comply with 
and to expose as an object of historical knowledge.  
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Specific rhetorical transpositions would thus be at work when constructs 
like the Iliad and the Odyssey are named Homeric or, more simply, Homer. There 
is, at a first level, a metonymic transfer from an authorial agency of production to 
the linguistic constructs produced – and transmitted through the meanders of 
initial compositional events and subsequent textualisation practices. The author, 
though, is also a figure. Its individual or collective entity is a synecdoche for a 
broader cultus of historical life. The textual form of a philologically restored 
Homer would literally be that of Homer as an authorial agency, to the precise 
degree that the latter stands as an instance of a historically situated cultural form. 
The above do not imply that the Wolfian idea of textuality derives from a 
notion of extra-textual formness. The opposite may very well be true. A specific 
idea of textual formness may be providing the paradigm for the philological 
understanding of cultural forms. In this sense, philology historicises textual form, 
only to the degree that it textualises historicity. The following passage from R. 
Bentley suggests as much. It comes from his Boyle Lectures and refers, not 
surprisingly, to Virgil – who may indeed have served as the prime example of 
philological textuality. Bentley’s rhetoric advances the figure of a well-formed 
text as the prototype of the form of the human body qua divine creation: 
We have formerly demonstrated that the body of man, which consists in 
an incomprehensible variety of parts, all admirably fitted to their peculiar 
functions and the conservation of the whole, could no more be formed 
fortuitously than the Aeneis of Virgil, or any other longer poem with good 
sense and just measures, could  be composed by the causal combination of 
letters. Now, to pursue this comparison, as it is utterly impossible to be 
believed, that such a poem may have been eternal, transcribed from copy 
to copy without any first author or original; so it is equally incredible and 
impossible that the fabric of human bodies, which has such excellent and 
divine artifice and, if I may so say, such good and a true syntax, and 
harmonious measures in its constitution, should be propagated and 
transcribed from father to son without a first parent or creator of it […]1 
                                                   
1 Quoted from Bentley’s Works, by  Pfeiffer (1976, 146). 
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Homer would be divine to the degree that any creative intellect, including the 
Godly one, is archetypically textual1. Philological metaphysics would thus be 
texto-centric rather than phono-centric. 
 
 
A.2.9. Textualising Homer 
 
What are the characteristics of the Wolfian idea of textual form? Recall 
that Wolf’s philological sense is practically non-definable: irreducible to concrete 
rules of thumb. Wolf’s rhetoric does not permit the reader of Prolegomena to 
clearly discern rules or principles of textual formness, specific criteria of a 
historically valid form. This would be the object of the announced but never 
written “second part” of the treatise. What we have, instead, are Wolf’s 
paradigmatic comments on more or less dubious aspects of the received Homeric 
scripta.  
The overall perspective, under which the notion of textual form is posited, 
is that of the relations between a whole and its parts. Wolfian rhetoric states the 
argument in all the ambiguity it needs in order to launch a long-standing debate. 
Should one decompose the vulgate in its original parts, or accept it, instead, as a 
reliable basis, provided its parts are somehow clearly displayed as such? 
I know how hard it is to forget Aristotle and the other literary theorists 
who drew their precepts from these parts long after they had firmly 
coalesced [quam partes hae firmiter coaluerant], but would it not be pleasant 
to obtain an example of the most ancient poetry once in a while by 
contemplating the parts [ex illarum contemplatione]? I know that all agree 
no one produced a very long work of this sort before Homer. I confess that 
whenever I return in spirit, so far as I can, to that ancient age, I find that 
these poems are not in the least displeasing when read this way, nor do I 
miss the wisdom of old age in this extraordinarily talented youth. (XXVIII; 
PRE, 122-123; PRL, 93-94)  
                                                   
1 Recall my quotation from Prolegomena XXXI, in section A.2.3, also bringing up the figure 
of divine creation as compared to the historical formation of Homeric scripta. 
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The reference to Aristotle is, most probably, to Poetics 8, where Homer’s 
techne and physis are praised for having attributed to the Odyssey the exemplary 
unity of mythos suitable for the poetic mimesis of a praxis1. Wolf, contra Aristotle, 
wants, as we have seen, a Homer excelling in the physis of a natural ingenium but 
wanting in the techne of an artificium structurae. More generally, Wolf postulates a 
notion of wholeness or unity and, ultimately, of form, very different from 
Aristotle’s. 
Through the ways in which the Prolegomena exemplify their critique to the 
extant Homeric scripturae, we can tentatively specify two main implicit principles 
of textual formness. We could name the one that concerns the integrity of scripta 
as a poetic composition, compositional coherence. The other would be idiomatic 
conformity, involving the norms of a historically identifiable language – from its 
vocabulary and morphology to its style and rhetoric2. Both principles, as 
paradigmatically exposed in Prolegomena, allow for an extremely wide range of 
judgements applied to the received scripta, controlling, but never totally erasing, 
aesthetic and, occasionally, socio-ethical problematics. Let us follow Wolf in how 
he detects and historically situates deficiencies of form in the vulgate – and how 
                                                   
 
1 Recall the following passage of the Poetics, where the mimetic unity is discusssed:  
“Aussi, de même que, dans les autres parts de la représentation, l’unité de la 
représentation provient de l’unité de l’objet, de même l’histoire, qui est représentation 
d’action, doit l’être d’une action une et qui forme un tout; et les parties que constituent 
les faits doivent être agencées de telle sorte que, si l’une d’elles est déplacée ou 
supprimée, le tout soit disloqué ou bouleversé. Car ce dont l’adjonction ou la suppression 
n’a aucune conséquence visible n’est pas une partie du tout” [51a, 30-35, as translated in 
Aristotle (1980)]. 
 
2 I will be using the term idiom to designate a specific language (or dialect) forming a 
historically situated system or structure of linguistic signs and mechanisms of signification. I will 
use idiom especially in contexts where it is necessary to clearly distinguish this meaning of the 
term language (close to the French langue) to its more general one (closer to the French langage).  
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he evaluates the hypothetical Alexandrian intervention as a first step in the right 
direction. 
The principle of compositional coherence is at stake when Wolf depicts 
problematic aspects of the vulgate, which he explains as reflecting operations of 
compilation of originally shorter songs. These aspects were sensed and debated 
as possible deficiencies long before Wolf – and continued to be so, long after him. 
The basic story is rather awkwardly interwoven with a series of side-stories that 
interrupt the progress of the main narrative. There are long digressions 
continuously impeding the flow of the narrative. Plot inconsistencies keep 
disturbing the reader's sense of the story. Repetitions are a structural dominant 
that does little to sustain the modern reader's attention. Characters seem to be 
lacking psychological depth and their behaviour often appears to be poorly 
justified. Finally, both the Iliad and the Odyssey are simply unnecessarily long.  
The main sign suggesting that such deficiencies are mostly due to post-
Homeric rhapsodic or scribal work, would be the passages that Wolf has 
qualified as “obvious and imperfectly fitted joints”1: 
[…] a number of obviously and imperfectly fitted joints [eminentes aliquot 
et hiantes commissurae] which I believe that I have found, in the course of 
very frequent readings, to be both the same and in the same places: joints 
of such a sort that I think anyone would at once concede, or rather plainly 
feel, once I had demonstrated the point with a few examples, that they had 
not been cast in the same mould as the original work [noncum primo opere 
fusas], but had been imported into it by the efforts of a later period. (XXX; 
PRE, 127; PRL, 99) 
Aristarchus would be the authority that contributed most decisively to the 
reformation of a Homeric textual construct complying, as much as possible, with 
the principle of narrative coherence:  
[Aristarchus] at length completed this polished and elegant redaction 
[policam et concinnam diaskeuhvn ÔOmhrikhvn] of Homer, in which the 
middle does not differ from the beginning, nor the end from the middle 
                                                   
1 These “joints” became most important objects of philological analytical criticism. 
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[in qua nec medium prim, nec imum discrepat medio], and it was perhaps he 
too who divided the two works into their present books. And therefore, if 
we are considering the general appearance and manner of the poems, 
there is no doubt that Giphanius [1572] rightly conjectured that our 
vulgate recension is the very one of Aristarchus. (XLIX; PRE, 205; PRL, 
198) 
Idiomatic conformity presupposes a historically identifiable linguistic and 
rhetorical usus poetae. It is also seen, by Wolf, as jeopardised by antique Greek 
akrisia and subsequent scribal labour. The vulgate would suffer gravely in this 
respect, in spite of the fact that “in general all the books have the same sound, the 
same quality of thought, language and meter [in universam, idem sonus est omnibus 
libri, idem habitus sententiarum, orationis, numerorum]” (XXXI). It would be the task 
of the philological sense, exercising its indistinguishably historical and aesthetic 
judgement, to investigate 
what is the unusualness [insolentia] of words and phrases and of what sort 
(for even the first book of the Iliad has hapax legomena), what is different 
and of disparate color in thought and expression [disparis coloris in 
sententiis et conformatione], what traces of another poet’s imitation lurk in 
the thing derived from Homer, but in such a way that the sinews [nervi] 
and the Homeric spirit [spiritus] are lacking, what is jejune and frigid 
[ieiunum et frigidum] in many passages […] (XXXI; PRE, 134; PRL, 105) 
 Alexandrian critics would also be the ones who initially imposed basic 
linguistic conformity on the Homeric scripta. Wolf attributes particular 
importance to Aristarchus’ critique of expressions that needlessly reduce the 
emphasis of a thought (L). He praises Aristarchus for “choosing, from a group of 
discordant readings, that one which best suits the genius and custom [ingenio et 
consuetidini] of Homer and is also the most appropriate to a specific poetic 
passage [ipsique loco optime conveniret]” (XLVII). The Alexandrian concern for 
metrical and grammatical regularity would also be highly relevant to textual 
form at the level of linguistic expression (XLIX). Grammar and metrics are 
acknowledged by Wolf as basic tools of textualisation, even if foreign to Homer’s 
times. The objective, as we have seen, is not the reproduction of hypothetical 
originals, but the extraction of form proper to historical reading.  
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If Aristarchus occasionally faltered, it would be in the direction of an 
excessive seriousness of mind or a formalistic frigidness of reasoning 
(yucrologiva, something close to a childhood disease of the philological sensus): 
For he [Aristarchus] sought out grammatical precision in more arid 
manner than was necessary, and he not infrequently corrupted the more 
daring and noble sentiments [audaciores generosioresque sententias] of his 
poet in order to bring them closer to nature and truth [ad naturam et 
veritatem]. We know few of his emendations and corrections of Homer and 
Pindar for certain, and even these include examples of a frigid logic 
[„˘¯ÚÔÏÔÁ›·] that is totally unacceptable in the emender of a poet. (XLVIII; 
PRE, 201; PRL, 193) 
Summarising the above, we can venture to construct the following list of criteria 
defining the philological idea of historically valid textual form. Compositional 
coherence entails, more specifically: 
· artistry of structure and composition – artificium structurae et compositionis 
(XXX); 
· planned continuity strung together through connection of parts – 
cogitationem longorum et continuo partium nexu (XXVI); 
· single basic plot interwoven with episodes – unam vel primariam actionem, 
episodiis intertextam (XXIX); 
· treatment of subjects in full through the management of successive parts – 
continenti tractatione partium (XXIX, n. 95). 
· non-ambiguity with respect to narrative flow (XXX, on Odyssey d.621-624).  
Conformity to the idiomatic habitus or a usus poetae would necessitate: 
· diction in accordance with an identifiable idiom with respect for rules of 
grammatical and metrical regularity (XXX, n.99);  
· avoidance of unnecessary repetition or of other kinds of redundancy, 
generating “discourse pertaining to nothing [lovgouß pro;ß oujde;n 
sunteivnontaß]” (XLVIII, n. 44); 
· sustained clarity of thought – which I propose for conformatio et tenor 
sententiae (IX). 
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· moderation of style (as opposed to insolentia) coupled, in the case of 
Homer, with youthful vigour and vividness. 
The above are, of course, among the common topoi of a more general, 
modern notion of formness applied to humanity as historical. Philology enacts an 
episteme on the grounds of which not only antique scripta but also literatures at 
large (including emergent practices of literary writing) are, correlatively, re-
formed so as to enact forms readable as textual. Publication norms and literary 
criticism correct eventual deficiencies or negotiate legitimate deviations.  
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A.3. CULTURAL FORM 
 
A.3.1. Form: Human 
  
I turn now to Wilhelm von Humboldt, in order to revisit sites of a more 
theoretical elaboration of the historicist notion of historical form1. I will first 
concentrate, in the present section of my work, on two of Humboldt’s short 
writings on history2. I will subsequently address, in my next section, his longer 
and more systematic essay on the structure of human languages.  
How does Humboldt’s notion of form (Form and, occasionally, Bild, in 
rather unspecified relations to Gestalt) relate to his notion of life in general, and 
human historical life in particular?  
The following passage from Humboldt’s Weltgeschichte essay tells how 
Leben (life) occurs in nature at large. It would emerge as Form, from the inside of 
individual wholes, against a background of formless masses of matter. 
“Organisation” and “character “ would be two different modes in which life-
                                                   
1 Recall that Humboldt, a pioneer of what evolved into the nineteenth-century tradition 
of historical linguistics, was also a most authoritative spokesman of German historicism, in its 
early idealist version. His work could be read as a conceptual elaboration of the basic premises 
which Wolf’s treatise has paradigmatically enacted. The exact relations of his theoretical 
discourse to the Wolfian philological paradigm should remain an open question for further 
investigation. 
 
2 I am referring, more concretely, to “Betrachtungen über die Weltgeschichte 
[Considerations on world-history]” (cited as Weltgeschichte) and to “Über die Aufgabe des 
Geschichtschreibenders [On the task of the historiographer]” (cited as Geschichtschreibender), 
which are actually lecture-notes dating from around 1820. My quotations from the German 
original will be from the first volume of the 1980 edition of Humboldt‘s Werke (cited as WRK). 
Translation will be provided in French, from the 1985 edition I have had access to (cited as 
Considérations). 
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forms subsist – the latter accounting for the specificity of human life as 
intellectual and moral, that is, cultural: 
 
Leben heisst durch eine geheimnissvolle 
Kraft eine Gedankenform  in einer Masse 
von Materie, als Gesetz, hersschend 
erhalten. In der physischen Welt heisst 
diese Form und dies Gesetz Organisation, 
in der intellectuellen und moralischen 
Charakter. Zeigen heisst, jene 
geheimnissvolle Kraft beginnen lassen, 
oder mit andern Worten eine Kraft 
anzünden, die plötzlich eine gewisse 
Quantität von Materie in einer durchaus 
bestimmten Form von der Masse losreisst, 
und nun fortdauernd diese Form in ihrer 
Eigenthümlichkeit allen anderen Formen 
entgegenstellt. (WRK, 572-573) 
Vivre signifie maintenir par une force 
mystérieuse la suprématie d’une forme de 
pensée, à titre de loi, dans une masse de 
matière. Dans le monde physique, cette 
forme et cette loi se nomment organisation, 
dans l’univers intellectuel et moral, 
caractère. Procréer signifie déclencher cette 
force mystérieuse, ou, en d’autres termes, 
allumer une force qui arrache 
soudainement de la masse une certaine 
quantité de matière sous une forme 
entièrement déterminée, et qui désormais 
oppose continuellement cette forme dans 
sa singularité à toutes les autres formes. 
(Considérations, 53)1 
 
Form acquires, in Humboldt, a status often explicitly configured as 
organisch (organic). Forms would emerge and evolve in time through events and 
processes leading from (sudden or even inexplicable) genetic occurrences to 
(ordered and predictable) maturation and decay or death. The figure of 
organicity includes a distinction between form proper or internal, and shape or 
external contours. As the Geschichtschreibender essay tells us, the human intellect, 
especially in the case of works of art, intends to reach, through imitation, the 
höhere Wahrheit of internal forms of wholes, cutting through external Umrisse: 
 
                                                   
1 I remind the reader that, as already stated in my “Introduction”, emphasis added in 
quotations by underlining is mine. In my eventual use of italics in quotations, I follow the 
original. 
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Die Nachahmung der organischen Gestalt 
kann auf einem doppelten Wege 
geschehen; durch unmittelbares 
Nachbilden der äusseren Umrisse, so 
genau Auge und Hand es vermögen, oder 
von innen heraus, durch vorhergängiges 
Studium der Art, wie die äusseren Umrisse 
aus dem Begriff und der Form des Ganzen 
entstehen, durch die Abstrahirung ihrer 
Verhältnisse, durch eine Arbeit, vermittelst 
welcher die Gestalt erst ganz anders, als 
der unkünstlerische Blick sie wahrnimmt, 
erkannt, dann von der Einbildungskraft 
dergestalt aufs neue gebohren wird, dass 
sie, neben der buchstäblichen 
Uebereinstimmung mit der Natur, noch 
eine andre höhere Wahrheit in sich trägt. 
Denn der grösseste Vorzug des 
Kunstwerks ist, die in der wirklichen 
Erscheinung verdunkelte, innere Wahrheit 
der Gestalten offenbar zu machen. (WRK, 
591) 
Deux voies s’offrent à l’imitation de la 
forme organique: soit que l’on copie 
immédiatement les contours extérieurs, 
aussi précisément que l’oeil et la main en 
sont capables, soit que, en partant de 
l’intérieur, on étudie au préalable la 
manière dont les contours extérieurs 
naissent du concept et de la forme du tout, 
qu’on procède à l’abstraction des rapports 
et qu’on se livre à un travail grâce auquel 
la forme soit d’abord saisie tout autrement 
que le regard profane ne la perçoit, puis si 
profondément renouvelée par 
l’imagination que, par delà même son 
accord littéral avec la nature, elle porte en 
elle une vérité plus haute.  
 
Car le plus grand avantage de l’oeuvre 
d’art est de révéler la vérité intérieure des 
formes obscurcies dans la manifestation 
réelle. (Considérations, 73-74) 
 
Geschichtschreibender continues by specifying that inner form has to do with the 
Wesen des Organismus (essence of the organism). As such, it assumes the status of 
an Idee  (idea ) in the case of mathematics; it becomes Begriff (concept) in natural 
sciences; for human sciences it is “Ausdruck der Seele, des geistigen Lebens 
[expression of soul or spiritual life]” (WRK, 593).  
Humans would emerge out of the larger setting of natural forces, as a 
particular form potential of spiritual life. As we read in the Weltgeschichte essay, 
humanity at large (or perhaps, humanness: Menschheit) enacts itself in time (zur 
Wirklichkeit kommt) as an overall Geist through a series of individual forms 
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emerging and evolving in incessant transformation. Observing such instances of 
the human spirit would be the most crucial task of the science of world-history:  
 
Der Geist, der diese [Menschheit] 
beherrscht, überlebt den Einzelnen, und so 
ist das Wichtigste in der Weltgeschichte 
die Beobachtung dieses, sich 
forttragenden, anders gestaltenden, aber 
auch selbst manchmal wieder 
untergehenden Geistes. (WRK, 570-71) 
L’esprit qui la domine survit à l’individu 
singulier, et le plus important dans 
l’histoire mondiale est donc l’observation 
de cet esprit qui perdure, prend des formes 
diverses, et disparaît souvent à nouveau. 
(Considérations, 51) 
 
 
In the Geschichtschreibender essay, Humboldt affirms that “ist daher alle 
Geschichte nur Verwicklichung einer Idee, und in der Idee liegt zugleich die 
Kraft und das Zeil [so is all history enactment of an Idea and in the idea lies both 
the force and the objective]” (WRK, 604). Shapes or figures (Gestalten) of human 
life would be enacting the formational potential of the idea of humanity, towards 
the realisation of which history would invariably tend:  
 
Das Ziel der Geschichte kann nur die 
Verwicklichung der durch die Menschheit 
darzustellenden Idee seyn, nach allen 
Seiten hin, und in allen Gestalten, in 
welchen sich die endliche Form mit der 
Idee zu verbinden vermag […] (WRK, 605) 
 Le but de l’histoire ne peut être que la 
réalisation de l’Idée qu’il parvient à 
l’Humanité d’exposer dans tous ses 
aspects et toutes les figures où la forme 
finie peut se lier avec l’Idée […] 
(Considérations, 86) 
 
Very much like Wolf, Humboldt understands forms of humanity as 
necessarily historical. According to the essay on Weltgeschichte, these forms 
would not immediately and clearly emerge as components of human life. They 
would be brought to the fore through the historical life of human conscience, 
eventually countering obscurity and disfigurement:  
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Die währe Individualität entsteht also von 
innen heraus, plötzlich und auf Einmal, 
und wird so wenig durch das Leben 
hervorgebracht, dass sie nur im Leben zum 
Bewusstseyn kommt, und oft noch 
verdunkelt, oder verdreht. (WRK, 573) 
L’individualité vraie surgit donc de 
l’intérieur, soudainement et tout d’un 
coup, et elle est si peu produite [brought to 
the fore] par la vie, qu’elle ne parvient à la 
conscience qu’au sein de la vie, et, en plus, 
de manière souvent obscure et fausse » 
(Considérations, 53) 
 
The task of the historian, like that of the philologist, would thus consist in 
restoring forms of human life, historically enacting the idea of humanness. 
The figure of organicity acquires a central importance in Humboldt’s 
configuration of human formness. It tells how the overall idea of Menschheit 
connects to its particular national-cultural instantiations. Humans would be a 
natural species, constituting an organic body structured into distinct levels of 
individual sub-species, organised themselves as classes of further individuals. 
Successive levels of individuality would connect to each other as leaves connect 
to branches and branches to trees. Through language and freedom (in other 
words, cultural dynamics) the human species historically develops and displays 
itself – at the most comprehensive levels of its idea, but also at the levels of sub-
species as well as of individual human beings: 
 
Das Menschengeschlecht ist eine 
Naturpflanze, wie das Geschlecht der 
Löwen und Elephanten; seine 
verschiedenen Stämme und Nationen 
Naturprodukte, wie die Racen Arabischer 
und Isländischer Pferde, nur mit dem 
Unterschied, dass sich im Keim der 
Bildung selbst zu den Kräften, die sich in 
jenen, uns sichtbar, allein zeigen, die Idee 
der Sprache und Freiheit gesellt, und sich 
L’espèce humaine est une plante naturelle, 
comme l’espèce des lions et des éléphants; 
ses différentes éthnies et nations, des 
produits naturels, comme des races de 
chevaux arabes et islandais, avec cette 
seule différence que, dans le germe même 
de leur culture, l’Idée de la langue et de la 
liberté s’unit aux forces qui seules se 
montrent visiblement à nous dans ces 
dernières et qu’elle y trouve un sol plus ou 
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besser oder schlechter besser. Der Einzelne 
ist in Verhältniss zu seiner Nation nur in 
der Art ein Individuum, wie ein Blatt im 
Verhältniss zum Baum, ebenso kann die 
Stufenfolge der Individualität weiter 
gehen, von der Nation zum Völkerstamm, 
von diesem zur Race, von ihr zum 
Menschengeschlecht. Nur innerhalb eines 
gewissen Kreises kann dann der 
Untergeordnete vorwärts gehen, 
zurückschreiten, oder anders seyn. (WRK, 
568-569) 
moins favorable. Un individu singulier 
n‘est par rapport à sa nation un individu 
qu’ à la façon dont une feuille l’est par 
rapport à une arbre; pareillement les 
degrés d’individualité peuvent s’étendre 
au-delà, de la nation jusqu’à la souche 
ethnique, de cette dernière jusqu’à la race, 
de celle-ci jusqu’à l’espèce humaine. Ce 
n’est qu’à l’intérieur d’un certain cercle 
que le terme subordonné peut alors 
progresser, régresser, ou différer. 
(Considérations, 49) 
 
Note that all levels of the structure are ontologically equivalent Stufenfolge. They 
all define the essential identity of human entities, structured in bifurcating levels 
of individuality. At the same time, subspecies is an individual whole in its own 
right, and so are the parts that constitute it as such. Historicist reasoning does not 
fear logical paradoxes: “Die Nation ist also auch ein Individuum, und der 
Einzelne ein Individuum vom Individuum [The nation is thus an individual and 
the singular individual an individual of the individual]” (WRK, 569). Individual 
human beings may thus perish, but an important component of their lives as 
humanly historical would persist at the level of their respective national, ethnic 
or broader historical classes.  
Under such a perspective, being essentially human means being, just as 
essentially, the subject of categories that name the different levels of organisation 
of the tree-organism of the human species. The leaf of Homer can only have been 
human as essentially as it has been part of an antique Greek branch of the 
evolving human spirit. This is the form that the historicist intellect can and must 
excavate out of the Homeric literary vestigia. 
Within the overall tree of ontologically equivalent and logically structured 
levels of human formness, the category of nationhood assumes a privileged 
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status. National Bildung (cultural formation) would be a most crucial knot in the 
articulation between individual human beings and their historically evolving 
species. The way Humboldt deals with the issue of human language brings this 
most clearly to the fore.  
 
 
A.3.2. Form: Linguistic 
 
The Wolfian transposition from historically specific cultus vitae to textus, 
implies that language is a medium of exposition and enactment of historical 
forms of humanness. Humboldt’s Sprachbau treatise1 provides us with conceptual 
formulations most pertinent in this respect. 
Humboldt understands human language in terms that we can qualify as 
indistinguishably anthropological and phenomenological2. Language originates 
in and enacts the intention of human consciousness; the latter receives and works 
on stimuli of phenomena standing as its objects.  
 
In die Bildung und in der Gebrauch der But the whole mode of perceiving things 
                                                   
1 I am referring to Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss 
auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts (Humboldt 1880). Various versions of this 
long essay date from the years 1827-1835. I will be using the English translation of 1988 (On 
language: The diversity of human language structure and its influence on the mental 
development of mankind) here abbreviated as Language. 
 
2 I use these terms in the following, rather broad sense. Anthropological would be 
approaches in which the human is understood as reducible to figures of empirical human beings, 
as bodily (or corporeal) and intellectual (or spiritual) compounds, whether individual or 
collective. Phenomenological would be approaches based on the idea that human practices (in 
particular linguistic ones) depend on how instances of human thought or consciousness relate to 
phenonena as manifested stimuli. 
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Sprache geht aber nothwendig die ganze 
Art der subjektiven Wahrnehnung der 
Gegenstände über. Denn das Wort entsteht 
eben aus dieser Wahrnehmung, ist nicht 
ein Abdruck des Gegenstandes an sich, 
sondern des von diesem in der Seele 
erzeugten Bildes. (Sprachbau, 72) 
subjectively necessarily passes over into 
the cultivation and use of language. 
The word arises from this very perceiving; 
it is a copy, not of the object itself, but of 
the image thereof produced in 
consciousness. (Language, 59) 
 
The English translation does not misread Humboldt, when it interprets 
Seele as consciousness. Humboldt’s text translates in phenomenological terms, 
indeed, the famous introductory passage of Aristotle’s Periv eJrmhneivaß (On 
interpretation, 16a, 4-5), which Cooke’s (1983) polyvalent reading renders as 
follows. “Words spoken [taŸ ejn th/`` fwnh``/] are symbols or signs 
[suvmbola, but later shmei`a] of affections or impressions [paqhmavtwn] of the 
soul [ejn th/`` yuch``/]” (114-115). The phenomenological twist consists in 
turning the Aristotelian psyche into the Humboldtian subjektiven Wahrnehnung – 
making Seele into a close synonym of Bewußtsein. Humboldt is followed in this, it 
should be noted, not only by nineteenth century historical linguistics but also, 
eventually, by the definition of sign in Saussurian semiology1. 
The intent of signification, entailing the Darstellung or primary 
presentation of a thought, is what, in Humboldt, accounts for the specificity of 
articulated sound as human and linguistic: 
 
Denn die Absicht und die Fähigkeit zur 
Bedeutsamkeit, und zwar nicht zu dieser 
überhaupt, sondern zu der bestimmten 
For the intent and capacity to signify, and 
not just in general but specifically by 
presentation of a thought, is the only thing 
                                                   
1 Recall that Saussure defines the “image acoustique” of the signifier as “pas le son 
matériel, chose purement physique, mais l’empreinte psychique de ce son, la représentation que 
nous en  donne le témoignage de nos sens”. The signified, would, in turn, be not an object but its 
mental or psychical “concept” (Saussure 1986, 98). 
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durch Darstellung eines Gedachten, macht 
allein den articuliert Laut aus, und es lässt 
sich nichts andres angeben, um seinen 
Unterschied auf der einem Seite vom 
thierischen Geschrei, auf der andren vom 
musikalischen Ton zu bezeichnen. 
(Sprachbau, 79-80) 
that constitutes the articulated sound, and 
nothing else can be stated to describe its 
difference from the animal cry, on the one 
hand, and the musical tone on the other 
(Language, 65). 
 
Other formulations, concerning the nature of human language, point to the same 
direction. Humboldt affirms, for instance: 
 
Die unzertrennliche Verbindung des 
Gedanken, der Stimmwerkzeuge und des 
Gehörs zur Sprache liegt unabänderlich in 
der ursprünglichen, nicht weiter zu 
erklärenden Einrichtung der menschlichen 
Natur. (Sprachbau, 64-65) 
The inseparable bonding of thought, vocal 
apparatus and hearing to language is 
unalterably rooted in the original 
constitution of human nature, which 
cannot be further explained.  (Language, 55) 
 
Humboldt’s problematics are often more sophisticated than passages such 
as the above suggest at a first reading. Human language, in Humboldt, is far 
from a simple instrument of enactment of thought as phone. It assumes the 
function of a formative organ of thought (bildende Organ des Gedanken). Thought 
and language thus tend to merge1. Language would always already be present in 
the soul in its entirety (der Seele in ihrer Totalität gegenwärtig: 98). It would enact its 
potential regardless of communication between man and man (Ohne daher irgend 
auf die Mitteilung zwischen Menschen und Menschen zu sehen: 67). Ultimately, it 
would be the very soul’s intention to utter it, containing only so much of the 
                                                   
1 “Sie [die intellectuelle Thätigkeit] und die Sprache sind daher Eins und unzertrennlich 
von einander” (Sprachbau, 64). 
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physical as external perception cannot do without1. If language consists in the 
outer manifestation of the spirit of a people, it is also identical to it: 
 
Die Sprache ist gleichsam die äusserliche 
Erscheinung des Geistes der Völker; ihre 
Sprache ist ihr Geist und ihr Geist ihre 
Sprache; man kann sich beide nie identisch 
genug denken. (Sprachbau, 52) 
Language is, as it were, the outer 
appearance of the spirit of a people; the 
language is their spirit and the spirit their 
language; we can never think of them 
sufficiently as identical. (Language, 46) 
 
The Sprachbau essay systematically investigates the relation between 
human languages and historically situated national cultures. The organic figure 
of a tree-organisation of the human species is steadily in the background. Human 
language is seen as individualisable on all possible levels of humanity, from that 
of mankind to that of individual human beings. Nations, however, are the 
instances most significantly affiliated to historically specific human languages: 
 
Denn so wundervoll ist in der Sprache die 
Individualisierung innerhalb der allgemeinen 
Übereinstimmung, dass man ebenso richtig 
sagen kann, dass das ganze 
Menschengeschlecht nur Eine Sprache, als 
dass jeder Mensch eine besondere besitzt. 
Unter den durch nähere Analogieen 
verbundenen Sprachähnlichkeiten aber 
zeichnet sich vor allen die aus 
Stammverwandtschaft der Nationen 
antstehende aus. (Sprachbau, 62)  
For in language the individualization with a 
general conformity is so wonderful, that we 
may say with equal correcteness that the 
whole of mankind has but one language, 
and that every man has one of his own.  
But among the linguistic similarities 
connected by closer analogies, the most 
outstanding is that which arises form the 
genetic relationship of nations (Language, 53) 
 
                                                   
1 “ […] nichts, als das ansichtliche Verfahren der Seele, ihn hervorzubringen, ist, und nur so 
viel Körper enthält, als die äussere Wahrnehmung nicht zu entbehren vermag” (Sprachbau, 80). 
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Greater or lesser family affinities and distances can thus be observed and 
studied between individual national languages1. Nonetheless, the notion of 
individuality of each national language as a historical whole is central to such 
scholarly research: 
 
Das vergleichende Sprachstudium, die 
genaue Ergründung der Mannigfaltigkeit, 
in welcher zahllose Völker dieselbe in sie, 
als Menschen gelegte Aufgabe der 
Sprachbildung lösen, verliert alles höhere 
Interesse, wenn sie sich nicht an den Punkt 
anschliesst, in welchem die Sprache mit 
der Gestaltung der nationellen Geisteskraft 
zusammenhängt . . . (Sprachbau, 17) 
The comparative study of languages, the exact 
establishment of the manifold ways in 
which innumerable peoples resolve the 
same task of language formation that is 
laid upon them, loses all higher interest if 
it does not cleave to the point at which 
language is connected to the shaping of the 
nation’s mental power. . .  (Language, 21) 
 
Linguistic Bildung would be the most telling enactment of the form proper to a 
national culture. Deeply rooted in a national mentality, it would be the organ of 
each national inner being and even this being itself2. 
How exactly is the connection established between a national spirit and a 
language? Humboldt identifies linguistic form (the Form of a Sprachbildung) as an 
innere Sprachform, an inner language-form defining the essence of a given 
language as national and historical3. Innere Sprachform is not a static structure, but 
                                                   
1 The figure governs, indeed, not only Humboldt’s historical linguistics but the whole 
tradition of comparative linguistics of the 19th century, with its inquiry into the basic “families” of 
human languages – amongst which there would be the Indo-european one, to which Greek is 
attached. 
 
2 “Die Sprache […] ist das Organ der inneren Seins, dies Sein selbst […]. Sie schlägt daher 
alle feinste Fibern ihrer Wurzeln in die nationelle Geisteskraft” (Sprachbau, 17-18). 
 
3 See especially Sprachbau, chap. 11. 
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a mode of formational potential –an energeia rather than an ergon, as Humboldt 
specifies (Sprachbau, 56). It would be the nucleus that accounts for a specific 
mode in which sound turns into articulate language. It would be identifiable, as 
such, only by well informed historicist sense:  
 
Das in dieser Arbeit des Geistes den 
articulierten Laut zum Gedankenausdruck 
zu erheben, liegende Beständige und 
Gleichförmige, so Vollständig, als möglich, 
in seinem Zusammenhange aufgefasst, 
und systematisch dargestellt, macht die 
Form der Sprache aus. (Sprachbau, 57) 
The constant and uniform element in this 
mental labour of elevating articulated 
sound to expression of thought, when 
viewed in its fullest possible 
comprehension and systematically 
presented, constitutes the form of language 
(Language, 50) 
 
Innere Sprachform would be characteristically at work in the Bildung der 
Grundwörter: the formation of the basic words of the corresponding language 
(Sprachbau, 59). This process would concern, to begin with, the basic biological 
mechanisms, through which vocal cords imitate and express thought-concepts, in 
onomatopoetically articulated sound. In the second half of the Sprachbau treatise, 
Humboldt ventures to classify different language-families from the point of view 
of their innere Sprachform. A series of different linguistic elements, well beyond 
the articulation of basic words, are taken into consideration. He investigates, for 
instance, grammatical structures, especially inflection rules; degrees and modes 
of formation and logical ordering of concepts; modes of integration into common 
speech of idioms as well as of poetic or philosophical traditions. The synthesis of 
the above would be the degree to which a language evolves according to a pure 
principle of regulated freedom (aus reinem Principe in gesetzmässiger Freiheit 
kräftig: 199), permitting subtlety and complexity in expression of thought.  
At the same time, all languages would ultimately tend towards the 
historical realisation of the principle of their essence as national – delimiting the 
mode of freedom proper to each language. Dialectics of organic maturation and 
decay would govern the corresponding dynamics. Each individual language 
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would be enacting the principle of its own historical form (Princip ihrer Bildung) 
leading to the historical completion of its being (Sprachvollendung Dasein) 
(Sprachbau, 26). The case of languages functioning at a universal or oecumenic 
level are seen as expressing phases of either primitive emergence or final 
degeneration of national linguistic forms. Humboldt explicitly refers to Greek as 
the exemplary case of such a process of gradual formation, maturation and 
degeneration (27-28). 
Connections between different linguistic forms would be events occurring 
through translation, furthering the overall process of historical evolution of 
languages. However, as each individual language is a structurally coherent 
whole, with its own world-view or Weltansicht, the effective crossing of the 
frontiers between different linguistic forms becomes somewhat problematic, if 
not impossible. As Humboldt remarks, the language that translates another, 
always tends to translate (hin-überträgen) its own self:  
 
Die Erlernung einer fremden Sprache sollte 
daher die Gewinnung eines neuen 
Standpunktes in der bisherigen 
Weltansicht sein, und ist es der That bis 
auf einen gewissen Grad, da jede Sprache 
das ganze Gewebe der Begriffe und die 
Vorstellungsweise eines Theils der 
Menschheit anthält. Nur weil man in eine 
fremde Sprache immer, mehr oder 
weniger, seine eigne Welt-, ja seine eigne 
Sprachansicht  hinüberträgt, so wird dieser 
Erfolg nicht rein und vollständig 
empfunden (Sprachbau, 73) 
To learn a foreign language should therefore 
be to acquire a new standpoint in the 
world-view hitherto possessed, and in fact 
to a certain extent is so, since every 
language contains the whole conceptual 
fabric and mode of presentation of a 
portion of mankind.  
 
But because we always carry over, more or 
less, our own world-view, and even our 
own language-view, this outcome is not 
purely and completely experienced. 
(Language, 60) 
 
Different languages, differently evolving towards the accomplishment of 
their respective formational principles, would have different ways and degrees 
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of effectively connecting to each other, conditioned by their respective historical 
positions. This standpoint implicitly posits an additional, typically Humboldtian, 
as well as Wolfian, postulate. Within the setting of world-history, human 
linguistic formness as such becomes transparent, as object of knowledge, to 
languages, and only to languages, formally advanced to a stage of mature 
historical awareness. The modern sense of history, overcoming the limitations 
and constraints of translative crossings, would eventually permit access to any 
human language as properly historical. Ideally, there would be no language 
either “dead” or “foreign” to an intellect that can bring back to life all human 
languages as objects of its knowledge. Historicism thus posits, in an apparent 
paradox, the overcoming of historical and linguistic differences otherwise 
postulated as incommensurable – such as those between antique or dead 
languages and modern or living ones.  
The historicist intellect can thus be seen as creating and occupying a 
position over and beyond the field of history and its national-linguistic 
territories. Assuming the role of an agency of ultimate historicisation of history, it 
situates itself at the outer edge of the realm of history, overcoming its constraints 
and limitations. Philology can thus assume the authority to restore, as a 
corrective sensus, the formational deficiencies of scribal artefacts, according to 
principles of validly readable textual formness. Its Wolfian task, akin to the 
Humboldtian quest of the inner Sprachbild of national languages, would be prior 
to and over-determining any current reading tasks, including translative ones. 
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A.4. DEBATING THE QUESTION 
  
A.4.1. Negotiating Homericity 
  
The Wolfian paradigm established the grounds on which the Homeric 
Question has been debated by the modern academic discipline of philology. The 
debate concentrated on a series of particular problems that Wolf highlighted as 
most pertinent. How far do the transmitted scripta comply with principles such 
as those of narrative coherence and expressive conformity? If they are found to 
deviate, should one attribute the deviance to defective mechanisms of 
transmission and proceed to drastic emendation or reformation? Should one, on 
the contrary, resituate the moment of the Homeric cultus vitae or mitigate 
principles of textual formness, so that the deviance may be excused or justified, 
according to the conditions of the initial emergence of the poems? The debate has 
been invariably seen as organised around two poles1: the pole of the analysts and 
the pole of the unitarians. Analysts, often considered as expressing the new 
orthodoxy of the German philological tradition, are most critical with respect to 
the readability of the received vulgate. Unitarians, mostly affiliated to traditions 
situated outside the field of German historicism (such as British classical studies 
or extra-academic erudition), are resistant to the Wolfian breakthrough.  
The analytic standpoint, particularly influential or even predominant 
during the 19th century, drives Wolfian criticism to its extremes by holding firmly 
to principles of textual formness and by regarding the received vulgate as highly 
questionable. The hypothesis of original compositions of limited extent, 
emerging relatively early in history (and, in any case, before the invention or 
expansion of alphabetic literacy), is retained with particular emphasis. At the 
                                                   
1 I have already indicated my main references on the history of the Homeric Question. 
Most interesting and informative, for a history of the post-Wolfian philological debate, are Dodds 
(1954), Lesky (1967), Heubeck (1988) and Turner (1997). 
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foundations of Western literary tradition there would be primeval expressions of 
inaugural poeticity, not all-encompassing literary artefacts. Homer would be a 
figure naming the idiosyncratic authorial agency of such beginnings. Initially 
short songs, gradually added around some initial common nucleus, were later 
joined into a whole, by the ingenious yet poetically problematic agency of a 
“bungling redactor” (Dodds 1954, 2). A tradition of diverse streams of copying 
and editing followed, on which Hellenistic scholarship imposed some 
homogeneity. The Byzantine vulgate would be the most recent offspring of the 
process. The most extreme instances of analytic criticism hold that the Homeric 
vulgate has to be decomposed into its different initial songs – starting, of course, 
with the dissociation of the older Iliadic songs from the most recent Odyssean 
ones1. 
                                                   
1 The following contributions have been particularly influential within the analysts’ field. 
G. Hermann’s De interpolationibus Omerici, 1832, was the first to formulate a theory which 
eventually acquired a predominant position: gradual formation of the Iliad on the basis of an 
initial poetic nucleus identified as the song of the “wrath of Achilles”. He was later considered, 
by more radical analytic tendencies, as aesthetically or linguistically conservative. K. Lachmann, 
advanced his “lay-theory” of the constitution of the Iliadic poem in his Betrachtungen über Homers 
Ilias, 1847. He precluded the existence of an identifiable unitary original song. According to 
models of folk-poetry, he distinguished up to 18 original Kleinlieder within the vulgate corpus of 
the Iliad. A. Kirchhoff was the first to have intensively applied analytical criticism to the Odyssey, 
in his Die homerische Odyssee und ihre Entstehung, 1859. The poem as we have it would be the 
rather awkward product of the toils of a Bearbeiter, compiled out of three distinct original songs 
(the one of Odyssey proper, the one of the voyage of Telemachos and the one of the Vengeance 
against the suitors). Wilamowitz could also be considered as initially endorsing analytic 
tendencies, especially in his Homerische Untersuchungen, 1881. An eccentric version of post-
analytical criticism later emerged in France. V. Bérard, in his 1924-1925 edition of Odyssée, opts 
for a unified Homeric text faithfully expressing the reality of its historical times. However, only 
extensive emendation and reformation would allow the recovery of the original Homeric text – 
clearly exposing, amongst others, the exact trajectory and timing of Odyssean travels. Bérard 
(1925) rejects the Wolfian legacy in quite polemical terms.  
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The unitarian position appears to have gained ground parallel to the 
development of English and American classical philology since the end of the 
19th century. It has been particularly favoured by such events as Schliemann’s 
archaeological findings and conjectures, which were initially seen as confirming 
the hypothesis of a historically identifiable Homer, having poetised historically 
verifiable events, to which he would be relatively close. An earlier dating of the 
invention and expansion of alphabetic literacy could corroborate the hypothesis 
that some form of writing may have been used by the poet. The basic claim is 
that the vulgate is adequately, if not perfectly, readable as the sequence of two 
compositional wholes, most probably by the same author. Problems of 
incoherence or inconsistency exposed by analysts would be dispelled through a 
deeper understanding of the overall structure of the poems – or, eventually, by 
mitigating and relaxing, although never radically questioning, the standards of 
textual formness themselves. The beginnings of modern literary tradition would 
thus reside in the extraordinary accomplishment of a poetic genius, however 
difficult it might be to account for its emergence.  
An alternative unitarian solution to the Homeric problem has been to 
distance Homer from the Mycenean age and situate him well into the “dark” 
Iron Age, later than Wolf or the analysts suggested. Writing could thus have 
significantly contributed to the Homeric compositional breakthrough, while also 
enabling the early standardisation and relatively unbroken chain of transmission 
of a genuinely Homeric vulgate. The latter, not drastically affected by the 
Alexandrian intervention, would suffer only from minor defaults of instability, to 
be depicted and edited1. 
                                                   
1 G. Hermann’s “nucleus” theory has been seen, as we have said, as basically unitarian in 
its implications. G.W. Nitzch is considered as the first and most influential German advocate of a 
clearly unitarian refutation of Wolf, arguing for a synthetic Homeric genius  – in his De Historia 
Homeri, 1830-37. The English extra-academic historian G. Grote, in his History of Greece, 1846, 
favours the quasi-unitarian view of a kernel of originally oral Homeric compositions. The 
canonical editions of A. Ludwich (Homer 1891; 1907) are grounded on research of analytical 
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The compromising “neo-analytic” standpoint is a re-formulation of the 
unitarian view of a relatively late Homer, in terms informed by analytic 
problematics1. The received texts are considered as Homeric but only under a 
                                                                                                                                                       
fervour but endorse unitarian premises. W. Leaf, in his 1915 Homer and history, maintains a very 
influential unitarian standpoint. In combination with Schliemann’s discoveries, Homer is 
redefined by Leaf as a bard of early aristocratic courts, having little to do with the analytical and 
romantic imagery of a Volk singer. Leaf’s historical perspective also acknowledges and ponders 
on the problematic status of Homeric poetry with respect to modern readability criteria. G. 
Murray’s Rise of the Greek epic, 1907, develops British unitarianism in a different direction. Murray 
opts for the idea of a Homeric “traditional book” integrating long-standing cultural traditions 
into poetically problematic but historically significant “monuments of the civilised humanity in 
the West” (Turner 1997, 144). Wilamowitz, in his Die Heimkehr des Odysseus, 1927, seems to be 
moving towards a unitarian compromise, including strong reservations with respect to the 
literary quality and value of the received Homeric poems. Th. W. Allen, with his work around the 
Oxford edition of Homer (Homer 1919) and the Prolegomena to his editio major of the Iliad (Allen 
1931), has been the most influential and authoritative advocate of a highly sophisticated unitarian 
tradition. Strong unitarian statements have also marked the development of American philology. 
J. A. Scott’s The unity of Homer, 1921, strongly criticises the Wolfian tradition. In France, Mazon’s 
1937-1938 edition of the Iliad remains on unitarian grounds, but is also poignantly aware of the 
complex and problematic nature of the manuscript tradition (see also Mazon 1959).  
 
1 Wilamowitz exemplifies, through his long and prolific career, the gradual passage from 
an extreme analytic position to a quasi-unitarian compromise. His Homerische Untersuchungen 
(op. cit.) restates and elaborates the analytic viewpoint of Lachmann and Kirchhoff, rejecting any 
idea of a coherent Homeric corpus in antiquity, although situating writing, together with Homer, 
very early in time. His Die Ilias und Homer (1916) moves Homer from the 10th century to the 
middle of the 8th, favouring the hypothesis of a basic initial Iliadic corpus, integrating earlier 
developments of the aoidic tradition. Die Heimkehr des Odysseus (op. cit.) situates the Odyssey at 
the closing of the tradition and allows for the possibility of a late Homer reassembling the chaos 
of discrepant branches of aoidic tradition. See, in this respect, Clarke (1981, 165) and Myres (1958, 
chap. 9).  
J.H.O. Immisch, with his Die innere Entwicklung de griechischen Epos, 1904 and G. Murray 
(op. cit.), have contributed a lot to historical problematics over the processes and mechanisms of 
the emergence, subsistence and gradual extinction of the Greek epic tradition. More strictly 
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perspective that considerably mitigates the status of their compositional unity – 
as well as the nature of Homer’s genius. Homer would be the culmination rather 
than the inauguration of an age-old aoidic tradition. He would have composed 
his poetry by integrating diverse and multiple elements of this tradition into a 
new synthesis of his own. The unitarian ideal of a foundational poetic instance is 
thus retained, but its role changes, taking into account analytic suspicion1. The 
object of philological inquiry is transposed accordingly: from the textual criticism 
of the received vulgate, to the investigation of its earlier sources and of the 
strategies that integrated them into the Homeric compositional whole.  
The more recent and currently prevailing “oral theory” of Homer is a most 
fruitful attempt to combine the basic Wolfian postulate of originally oral 
Homeric compositions with a defence of the received scripta as historically 
readable documents2. Its most interesting aspect, for our purposes, resides in its 
                                                                                                                                                       
philological, the work of D. Mülder is considered as the inaugural statement of the neo-analytic 
compromise, towards which the field of philology gradually evolved. Die Ilias und ihre Quellen, 
1910,  set the task of reading the transmitted text as properly Homeric, while systematically 
investigating its historical background and earlier poetic sources. W. Schadewaldt’s Von Homers 
Welt und Werk, 1944, distinguishes within the Homeric corpus the basic or primitive trend of 
Iliadic grandeur and a second, more sophisticated tendency involving religious and moral 
problematics, of the type that predominate in the Odyssey. Also influential in a neo-analytical 
direction has been the work of I. Th. Kakridis. 
 
1 See for example the statement of Kakridis (1954): 
“The image of Homer which thus gradually begins to be formed is exactly what one 
should expect from the genius of a Greek poet: he is tied to the long-standing tradition of 
his country, while rescuing the tradition by creating a world of his own.” (195; my 
translation). 
 
2 The pioneering role in this respect is invariably attributed to Milman Parry. The 
posthumous publication of his collected works (1971) comprises a series of treatises and essays 
mainly published during the period 1928-1937. Systematic references to the “oral theory” of 
Homer as a new or even revolutionary tendency, joining philological research to anthropological 
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critique of the philological principles of textual formness and readability. The 
vulgate would be a valid document to the precise degree that it is an 
idiosyncratic linguistic construct, governed by non-textual principles of 
composition and necessitating different skills of reading. The “oral theory” of 
Homer could thus be considered as a largely post-philological development. As 
such, it will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
 
A.4.2. Variance 
 
New manuscript Homeric material has been brought to light since Wolf – 
especially papyri, mostly fragmentary, dating from Hellenistic and Roman times. 
We can distinguish, today, the following categories of Homeric scripta1: 
· Byzantine parchment or paper codices (the oldest extant integral one, still 
being the tenth-century Venetus A Iliad);  
· papyri (mostly fragments of scrolls), discovered throughout the nineteenth 
and especially since the beginning of the twentieth century, dating from 
                                                                                                                                                       
inquiry, appear in the 1960s – see for example Dodds (1954). A. Lord’s Singer of tales (1960) is 
most often considered as the paradigmatic work in this respect, Lord being Parry’s student and 
collaborator. A clear indication of the dominating position that this tendency has gradually 
acquired in the field of Homeric studies is the characteristic difference, in structure and overall 
orientation, between the old and the new Companions to Homer (Wace and Stubbings 1962; 
Morris and Powell 1997; see in particular the “Editor’s Introduction” to the latter). The 
impression is analogous in the case of the most recent analytical commentaries on the Iliad  and, 
especially, on the Odyssey  (Kirk, 1993; Heubeck, 1992) 
 
1 Scattered information on the subject of this section can be found in many publications, 
especially introductions to philological editions of Homer. Most comprehensive and 
bibliographically informed is Halsam (1997) who estimates at around 1000 the overall number  of 
extant Homeric documents (including fragments). 
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early third century B.C. to eighth century A.D. (most of them from the 
third and second centuries A.D., no more than 40 earlier than 150 B.C.)1;  
· citations of older authors (including Plato and Aristotle as well as minor 
authors, systematically recorded and investigated only after Wolf)2.  
The poetic corpus seen as carried by this material does not appear to have 
significantly changed since Wolf. Contemporary philologists still talk, however 
tentatively, of a Homeric “vulgate” 3. Passing from late antique to medieval 
                                                   
1 Allen (1931) lists and classifies 188 manuscripts for the Iliad. Myres (1958, 13) gives the 
number of 76 for the Odyssey. Allen also lists 122 papyri fragments for the Iliad, a figure raised to 
372 by Mazon (1959) – whose papyri contain a total of 13542 verses. Bérard (1925) lists a number 
of papyri close to 90 for his Odyssey. Reynolds and Wilson (1986, 192) raise the total figure of 
papyri fragments to 600, post-Ptolemaic in their majority, with 15 containing Alexandrian critical 
signs.  
The first papyrological document, containing fragments of 19 books of the Iliad, was 
published as early as 1819 by Cardinal Angelo Mai. An impressively large number of them came 
to light during the years 1899-1902 in Oxyrynchus: they provided scholarship with early copies of 
extensive passages of antique texts. Since 1889 we have systematic annual publishing of 
papyrological material. For an introduction to papyrology see E. G. Turner, Greek Papyri, Oxford, 
1980. For details on the Homeric papyri from the Ptolemaic Age (edited and commented with 
respect to their significance, as compared to the Byzantine manuscript tradition) see West (1967) 
as well as the more recent and comprehensive D.F. Sutton Homer in the papyri, Atlanta, 1991 (APA 
computer software). 
 
2 Byzantine codices and older papyri or parchment scroll fragments constitute the two 
basic sources of Homer up to now. Citations of lines referred to as Homeric found in other 
antique texts are a third and supplementary source. The cases of Plato and Aristotle are the most 
famous ones, but the field extends to lemmata cited in Byzantine lexicographic and scholiastic 
works, for instance. The authority of these witnesses is conditioned by our scant knowledge of 
the very norms governing citation practices in older times. 
 
3 Halsam (1997) remarks the following with respect to the reference of the term vulgate: 
“Furthermore, the very term “vulgate” is a misnomer. It designates no particular version 
of the text; there is no vulgate of Homer as there is a vulgate of the Bible. It is convenient 
to be able to refer to any given reading of all or most of the medieval manuscripts as the 
vulgate reading. But that is no more than a form of shorthand. By an extension of this 
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manuscripts, we would have a multiplicity of variants of this corpus, retaining 
the perplexing status of a “rather Protean thing” (Halsam 1997, 56). Wolfian 
analytic philology raises, as we have seen, the question of the properly historical 
unity of the vulgate: recorded variants could be evidence of a multiplicity of 
corpi circulating before our oldest extant sources. Of what kind and range is the 
variance that marks the Homeric scripta as we have them?  
Variance occurs on three relatively distinct levels: the materiality of the 
scribal artefacts (that is, the signifier in the strict sense of the term); the language 
of the poems (in the sense of the enacted idiom); the poetic corpus (in the sense of 
a compositional whole). 
Philology has always seen the materiality of the scribal signifier as being 
of a minor, purely technical importance. Variance, in this respect, ranges from the 
vehicle of inscription and the technique of writing to the articulation of the 
corpus. Homeric documents start circulating as codices, replacing scrolls, around 
the third century of our era. Parchment replaces papyrus at a slower rate – and it 
is later replaced by paper. There is systematic separation of words at least since 
the third century before our era. Punctuation appears to be established after the 
fifth century A.D., while the use of accents continues to vary. The separation of 
different rhapsodies of the Homeric poems does not occur in papyri earlier than 
the second century A.D. – but it is often considered as a pre-Alexandrian 
convention. Scholiastic and other exegetical annotations, including interlinear 
                                                                                                                                                       
shorthand the collectivity of such readings will be the vulgate text. But that is a construct 
which may never have had any existence in the real world, and it would be wrong to 
view any given manuscript as a more or less deformed version of it. What the 
manuscripts reflect is a host of concurrent variants jostling for preference, and there was 
no point in time at which this was not the case. Over time some variants dropped out, 
others came to the fore. The stabilisation of the 2nd century B.C., however drastic, was still 
only relative. Manuscripts continue to show a great deal of textual variation (more than is 
sometimes made out) but its range is narrower than seems to have been the case earlier. 
In this context the “vulgate” text may mean the collectivity not just of majority readings 
but of all readings in subsequent general circulation, as distinct from the different textual 
instantiations of the early Ptolemaic manuscripts. In this sense the vulgate text is a real 
thing, but far from a uniform entity.” (63) 
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translation, only gradually acquire the extensive character that marks the 
Byzantine manuscript of the tenth century1. These changes were not seen as 
significantly affecting the literary construct at stake: techniques and methods of 
palaeographic decipherment and transcription would neutralise the 
corresponding differences. 
The kind of variance that has mostly attracted the attention of philological 
editing concerns the linguistic-idiomatic and the compositional components of 
manuscript Homer. In both cases, a consensus seems to be firmly established on 
the following assumption. Variance is relatively limited, never reaching the point 
of suggesting that one or the other document carries a corpus, or fragments of a 
corpus radically different from that of the vulgate whole.  
Within the Byzantine tradition, as recorded in the philological apparatus, 
morphological or syntactic variance is sporadic. Differences between 
manuscripts at the level of whole lines mainly concern the addition or omission 
of verses highly repetitious and formulaic. We do not have cases of differently 
composed larger compositional segments. One can thus wonder indeed over the 
“strikingly uniform medieval manuscript tradition” (Lamberton 1977, 33). 
 Papyrological findings also seem to corroborate the idea of a unitary, 
albeit varying, idiomatic and compositional whole2. Some fragments suggest the 
circulation of “wild” or “eccentric” corpi until the first century B.C: they include 
a number of “plus-verses” suggesting compositions longer than the vulgate3. 
                                                   
1 For a concise summary of such changes and variations see Halsam (1997, 57-60); for a 
more general approach see Reynolds & Wilson (1991). 
 
2 Halsam (1997) talks of an early construct of  “different physiognomy” than the medieval 
one (64) but also affirms that “ancient manuscripts vary among themselves in much the same 
way as the medieval, only more so” (97). 
 
3 According to Halsam (1997), such verses “slow the pace of the narrative without 
materially altering the action” (66). 
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These verses, however, are mostly repetitions of lines also occurring in the 
vulgate, which do not significantly alter the compositional whole (West 1967, 13; 
Mazon 1957, 70). All papyri dating later than the first century B.C. reproduce 
parts of an overall corpus practically identical with the Byzantine vulgate, with 
variations mainly grammatical and orthographic1. We can thus safely talk of a 
poetic corpus highly standardised at least since the first century B.C. and 
persisting up to and through the medieval manuscript tradition. This moment 
comes shortly after the times of Hellenistic scholarship and may thus suggest 
that Alexandrian scholars significantly contributed to the standardisation. 
Questions can be raised, of course, about the situation before the moment 
of a relative standardisation of Homer. Citations by old authors have been used 
as sources referring us to Homeric corpi circulating in times older than those of 
our oldest extant manuscripts. They do presents us, occasionally, with lines or 
small passages unknown to the vulgate. Nevertheless, he corresponding corpi 
would still not be radically different from the corpus of the medieval codices and 
Ptolemaic papyri (Mazon 1959, 66, n. 3)2. 
The discovery of older material, in other words, has accentuated the old 
paradox of the emergence and persistence of a relatively stable Homeric corpus. 
                                                   
1 See Allen (1931, 195) for a strong statement in this respect. West (1967) is more 
ambiguous but does not question those premises. See my next section for more details on the role 
of the Alexandrian critics with respect to the transmission of Homeric scripta. 
 
2 A. Ludwich in his Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen, Leipzig, 1898, collects 
259 citations adding up to 520 verses. He concludes with the suggestion that a Homeric vulgate, 
not radically different from the medieval one, was already established in early antiquity (Mazon 
1959, 66, n. 3). Lamberton (1997, 33) illustrates how “there are formidable obstacles to answering 
these questions prior to the Hellenistic period”. 
The possibility that a multiplicity of versions of Homer were in circulation in pre-
Alexandrian antiquity does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that one of these versions 
enjoyed some kind of a higher canonical authority.  
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It is, consequently, not surprising that modern philology did not manage to 
effectively break the authority of the medieval vulgate, in spite of the continuing 
debate. Wolf himself never went so far as to present an edition standing up to the 
desiderata of his Prolegomena1. Heyne, Wolf’s teacher and antagonist, published, in 
1802, an edition of the Iliad which has been qualified as a “second princeps” 
(Allen 1931, 267). It set the norm of the modern apparatus criticus, systematically 
recording variant manuscript readings. A series of editions followed, affiliated to 
different national or inter-national philological entreprises. Different editorial 
conventions have been used to mark suspected interpolations or repeated lines – 
most of which remain in the edited corpus2, which varies mostly at the level of 
sporadic grammatical and orthographic choices3. 
                                                   
1 His first educational edition of Homer had already appeared in 1784-1785 and his 
second, definitive edition appeared in 1804-1807, with a long preface on the history of the text, 
but without substantially differing on the level of the text itself. 
 
2 The 1895-1987 edition of Van Leewen and Da Costa is noticeable. It prints the “lost” 
digamma (first introduced in by Bekker in 1843) but also identifies and annotates all repeated 
passages. The Lipsiae editions of Ludwich (Homer 1891; 1907) take into consideration a larger 
number of manuscripts and set the norm for the collation of newly discovered papyri. The 
Oxford editions of T. W. Allen and D. B. Monro  (Homer 1919), as well as Allen’s 1931 editio major 
of Iliad have largely canonised the assumption of a pre-Alexandrian vulgate, relatively well 
preserved by the medieval tradition. More radical in its reference to pre-medieval corpi, is 
Bolling’s 1950 Ilias Atheniensium (aiming at the reconstruction of the Pisistratedean original and 
its Attic forms while respecting Alexandrian critical signs, especially the athetesis). Von der 
Mühll’s 1946 Odyssey is also marked by analogous preoccupations. For more information see 
Halsam (1997, 99-100).  
Parallel to new editions of Homer, we have had autonomous editions of the Byzantine 
scholia and connected exegetical works. See in particular Dindorf (1855; 1888) and Erbse (1988). 
See also Eustathius (1960; 1971). For more information on the different editions of Homeric 
scholia and their methodological presuppositions see Nagy (1997). 
 
3 The choice of readings largely depends on the degree to which the editor conforms to 
variants of the Byzantine vulgate or opts, instead, for readings hypothetically closer to 
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The apparatus criticus could thus be considered as the most important 
innovation of modern philology as compared to older editorial traditions. It 
states the sources of the chosen readings and records discarded variants found in 
other sources: it controls the authority of the modern editor rather than that of 
the manuscript tradition. There is an ironic twist in this: modern philological 
criticism appears to have affected the authority of its vulgate much less than 
Wolf wanted his Alexandrian precursors to have affected their own received 
material.  
The question that remains open is how to account for the exact conditions 
under which the Homeric corpus persisted as a relatively standardised one. 
 
 
A.4.3. Transmission 
 
 The notion of transmission has been of a key-concept of modern philology 
at large, and of the debate over the Homeric case in particular. I am not sure that 
Wolf would use the notion any less ironically than he uses vulgate. His approach, 
as I have tried to show, questions the idea, implicit in transmission, that memory 
and its common technical supports, including early writing practices, could 
adequately carry genuine historical forms. The alternative or, at least, 
complementary idea of a gradual and largely irregular process of initial 
formation and textual reformation of scribal material, would be closer to Wolfian 
problematics. Modern philology has been persistently lagging behind Wolfian 
sophistication in this respect. This is perhaps especially true for the unitarian 
standpoint, but it also holds for the analytical one. Post-Wolfian philology has 
been marked by an overall tendency to understand the editorial task as driving 
                                                                                                                                                       
Alexandrian suggestions or older versions of Homer. A most recent tendency in editorial norms 
(Thiel 1991; 1996) is to privilege the medieval vulgate at the expense of older readings while 
minimising the role of the apparatus. 
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us back to an original. This original would be recoverable through a sort of 
reversal or even erasure of the chain of transmission that mediates between 
antiquity and modernity.  
T. W. Allen, a most authoritative advocate of British unitarian Homeric 
philology, has developed an influential body of arguments in favour of the pre-
Alexandrian establishment and unhindered transmission of the Homeric vulgate 
(Allen 1924). The historical mechanisms sustaining such an emergence would 
consist in the relative autonomy of the field of book-production and circulation, 
with respect to scholarly practices and editorial concerns. The field was already 
in work, according to Allen, in Pisitratedean times. It entailed the institution of 
scriptorial agencies for which the “only law was the correct copying of their 
original” (327). The offspring of their work would have persisted in spite of or 
even against scholarly tendencies such as those enacted by Alexandrian critics 
and modern analytical philologists1.  
                                                   
1 Allen (1924) presents a quantitative analysis of the percentage of readings of each of the 
major Alexandrian critics (as recorded by the scholia) that have passed onto the medieval 
vulgate. The conclusion reads: “There is nothing to show that the Alexandrians wrote 
commentaries otherwise than upon texts of practically the same bulk as those we possess; their 
comments assume a normal text and the same we possess” (319). 
See also Reynolds & Wilson (1968, 13) for a discussion of analogous quantitative 
evidence. This position does not seem to be in any way contradicted by Fraser (1972, chap. 8) who 
summarises and elaborates updated historical research. Mazon (1959) holds a rather 
compromising view according to which “si nos manuscrits ne sont pas ‘aristarchiens’ ils ne 
continuent non plus la koinhv; ils ont subi une influence alexandrine et représentent une 
tradition mélangée.” (27). The main impact of the Alexandrian intervention is seen by Mazon as 
residing in the definitive omission of a certain number of lines (see especially pp. 32-33). West 
(1967, 17 and 27) doubts the relevance of papyrological witnesses in this respect.  
Analytical “aristarchomania” has also been criticized on broader, historical grounds. 
According to Pfeiffer (1968, 215 et seq.) Alexandrian critics mainly acted as “men of letters”, 
immediate successors and students of poets, never actually assuming the role of philologists in 
the modern sense of the term.  
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However “conservative” this approach may be, its theoretical challenge is 
quite significant, although rarely, if ever, acknowledged or addressed as such by 
its advocates. It exposes the persistence of literary formations as a phenomenon 
irreducible to developments at the level of textual and historical awareness. It 
encourages research on the idiosyncrasy of the very activity of manuscript 
copying, countering the Wolfian sense of scribal negativity. This should include 
antique, but also medieval manuscript traditions, the history of which had been 
recently acknowledged as “uncharted territory” (Halsam 1997, 89).  
The task of philological Textkritik1 is often presented in terms that express 
a rather simplistic conception of the operations and workings of manuscript 
traditions. The objective of editorial criticism would be to discover or to 
hypothetically reconstruct a unique source lying at the beginning of copying the 
copying chain and its bifurcations. Ideally, this would be close to the archetypal 
Urtext of which all received manuscripts have derived. The corresponding 
                                                                                                                                                       
More recently, van Thiel, in his edition of Odyssey (Homer 1991) insists that “Auch die 
Alexandriner kannten keinen anderen als unseren Text” (Halsam 1997, 87).  
For older criticism of the Wolfian hypothesis of an editorial chaos reigning up to the 
Alexandrian times, see the study of Ludwich on the antique citations of Homer, already cited. 
 
1 The technicalities and terminology of philological Textkritik were elaborated and 
canonized not by Wolf, but by his successors in the field of German philology. Lachmann, in his 
edition of the New Testament, provided the paradigm for the “stemmatic theory”, which we 
briefly discussed here. 
A standard short manual has been P. Maas’ Textkritik, Leipzig, 1927 (1st edition) updated, 
in English, by West (1973). Also basic is A. Dain’s Les Manuscrits, Paris, 1964. For details on the 
constitution and evolution of the methodology of philological textual criticism see: R. Devreesse, 
Introduction à l’ étude des manuscrits grecs, Paris, 1954; W. W. Greg, The Calculus of variants, Oxford, 
1927; S. Timpanaro, La genesi del metodo del Lachmann, Padua 1981 (3rd revised edition). 
Particularly interesting accounts of problems concerning specific case-studies are offered by: R. 
Renehan, Greek textual criticism: A Reader, Cambridge Mass., 1969; A. Severyns, Texte et apparat: 
Histoire critique d’ une  tradition imprimée, Bruxelles, 1962.  
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methodology (paradigmatically inaugurated by Lachmann, shortly after Wolf) 
reconstructs genealogical ties between manuscripts and groups of manuscripts, 
according to the arborescent figure of a stemma codicum. Stemmatic affinities 
would be betrayed by copying mistakes that different manuscripts display in 
common. The logic of the model implies the existence of a single archetype, 
usually situated early in the Middle Ages1. Allen (1931), for his major edition of 
Iliad, has elaborated and altered the model by proposing a highly influential, 
even if often contested (both in its application and its principles) classification of 
Homeric manuscripts in “families”2.  
A basically organic and, more specifically, biological configuration of the 
structure of manuscript traditions marks such approaches. Their regression with 
respect to Wolfian theoretical sophistication and methodological flexibility comes 
to the fore with particular emphasis when the philological task is pictured as a 
simple reversal of the process of textual transmission: 
The business of textual criticism is in a sense to reverse this process, to 
follow back the threads of transmission and try to restore the texts as 
closely as possible to the form which they originally had. Since no 
autograph manuscripts of the classical authors survive, we are dependent 
for our knowledge of what they wrote on manuscripts (and sometimes 
editions) which lie at an unknown number of removes from originals. 
These manuscripts vary in their trustworthiness as witnesses to the 
                                                   
1 Wilamowitz, in the last part of his Geschichte der Philologie, comments on the 
methodology of textual criticism. He insists on the complexities of the task, but also on the idea 
that emendation should lead as closely as possible back to the “original act of authorsrhip” (1982, 
170). Nevertheless, he questions the hypothesis of a single archetype (171). 
For a more detailed description of the stemmatic model see Reynolds and Wilson (1968, 
ch, 6, 208 et seq.) For a critical discussion of related issues see Cerquiglini (1989, 75-77). 
 
2 None of the families into which Allen classifies his 188 manuscripts presents substantial 
differences with respect to the rest, except for family “h”. The unusual number of Aristarchean 
readings present in the latter is explained by Allen as the result of copying mistakes owed to 
“transference from the marginalia” (1931, 209 et seq.) 
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original texts; all of them have suffered to some degree in the process of 
transmission, whether physical damage, from the fallibility of the scribes, 
or from the effects of deliberate interpolation. An attempt to restore the 
original text will obviously involve the use of a difficult and complex 
process, and this process falls into two stages [recension & emendation]. 
(Reynolds and Wilson 1968, 207) 
Mazon, in his French edition of the Iliad, although accepting the idea of a 
persistent vulgate, questions the consistency of Allen’s “families” as well as the 
assumption of a single archetype standing at the origins of extant manuscripts. 
He proposes a more complex image for the transmission process: 
ll ressort déjà de ces indications que la tradition médiévale manuscrite de 
l’ Iliade est une des plus contaminées qui soit, ou, plus exactement, une 
des plus mélangées. Ce fait s’explique par le caractère originel du texte: 
nous verrons que si haut que nous remontions, nous avons toujours 
affaire à une vulgate. Il s’ explique aussi par l’ histoire de ce texte au 
Moyen Age. L’ Iliade a été transmise dans un grand nombre de manuscrits 
et nous constaterons qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’essayer de restituer un 
archétype. (Mazon 1959, 8-9) 
A method of recension aiming at the reconstruction of a codex optimum, according 
to selected criteria by which extant manuscripts are appraised independently of 
their position in a stemma, is presented in Reynolds and Wilson (1968, 216 et 
seq.)  
The idiosyncrasy, if not the enigmaticity, of the mechanisms and processes 
of the manuscript tradition, starting with the Byzantine copying practices and 
scriptorial institutions, remains to be theoretically addressed. An original that is 
not necessarily like its initial self could be persisting as such through copying 
practices that do not simply transmit a given archetypal construct.  
 
 
A.4.4. Learning the Language 
 
The language of Homer has borne no other name than “Homeric” – no 
further category having adequately qualified its historical specificity as a distinct 
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variation of antique Greek. It should be recalled that the Homeric poems are the 
only extant witnesses of their language. They thus enact it in its entirety – with 
the possible exception of their Hesiodic counterpart. A dimension that was only 
implicitly addressed by Wolf, but which greatly preoccupied early Humanist 
Homeric scholarship is that of the learning of this language.  
“The nature and historical formation of the Homeric dialect” has been 
recently qualified as “the longest-standing of all Homeric problems” (Morris and 
Powell 1997, xvi). The term “dialect” itself is certainly part of the problem. It 
assumes that Homeric Greek complies with categories and problematics of 
historical and comparative linguistics applied to national languages and their 
families or branches. The use of the term thus begs the main question: the one of 
the very status of the Homeric language as a historically identifiable linguistic 
idiom1.  
Philology encounters, indeed, major difficulties when venturing to situate 
Homeric Greek in its relations to hypothetically reconstructed spoken Greek 
dialects at the age around which the poems are supposed to have been originally 
composed and initially circulating2. Note, for instance, how Horrocks, in his 
elaborate contribution to the New Companion to Homer, acknowledges the 
difficulty, if not aporia, of a historical linguistics of Homer: 
The language of the earliest Greek poetry therefore displays a clear 
dialectal character, but interestingly one which never corresponds to the 
“official” dialect of any given city or region (insofar as these are known to 
                                                   
1 Recall that I use the term idiom to refer to the lexically, morphologically and 
syntactically distinct fields of languages or dialects, to which we currently attribute names like 
Greek, Latin, English . I tend to use language as a more general term, closer to the French langage. 
  
2 Such are, mainly, the Ionic and Aeolic dialects (to which Homeric seems to be 
particularly akin, eclectically using morphological and syntactical features of both). Attic or 
properly classical Greek also comes in the picture, especially when alphabetic recording is 
concerned. 
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us). Instead each genre employs a form of language which exhibits certain 
distinctive “markers” of the dialect group to which the spoken and official 
varieties of its supposed region or origin belonged, but which 
conventionally eliminates narrow linguistic parochialism in favour of a 
more stylised diction which conveys its dialectal affiliations in a rather 
neutral way and which, in varying degrees, reflects authorial ambitions to 
reach a panhellenic audience. (Horrocks 1997, 195)  
The reference to a “panhellenic” audience is one direction in which the solution 
to the problem has been sought. The other has been to consider the Homeric 
idiom as a kunstsprache: an idiom artistic or even artificial – in a way even more 
pronounced than in the case of other literary variants of antique Greek. Although 
the term has lost much of its older value and impact, the problem that it has 
exposed persists – namely, the resistance of Homeric Greek to historicist 
linguistic categorisations. 
 The phenomenon that I wish to emphasise (and trace back to Wolf’s 
Prolegomena in its connection and juxtaposition to the Humanist tradition) may 
sound paradoxical: philology reads Homer by somewhat circumventing the 
problem of the learning of the Homeric language. The theoretical premises of 
such a standpoint are at work in how Humboldt posits the accessibility of 
linguistic forms to modern historicist intellect1. 
Philological modernity has been systematically working, of course, on the 
Homeric vocabulary, grammar and syntax2. We also know that innumerable 
philological studies probe the meaning and connotations of specific Homeric 
words, phrases or figures. I do not intend either to disregard such labour or to 
                                                   
1 See section A.3.2 above. 
 
2 Comprehensive manuals of Homeric grammar have appeared since the 19th century, 
claiming the application of a historical method breaking with traditional grammatical formalism: 
Monro’s A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect, Oxford, 1882; van Leeuwen’s Enchiridium dictionis 
epicae, Leyden, 1894. Chantraine (1988; 1st edition 1942-1953) reflects recent developments, 
informed by tendencies of structuralist linguistics.  
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doubt its authority. Nonetheless, I would like to ponder on how, in its scholarly 
approach to Homeric language, philology tends to erase or cut through the 
mediation of post-Homeric Greek lexicographic and exegetical material. Modern 
philology presupposes a somewhat direct access to Homeric Greek, 
circumventing or bracketing the translative task enacted by the latter. In this, 
modern philology differs significantly from earlier Humanist approaches to 
Homer.  
 It is a commonly accepted fact that “knowledge of Greek became an 
attainment of exceptional rarity throughout the Middles Ages” in the European 
West (Reynolds and Wilson 1968, 118). Petrarch is known to have regretted the 
fact that he could not read the Homeric manuscript he had sought and received1 
and to have prompted, together with Boccaccio, a translation of Homer into Latin 
prose by Leozio Pilato, in Florence2. Dante, before him, and Chaucer, after him, 
also read Greek authors only in Latin translation. So did Chapman, whose 
translation into rhymed iambic couplets of The Whole Works of Homer, Prince of 
Poets, published between 1611 and 1615, is the first entire Iliad and Odyssey, 
turned by a single hand into a modern European language (Clarke 1981, 57). 
Recall that the appending of a Latin translation to the edited Homeric original 
was an established norm for early modern editions of Homer.  
Greek began to be systematically taught in the West around the end of the 
fourteenth century, by invited Byzantine scholars. Its academic or quasi-
academic learning expanded, throughout Humanist Europe, in the grounds of its 
                                                   
1 Note the following from Petrarch’s Familiarum Rerum Libri 18, 19 January 1354: “Homer 
is mute to me, or rather, I am deaf to him. Still, I enjoy just looking at him and often, embracing 
him and sighing, I say ‘Oh, great man, how eagerly would I listen to you” (Clarke 1981, 57; from 
Petrarch’s Opera, Florence, 1975). 
 
2 See Pfeiffer (1976, pp. 8, 38, 43 et seq.) for information on the tentative or completed 
renaissance translations of Homer into Latin prose or hexameters by scholars such as Lorenzo 
Valla, Politian, Samxon.  
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neo-Latin oecumenicity. This was not a learning of “antique” or “classical” 
Greek. As the Erasmian model exemplifies, the learning of Greek included the 
language of pagan Greek literature but also that of the Old and New Testament – 
in conjunction with Hebrew. In other words, older versions of Greek, including 
the Homeric one, were learned under the perspective of, not only other old 
languages, but also more recent forms of Greek. However scant or spurious, 
Byzantine lexicographic material was among the “favourite queries for the 
Hellenists of the day” (Grafton 1991, 13)1.  
A different tendency emerged as the idea of the antique, if not archaic 
status of Homeric poetry gained ground. Consider, for instance, the following 
argument of Johnson, commenting on Pope’s uncertain knowledge of Greek. The 
translation of Homer through the mediation of Latin would present no 
inconvenience, precisely because the poetic language of Homer, as an archaic 
one, is most easily and effectively translatable: 
Minute inquiries into the force of words are less necessary in translating 
Homer than other poets, because his positions are general and his 
representations natural, with very little dependence on local or temporary 
customs, on those changeable scenes of artificial life which, by mingling 
original with accidental notions, and crowning the mind with images 
which time effaces, produces ambiguity in diction and obscurity in books. 
To this open display of unadulterated nature it must be ascribed that 
Homer has fewer passages of doubtful meaning than any other poet either 
in the learned or in modern languages […] Those literal Latin translations 
were always at hand, and from them he could easily obtain his author’s 
sense with sufficient certainty; and among the readers of Homer the 
                                                   
1 The French Humanist scholar Casaubon is recorded as having identified the Byzantine 
dictionary of Hesychius as “the greatest treasure of human learning now extant”. The editio 
princeps of the extended Homeric twelfth-century commentary of Eustathius was appreciated as a 
major event for Homeric scholarship. Together with the interlinear translations of the poems into 
Byzantine Greek and the rest of the marginalia  (occasionally and eclectically printed along with 
the poetic corpus), Eustathius must have functioned as a basic educational tool for the learning of 
the Homeric language. 
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number is very small of those who find much in the Greek more than in 
the Latin, except the music of numbers.1 
Pope, in his introduction to his translation of Homer, insists, indeed, that 
the Homeric language, once envisaged in its antique status, is particularly 
accessible to an adequately disposed modern intellect. The poetically learned 
modern translator can cut through the mediation of accessory material 
accompanying the conventional ways of learning and reading Homer. This 
“fortification” of Homer by his antique and, especially, medieval Greek readers 
would be a burden from which the modern reader should free himself (and the 
poems): 
I must confess the Greek fortification does not appear so formidable as it 
did, upon a nearer approach; and I am almost apt to flatter myself, that 
Homer secretly seems inclined to correspond with me, in letting me into a 
good part of his designs. There are, indeed, a sort of underlying auxiliaries 
to the difficulty of the work, called commentators and critics, who could 
frighten many people by their number and bulk. These lie entrenched in 
the ditches, and are secure only in the dirt they have heaped about ’em 
with great pains in the collecting it. But I think we have found a method of 
coming at the main works by a more speedy and gallant way than by 
mining underground; that is, by using the poetical engines, wings, and 
flying thither over their heads. (Pope 1967, VII: 4) 
The modern poetic intellect sees itself as entitled and able to reach its own 
antiquity by crossing over piles of poetically and historically indiscriminate 
trivia. Such trivia, it should be noted, Pope is otherwise eager to show that he has 
effectively visited and assimilated. He constantly refers, in his annotations, to the 
corresponding authorities, especially Eustathius. 
 For Wolf, the reading competence of a modern intellect is no longer that 
of poetic sensibility but, rather, that of historical awareness. In Prolegomena, he 
evaluates the contribution of post-Alexandrian lexicographers and grammarians 
with respect to the learning of Homer’s language. He mainly refers to late Greek 
                                                   
1 Cited in Pope (1967, vol. VII, “Introduction”, lxxxiii). 
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antiquity, but everything he says also concerns the Byzantines, through which 
much of the corresponding material circulated. Wolf talks, in other words, about 
Pope’s “ditches” – and he drives his argument in a direction surprisingly akin to 
Pope’s. The Homeric language would be effectively readable only when liberated 
from its own Greek and Latin parerga. The philological sense can cut through 
ultimately trifling, albeit initially indispensable mediations, and understand any 
language better than its native speakers: 
But I do not regret at all the effort I expended on the study of the old 
grammarians. On the contrary, I feel that it aided me enormously both for 
this work and for general mastery of the Greek language [ad omnem 
facultatem lingae Graece], and no one can do useful work on editing any 
Greek writer unless he has collected the grammarians’ rules through a 
similar course of reading and tested them against correct principles [ad 
optimas rationes examinaverit. […]  Of course those learned in that sort of 
reading are wearied by ignorant and trifling hair-splitting [indoctarum 
quarundam et minutarum argutiarum]. But first of all modesty forbids you to 
despise anything before you know it very well. And – not to mention how 
many things they alone have preserved for us from ancient memory [quam 
multa illi nobis soli ex vetusta memoria servaverint]– those same triflers often 
explain the literal sense of passages very well [etiam sensum verborum opime 
expediunt]. For native knowledge of the language, which they had not 
entirely yet lost [usus linguae nondum penitus amissus tutos], saved them 
from many errors which nowadays we wrongly shield with the pleasures 
afforded by novelty in interpretation [nove interpretatione deliciis]. In 
Homer, moreover, work of that sort possesses unique pleasure and value. 
For by mastering and criticizing the variant readings and technical rules 
[variarum lectionum et canonum technicorum … conquisitione et censura] 
offered by the grammatical books and scholia, we are summoned into old 
times, times more ancient than those of many ancient writers [in vetus et 
plerisque antiquis scriptoribus antiquius aevum] and, as it were, into the 
company [in societam] of those learned critics, whose judgments and 
teachings once nourished the young Cicero, Virgil and Horace. We 
barbarians who have been so slow to learn [nos barbari ojyimaqei`ß] can, 
so it seems, thoroughly rework those [judgments and teachings] without 
absurdity  [passim non absurde refingere posse videamur] even though they 
were written about the Greek – that is, their native – language [de Graeca, 
id est patria ipsorum, lingua scriptas]. (VI; PRE, 55-56; PRL, 14-15) 
Ironically barbarian late-learners know better: they can correct ad optimas rationes 
what has been handed to them ex vetusta memoria.  Antiquity, as an object of 
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historical knowledge, would thus be snatched out of rudimentary memorial 
mechanisms. Clarity of form, as opposed to blurred confusion, is implicitly 
postulated as the necessary correlative of such knowledge. Compare and connect 
the above to the following passage, questioning the value, although not the 
occasional usefulness, of the Venetus scholia: 
They  were not made with the method [non eo instituto facta] that one of us 
would now use when taking notes: sometimes they were rather full, 
sometimes rather short. They were stuffed with readings, but these were 
not taken from the earliest sources, and were not adequately equipped 
with explanations of the arguments in their support [nec rationum 
explicatione satis munitis]. They contained much that related to Homeric 
learning and literature; little that helps to form a sense [ad sensum … 
informandum] of poetic qualities; nothing at all that depicts [nihil quod … 
repraesentet] the poets’ age in terms of its own opinions, customs, and 
general tenor of feeling and thinking – not to mention the further stock of 
learned and unlearned trivia, with which these scholia too reveal the date 
of their origin. (IV; PRE, 50; PRL,8) 
Principles of textual formness are at work again: methodical arrangement 
or disposition, explication of a rationale, in-formation of sense, configuration of 
an era as historically specific. On their grounds, philology learns Homer’s 
language anew – perhaps more like a competently mastered, living language, 
than like an insurmountably distant, dead one. The vestigia of all languages 
would be, in a way, directly accessible or transparent to the supra-historical 
sensus that restores their proper historical forma. The problem of readability is 
raised and resolved, for philology, beyond the constraints of current translative 
toils. Translation is displaced to the realm of literary or pedagogical endeavours 
– of little, if any, scholarly relevance1. 
 
                                                   
1 The use of Latin, not only in Prolegomena, but also in modern philological editing 
practices at large, could be less a translative mediation of the kind early Humanism indulged in, 
than an index of linguistic affinity and transparency. An antique language, conserved as the 
living academic language of philology, would be siding with the revived antique language it 
approaches, over and above current historical borders. 
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PART B. THE TRANSLATIVE PARADIGM 
 
 
B.1. THE CASE OF BENJAMIN 
 
B.1.1. Translative History 
 
Central to this second part of my thesis is an essay that has attracted 
considerable attention within the field of contemporary literary theory, namely, 
Walter Benjamin’s relatively early “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers [The task of the 
translator]”1. My approach to it will be largely articulated around questions 
provoked by Paul de Man’s reading of the same in his “Conclusions: The Task of 
the Translator”2. How would Benjamin’s notion of translation involve issues 
comparable to those of the philological paradigm? Why would de Man’s reading 
of Benjamin be particularly significant in this respect? 
Both Benjamin’s and de Man’s intellectual enterprises involve a constant 
confrontation with an issue that often lurks behind contemporary literary theory: 
what are we to make of philology? For Benjamin, philology is a field of 
scholarship closely connected to the academic tradition of German historicist 
thought and research. This tradition constitutes an explicit target of Benjaminian 
critique. At the same time, part of Benjamin’s work (especially in the case of the 
Passagen project) seems paradoxically philological in inspiration and scope – and 
is, as such, most perplexing for a contemporary student of literary theory and 
                                                   
1 The essay was initially published in Heidelberg, in 1923, as a preface to Benjamin’s 
translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens. I will be referring to it as Aufgabe. 
 
2 The text is an edited transcript of a 1983 oral presentation concluding a series of lectures 
at Cornell University. It includes an appendix with the ensuing discussion under the title 
“Questions”. I will be referring to the whole as Conclusions.  
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criticism. Consider, for instance, the recording of minute and largely trivial 
linguistic material. Benjamin has suggested that his monadological perspective 
on history offers a ligne de fuite, not out of history or philology in general, but out 
of the mystical rigidity which marks modern philological tradition and, more 
particularly, its historicist concentration on presumably self-sufficient facts1. De 
Man has provocatively affiliated literary theory to a gesture of a “return to 
philology”2. He speaks, however, from a position very distanced, not only from 
German historicism, but from all historical approaches to literature. His use of 
the term philology denotes, in a distinctly ironic accordance with its current 
Anglo-saxon meaning, a minute concentration on exclusively linguistic 
dimensions of texts. There is thus a subtle difference between Benjamin’s and de 
Man’s relations to the philological challenge. It echoes the old difference between 
language and history – and it emerges very tellingly in how de Man reads 
Benjamin on translation. 
Translation, having been overlooked, if not erased, by Wolfian philology, 
might be the blind spot through the illumination of which one may probe one’s 
relations to the premises and limits of the philological paradigm. The term 
Überszetsung, in Benjamin’s essay, is a quasi-catachrestic figure of speech. It is 
borrowed from every-day usage, in which it designates a current and constantly 
on-going activity, transposing verbal constructs formulated in a given language, 
to equivalent ones in a different language. Its use in Aufgabe, however, refers us 
to a field quite distinct from the one of translative practice as we know it. 
Benjamin says, for instance, that texts in which discourse stands as a vehicle of 
information and which common usage considers as the most easy to translate, 
                                                   
1 See Benjamin’s letter to Adorno, as cited in Tiedemann (1987, 65), from Correspondance, 
vol. 2 , Aubier-Montaigne, 1979, pp. 277-278. 
 
2 See in particular “The return to philology” in Resistance to Theory, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1986: 21-26. 
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are of little translative significance  – and even, in a sense, non-translatable. He 
proposes as translatable par excellence texts most problematic for current 
translation – namely, antique and sacred ones. He designates as translative 
archetypes Hölderlin’s versions of Sophocles – which are well known to be 
unreadable to those interested either in an acquaintance with the original or in 
enjoying the literary potential of the German language.  
For Benjamin, the activity of translation is only interesting when it reaches 
extreme and most problematic limits: not when it pretends to solve the problem 
of crossings and connections between different languages, but when it 
shockingly exposes it as a theoretical one. He is particularly interested in how 
writings of the past persist as readable beyond the linguistic setting of their 
initial emergence. Translative relations between temporally distanced linguistic 
fields involve the issue of history. I suggest translative occurrences are addressed 
by Benjamin as paradigmatic historic events1. 
The Über- of Übersetzung might hold significant keys to the matter. It also 
occurs in a term used by Benjamin in close connection and implicit juxtaposition 
to his idea of the translative task: Übertragung, connoting a transference perhaps 
more complete or integral than the transpositioning of Übersetzung. The 
preposition also has a broader use in Benjamin’s text. Translation, for instance, is 
said to regard not the life, but the over-life (Überleben) of the original; not a 
historical but an over-historical (überhistorisch) kinship between different 
languages. Transmission and tradition are implictly at stake. 
For Benjamin, the issue of history clearly persists along that of language. It 
only does so in a way that problematises the historicist configuration of a 
temporal succession of causally related entities or events. Aufgabe thus 
                                                   
1 As Derrida remarks “loin que nous sachions d’abord ce que veut dire ‘vie’ ou ‘famille’ 
au moment ou nous nous servons de ces valeurs familières pour parler de langue et de 
traduction, c’est au contraire à partir d’une pensée de la langue et de sa ‘survie’ en traduction que 
nous accéderions à la pensée de ce que vie et famille veulent dire ” (1985, 222). 
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anticipates the central importance that the concept of history, the Begriff der 
Geschichte, explicitly acquires in Benjamin’s later work. In this thesis, I will be 
distinguishing between the Benjaminian and the historicist configurations of 
history, by juxtaposing historic to historical1.   
A certain number of questions arise with respect to the above, which are 
particularly conspicuous in Aufgabe – and on which de Man largely centres his 
own intervention. How can we still talk of human history when the historicist 
configuration of historical humanness is undone? Would an über-historical 
perspective involve metaphysical and even theological problematics?  
De Man begins his own essay by implicitly juxtaposing language to history. 
He refers, more particularly, to Gadamer’s quest of the specific characteristic that 
would have driven modern thought “beyond Hegel in Hegelian terms” 
(Conclusions, 76). According to Gadamer, as de Man reads him, this would consist 
in a dialectical overcoming of the theologically charged notion of spirit or Geist 
(and of its implications with respect to subject), operated through a distinctly 
critical and acute awareness of the issue of language. De Man agrees that 
language has recently been and should be firmly kept at the centre of attention. 
He adds that language, played against spirit, jeopardises all problematics of 
historical overcoming – problematics that, de Man suggests, are more theological 
than Hegelian. He subsequently takes this point in a relatively different 
direction: if history remains to be addressed at all, it would be only as a “purely 
                                                   
1 This terminological distinction is my own: it has no direct counterpart in Benjaminian 
German. I propose it as an operational rather than as a properly conceptual accommodation: a 
shorthand reference to my inquiry on how Benjamin’s notion of history differs from the 
historicist one. One could surmise that we also need a different term for “history” itself (say 
“historia”, drawing on the Herodotean paradigm rather than on the Heideggerian juxtaposition 
between  “Geschichte” and “Historie”). I prefer to resist this rather positivistic tendency to 
change terms when a reconfiguration or transposition of their meaning is at work. Words are 
fields of changing and eventual diverging meanings – and, as such, should remain the same, as 
much as possible.  
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linguistic complication” (Conclusions, 92). He reads Benjamin as thinking along 
those lines. Aufgabe would be a quest for a theory of language, which undoes the 
validity of problematics over history1. Translation would acquire its crucial 
importance precisely because it highlights purely linguistic concerns: 
The relationship of the translator to the original is the relationship 
between language and language, wherein the problem of meaning or the 
desire to say something, the need to make a statement is entirely absent. 
Translation is a relation from language to language, not a relation to an 
extralinguistic meaning that could be copied, paraphrased, or imitated. 
(Conclusions, 81-82) 
Anticipating typically deconstructive insights, de Man’s Benjamin would be 
telling us why and how it is, consequently, “impossible to translate” (74).  
This way of defining or summarising the Benjaminian task is, indeed, 
readable into Benjamin  – but only as an insightful misreading. De Man is correct 
when he stresses how Benjamin probes the relationship between language and 
meaning. He is also correct when he underscores not only Benjamin’s anti-
historicism but also his distances with respect to mystical idealism or 
traditionally messianic concerns. He is wrong, however, when he assumes that 
Benjamin’s concern for language implies that historical matters would be effects 
of (or secondary with respect to) linguistic figuration2. If he insightfully discards 
the idea of a dialectic overcoming of Hegelianism, he seems to be blindly 
endorsing, contra Benjamin, the figure of a rupture with respect to other 
intellectual traditions, especially those that place the issue of language under 
metaphysical or even theological perspectives.   
                                                   
1 See Handelman (1991, 37-39) for an overview of the more general tendency to read 
Benjamin’s concentration on language only in order to disqualify historical problematics. 
 
2 The tendency to consider that early Benjaminian theory of language tends to view 
language as an end in itself, in a way comparable to theories of art pour l’art has been expressed 
by Tiedemann (1987, 50-51). Unlike de Man, who operates an analogous misreading in order to 
embrace its conclusions, Tiedemann, echoing Adorno, holds a critical standpoint in this respect. 
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Aufgabe inquires, in fact, why and how, under what conditions and to 
what degree, translative connections between languages are possible. In doing so, 
it presupposes that the notion of history retains its pertinence along with the 
question of language, on the grounds of an indistinguishably epistemological and 
metaphysical critique of humanness. Benjamin, in other words, is in quest of a 
way of thinking the historical beyond historicism and the human beyond 
anthropology. This implies thinking language beyond linguistics. It also means 
addressing metaphysical concerns that are prior to the conventional distinction 
between ontology and phenomenology. It accordingly entails the legitimacy, if 
not the need, of a critical return to problematics theological. The Benjaminian 
task would thus outdo not only historicist premises but also their deconstructive 
refutation. 
 
 
B.1.2. Thinking Incompatibilities 
  
As de Man insightfully remarks, one should read in Benjamin the subtle 
way in which he uses figures only in order to check their signifying consistency:  
But this is precisely the challenge of this particular text. Whenever 
Benjamin uses a trope which seems to convey a picture of total meaning, 
of complete adequacy between figure and meaning, a figure of perfect 
synecdoche in which the partial trope expresses the totality of a meaning, 
he manipulates the allusive context within his work in such a way that the 
traditional symbol is displaced in a manner that acts out the discrepancy 
between symbol and meaning, rather than the acquiescence between both. 
(Conclusions, 89) 
The challenge is not only in Aufgabe; it is in Benjamin’s writing in its entirety. It 
reaches well beyond the rhetorical discrepancy between figure and meaning. It 
concerns a distinctly Benjaminian mode of contemplative and idiosyncratically 
dialogical thought – the specificity of which is not adequately grasped by de 
Man’s insight. 
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Benjamin’s rhetoric upsets, but does not altogether erase, the significance 
of the terms and figures he eclectically concentrates on. If it exposes the tensions 
between the figures and their presumed meanings, it also signals the resistance 
of the corresponding terms or schemas as they constantly recur in changing 
argumentative arrangements. Figures retain, in Benjamin, a constancy that 
outlasts the exhaustion of their conceptual framing within historically 
identifiable bodies of intellectual traditions.  
When Benjamin uses terms currently recognisable as signposts of a given 
intellectual tradition (scholarly discipline, school of thought, world-view), we 
should, of course, not infer that he endorses or iterates the corresponding 
tradition. The terms used do not enact, in Benjamin, the premises that one is 
taught, by histories of ideas, to associate them with. This, I suggest, goes further 
than the discrepancy between symbol and meaning, which de Man concentrates 
on. Benjaminian rhetoric undoes the acquiescence between terms or figures and 
the intellectual traditions to which they are supposed to be historically affiliated. 
Terms or figures, in other words, persist out of and against their presumed 
historical and intellectual context. The very identification between discursive 
practices and their contexts or classes as defined and delimited by historical 
taxonomies is thus ultimately at stake1. 
Accordingly, Benjamin trusts that a provocatively joined use of rhetorical 
tools categorised, by historical reasoning, as belonging to incompatible or 
incongruent traditions of thought, can lead to critical intellectual gestures. Such 
gestures would not exactly be new or old; neither would they stand as modern or 
pre-modern. They would rather cut through commonly accepted and typically 
historicist juxtapositions, such as the ones between traditional mysticism and 
                                                   
1 Note that de Man has himself been critical of historicist approaches that view 
Hegelianism or Romanticism as well demarcated intellectual traditions based on given beliefs or 
attitudes. 
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modern rationalism, collectivism and individualism, pseudo-historical nostalgia 
and positivist oblivion of history. 
Benjamin thus investigates the possibility of a non-historicist way of 
thinking, while remaining intensely concentrated on the issue of history (which 
de Man discards). His literary criticism often outdoes the highly resistant polarity 
between a hermeneutics and a poetics of literature (on which de Man very 
strongly insists). He probes the theoretical pertinence of metaphysical or 
theological problematics, while questioning the current configuration of 
metaphysics and theology (which de Man seems to take for granted). He engages 
in his notorious combination of the presumably incommensurable traditions of 
theology and Marxism; his blending of contemplative thought and political 
engagement is one more instance of the same strategy (with respect to which de 
Man is particularly resistant1). 
Benjaminian rhetoric enacts contemplative connections between figures, 
which transgress historically and conceptually set boundaries between fields of 
intellectual kinship or incompatibility. Reading Benjamin becomes an exercise in 
liberating words from their configuration as conceptual tools of historically 
situated systems of thought2. This also means that the Benjaminian “alternative” 
                                                   
1 A certain failure of this resistance could account for the emergence, in de Man’s 
Conclusions, of notions drawn from and further provoking broader ideological debates and 
concerns, largely breaking with de Man’s ascetic rhetoric. I am referring, more particularly, to the 
notion of humanness and to the correlative question of the inhuman or non-human nature of 
language – on which I will insist accordingly. 
 
2 Adorno (1999) has insisted on how Benjamin combines a tradition of mysticism with 
that of Enlightenment – and has expressed reservations in this respect. His “Preface” to 
Tiedemann (1987), originally dating from 1965, depicts such idiosyncrasies as those of: a 
philosophy enacted through literary criticism, a sociology centred on the concrete rather than on 
overall trends, a critique of both Kantian and historicist subjectivism, an idea of eternity inherent 
as a temporal nucleus in factual details. Adorno’s reservations with respect to the above are 
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should not be understood as historically situated in the position of a post-
philological or, more generally, post-modern emergence. As schemas of historical 
classification and arrangement are outdone, including their correlative 
problematics of historical overcoming or transgression, connections, rather than 
distances, between languages are brought to the fore as urgently at stake – 
connections historically translative. 
One may refer to the Benjaminian task as an “alternative to historicism”. I 
understand this alternative as diverging from the tendency to discard any cluster 
of terms or figures (including philological or even typically historicist ones) 
along with the critique of a historically situated and self-contained system of 
thought or intellectual tradition (such as philology or historicism). More 
generally, the Benjaminian critique of historicism excludes relations of historical 
overcoming between traditions of thought1 – it posits, instead, relations of 
historic connection between languages. In this sense, it would be wrong to regard 
the Benjaminian paradigm as historically post-philological. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
echoed in Tiedemann’s own observation according to which Benjamin would be anticipating or 
announcing a critical breakthrough that his “esoterism” would fail to enact:  
“Néanmoins, tous les travaux de sociologie de l’art qu’il a réalisés doivent être considérés 
comme des prolégomènes. Ils ne nous livrent pas une théorie sociale achevée explicitant 
le rapport entre art et société […] ” (Tiedemann 1987, 128) 
 
1 Benjamin resists the historicist tournure that does mark Lyotardian problematics – in 
spite of Lyotard’s own warnings and corrections against the understanding of his notions of the 
modern and the post-modern as historical concepts (Lyotard 1979; 1982). 
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B.1.3. Benjaminian Works1 
 
The later works of Benjamin have attracted considerably more attention 
than his earlier ones2. Begriff 3 is, indeed, insurmountable as a fundamental anti-
historicist statement, within the setting of which political problematics of 
historical materialism displace theological ones from the centre of the scene. 
Recall, in particular, the seventh section, concerning the critical distances 
(distanzierten Betrachten) that the historical materialist should take with respect to 
cultural goods (Kulturgüter) – such as the Homeric manuscript material. The 
veneration of the latter is seen as the result of an akedia entailing intellectual and 
political allegiance to those leading the procession of history and appropriating 
cultural remains as spoils (Beute). Barbarism would inhere, along with cultural 
value, in any document of culture (Dokument der Kultur), also marking the very 
process of its transmission from one victor to the other4.  
                                                   
1 My quotations will mostly be from Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften (abbreviated as GS). 
Block-quotations are accompanied, in table form, by French translation as recently published in 
Oeuvres (abbreviated as OE). Short in-text quotations from the German original are accompanied 
by an English translation, in brackets, which is my own – unless otherwise specified. It is based 
on the French one, as well as on Zohn’s English translation published in Illuminations (Benjamin 
1968). 
 
2 The turning point could be situated around 1933, when the posthumously published 
fragment on the faculty of linguistic mimesis (“Über das mimetische Vermögen [On the mimetic 
faculty]”) was written – often understood as revising earlier approaches of Benjamin to language.  
 
3 This abbreviation refers to “Über den Begriff der Geschichte [On the Concept of 
History]”, written around 1940 and published posthumously as the last completed work of 
Benjamin.  
 
4 “[…] wie es selbst nicht frei ist von Barbarei, so ist es auch der Prozeß der Überlieferung 
nicht, in der es von dem einen an den anderen gefallen ist.” (Begriff, 698). 
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Another of Benjamin’s later works, marked by a materialist perspective, is 
Kunstwerk1. The essay deals with the persistence of the original work of art 
through reproduction – that is, in philological terms, with the issue of 
transmission. In its paralipomènes or Anmerkungen, we find statements concerning 
the distances that Benjamin takes with respect to what he often considers as the 
counterpart of modern historicism – namely, aesthetics and, more specifically, 
the distinctly modern abstract-magical or mystical conceptions of beauty. 
Benjamin connects his own approach to a “Kritik des aus dem neunzehnten 
Jahrhundert uns überkommenen Begriffs der Kunst [critique of the concept of art 
that has been passed on to us by the nineteenth century]” (GS, I, 3:1050). This 
concept of art would be centred on a notion of beauty, the crisis of which (Krisis 
der Schönheit) would be triggered or accentuated by the expanding mechanical 
reproduction of the work of art. Intrinsic to the crisis would be an aesthetic 
ideology marked by a misleadingly mystical approach to the relations between 
art and its genuinely magical (that is, non-mystical) origins2: 
 
                                                   
1 This abbreviation refers to Benjamin’s own French version of his essay on “L’oeuvre 
d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction mécanisée”, as published, with a selection of “paralipomènes 
et variantes” (translated by the editors) in Ecrits Français (Benjamin 1991). Three versions of this 
essay appear in Benjamin’s GS, I, 2. The first is the German version, published in 1935 under the 
title “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit”. The second is the 
French version, done by Benjamin himself and first published in 1936. The third is a re-working 
of the other two, written around 1939 and published posthumously. The differences between the 
versions do not affect the overall argument or its structure, although parts of it undergo changes 
entailing a different number and arrangement of sections in each case. For the paralipomena, I 
will be using, along with the French translation, the original German notes as published in GS, I, 
3. 
 
2 Passages such as the one quoted here should guard us against the tendency to use the 
terrns “mysticism” and “magic” as interchangeable. 
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[…] die Auffassung der Kunst umso 
mystischer wird, je mehr die Kunst von 
echter magischer Brauchbarkeit sich 
entfernt; je größer dagegen diese magische 
Brauchbarkeit ist (und in der Urzeit ist sie 
am größten), desto unmystischer ist die 
Auffassung von der Kunst. (GS, I, 3: 1050) 
[…] a conception de l’art devient d’autant 
plus mystique que l’art s’éloigne de la 
possibilité d’un usage vraiment magique; 
par contre, plus cet usage magique 
possible est grand (et c’est dans la 
préhistoire qu’il est des plus grands), 
moins la conception de l’art est mystique. 
(Benjamin 1991, 184) 
 
The problem with Benjamin’s later work is that it has been proven little 
resistant to readings indulging in the iteration of its overwhelming figural 
language. The past “flashing up at a moment of danger” to  “blast open the 
continuum of history”1 rings far too impressively to allow an investigation of the 
epistemological and theoretical premises of the corresponding figures. The 
“messianic element”, in its tense cohabitation with “Marxism” or “materialism”, 
has correlatively re-entered our discursive habits, as if referring to well-known 
and easily identifiable traditions of thought, and actually veiling our current 
oblivion of (or even illiteracy with respect to) the corresponding discursive 
fields2.  
                                                   
1 The phrases are those used by Zohn in Illuminations (Benjamin 1968, pp. 255 and 262), 
for the translation of Benjamin’s Begriff (VI and XVI). The German original reads, respectively 
“wie sie [einer Erinnerung] im Augenblick einer Gefahr aufblitzt” and “das Kontinuum der 
Geschichte aufzusprenden”. 
 
2 The following remark of Jennings (1987) is not always the case:  
“When we use Benjamin to a particular end or in the service of a particular cause, then 
we are proceeding in a Benjaminian way, not so much in that we use his ideas to 
construct our own critical constellations but in that we “mortify” Benjamin’s own words, 
we rip them from their context and so expose Walter Benjamin’s own pretensions to a 
higher knowledge.” (213) 
Not any kind of de-contextualisation of words or figures is Benjaminian – or fruitful in 
reading Benjamin.  
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We work, today, towards regaining access to terminological and figurative 
devices that Benjamin indexes for us. A first step in this direction would be to 
address questions of a metaphysical, if not theological status raised most 
explicitly and systematically in early works of Benjamin, while persisting, in his 
later writings, often in the guise of codified allusions. My thesis concentrates on 
some of Benjamin’s earlier essays, the writing and eventual first publication of 
which situates them close to Aufgabe. In them, metaphysical concerns are 
combined with epistemological problematics essential to the notion of language. 
This does not imply that I endorse the distinction between substantially different 
periods or phases in the presumed development of Benjamin’s work. The 
Benjaminian mode of thinking through conceptual or historical incompatibilities 
is a whole, which I chose to approach from its earliest and in many respects most 
perplexing extremes1. 
Benjamin’s early writings do not present us with youth adventures in the 
direction of a naive Platonism, nor with expressions of mystical or religious 
beliefs. They are a systematic endeavour to investigate in what sense and under 
what conditions metaphysical problematics, not excluding their theological 
ramification, may prove useful for a theoretical, that is, philosophical approach 
to language2. 
                                                   
1 Mosès (1992) organises his approach to Benjamin’s overall work around the clear and 
highly influential general schema of a gradual evolution from theological, to aesthetic and, 
ultimately to political problematics. Mosès stresses, however, that the whole process would be 
one not of transposition of one field to the next but of rising levels of integration (100).  
 
2 Tiedemann (1987) is exemplary, I think, in how he systematically brings to the fore the 
epistemological dimensions of Benjamin’s early writings. His tendency, however, to affiliate 
Benjaminian problematics to a “contexte sotériologique et anhistorique” blurring the perspective 
of socio-political dynamics (64-65), or to a “théologie traduite en termes profanes” (149), I find 
rather reductive. The same tendency, expressed in terms much less sophisticated, marks more 
recent approaches to Benjaminian thought, which connect it to the one of G. Scholem and  
understand it as reconfigured mysticism. Note, for instance, the position of Handelman (1991): 
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One should start with Sprache1, which explicitly draws on theological 
problematics in its endeavour to tackle aspects of a general theory of language 
and humanness. Aufgabe can be seen as transposing the same issue to the field of 
history. Along with Sprache, a number of other writings have drawn my attention 
as deserving close reading with respect to the object of this thesis. The most 
important one is Vorrede2, the epistemologial-critical preface to Benjamin’s thesis 
on the literary form of the German Baroque drama, in which his relations to 
German academia are explicitly at stake. Benjamin insists on qualifying his 
approach as a “philosophy of art” (im Sinn der kunstphilosophischen Abhandlung: 
218) aiming at seizing the “metaphysics of form” of its object (Metaphysik dieser 
Form: 228). His task would also be one of a “philosophical history” (philosophische 
Geschichte: 227). It would concern the “life of works and forms” (Leben der Werke 
und Formen) under the perspective of a history “natural rather than pure” (nicht 
reine, sondern natürliche Geschichte: 227). 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Benjamin and Scholem “secularised” a kabbalistic or mystical theory of language (as did 
other German romantic writers) then established it as a philosophical critical category, 
then applied that category as the criterion by which to interpret all other manifestations 
of language.” (92) 
 
1 This abbreviation refers to the posthumously published “Über die Sprache überhaupt 
und über die Sprache des Menschen [On language in general and on the language of man]” 
addressed to G. Scholem in 1916. This essay is often seen as an initial inquiry on the question of 
human language. Its sequel, more detached from theological references and closer to historical 
concerns, would be “Über das mimetische Vermögen [On the mimetic faculty]” written in 1933, 
also in connection to Benjamin’s correspondence with Scholem, and published posthumously. I 
will refer to the latter as Mimesis.  
 
2 I am referring to “Ekenntniskritische Vorrede [Epistemic-critical preface]” in Benjamin’s 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (The origins of the German drama) first published in 1925 (GS, 
I, 1). Translation will be provided from the French edition of this work (Benjamin 1985), referred 
to as Préface. 
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It would be wrong to consider that we are thus being referred to “natural 
sciences” as juxtaposed to “humanities”. At stake is, rather, the very idea of life 
as historic, dismissing the very juxtaposition of non- or a-historical nature and 
human-historical culture. History thus becomes the core-figure for a 
configuration of life in general, whether natural or cultural – including language 
and literature. 
Benjaminian anti-historicist “natural history” puts language and humanity 
under a perspective of universality – even if only negatively defined, as the 
resistance of matters linguistic and human to historicist taxonomies. This 
perspective persists in Begriff, where Benjamin qualifies the present moment as 
an “abbreviation of the entire history of mankind” (in einer Abbreviatur die 
Geschichte der Ganzen Menschheit zusammenfaßt: 703).  
The Benjaminian idea of the wholeness of humanity, implies a drastic 
critique of the modern idea of human subjectivity, whether individual or 
collective – and, more particularly, the undoing of its phenomenological and 
anthropological premises. These premises were elaborated, as we have seen, by 
historicist thinking. They were also involved in Kantian rationalism. Through his 
singularly programmatic and little read Programm1, Benjamin connects, indeed, 
his overall critique of historicism to a revision of Kant. This gesture, which I will 
discuss in some detail, can be seen as a critique of Kant from a standpoint other 
than that of modern historicism. Programm would thus be an early counterpart of 
Begriff: the latter operates an analogous intellectual gesture as it revises Marxism 
from a non-idealist standpoint. The difference is that, in Programm, theology, the 
“hidden hunchback” of Begriff, assumes a central role on the stage of the 
“Prolegomena einer künftigen Metaphysik [prolegomena to future 
                                                   
1 This abbreviation refers to “Über das Programm der Kommenden Philosophie [On the 
program of the philosophy to come]”. The writing of this posthumoulsy published text has been 
situated, by Scholem between the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 (which would make it 
one of the earliest Benjamin’s known works, close to his Sprache). 
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metaphysics]” (Programm, 183). This would be metaphysics exposing the issue of 
language as the blind spot of Kantian criticism – if not of the very position of 
criticism assumed by modern philosophy.  
 
 
B.1.4. Questions of Form 
  
 The relations between language and history, exposed in how the present 
addresses literary works of the past, is the issue with respect to which I compare 
Benjaminian and philological problematics. The comparison highlights a number 
of conceptual clusters, connected to old philosophical problems, central to both 
philological historicism and Benjaminian critique. One of the objectives of my 
work has been to inquire on how these clusters do not simply persist in Benjamin 
but are also drastically reconfigured. Form appears to be a basic knot. 
Historicism sees the emergence and development of historical forms as a 
process of organic becoming, involving birth, growth and degeneration, as well 
as relations of kinship between genres and species of the same origins. The 
notion of form is thus co-extensive with that of culture or Bildung as a historically 
situated and evolving mode of human life. Human life would emerge and 
evolve, historically, through a multiplicity of cultural forms that gradually 
deploy and affirm their identity and specificity, before degenerating and dying 
out as such. Language, as a medium of communication, would express and enact 
cultural forms, in their modes or degrees of evolution. Every given language is 
presumed to correspond, through its inner form, to the culture it expresses. The 
correspondence is mediated by the degree to which a given language has 
reached the necessary level of maturity enabling it to adequately represent the 
historical specificity of the corresponding cultural form.  
Parallel, but also relatively autonomously with respect to cultural entities, 
linguistic forms evolve from rudimentary to advanced degrees of 
representational validity. This process would be crowned by the advent of 
122 
B.1. The Case of Benjamin 
modernity and its intellectual breakthrough, through which human language at 
large acquires the capacity to form itself, as well as other languages, according to 
principles of textual formness. Textual form would permit the valid linguistic 
representation of the historical specificity of every form of cultural life, bygone or 
ongoing. Textualised, linguistic artefacts can be made to validly expose to 
knowledge the cultural forms to which they inherently correspond. 
In other words, textual form corrects languages from the standpoint of 
their historical-cultural essence. Text is language historically formed, to the 
precise degree that historical formness is cultural. Humanity itself would thus be 
restored as properly historical, as its two essential attributes, language and 
culture, become mutually transparent at the level of form. 
It is on the above premises that one can better understand the complexities 
of Wolf’s analysis of the relations between the Homeric cultus vitae, historically 
situated in archaic Greece, and the Homeric poems. Homeric language, whether 
orally enacted or transmitted in writing, would be marked by an inherent 
connection to the Homeric cultus vitae, as well as by its inadequacy as a medium 
of representation of its own historical form. It is only through the editorial 
intervention of modern philology that Homer would acquire a proper and 
properly historical textual expression, necessarily differing, in many crucial 
respects, from most of the previous linguistic enactments of Homericity.  
The notion of form is also central to Benjaminian concerns. Form and Bild 
are conspicuous in his writing. This is not the case with Bildung, which is absent, 
or with Text, which is rare. In the Aufgabe essay, he mostly uses Gebilde (or 
Geformte) to refer to literary artefacts as forms. I consider this notion to be a 
crucial knot, through which Benjamin’s approach to human language and history 
deploys its specificity with respect to historicist philology – and I translate it as 
formation. This part of my thesis ventures to investigate the epistemological and 
theoretical implications of the Benjaminian understanding of linguistic form as 
formation. Let me add, here, a number of preliminary remarks in this respect. 
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Formation, in English (as well as in French) has a disturbing semantic 
ambiguity. It designates a process as well as the product of the process. Both 
meanings are present in Benjamin’s Gebilde, but the second one predominates, in 
a way that radically problematises the first one. Gebilde is linguistic form 
persisting or surviving in time through changes of semiotic constructs or 
artefacts1 -lying, somehow, at the origins or Ursprung of variable oral or scribal 
manifestations.  
Linguistic formations in Benjamin do not express forms of human life 
identified as historically situated cultural entities. Nonetheless, they involve 
human historicity – the human as historic. They do so by understanding 
linguistic and human essence as somewhat temporal – albeit not in the sense of 
the phenomenic temporality conditioning historical life. Let us further examine 
how form relates to essence or Wesen – a notion also central to Benjamin, perhaps 
even much more so than in the case of historicist discourse. 
For historicism, historical form, as Bildung, corresponds to attributes (such 
as race, ethnicity and nationality) defining the essence of human entities 
according to their position in the evolving organism of their species. Textual 
forms transpose the same to human languages. Benjamin’s use of Gebilde, with 
respect to linguistic things, implies a metaphysical critique, which suspends the 
validity of the ontological premises of historicist anthropology, as well as of the 
corresponding phenomenological problematics concerning language. In order to 
tackle such problems, one can have recourse to certain aspects or topoi of 
Aristotle’s Kathgorivai (Categories)2. These topoi have long been haunting 
                                                   
1 In the rest of my thesis construct or artefact will be designating the semiotic instances in 
or through which formation persists.   
 
2 I use the edition of Cooke (Aristotle 1983)  
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discussions over notions such as those of essence and substance, subjects and 
individuals, genres and species, universals and particulars1.  
The Aristotelian treatise assigns to the notion of uJpokeivmenon 
(hypokeimenon) a highly ambiguous or enigmatic status, which jeopardises its 
modern translation as subject. The Aristotelian sub-ject would designate the 
reference of a deictic gesture indexing a sub-lying some-thing – an emergent 
tovde ti (tode ti). The emergence of a hypokeimenon would entail questions 
concerning properties or attributes named by categories. The treatise examines 
different possible kinds of categories, from the point of view of how exactly each 
kind relates to the hypokeimenon concerned – how it stands with respect to it. We 
have, to begin with, categories of first and second essence: prwvth oujsiva (prote 
ousia) and deutevra oujsiva (deutera ousia). These would be categories 
answering most basic questions about the hypokeimenic some-thing in its self. The 
attribution of the rest of the categories concern properties that, elsewhere in the 
Aristotelian Organon2, are called accidental, contingent or, more accurately, of 
occurrence: kata; to; sumbebhkovß (kata to sumvevikos). They would answer 
questions concerning how the thing is situated, how much it is, with respect to 
what it stands.  
I cannot engage, here, in a detailed reading of the Categories or in the 
discussion of the different philosophical and epistemological issues that have 
                                                   
1 These discussions have developed over an extremely wide range of epochs and fields or 
disciplines, starting with neo-platonic doctrines and Christian theology and gradually framed 
within the institution of modern philosophy. They have recently been taken up in a quite 
different setting, under the perspective of “gender studies” – the very denomination of which 
refers to the issue of the attribution of generic categories and the correlative constitution of 
“gendered subjects”. See, in particular, Butler (1999, especially chap. 1, entitled “Subjects of 
Sex/Gender/Desire”. My “Introduction” presents some additional remarks in this respect. 
 
2 See especially Topica, I, iv, v. 
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been raised with respect to it1. What interests me is to retain and ponder on the 
basic distinction between the two kinds of essence: ousia prote and deutera, 
essence primary and second2.  
 Primary essence sets the conditions under which the rest of the categories 
become attributable to the hypokeimenon concerned. Aristotle enigmatically 
defines it as what can neither “be in a subject” nor be “said about a subject”. It 
constitutes the subject as a given thing, liable to further categorial attribution3. It 
would involve, for the subject, no more than a proper name. We only have the 
rudimentary emergence of something about to become subject of attributes – 
including ones of second essence, defining its nature through categories such as 
those of species and genus. 
                                                   
1 Such issues (still open today) include the epistemological status of the treatise: it 
remains notoriously unclear whether or to what degree its problelmatics concern the ontology of 
existing entities or the phenomenology of logico-grammatical relations. A great number of 
exegetical problems are more or less directly connected to this question. Is the list of categories 
that Aristotle presents us with selective and indicative, or exhaustively structured? How does it 
relate to the logical distinction between genera or universals and species or particulars? Would 
genera or universals, as categories of essence, have a status of ontological autonomy with respect 
to the particular individuals to which they are attributed?  
My own reading of Categories is closer to how Aubenque (1962) relates the treatise to a 
distinctly aporetic ontology, than to Ackrill’s (1963) translation and commentary. Wedin (2000) 
underscores epistemological issues and reconsiders the very distinction between ontological and 
logico-linguistic interpretations of Categories. Particularly interesting for my approach is the  way 
in which he establishes a direct connection between the notion of primary essence, as it occurs in 
Categories, and the one of form  [morfhv (morphe) or ei\doß (eidos)] as it occurs in Metaphysics Z.  
 
2 The remarks that follow are mainly based on my reading of section V of Categories, 
especially 2a11-3b9 (Aristotle 1983, 18-28). 
 
3 A further way of configuring the attribution of a primary essence would be to identify 
its gesture as coinciding with the very passage from a condition of hypokeimenic Darstellung to 
the one of a conceptualised Vorstellung. 
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Substance is a further term that can be considered as synonymous with my 
understanding of formation. It should be recalled that substance, via the Latin 
substantia, is a close translation of the Greek uJpovstasiß (hypostasis). The latter 
does not occur in Aristotle’s Categories: it is affiliated to neo-platonic problematics 
concerning different modes of enactment or manifestation of essences. 
Nevertheless, substantia and substance have been and are still currently used as 
translations of Aristotle’s ousia, both in its primary and in its second sense. I 
suggest that we keep substance or, more accurately, substantiation, as designating 
the emergence of a primary essence – form in the primary state of formation. We 
could, accordingly, restrict the use of the term essence to categories of second 
essence.  
Formation, as primary essence or substance, would not correspond to our 
current understanding of an identifiable individual entity, co-extensive with an 
empirically delimited particular1. Formational monadicity would be prior to the 
notions of particularity and universality, as well as to those of individuality and 
                                                   
1 Tiedemann (1987) formulates as follows the ontological question that he sees as 
addressed by Benjaminian metaphysics: 
“L’épistémologie benjaminienne reprend la polémique que la philosophie européenne 
fait remonter à Platon et à Aristote. Elle répond à la question, ouverte depuis ce temps, de 
savoir si les Idées, objets de la recherche philosophique, ont un caractère ontologique – 
s’il faut les interpréter de manière réaliste, ou si, comme dans l’idéalisme, elle sont les 
produits d’une conscience qui, selon le mot de Goethe, les  apporte ;  autrement dit à la 
question de savoir si la philosophie doit prendre pour prw`ton la matière ou la forme, la 
nature ou l’esprit […]” (19)  
Although Tiedeamnn is very helpful in allowing us to address Benjaminian problematics 
on their proper level of theorisation, he is wrong, I think, in identifying the issue in such terms. 
The ontological question is actually suspended by Benjamin’s approach in Sprache. With respect 
to essences, spiritual or linguistic, there can be no question of a “realist” as opposed to an 
“idealist” ontology, as distinguished by Tiedemann. With respect to the related question of 
whether and how universale exist in re, Tiedemann (1987, 83) presents an interesting note from an 
abandoned variant of Benjamin’s work on the Trauerspiel. In it Benjamin characteristicaly remarks 
that one should talk of “res in universale” rather than of “universale in re” (83).   
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plurality. It would set the grounds on which further categories of second essence 
and of contingency are attributable to the corresponding hypokeimenon.  
I suggest that the Aristotelian prote ousia is, in the case of linguistic things 
or hypokeimena, very close to Benjamin’s Gebilde. Formation would be language 
standing there, persisting through changes in temporal duration: a monad with 
respect to which questions of secondary essential form, as well as of contingent 
attributes are about to be raised.  
How can a given formation or set of formations be subject to the categories 
of language, humanness and historic life? Could it be bearing them as its sole 
essential attributes? If so, in what sense would other categories, attributable to 
the formation, be of a contingent status? Far from expressing cultural forms as 
the essence of human history, linguistic formations could essentially be 
idiosyncratic sites of historic humanity and life. An essential form of 
reproducible and translatable literary originals would thus run through the 
conditions of life and death of the human beings that reproduce and translate 
them. 
128 
B.2. Historic Life 
B.2. HISTORIC LIFE 
 
B.2.1. Regarding Life 
 
The first paragraph of Benjamin’s Aufgabe concludes by postulating that 
“kein Gedicht gilt dem Leser, kein Bild dem Beschauer, keine Symphonie der 
Hörerschaft [no poem addresses the reader, no image the beholder, no 
symphony the audience]” (9). De Man, in his Conclusions, notes the scandalous 
effect that the paragraph, in its aphoristic tone, has had amongst 
Rezeptionsästhetik theorists (77). Benjamin disputes, indeed, the connection of any 
artistic work to any kind of subjective hermeneutic horizon. It should be added 
that this is situated under a perspective further specified at the beginning of 
Benjamin’s essay. It is with respect to a certain kind of knowledge of works of art, 
or art-forms, that reference to reception would not be fruitful: “Nirgends erweist 
sich einem Kunstwerk oder einer Kunstform gegenüber die Rücksicht auf den 
Aufnehmenden für deren Erkenntnis fruchtbar” (9). On equivalent 
epistemological grounds, Benjamin had postulated, in earlier writings, that the 
historical producer of a work of art, whether individual or collective, is an 
equally irrelevant reference. Recall his essay on Zwei Gedichte von Frierdrich 
Hölderlin: 
 
Ist dieses Leben noch das des 
Griechentums? So wenig ist es das, wie das 
Leben eines reinen Kunstwerks überhaupt 
das eines Volkes sein kann, so wenig wie 
es das eines Individuums ist und keines als 
sein eignes, das wir im Gedichteten finden. 
(Benjamin 1989f, 125-6)  
Cette vie est-elle encore celle de 
l’hellénisme ? Elle ne l’est pas plus que la 
vie d’un pure oeuvre d’art ne peut jamais 
être celle d’un peuple, pas plus qu’elle n’est 
celle d’un individu, ni autre chose que cette 
vie propre que nous trouvons dans le 
noyau poétique du poème. (OE, I: 123)  
 
Poetic language would bear the attribute of life in a way very different 
from that of human subjects, such as “peoples” or “individuals”. The problem of 
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the category of life and of the conditions of its attribution returns in the 
introductory part of the Aufgabe essay. It does so in a way that impels de Man to 
ask how, if at all, humanness retains its pertinence with respect to artistic works. 
My suggestion, in this respect, is that Benjamin’s Aufgabe does not at all erase 
humanness: it entails its reconfiguration, along with the reconfiguration of life. The 
life of literary works could be human to the precise degree that the human is not 
limited to the anthropological constructs of “individuals” and “peoples”.  
De Man, in his enthusiastic approval of the opening aphorism, overlooks 
that Aufgabe also states, from the very outset, why exactly works of art cannot be 
fruitfully understood on the grounds of their reception. The reason would be that 
humanness is discussed in terms of “essence”. Theory would thus dovetail into 
art itself, which “fore-poses” the issue of a “corporeal and spiritual essence” of 
the human: 
 
[Alles kunsttheoritischen Erörterungen] 
lediglich gehalten sind, Dasein und Wesen 
des Menschen überhaupt vorauszusetzen. 
So setzt auch die Kunst selbst dessen 
leibliches und geistiges Wesen voraus – 
seine Aufmerkamseit aber in keinem ihre 
Werke. (Aufgabe, 9)  
[les exposés théoriques sur l’art] ne sont 
tenus de présupposer que l’existence et 
l’esssence de l’homme en général. De 
même, l’art présuppose l’essence 
corporelle et intellectuelle de l’homme, 
mais dans aucun de ses oeuvres il ne 
présuppose son attention. ( OE, I : 244)  
 
Note the significance that positioning acquires here, anticipating the theme 
of translation. Benjaminian translation trans-poses (über-setzen) the question of 
human essence; literature and theoretical speculation fore-pose (voraus-setzen) 
this question. The attention or intention of “individuals” or “peoples”, both as 
producers and as receivers, would be irrelevant, to the precise degree that 
human life should be regarded from the point of view of its fore-posed and 
transposable essence. 
The ensuing paragraph specifies that the informational content (Aussage, 
Mitteilung or Inhalt) is an inessential (Unwesentlich) attribute of poetry, drawing 
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the translators to two equally misleading conceptions of their task. On the one 
hand, there is the idea of a translative mediation (vermitteln) aiming at the 
communication of information. On the other hand, we have the postulate of a 
mysterious, unfathomable or inaccessible “poeticity” (das Unfaßbare, 
Geheimnisvolle, Dichterische). Benjamin thus reaffirms his double distances from 
the premises of both phenomenological positivism and mystical aestheticism.  
The notion of life is introduced in Aufgabe right after the above, as 
Benjamin ventures to delimit the domain in which a linguistic work of art, as 
translatable, can be situated. This domain would involve a notion of relationship 
(Relationsbegriffe) best understood when seen as not exclusively referring to human 
beings: “wenn sie nicht von vorne herein ausschließlich auf den Menschen 
bezogen werden” (Aufgabe, 10). De Man understands this as stating that literature 
does not regard humans (Conclusions, 70). Benjamin, however, discredits, not the 
notion of humanness, but the conceptual operations that attribute exclusive 
relevance to the anthropological realm of empirically identifiable human 
subjects. Not solely lives of empirical human individuals or collectivities, but life 
in a much more encompassing sense of the term would be somehow at stake. 
Benjamin elaborates his statement with the following analogy. A life-
moment (Leben oder Augenblick) can be unforgettable (unvergesslichen) even when 
all human beings have forgotten it. Accordingly, originals may persist as 
essentially translatable, even if they remain non-translated. At stake would be 
instances of a natural inter-connectedness of life: “Er darf ein natürlicher genannt 
werden und zwar genauer ein Zusammenhang des Lebens” (Aufgabe, 10). 
Benjamin specifies that the corresponding realm of life includes the Überleben of 
the original, or a Stadium ihres Fortlebens. A remark follows, which is, I think, one 
of the most crucial ones in the Aufgabe essay, from the point of view of its 
theoretical implications. “In völlig unmetaphorischer Sachlichkeit ist der 
Gedanke vom Leben und Fortleben der Kunstwerke zu erfassen [In entirely non-
metaphorical reality one is to grasp the ideas of life and sur-vival of works of 
art]” (11). The notion of life, Benjamin explains, should be understood as 
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involving all natural life seen from the perspective of history: “alles natürlicher 
Leben aus dem umfassenderen der Geschichte zu verstehen” (11). Life, he insists, 
is inherently or necessarily historic – it is not simply the setting or scene within 
which history occurs. The idea of history would thus over-determine the one of 
nature itself.  
The historic configuration of life is opposed, in Benjamin’s Aufgabe (11), to 
a number of different conceptual approaches, that we could designate as follows: 
· historicist organicity: reductions of life to some sort of organic corporeality 
(“man nicht der organischen Leiblichkeit allein Leben zusprechen dürfe” );  
· mechanistic empiricism: definitions of life on the grounds of basic animal 
sensations (“daß Leben aus den noch weniger maßgeblichen Momenten 
des Animalischen definiert werden könnte, wie aus Empfindung”); 
· mystical metaphysics: extensions of life under the auspices of a notion of 
soul (“nicht... unter dem schwachen Szepter der Seele dessen Herrschaft 
auszudehnen”). 
Understanding nature and life in general from the perspective of the 
enigma of history (instead of discarding the latter on the grounds of given 
figurations of the former) is the task of Benjamin’s theory of translation. As de 
Man most insightfully points out:  
In what is the most difficult passage in this text, Benjamin says that it 
[translation] is like history to the extent that history is not to be 
understood by analogy with any kind of natural process. We are not 
supposed to think of history as ripening, as organic growth, or even as 
dialectic, as anything that resembles a natural process of growth and of 
movement. We are to think of history rather in a reverse way: we are to 
understand natural changes from the perspective of history, rather than 
understand history from the perspective of natural changes. If we want to 
understand what ripening is, we should understand it from the 
perspective of historical change. (Conclusions, 83) 
History becomes the name of a theoretical or epistemological perspective, 
breaking not only with figures of organic cultivation or Bildung growth, but with 
all figuration based on principles of schematic analogy and similarity. De Man 
further asserts that  “to understand this historical pattern would be the burden of 
132 
B.2. Historic Life 
any reading of this particular text”. The Aufgabe essay is, indeed, readable as an 
inquiry into a historic “pattern” of life exemplified by the life and survival of 
works of art.  
The closing section of the introductory part of Aufgabe provides us with 
further clues in this respect. The distinctly abstract rhetoric of the relevant 
passage does more to problematise the pattern than to clarify it: it introduces 
concepts and notions that de Manian reading is firmly resistant to. Translation 
would be connected to the development (Entfaltung) of the original’s life in an 
idiosyncratically higher sphere (eigenmutlichen und hohen Lebens) governed by its 
own kind of finality (Zweckmäßigkeit). More generally, phenomenic 
manifestations of life would acquire a higher finality in the expression of the very 
essence or the representation of the significance of life as such: “für den 
Ausdruck seines Wesens, für die Darstellung seiner Bedeutung” (Aufgabe, 11-12).  
I will further investigate, here, two notions, crucial with respect to the 
Benjaminian notion of historic life: the one of the Überleben (survival) of an 
accomplished past, and the one of the recollection of its Bild  (figure or form). We 
will thus be in a position to better understand a theory of language that 
concentrates on the connection between the über-setzen of literary works and the 
voraus-setzen of human essence. 
 
 
B.2.2. Surviving Gewesene 
 
Überleben or Fortleben would not be metaphors: they should be understood 
as theoretical notions. Historic life would involve, not only phenomena affiliated 
to temporal conditions of birth, growth and death, but also a dimension or 
sphere that, in a sense, transcends them. It would literally persist beyond 
phenomenic conditions of existence – beyond life-time. I use beyond, rather than 
after, as closer to über or fort. Überleben (or Fortleben) would not be after-life. The 
latter implies temporal positioning, whereas the former does not. By disputing 
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the use of the notion of soul in this respect, Benjamin warns us that the relations 
between Leben and Überleben owe as little to the metaphysics of life-after-death as 
they do to the phenomenology of a life ending in death. Überleben or Fortleben 
would thus better correspond to the French survie or the English survival. 
Temporal and spatial conditions of phenomenic existence would partake 
in life and be even presupposed by it, but life would not be reducible to them. 
History and metaphysics, as fields of knowledge, would, accordingly, entertain 
relations very different from those implied by conventionally modern premises. 
Theory would have to investigate the problem of their mutual pertinence. This 
theoretical challenge de Man refuses to address as such, when he understands 
Überleben as an “illusion of life which is only an after-life” (Conclusions, 92). 
Through this reading, de Man exposes the different grounds on which he 
constructs his own approach to the issue of history: he attributes to historic 
survival the defective ontological status of “illusion”. Benjamin, on his part, 
refrains from an evaluation of ontological statuses or weights. He implicitly, yet 
persistently, brackets ontology. 
How may one understand the historic connection between lifetime and 
survival? I suggest that Benjamin’s later use of the concepts of Gewesene and 
Jetztzeit can be particularly useful in this respect. These two notions, 
systematically linked to each other, are very present in Begriff as well as in certain 
sections of Passagen1. The relation between the past as Gewesene and the present 
as Jetzt occurs as a Bild (an image, a figure or perhaps more generally a form) at 
standstill. As such, it would be dialectic (in my terms: historic) rather than 
temporal (in my terms: historical) in status. Under such a perspective, the past is 
no longer the archaic counterpart of the present moment: 
 
                                                   
1 This abbreviation refers to Das Passagen-Werk (literally: The work of passages) especially 
sections N and K. The French version I use is Paris, Capitale du XIXe siècle (Benjamin 1993). 
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Nicht so ist es, daß das Vergangene sei 
Licht auf das Gegenwärtige oder das 
Gegenwärtige  sein Licht auf das 
Vergangene wirft, sondern Bild ist 
dasjenige, worin das Gewesene mit dem 
Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation 
zusammentritt. Mit andern Worten: Bild ist 
die Dialektik im Still stand. Denn während 
die Beziehung der Gegenwart zur 
Vergangenheit eine rein zeitliche ist, ist die 
des Gewesen zum Jetzt eine dialektische: 
nicht zeitlicher sondern bildlicher Natur. 
Nur dialektische Bilder sind echt 
geschichtliche, d.h. nicht archaische Bilder. 
( Passagen, 578) 
Il ne faut pas dire que le passé éclaire le 
présent ou le présent éclaire le passé. Une 
image, au contraire, est ce en quoi 
l’Autrefois rencontre le Maintenant dans 
un éclair pour former une constellation. En 
d’autres termes : l’image est la dialectique 
à l’arrêt. Car, tandis que la relation du 
présent au passé est purement temporelle, 
la relation de l’Autrefois avec le 
maintenent est dialectique : elle n’est pas 
de nature temporelle mais de nature 
figurative. Seules les images dialectiques 
sont des images authentiquement 
historiques, c’est à dire non archaiques.  
(Benjamin 1993, 479-480)  
 
The past acquires an “authentically historic” status when it is understood 
as not “purely temporal”. Gewesene is life surviving as Überleben. The term 
Gewesene implies a reference to the metaphysics of Wesen (essence). This would 
be essence unrelated to a quest of historically foundational modes of being1. At 
stake is, rather, the form of a life already accomplished – a past somehow 
rendered autonomous with respect to the present.  
Benjamin’s Gewesene would thus indicate the specificity of the present 
perfect as compared to the simple past tense. Überleben would be life persisting as 
presently perfected: life that has been with respect to what presently is – as 
opposed to life that was before it became what it is. 
Simple past is the tense of narration. What was, leads to what is, often 
through chains of causal articulations. This is what would make all past 
                                                   
1 This could be a first important point on which Benjamin’s notion of Gewesene differs 
from Heidegger’s. 
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“archaic”: it could only be the antiquity of modernity. Present perfect is the tense 
of the temporally perfected: something acknowledged as presently actual or 
topical, but in ways that narrative rhetoric cannot account for. The Gewesene has 
taken place and continues to do so, but the circumscription of its space and site 
remains an open issue. The same would hold from the point of view of the 
future. The corresponding tense bears the paradoxical names of future perfect, 
futur antérieur or tetelesmevnoß mevllwn (tetelesmenos mellon: accomplished 
future)1. 
Gewesene does not comply with becoming. The past would not be the seed 
from which present and future somehow spring, nor would the present or the 
future be standpoints on which the understanding of the past depends. Perfected 
past would connect to the present but not by determining it. The present would 
connect to the perfected past, but not by constructing it as its own projection. In 
this sense, both the historicist understanding of history, and its hermeneutic 
counterpart would be deprived of their epistemological grounds. 
Terms such as accomplished or perfected should not be understood as 
implying organic or mechanistic completion or totalisation. They imply 
termination rather than ending, interruption rather than closure. Gewesene is thus 
the site or dimension of all Jetztzeit, in which persists everything that has not 
managed and will never manage to become anything more or less than what it 
has already been and will have been. In this sense, historic perfectedness is closer 
to catastrophe2 than to achievement. Life surviving is closer to ruins piling up 
than to monuments perspicuous1. 
                                                   
1 Recall from Szondi (1986):  
“Unlike Proust, Benjamin does not want to free himself form temporality; he does not 
wish to see things in their ahistorcial essence. He strives instead for a historical 
experience and knowledge. Nevertheless, he is sent back into the past, as past, however, 
which is open, not completed, and which promises the future. Benjamin’s tense is not the 
perfect, but the future perfect in the fullness of its paradox; being future and past at the 
same time” (153) 
 
2 This figure has been rendered particularly famous through Benjamin’s Begriff. 
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History would be constantly (and eventually urgently) at stake in the 
connection of every Jetzt to the challenge of the perfected accomplishment of any 
Gewesene. No present life would be sheltered against its inhabitance or 
colonisation by perfected modes of having been alive. All perfected past would, 
indeed, persist with respect to any present moment – and all present moment 
would remain exposed to the survival of all perfected pasts. There would be no 
living formation immune to the challenge (not simply of the past that it 
recognises as its own but rather) of the survival of the entire “natural history of 
works and forms” – or the “entire history of mankind”. On-going life would thus 
be historic, not because its past would provide it with the depth of temporal 
perspective, but because all accomplished past(s) risk breaking into its moment. 
The connection of Jetzt to its accomplished past(s) becomes an issue impossible to 
resolve on grounds of either anthropological certainty  (claimed by the historicist 
sense) or phenomenological insights (claimed by hermeneutic reading)2. 
In his Vorrede, Benjamin provides us with further clues to the historic 
status of Gewesene, when he adopts the correlative notion of Ursprung3. Historic 
origins consist in the survival of the past as a Gewesene.  
Benjamin explicitly keeps Ursprung away from problematics of temporal 
evolution or generation, although insisting on its historic status: “Ursprung, 
wiewohl durchaus historische Kategorie, hat mit Entstehung dennoch nichts 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 Recall the famous imagery of Angelus Novus, in Begriff, IX. 
 
2 A-letheia is thus, in a sense, the historical impossibility of complete oblivion. 
Benjaminian problematics outdo the Heideggerian notion of existential truth as an “un-covering”, 
however tendential or problematic, of the foundations of one’s essential historicity.  
 
3 It should be noted that the notion applies to the “idea” of an “essence” as “monad”: I 
will return to these aspects of Benjamin’s work later on, as they concern, more specifically, the 
reading of literary and, more generally, linguistic forms. 
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gemein”1. Ursprung would refer to pre- or post-history of observed facts, not to 
their historical development: “Also hebt sich der Ursprung aus dem 
tatsächlichen Befunde nicht heraus, sondern er betrifft dessen Vor- und 
Nachgeschichte”. It indexes both the becoming and the decline of something 
constantly re-dying and re-emerging: “Im Ursprung wird kein Werden des 
Entsprungenen, vielmehr dem Werden und Vergehen Entspringendes gemeint”2. 
The recognition of such origins presupposes toils of restoration or re-production, 
but only in a sense that invalidates the philological perspective of textual 
completion: “Sie will als Restauration, als Wiederherstellung einerseits, als eben 
darin Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes andererseits erkannt ist”.  
The task of the Aufgabe essay is to reflect on translation as entailing the 
occurrence of paradigmatic historic connections to surviving origins – or 
originals. Aufgabe, it should be remarked, does not hesitate to connect to the 
conventional rhetoric on the issue, including the initially discarded figures of 
reception. It specifies that the notion of an “eternal survival” has something to do 
with what is currently understood as the “glory” that “great” works of art enjoy 
through succeeding “generations” of readers: 
                                                   
1 All quotations in this paragraph are from Vorrede, 226. 
 
2 I do not think that this implies problematics of a messianic arrest of temporality or of a 
messianic redemption, as Tiedamann seems to infer when he remarks that Benjamin ventures to 
philosophically seize “une relation entre le monde historique et le monde messianique” (1987, 
89). On the other hand, one cannot easily discard Heideggerian reminiscences. One should 
further probe into both the flagrant similarity and the subtle divergence between Benjamin’s and 
Heidegger’s figurations. Benjamin’s Gewesene is not subject to the problematics of disclosure of 
historicity, that allow Heidegger to pass from an ontology of beingness to a history of destinies, 
explicitly configured in terms of national historical entities. A hint to this highly significant 
divergence is provided, perhaps, by the reference of the above-quoted passage to becoming and 
decline as fields of historic life. Death (or historical catastrophe) assumes, in Benjamin, a crucial 
historic significance as such, which Heideggerian problematics of foundational beingness tend to 
obscure. 
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Die Geschichte der großen Kunstwerke 
kennt ihre Deszendenz aus den Quellen, 
ihre Gestaltung im Zeitalter des Künstlers 
und die Periode ihres grundsätzlich 
ewigen Fortlebens bei den nachfolgenden 
Generationen. Dieses Letzte heißt, wo es 
zutage tritt, Ruhm. Übersetzungen, die 
mehr als Vermittlungen sind, entstehen, 
wenn im Fortleben ein Werk das Zeitalter 
seines Ruhmes erreicht hat. Sie dienen 
daher nicht sowohl diesem, wie schlechte 
Übersetzer es für ihre Arbeit zu 
beanspruchen pflegen, als daß sie ihm ihr 
Dasein verdanken. In Ihnen erreicht das 
Leben des Originals seine stets erneute 
späteste und umfassendste Entfaltung. 
(Aufgabe, 11) 
L’ histoire des grandes oeuvres d’art 
connaît leur filiation à partir des sources, 
leur création à l’époque de l’artiste, et la 
période de leur survie, en principe 
éternelle, dans les générations suivantes. 
Cette survie, lorsqu’elle a lieu, se nomme 
gloire. Des traductions qui sont plus que 
des transmissions naissent lorsque, dans sa 
survie, une oeuvre est arrivée à l’époque 
de sa gloire. Par conséquent elles doivent 
plus leur existence à cette gloire qu’elles ne 
sont elles-mêmes à son service, comme de 
mauvais traducteurs le revendiquent 
communément pour leur travail. En elles 
la vie de l’original, dans son constant 
renouveau, connaît son développement le 
plus tardif et le plus étendu. (OE, I : 247-
248)  
 
Aeonic I suggest as a further configuration of the historic status of 
Benjaminian lives. I understand the term as including its etymological history, 
passing from the old and rather obscure Greek notion of one’s assigned life-span, 
to its Latin figuration of eternity. We can talk of moments, epochs or eternities 
indistinguishably, provided we understand them as aeonic instances of historic 
life.  
Aeon occurs, indeed, in another of Benjamin’s early essays1. Literary 
history would involve the “gesamter Lebens- und Wirkungskreis [the entire 
                                                   
1 “Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft (Literary history and literary studies)”, 
originally published in 1931. 
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circle of the life of works]”, comprising “ihr Schicksal, ihre Aufnahme durch die 
Zeitgenossen, ihre Übersetzungen, ihr Ruhm [their destiny, their reception from 
contemporaries, their translations, their glory]”. Reception (which the beginning 
of Aufgabe has excluded as irrelevant) is here explicitly retained, but is also 
reconfigured under a historic rather than a conventionally historical perspective. 
Literary works would be “micro-aeons” (rather than “micro-epochs”, as the 
French translation suggests), active “organa” (rather than given objects or 
materials) of historical knowledge – or knowability: 
 
Damit gestaltet sich das Werk im Inneren 
zu einem Mikrokosmos oder viel mehr: zu 
einem Mikroaeon. Denn es handelt sich ja 
nicht darum, die Werke des Schrifttums im 
Zusammenhang ihrer Zeit darzustellen, 
sondern in der Zeit, da sie entstanden, die 
Zeit, die sie erkennt – das ist unsere – zur 
Darstellung zu bringen. Damit wird die 
Literatur ein Organon der Geschichte und 
sie dazu – nicht das Schtifttum zum 
Stoffgebiet der Historie zu machen, ist die 
Aufgabe der Literaturgeschichte. (GS, III, 
283) 
Ainsi l’oeuvre se structure en elle-même 
pour former un microcosme, ou mieux : 
une microépoque. Car il ne s’agit pas de 
présenter les œuvres littéraires dans le 
contexte de leur temps, mais bien de 
donner à voir  dans le temps où elles sont 
nées le temps qui les connaît – c’est à dire 
le nôtre. Ainsi la littérature devient un 
organon de l’histoire, et lui donner cette 
place – au lieu de faire de l’écrit un simple 
matériau pour l’historiographie – telle est 
la tâche de l’histoire littéraire.  (OE, II: 283) 
 
 
B.2.3. Recollecting Forms 
 
Of what kind are the gestures or operations that allow historic connections 
to an original Gewesene? Translation, as we have said, could be paradigmatic in 
this respect. 
The notion of translation is introduced, in Benjamin’s Aufgabe, with a short 
statement, surprising in its simplicity and perplexing in its elliptical rhetoric: 
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“Übersetzung ist eine Form [Translation is a form]” (9). The statement is 
followed by remarks on Übersetzbarkeit (translatability): an essential attribute of 
certain original literary works, setting the law (Gesetz) of the form concerned. 
Translatability would be the potential with which the original work, on account 
of its essence, claims or calls for translation, given the significance of this form: 
“ob es seinem Wesen nach Übersetzung zulasse und demnach – der Bedeutung 
dieser Form gemäß – auch verlange” (10). In other words, the initial statement 
could read: translation regards and depends on the surviving original, to the 
degree that the latter addresses a claim (and can be addressed) as a translatable 
form.  
In order to clarify the nature of the connection between the translatability 
of the original and the eventual occurrence of its translated form, Benjamin 
brings up the example of instances of life that remain essentially unforgettable, in 
spite of the fact that they may be currently little remembered: 
 
So dürfte von einem unvergeßlichen Leben 
oder Augenblick gesprochen werden, auch 
wenn alle Menschen sie vergessen hätten. 
Wenn nämlich deren Wesen es forderte, 
nicht vergessen zu werden, so würde jenes 
Prädikat nichts Falsches, sondern nur eine 
Forderung der Menschen nicht 
entsprechen, und zugleich auch wohl den 
Verweis auf einen Bereich enthalten, in 
dem ihr entsprochen wäre: auf ein 
Gedanken Gottes. (Aufgabe, 10) 
Ainsi pourrait-on parler d’une vie ou d’un 
instant inoubliables, même si tous les 
hommes les avaient oubliés. Car, si 
l’essence de cette vie ou de cet instant 
exigeait qu’on ne les oubliât pas, ce 
prédicat ne contiendrait rien de faux, mais  
seulement une exigence à laquelle les 
hommes ne peuvent répondre, et en même 
temps, sans doute, le renvoi à un domaine 
où cette exigence trouverait un répondant: 
la mémoire de Dieu. (OE, I : 246) 
 
Translatability would be an instance of a more general characteristic of life 
surviving as form (which does not mean life conserved in given shapes or 
phenomenic contours). The claim for translation would be a claim to non-
forgefulness, addressed by an instance of accomplished or perfected life, on the 
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grounds of which historic connections may occur. The fact that the figure of 
Godly thought or memory closes the above-quoted passage implies that the 
notion of non-forgetfulness involves a metaphysics of anamnesis, rather than a 
phenomenology of memory1. Benjamin’s Unvergeßlich does not depend on 
memory, but, rather, on the transcendence of the realm and constraints of 
phenomenological memory or knowledge (with respect to which philology, as 
we have seen, has articulated its critique). Recollection (rather than either memory 
or knowledge) is the term I suggest we use in order to designate the Benjaminian 
understanding of the nature of translative or other historic connections to 
perfected instances of life.  
Let us turn to Passagen for further indications on how historic connections 
involve recollective toils. A dialectical Bild (image or figure or form) enacts its 
potential as a historic Index in distinct moments of  Lesbarkeit (readability) or 
Erkennbarkeit (knowability, but with strong connotations of recognition or 
recollection. The notions of readability or knowability, as they occur in the 
following, already partly quoted passage, are highly akin to translatability. They 
all involve a capacity to recognise or recollect: 
  
Der historische Index der Bilder sagt 
nämlich nicht nur, daß sie einer 
bestimmten Zeit angehören, er sagt vor 
allem, daß sie erst in einer bestimmten Zeit 
zur Lesbarkeit kommen. Und zwar ist 
dieses “zur Lesbarkeit” gelangen ein 
bestimmter kritischer Punkt der Bewegung 
in ihrem Innern. Jede Gegenwart ist durch 
diejenigen Bilder bestimmt, die mit ihr 
La marque historique des images 
n’indique pas seulement qu’elles 
appartiennent à une époque déterminée, 
elle indique surtout qu’elles ne 
parviennent à la lisibilité qu’à une époque 
déterminée. Et le fait de parvenir «à la 
lisibilité» représente certes un point 
critique déterminé dans le mouvement qui 
les anime. Chaque présent est déterminé 
                                                   
1 Also note that the realm of God, as it occurs in this passage, has little to do with history 
as it happens but functions as a reference sustaining the possibility of its happening. I will 
elaborate on this aspect of Benjaminian theological references later. 
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synchronistisch sind; jedes Jetzt ist das 
Jetzt einer bestimmter Erkennbarkeit. 
(Passagen, 577-578) 
par les images qui sont synchrones avec 
lui ; chaque Maintenant est le Maintenant 
d’une connaissabilité déterminée. 
(Benjamin 1993, 478) 
  
My insistence on the notion of recollection is also corroborated by Benjamin’s 
notion of Erinnerung, as it occurs elsewhere in Passagen, directly connected to 
Gewesene:  
 
Die kopernikanische Wendung in der 
geschichtlichen Anschauung ist diese: man 
hielt für den fixen Punkt das „Gewesene” 
und sah die Gegenwart bemüht, an dieses 
Feste die Erkenntnis tastend 
heranzuführen. Nun soll sich dieses 
Verhältnis umkehren und das Gewesene 
zum dialektischen Umschlag, zum Einfall 
des erwachen Bewußtseins werden. Die 
Politik erhält den Primat über die 
Geschichte. Die Fakten werden etwas, was 
uns soeben erst zustieß, sie festzustellen ist 
die Sache des Erinnerung. Und in der Tat 
ist Erwachen der exemplarische Fall des 
Erinnerns: der Fall, in welchem es uns 
glückt, des Nächsten, Banalsten, 
Naheliengendsten uns zu erinnern. 
(Passagen, 490-491)  
La révolution copernicienne dans la vision 
de l’histoire consiste en ceci: on considérait 
l’ «Autrefois» comme le point fixe et l’on 
pensait que le présent s’efforçait en 
tâtonnant de rapprocher la connaissance 
de cet élément fixe. Désormais, ce rapport 
doit se renverser et l’Autrefois devenir 
renversement dialectique et irruption de la 
conscience éveillée. La politique prime 
désormais l’histoire. Les faits deviennent 
quelque chose qui vient seulement de nous 
frapper, à l’instant même, et les établir est 
l’affaire du ressouvenir. De fait, le réveil 
est le paradigme du ressouvenir, le cas où 
nous parvenons à nous ressouvenir de ce 
qui est le plus proche, le plus banal, le plus 
manifeste. (Benjamin 1993, 405-406)  
 
There is an additional passage explicitly relating history to work of 
recollection. This time, the notion used by Benjamin is the one of Eingedenken, the 
epistemological implications of which are seen as indexing the inescapable, even 
if obscured, presence of theological problematics:  
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Das Korrektiv dieser Gedankengänge liegt 
in der Überlegung, daß die Geschichte 
nicht allein eine Wissenschaft sondern 
nicht minder eine Form des Eingedenkens 
ist. Was die Wissenschaft «festgestellt» hat, 
kann das Eigedenken modifizieren. Das 
Eingedenken kann das Unabgeschlossene 
(das Glück) zu einem Abgeschlossenen 
und das Abgeschlossene (das Leid) zu 
einem Unabgeschlossenen machen. Das ist 
Theologie; aber im Eingedenken machen 
wir eine Erfahrung, die uns verbietet, die 
Geschichte grundsätzlich atheologisch zu 
begreifen, so wenig wir sie in unmittelbar 
theologischen Begriffen zu schreiben 
versuchen dürfen. (Passagen, 589) 
On apportera un correctif à ces reflexions 
en songeant que l’histoire n’est pas 
seulement une science et qu’elle est tout 
autant une forme de remémoration. Ce que 
la science a “constaté”, la remémoration 
peut le modifier. La remémoration peut 
transformer ce qui est inachevé (le 
bonheur) en quelque chose d’achevé et ce 
qui est achevé (la souffrance) en quelque 
chose d’inachevé. C’est de la théologie; 
mais nous faisons, dans la remémoration, 
une expérience qui nous interdit de 
concevoir l’histoire de façon 
fondamentalement athéologique, même si 
nous n’avons pas, pour autant, le droit 
d’essayer de l’écrire avec des concepts 
immédiatement théologiques. (Benjamin 
1993, 489) 
 
Recollection does not comply with the model of cognitive relationships 
between subjects and objects of memory or knowledge. It counters the 
phenomenological conception of human consciousness as the field in which 
historical relations are brought to the light of awareness. It implies that the 
human, as historic, is not the same as the modern subject of experience – or of 
history. Note, in this respect, its etymological ties, through the Latin colligere, to a 
series of notions that could be significantly affiliated to Benjaminian 
problematics. There is reading, to begin with – or, more specifically, enacting in 
recitation. Through its modern Greek equivalent of ajnavgnwsiß (anagnosis), 
reading further leads us to re-cognition and to Erkenntnis – as juxtaposed to 
knowledge and Wissenschaft. There is also, in colligo or lego the idea of gathering 
what has been dispersed – selectively, instead of negligently, in gestures that 
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could range from coiling or winding up to spinning and tracing out. We are thus 
reminded of the Greek levgw and lovgoß – and its divergence from ratio. We are 
further driven to intelligence as an inter-legere. There would also be conversation or 
Gespräch – from sun-levgw, semantically close to sun-om-iliva. Recollection would 
thus come close to inter-discursive toils of configuration and reconfiguration. The 
recollective event would affect not only the recollected, but also the recollecting 
instance: by recollecting a Gewesene  as readable, the Jetzt recollects itself as a 
reader. 
De Man reads Benjamin differently when he comments on a passage in 
which Benjamin refers to tensions and dynamics of historical connections 
between languages. He considers that linguistic awareness does away with 
certain notions or concepts that, in my opinion, Benjamin insists on critically 
revising, instead of discarding: 
It is easy to say to some extent what this suffering is not. It is certainly not 
subjective pains, some kind of pathos of a self, a kind of manifestation of 
self-pathos which the poet would have expressed as his suffering. This is 
certainly not the case, because, says Benjamin, the sufferings that are here 
being mentioned are not in any sense human. They would not be 
sufferings of an individual or of a subject. (...)  [This suffering] is not the 
pathos of remembrance, of this pathetic mixture of hope and catastrophe 
and apocalypse which Hartman captures, which is present in Benjamin’s 
tone, but not so much in what he says. It is not the pathos of history, it is 
not the pathos of what Hölderlin has called the dürftiger Zeit between the 
disappearance of the Gods and the possible return of the Gods. It is not 
this kind of sacrificial, dialectical and elegiac gesture, by means of which 
one looks back on the past as a period that is lost, which then gives you 
the hope of another future which may occur. (Conclusions, 85-86)  
Pathos, in Benjamin, is certainly very distinct– precisely because of the 
nature of the stakes. Remembrance is, indeed, displaced, but recollection takes its 
place – along with the notion of survival. Historicist temporality is also 
problematised, but history persists – in a way that could be very close to 
Hölderlin, in fact. The notion of human subject, either individual or collective, is 
bracketed, but only so that humanness may be rethought – in terms non-
phenomenological and non-anthropological.  
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The task of thinking the human beyond the modern notion of individual 
or collective human subjectivity is, indeed, a central one. Who or what is it that 
recollects, if it is not a subjective human conscience? How can we have a 
recollective instance, if humanness is not enacted through phenomenological 
entities? I turn, for clues in this respect, to Programm – Benjamin’s early 
programmatic essay on Kant.  
 
 
B.2.4. Critical Metaphysics 
 
Benjamin’s Programm, in its eccentrically programmatic style and rhetoric, 
invites the reader to operate a critical return to the relations between Kantianism 
and modern Enlightenment, from a perspective other than the one of historicism. 
Benjamin’s critique targets the very grounds on which the figure of the human is 
addressed by modern anthropological humanism at large. It is a quest for the 
standpoint “einer künftigen Metaphysik [of a future metaphysics]”(1831). 
Benjamin criticises, more particularly, what he designates as the empiricist or 
mechanistic conceptions of the human subject – which prove to be as 
questionable as the organic or historicist ones. It is quite noteworthy that, 
although Benjamin’s essay investigates the conditions of metaphysics, it persists 
in connecting its concerns to history. 
According to Benjamin, Kantianism may have done relatively well in 
criticising the autonomy or self-sufficiency of the object of knowledge as an 
empirical entity, but the notion of the subject as knowing conscience has resisted 
this breakthrough:  
 
                                                   
1 Benjamin explicitly refers here to Kant ‘s 1783 essay (Kant 1993). All German quotations 
in this section are from Programm. 
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[…] selbst soweit Kant und die 
Neukantianer die Objektnatur des Dinges 
an sich als der Ursache der Empfindungen 
überwunden haben bleibt immer noch die 
Subjekt-Natur des erkennenden 
Bewußtseins zu eliminieren.  (Programm, 
161) 
[…] même si Kant et les néo-kantiens ont 
dans une certaine mesure dépassé la 
nature d’objet de la chose en soi comme 
cause de sensations, il reste toujours à 
éliminer la nature subjective de la 
conscience connaissante . (OE, I: 184) 
 
An effective critique of Kantianism would have to start by critically addressing 
the modern “mythological” notion of the human subject of experience and 
knowledge as a construct of body and spirit, senses and intellect: 
 
Es ist nämlich gar nicht zu bezweifeln daß 
in dem Kantischen Erkenntnisbegriff die 
wenn auch sublimierte Vorstellung eines 
individuellen leibgeistigen Ich welches 
mittelst der Sinne die Empfindungen 
empfangt und auf deren Grundlage sich 
seine Vorstellungen bildet die größte Rolle 
spielt. Diese Vorstellung ist jedoch 
Mythologie und was ihren 
Wahrheitsgehalt angeht jeder andern 
Erkenntnismythologie gleichwertig. 
(Programm, 161) 
 Car on ne peut douter du rôle primordial 
que joue dans le concept kantien de 
connaissance l’idée, fût-elle sublimée, d’un 
moi individuel, à la fois corporel et 
intellectuel, qui, au moyen des sens, reçoit 
des sensations à partir desquelles il 
constitue ses représentations. Or cette idée 
relève de la mythologie, et n’a pas plus de 
valeur, au point de vue de son contenu de 
vérité que n’importe quelle autre 
mythologie de la connaissance. (OE, I : 185) 
 
The desideratum would be a critical philosophy of knowledge addressing  
“die Sphäre totaler Neutralität in Bezug auf die Begriffe Objekt und Subjekt [the 
sphere of total neutrality with respect to the concepts of object and subject]” 
(163). Benjamin’s approach to the issue has typically dialectic overtones. The 
subject of modern Aufklärung, based on “eine Erfahrung deren Quintessenz 
deren Bestes gewisse Newton‘sche Physik war [an experience of which the 
quintessential best was a certain Newtonian Physics]” (159) is seen by Benjamin 
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as having enabled a significant breakthrough, at the level of a critical theory of 
knowledge. The correlative paradigm of experience would also account for the 
crucial limitations and drawbacks of Kantianism. The problem, according to 
Benjamin, is that modern episteme fails to address a distinct kind of experience, 
indistinguishably religious and historical: 
 
Was das Niedere und Tiefstehende der 
Erfahrung jener Zeit ausmacht, worin ihr 
erstaunlich geringes spezifisch 
metaphysisches Gewicht liegt wird sich 
nur andeuten lassen in der Wahrnehmung 
wie dieser niedere Erfahrungsbegriff auch 
das Kantische Denken beschränkend 
beeinflußt hat. Es handelt sich dabei 
selbstverständlich um denselben 
Tatbestand den man als die religiöse und 
historische Blindheit der Aufklärung oft 
hervorgehoben hat ohne zu erkennen in 
welchem Sinne diese Merkmale der 
Aufklärung der gesamten Neuzeit 
zukommen. (Programm, 159) 
Pour suggérer ce qui fait la pauvreté et la 
médiocrité de l’expérience propre à cette 
époque [des Lumières], à qui tient son 
étonnante inconstance métaphysique, il 
suffit de mesurer l’influence restrictive que 
ce concept inférieur de d’expérience a 
exercée sur la pensée Kantienne elle-
même. Nous voulons naturellement parler 
de cette cécité religieuse et historique que 
l’on a souvent reprochée aux Lumières, 
sans reconnaître en quel sens ces caractères 
sont imputables à l’ensemble des Temps 
modernes. (OE, I : 182) 
 
Metaphysics and religion, in their interconnection, are, for Benjamin, in 
need of a critical rehabilitation countering their restrictive modern 
understanding. Religious experience would regard a “kommenden neuen und 
höheren Art der Erfahrung [new and more elevated mode of an Experience still 
to come]” (160), referring us to “eine tiefere metaphysische erfüllte Erfahrung [an 
experience of a more profound metaphysical plenitude]” (161). Metaphysics 
should thus be understood as involving a field of problematics questioning 
Kantian confines and delimitations. One of their tasks would be to account, not 
for religion in general, but for a specific kind of “Religion, nämlich als die wahre, 
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wobei weder Gott noch Mensch Objekt oder Subjekt der Erfahrung ist [religion, 
yet a true one, for which neither God nor man are either objects or subjects of 
experience]”(163). 
 The multiplicity and diversity of various modes of experience would be 
correlative to an equally multiple and diverse field of modes of conscience and 
knowledge. “Das wahre Kriterium des Wertunterschiedes der Bewußtseinsarten 
festzustellen wird eine der höchsten Aufgaben der kommenden Philosophie sein 
[To establish the true criterion of the value-difference between different modes of 
consciousness will be one of the highest tasks of the philosophy to come]” (163). 
Amongst these modes, there would be the one of the purely or authentically 
transcendental consciousness that modern Kantianism fails to address. The 
Benjaminian idea of purety or authenticity, in this respect, involves the 
discarding of the figures of biological, psychological or spiritual anthropological 
subjects – both as the agencies of experience and as instances of knowledge. The 
very notion of consciousness would ultimately be in doubt, given its 
phenomenological connotations: 
 
Alle echte Erfahrung beruht auf dem 
reinen erkenntnis-theoretischen 
(transzendentalen) Bewußtsein wenn 
dieser Terminus unter der Bedingung daß 
er alles Subjekthaften entkleidet sei noch 
verwendbar ist. Das reine tranzendentale 
Bewußtsein ist artverschieden von jedem 
empirischen Bewußtsein und es ist daher 
die Frage ob die Anwendung des 
Terminus Bewußtsein hier statthaft ist. 
(Programm, 162-163 ) 
Toute expérience authentique repose sur la 
pure conscience (transcendentale) définie 
au plan de la théorie de la connaissance, 
pour autant que le terme de conscience soit 
encore utilisable lorsqu’on le dépouille de 
tout élément subjectif. La pure conscience 
transcendentale est spécifiquement 
différente de toute conscience empirique, 
et c’est pourquoi l’on peut se demander si 
le terme est ici appropriée. (OE, I : 186) 
 
The Benjaminian prolegomena to metaphysics also insist on the 
transgression of given conceptual categorisations and classifications of human 
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experience. Venturing “ein reines systematisches Erfahrungskontinuum zu 
bilden [to form a pure continuum of experience]” (164) would be the crucial task 
of the coming metaphysics. Philosophy would thus be confronted  “auf ein 
Absolutes, als Dasein, und damit auf jene Kontinuität im Wesen der Erfahrung 
[to an absolute as human existence, hence to a continuity in the very essence of 
experience]” (170). It would address a field in which “würde überhaupt der 
Unterschied zwischen den Gebieten der Natur und der Freiheit aufgehoben wäre 
[all difference would disappear between the domain of nature and the one of 
freedom]” (165). A complete revision of the table of categories is postulated as 
the counterpart, if not precondition, of the task: “ist die Tafel der Kategorien wie 
es jetzt allgemeinen gefordert wird völlig zu revidieren” (166). 
The issue is not how to substitute metaphysics for secular philosophy but 
how to resist the erasure of the former by safeguarding its specific site within the 
field of the latter – the site of the logical possibility of metaphysics:  
 
Dieser neue Begriff der Erfahrung welcher 
gegründet wäre auf neue Bedingungen der 
Erkenntnis würde selbst der logische Ort 
und die logische Möglichkeit der 
Metaphysik sein. (Programm, 163 ) 
Ce nouveau concept d’expérience qui 
serait fondé sur des nouvelles conditions 
de connaissance, constituerait lui-même le 
lieu logique et la possibilité logique de la 
métaphysique. (OE, I : 187 ) 
 
In the “Addendum” to Programm, Benjamin examines the Kantian division 
of philosophy into a critical Erkenntnistheorie and a dogmatische metaphysics. The 
definition he suggests for metaphysics, within such a division, is quite telling. 
Metaphysics address the point at which the philosophical critique of knowledge 
leads to the doctrine of something, the knowledge of which presupposes the 
critique of the very concept of knowledge (169). This would join the 
philosophical critique of knowledge to the kind of knowledge that religion 
implies. Metaphysics would thus be answering the basic claim “der virtuellen 
Einheit von Religion und Philosophie [of the virtual unity between religion and 
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philosophy]” – or “der Einordnung der Erkenntnis der Religion in die 
Philosophie [of the insertion of the knowledge of religion in philosophy]” (171). 
 If metaphysics were thus to assume a new position in the overall system 
of a critical philosophy, it would have to address the issue of language. Programm 
does not elaborate on this point. It only indexes its crucial importance – implicitly 
referring us to the essay on Sprache, to which we will soon turn: 
 
Die große Umbildung und Korrektur die 
an dem einseitig mathematisch-
mechanisch orientierten Erkenntnisbegriff 
vorzunehmen ist, kann nur durch eine 
Beziehung der Erkenntnis auf die Sprache 
wie sie schon zu Kants Lebzeiten Hamann 
versucht hat gewonnen werden. 
(Programm, 168 ) 
La grande transformation, la grande 
correction à laquelle convient des 
soumettre un concept de connaissance 
orienté de façon unilatérale vers les 
mathématiques et la mécanique n’est 
possible que si l’on met la connaissance en 
relation avec le langage, comme Hamann 
avait tenté de le faire du vivant même de 
Kant. (OE, I: 193) 
 
Epistemologically, this would involve a kind of dialectics – a dialectics in which 
the Hegelian or, more generally, historicist objective of a synthetic overcoming of 
tensions or oppositions, would be cancelled: 
 
Jedoch wird außer dem Begriff der 
Synthesis auch der einer gewissen Nicht-
Synthesis zweier Begriffe in einem andern 
systematisch hochst wichtig werden, da 
außer der Synthesis noch eine andere 
Relation zwischen Thesis und Antithesis 
möglich ist.  (Programm, 166 ) 
Cependant, en dehors du concept de 
synthèse, celui d’une certaine non-synthèse 
de deux concepts en un troisième prendra 
la plus haute importance systématique, car 
une autre relation que la synthèse est 
possible entre la thèse et l’antithèse. (OE, I: 
190-91) 
 
History could be naming the very idea of non-synthetic connections 
accomplished under conditions of dialectic tensions. 
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B.2.5. Sites of Humanity 
 
I now turn to two other essays of Benjamin, which are quite separated in 
time but raise in analogous terms the issue of humanness – and do so in direct 
connection to specific literary texts. They could be helpful for our understanding 
of how the notions of life and survival of works of art may be steps towards a 
post-Kantian theory of historic humanity. Both address the issue of humanness 
in terms that involve immortality through recollection. Both concern Russian 
literature and, if only implicitly, Christian Orthodox religious tradition.    
As Benjamin puts it in his essay “Der Erzähler [The story-teller]”1, human 
death lies at the very grounds of narrative authority: its occurrence transposes, so 
to speak, human life from the realm of its temporal conditioning to the one of its 
survival as an unforgettable form. 
  
                                                   
1 The essay was first published in 1936. 
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Nun ist es aber an dem, daß nicht etwa nur 
das Wissen oder die Weisheit des 
Menschen sondern vor allem sein gelebtes 
Leben – und das ist der Stoff, aus dem die 
Geschichten werden – tradierbare Form 
am ersten am Strebenden annimmt. So wie 
im Innern des Menschen mit dem Ablauf 
des Lebens eine Folge von Bildern sich in 
Bewegung setzt – bestehend aus den 
Ansichten der Eigenen Person1, unter 
denen er, ohne es inne zu werden, sich 
selber begegnet ist – so geht mit einem Mal 
in seinen Mienen und Blicken das 
Unvergeßliche auf und teilt allem, was ihn 
betraf, die Autorität mit, die auch der 
ärmste Schächer im Streben für die 
Lebenden um ihn her besitzt. Am 
Ursprung des Erzählten steht diese 
Autorität.  (Benjamin 1989a, 449-450 ) 
Or il est de fait que non seulement la 
connaissance et la sagesse de l’homme 
mais surtout sa vie vécue – et c’est la 
matière dont sont faites les histoires – 
prend une forme dont la tradition peut 
s’emparer [forme communicable] avant 
tout chez le mourant.  De même que 
certains images de sa vie se mettent à 
défiler devant celui qui meurt [-visions de 
sa propre personne, dans lesquelles, sans 
s’en rendre compte, il s’est lui-même 
rencontré-] de même se révèle soudain 
dans sa mimique et ses regards 
l’Inoubliable qui attribut à tout ce qui le 
concerne cette autorité dont dispose au 
regard des vivants en mourant,  même le 
plus misérable larron.  C’est cette autorité 
qui est à l’origine du récit.  (Benjamin 1991, 
2152) 
 
Human life, through the event of death, would pass on to literary 
language the authoritative form of a perfected and persisting Gewesene. 
Recollection is brought to the fore through the negative figure of an impossibility 
of forgetfulness – just as in the Aufgabe essay. This would not be remembrance 
                                                   
1 One cannot help wondering whether Benjamin’s use  of Person in the German original 
refers us to Christian and, more specifically, Russian-orthodox theology – rather than to the 
modern or personalist configuration of individual subjectivity. I will return to this issue in the last 
part of my thesis.  
 
2 I quote the translation published in Ecrits Français, which is by Benjamin himself. I add, 
in brackets, omitted parts as they occur in the translation of the German  original in OE (III: 130). 
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operated by cognitive faculties of individual or collective human entities. Neither 
would it depend on the support provided to such faculties by the 
representational function assumed by literary discourse – or by institutions 
negotiating historical value in terms of momumental significance1. The very 
possibility of literary discourse would depend on the recollection of human life 
as Gewesene. In the following passage, the realm of human life-through-death 
(rather than life-after-death), within which literary authority emerges, involves 
“natural” history: 
 
Der Tod ist die Sanktion von allem, was 
der Erzähler berichten kann. Vom Tode hat 
er seine Autorität geliehen. Mit andern 
Worten: es ist die Naturgeschichte, auf 
welche seine Geschichten zurückverweisen 
(Benjamin 1989a, 450) 
La mort est la sanction de tout ce que le 
narrateur peut raconter. Son autorité, c’est 
à la mort qu’il l’emprunte. En d’autres 
termes : c’est à l’histoire naturelle que 
revoient toutes les histoires.  (Benjamin 
1991, 215) 
 
The above could shed some light on enigmatic passages of Benjamin’s 
earlier essay on Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot2 – passages in which metaphysical 
problematics are more explicitly at work. Dostoyevsky’s Prince would be a figure 
of humanness irreducible to empirical human entities, whether individual or 
collective. It would be wrong, Benjamin warns us, to address the novel “als ob es 
sich um die russische ‘Psyche‘ oder die des Epileptikers handle [as if it was about 
the Russian or the epileptical «psyche»]” (1989b, 237). There is humanness (and 
even national humanness), but only in a way involving the metaphysics of the 
                                                   
1 I cannot elaborate here on how Benjamin juxtaposes the story-teller’s recollective passe-
temps to the authority of the historian, as well as of the modern novel in its teleological 
perspective.  
 
2 “’Der Idiot’ von Dostojewskij”, written in 1917, was first published in 1921 – and is thus 
situated between Sprache and Aufgabe.  
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corresponding identities. According to Benjamin, “Dagegen gilt es die 
metaphysische Identität des Nationellen wie des Humanen in der Idee der 
Schöpfung Distojewskijs zu erfassen [What matters here is to grasp the 
metaphysical identity of both the national and the human in the idea of the 
Dostoyevskian creation]” (238). 
The Benjaminian metaphysics of Dostoyevskian humanity include the 
discussion of the issue of non-forgetfulness – this time in explicit connection to 
the one of immortality. The Prince would be immortal human life. The 
immortality of such a human life would have little to do with current 
conceptions of immortal entities depending on corporeal, psychological or 
spiritual components of human beings. It would be immortality of life as such – or, 
more specifically, of life as perfected form. In other words, immortality would be 
the very irreducibility of human life to its anthropological and phenomenological 
dimensions: 
 
Das unsterbliche Leben, von dem dieser 
Roman das Zeugnis ablegt, ist nichts 
weniger als die Unsterblichkeit im 
gewöhnlichen Sinn. Denn in der ist gerade 
das Leben sterblich, unsterblich aber ist 
Fleisch, Kraft, Person, Geist in ihren 
verschiedenen Fassungen. […] Das alles ist 
weit entfernt von der Unsterblichkeit des 
Lebens, von dem Leben, das seine 
Unsterblichkeit im Sinne unendlich 
fortschwingt, und dem die Unsterblichkeit 
die Gestalt gibt. Denn hier ist von Dauer 
nicht die Rede. (Benjamin 1989b, 239 ) 
La vie immortelle dont témoigne le roman 
n’est rien moins que l’immortalité dans le 
sens courant du terme. Car en celle-ci, la 
vie justement est mortelle, mais immortels 
sont la chair, la force, la personne, l’esprit 
sous leurs formes diverses. […] Tout cela 
est très éloigné de l’immortalité de la vie, 
très éloigné de cette vie qui répercute à 
l’infini son immortalité dans le sens, et à 
laquelle l’immortalité donne forme. Car il 
n’est pas question ici de durée. (OE, I: 169) 
 
The notion of non-forgetfulness precludes the modern idea of a subject of 
phenomenological memory. As the immortality of Leben is its very irreducibility 
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to phenomenic conditions, Überleben cannot in any sense depend on a subject 
remembering objects of experience or knowledge. Unforgetfulness, along with 
immortality, tell that life is not temporally situated in a by-gone past, but persists 
as historic perfectedness. As such it can be either recollected or dispersed, but 
neither remembered nor forgotten: 
 
Das unsterbliche Leben ist unvergeßlich, 
das ist das Zeichen, an dem wir es 
erkennen. Es ist das Leben, das ohne 
Denkmal und ohne Andenken, ja vielleicht 
ohne Zeugnis unvergessen sein müßte. Es 
kann nicht vergessen werden. Das Leben 
bleibt gleichsam ohne Gefäß und Form das 
unvergängliche. Und «unvergeßlich» sagt 
seinem Sinn nach mehr als daß wir es nicht 
vergessen können; es deutet auf etwas im 
Wesen des Unvergeßlichen selbst, 
wodurch es unvergeßlich ist. (Benjamin 
1989b, 239) 
La vie immortelle est inoubliable, tel est le 
signe auquel nous la reconnaissons. C’est 
la vie qui, sans monument commémoratif, 
sans souvenir, peut-être même sans 
témoignage, échapperait nécessairement à 
l’oubli. Il est impossible qu’elle soit 
oubliée. En quelque sorte sans contenant et 
sans forme, cette vie demeure ce qui ne 
passe point. Et la dire « inoubliable » ce 
n’est pas dire seulement que nous ne 
pouvons l’oublier ; c’est renvoyer à 
quelque chose dans l’ essence de 
l’inoubliable, par quoi il est inoubliable. 
(OE, I : 170) 
 
There would be aeonic life at stake in literary scripta, somehow involving 
their transmission and translation. This life would be immortal or inescapably 
recollectable, but it would be neither of an authorial agency, nor of historically 
situated cultural entities. It would still be human and historic life: to the precise 
degree that it is life of language. 
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B.3. LINGUISTIC HUMANNESS 
 
B.3.1. On Language 
 
According to Programm, language could be an element crucial to the 
“logical site” of a post-Kantian metaphysics of the human. The following passage 
from Vorrede presents us with basic figural knots through which the notion of 
language could be reconfigured accordingly: 
 
Nicht als ein Meinen, welches durch die 
Empirie seine Bestimmung fände, sondern 
als die das Wesen dieser Empirie erst 
prägende Gewalt besteht die Wahrheit. 
Das aller Phänomenalität entrückte Sein, 
dem allein diese Gewalt eignet, ist das des 
Namens. Es bestimmt die Gegebenheit der 
Ideen. Gegeben aber sind sie nicht sowohl 
in einer Ursprache, denn in einem 
Urvernehmen, in welchem die Worte ihren 
benennenden Adel unverloren an die 
erkennende Bedeutung besitzen. (Vorrede,  
216) 
La vérité ne consiste pas dans une visée 
qui trouverait sa détermination à travers la 
réalité empirique, mais dans un pouvoir 
qui donnerait d’abord sa forme 
caractéristique à l’essence de cette réalité. 
L’être détaché de toute phénomenalité qui 
seul a ce pouvoir en propre, c’est celui du 
nom. C’est lui qui détermine le caractère 
donnée des idées. Mais celles-ci sont 
données moins dans une langue originelle 
que dans une perception originelle, ou les 
mots possèdent le noble privilège de 
nommer, sans l’avoir perdu dans la 
signification qui est liée à la connaissance. 
(Préface , 33) 
 
By slightly correcting the French translation, we read, in the beginning of 
the passage, a redefinition of truth (Wahrheit) as a force that stamps (and thus 
forms) the essence (Wesen) of empirical reality. Language would assume this 
force as name (Name) directly related to the realm of ideas (Ideen). Linguistic 
naming would be inherent in all linguistic manifestations. As a kind of 
Urvernehmen (primal hearing, rather than perceiving, as the French translation 
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has it) it would be free from the constraints of signification, and, more generally, 
detached from all phenomenicity. Benjamin’s Name thus becomes the crucial site 
for the articulation of a theory of language contesting the anthropological and 
phenomenological premises of linguistics, whether historical or structuralist.  
This chapter of my thesis addresses elements for such a theory provided 
by a number of early Benjaminian essays, especially Sprache and Vorrede. I will 
also take into consideration the later essay on Mimesis, where the distinction 
between semiotic and non-semiotic dimensions of human language is more 
explicitly at stake.  
Sprache, is an essay “On language in general and on human language”, 
which develops into a commentary on Genesis. The commentary reads the Bible 
as an allegory of theoretical problematics about language, centred on the figure 
of Adamic language and humanness. The allegorical reading of the Adamic 
figure involves no historical or pseudo-historical nostalgia or quest for an Ur-
language, situated at a point of distant beginnings and remaining to regain or 
recover. The Bible is probed as a field on the grounds of which theory can 
dispute the premises of modern approaches to the notion of human language – 
starting with the one of language in general.  
One of the main postulates of the Benjaminian theory of human language 
is that language should not be understood as limited to its semiotic dimension – 
or to the corresponding tensions between semiosis and semansis. It is by 
identifying humanness with a desired but impossible control over such tensions, 
that de Man postulates (not without tragic overtones) the non-human or in-
human status of language. He comes closer to Benjamin towards the end of the 
following passage, when he sees a difficulty within the very notion of the human:  
 […] a constant problem about the nature of language as being either 
human or inhuman. That there is a nonhuman aspect of language is a 
perennial awareness from which we cannot escape, because language 
does things which are so radically out of our control that they cannot be 
assimilated to the human at all, against which one fights constantly [...] 
Things happen in the world which cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
human conception of language. And they always happen in linguistic 
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terms, or the relation to language is always involved when they have 
happened [...] Philosophy originates in this difficulty about the nature of 
language which is as such... and which is a difficulty about the definition 
of the human, or a difficulty within the human as such. And I think there 
is no escape from that. (Conclusions, 101) 
 An idea of a properly human language, Benjamin tells us, is not 
inconceivable or a priori false. Both language and humanness, however, would 
have to be reconfigured outside the premises of their modern understanding. 
 
 
B.3.2. A Language of Humanity 
 
The following statement, from the introductory part of Sprache, is quite 
trivial, if read as a personifying metaphor; yet we are told that it is not 
metaphorical. Read as a theoretical suggestion, then, it becomes quite perplexing. 
Everything would partake in language, to the degree that it communicates its 
being as spiritual. Events or things are languaged, as non-metaphorically as 
linguistic works of art survive: 
 
Es gibt kein Geschehen oder Ding in der 
belebten noch in der unbelebten Natur, das 
nicht in gewisser Weise an der Sprache 
teilhätte, denn es ist jedem wesentlich, 
seinen geistigen Inhalt mitzuteilen. Eine 
Metapher aber ist das Wort «Sprache» in 
solchem Gebrauche durchaus nicht. 
(Sprache, 140-141) 
Ni dans la nature animée ni dans la nature 
inanimée, il n’existe événement ni chose 
qui, d’une certaine façon, n’ait part au 
langage, car à l’un comme à l’autre il est 
essentiel de communiquer son contenu 
spirituel. Ainsi utilisé le mot “langage” n’a 
rien d’une métaphore. (OE, I : 143) 
 
The statement invites us to think of language independently of the figure of the 
human. The essay on Sprache is, indeed, an inquiry into the non-
anthropomorphic configuration, not only of language, but also of the human 
itself.  
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The essay begins by concentrating on manifestations of human spiritual 
life (Jede Äußerung menschlichen Geisteslebens) such as sculpture, music or justice. 
Every such manifestation would involve a mode of language (Art der Sprache). 
Language, as a “Mitteilung geistiger Inhalt [communication of spiritual content]” 
would thus be irreducible to a “Mitteilung durch das Wort [communication 
through words]” (140) 1.  
The term Inhalt is soon replaced, in the essay, by Wesen (essence). Before it 
engages in the analysis of Genesis, the Sprache essay discusses the relations 
between the geistige Wesen and the sprachliche Wesen of things – between a 
spiritual essence of things and the essence of a language that would correspond 
to it. These would be relations of expression (Ausdruck) and communication 
(Mitteilung). Language, Benjamin tells us, is what anything partakes of, to the 
degree that it communicates, in expression, its spiritual essence: “sein geistiges 
Wesen […] im Ausdruck mitteilt” (143). The expression of a spiritual essence is 
(and can only be understood as) language: “ist der Ausdruck seinem ganzen und 
innersten Wesen nach nur als Sprache zu verstehen” (141). Linguistic essence 
would, accordingly, be the unmediated expression of spiritual essence. 
Concerning the essence of any language, Benjamin suggests that we ask “für 
welches geistige Wesen es denn der unmittelbare Ausdruck sei [of which 
spiritual essence it is the unmediated expression]” (141). Unmediated: the 
mediation excluded is the one of human consciousness involved in current 
communicative and expressive practices. The task of a theory of language thus 
becomes part of a more general task of thinking life in general and human life in 
particular without being confined to phenomenological problematics.  
Note that the German term for language is not a synonym of tongue; it is 
thus free of metonymic connections to the physical act of speaking. In this sense, 
the term Sprache is quite far from the French langue or its Greek equivalent, 
glw`tta, and rather close to the Greek lovgoß, in its own double meaning (spirit 
                                                   
1 All page-references of in-text quotations, in this chapter, are to the Sprache essay. 
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and language). In his essay, Benjamin specifies, indeed, that the term lovgoß 
designates the fundamental and, as such, insoluble paradox of the distinction and 
identity between spiritual and linguistic essence (141).  
 Would there be some other term equivalent to or even interchangeable 
with language in the perspective of such problematics? My suggestion is that form 
(the German Form but also, to a certain degree, Bild) may indeed be such a term. 
Benjamin would thus be saying that all things are hypokeimena of a primary 
essence, in a way that sustains further questions concerning their essential form. 
“All things partake of language” would mean: all things are formations (Gebilden 
or Geformten)1.  
The essence of any specific language, on this level of abstraction, would be 
identical to the corresponding spiritual essence, to the degree that the latter 
communicates itself as form – that is, according to my reading, presents itself as 
formation. As Benjamin repeatedly underscores, the propensity of a spiritual 
essence to communicate itself communicates itself in its language as a whole – 
not through or by it. Linguistic expression of spiritual essence would not be 
transmission by means (Mittel) of language but enactment or instantiation in the 
linguistic medium (Medium) itself: “Die Sprache eines Wesens ist das Medium, in 
dem sich sein geistiges Wesen mitteilt” (157). Languages would communicate 
nothing but the very communicability of the corresponding spiritual essences: 
“teilt die Sprache […] eine Mitteilbarkeit schlechthin mit” (145-146). The essence 
of a language would be the very communicability of the corresponding spiritual 
essence: 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 As I have previously stated, the notion of primary essence (or substance) should not be 
taken as necessarily implying individual empirical entities – or particulars as opposed to 
universals. Anything (from human individuals to civilisations, from texts or poems to whole 
genres, from specific machines to technology at large) could be a substantial formation, to the 
degree that it involves the question, not so much of its existence or being, as of its essence or 
form. 
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Das geistige Wesen teilt sich in einer 
Sprache und nicht durch eine Sprache mit 
– das heißt: es ist nicht von außen gleich 
dem sprachlichen Wesen. Das geistigen 
Wesen ist mit dem sprachlichen identisch, 
nur sofern es mitteilbar ist. Was einem 
geistigen Wesen mitteilbar ist, das ist sein 
sprachliches Wesen. (Sprache, 142) 
Dire que l’essence spirituelle se 
communique dans un langage et non par 
lui, signifie que, du dehors, elle n’est pas 
identique à l’essence linguistique. Elle ne 
lui est identique que dans la mesure  où elle 
peut être communiquée. Ce qui est 
communicable dans une essence 
spirituelle, c’est son essence linguistique.  
(OE, I : 144) 
 
In this sense, languages would communicate nothing but their own selves 
as form: “Jede Sprache teilt sich selbst mit” (144). Since this self consists in the 
very communicability of a spiritual essence, we are not within the logic of a self-
referential mise-en-abyme structure. Language entails, rather, the very 
impossibility of self-reference or even self-reflexivity. A basic law of language 
would be that expressing one’s self and addressing everything else is the same: 
“nach dem sich selbst aussprechen und alles andere ansprechen dasselbe ist” 
(145). Language thus tells that the question of essence is the one of a persistent 
connection between “aussprechen” and “ansprechen”, “Ausruf” and “Anruf”. 
Languages of things, Benjamin further specifies, constitute fields of 
infinities, incommensurable to each other: “wohnt jeder Sprache ihre 
inkommensurable einzigeartete Unendlichkeit inne” (143). The theoretical 
challenge of this suggestion lies in the idea that languages express or 
communicate spiritual essences in spite of or even through their mutual 
incommensurability.  
The paradigm of Genesis acquires its allegorically theoretical significance 
with respect to the specificity of human language. This specificity resides in its 
mediating position – it stands between all other languages and Godly logos.  
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How would human language occupy such a position? Its linguistic 
essence would consist in its being the only language that names. It would be the 
naming of the spiritual essences of things as communicable – that is, their 
linguistic essences. Without it, essences would be non-recognisable as 
phenomenic formations; in other words, there would be no phenomena.  
At the same time, human naming-language would express or 
communicate the communicability of the spiritual essence of the human thing: 
“Der Mensch teilt also sein eignes geistiges Wesen (so fern es mittelbar ist) mit, 
indem er alle anderen Dinge benennt” (145). Naming would be identical to the 
essence of the human as communicable. The communicable spiritual essence of 
the human would consist in naming the communicability of things as formations.  
By naming, human language would invent nothing. It would be 
responding, according to Benjamin, to the essences of things communicating 
themselves to the human – thus crowning a network of mutual addressing of 
languages. “Der Name ist aber nicht allein der letzte Ausruf, er ist auch der 
eigentliche Anruf der Sprache [But the name is not only the last cry, it is also the 
proper appeal of language]” (145). Benjamin further qualifies the connection 
between the language of things and their human naming as translative. Human 
language would involve the “Übersetzung des Namenlosen in den Namen” 
(151). Recall that claiming or addressing are also crucial in how Aufgabe presents 
translative relations between different human languages. 
Naming language is universally human (universellen Benennung: 141). This 
does not mean common to all human beings. It means: language of humanness –  
“ist allerdings, weil er in Namen spricht, der Mensch der Sprecher der Sprache, 
eben darum auch ihr einziger” (145). Der Mensch is no specific human being or 
collectivity, nor, for that matter, the human species as a whole. It is the spiritual 
essence, of which the communicable form is identical to the linguistic essence of 
naming-language.  
The figure of God signals the absence of any actual addressee, as well as 
the presence of everything as a potential addressee of this human language: “im 
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Namen teilt das geistige Wesen des Menschen sich Gott mit [in name the 
spiritual essence of humans communicates itself to God]” (144). Godly logos 
would thus not be an original or an ultimate instance, inaugurating or crowning a 
process of dialectic synthesis. It would, rather, be closer to a figure that sustains 
the field of languages, in a state of motion that springs from nowhere and leads 
in no specific direction. In this sense, the following, closing statement of Sprache 
may be as little theocratic, in its implications, as it is anthropomorphic: 
  
Der Mensch teilt sich zum Gott durch den 
Namen mit, den er der Natur und 
seinesgleichen (im Eigennamen) gibt, und 
der Natur gibt er den Namen nach der 
Mitteilung, die er von ihr empfängt […] 
Die Sprache der Natur ist einer geheimen 
Lösung zu vergleichen, die jeder Posten 
dem nächsten in seiner eigenen Sprache 
weitergibt, der Inhalt der Lösung aber ist 
die Sprache des Postens selbst. Alle höhere 
Sprache ist Übersetzung der niederen, bis 
in der letzten Klarheit sich das Wort Gottes 
entfaltet, das die Einheit dieser 
Sprachbewegung ist. (Sprache, 157) 
L’homme se communique à Dieu par le 
nom qu’il donne  à la nature et (dans le 
nom propre) à ses semblables, et s’il donne 
nom à la nature, c’est selon la 
communication qu’il reçoit d’elle […] Le 
langage de la nature doit être comparé à 
un secret mot d’ordre que chaque 
sentinelle transmet dans son propre 
langage, mais le contenu du mot d’ordre 
est le langage de la sentinelle même. Tout 
langage supérieur est traduction du 
langage inférieur, jusqu’à ce que se 
développe dans son ultime clarté le verbe 
du Dieu qui est l’unité de ce mouvement 
du langage. (OE, I : 165) 
 
Let us now turn to the issue of the relations between human language, as a 
universal naming-language, and the multiplicity of human languages, as distinct 
modes of linguistic semiosis. 
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B.3.3. Between Logos and Lexis 
 
The term Wort, in the Sprache essay, is a homonym for three relatively 
distinct notions. It can be the Godly logos, the purely human-linguistic Name, or 
the semiotic construct of a lexis. The relations between these three kinds of 
Worten constitute a crucial knot for the Benjaminian theory of language. 
Wort as Godly Logos (which the French translation renders by Verbe) 
would be the principle or arche that underlies and sustains all languages of things 
as communicable essences. Wort as the Name of the specifically human language 
would be the medium enacting the relations of nameless languages of things to 
each other and to the realm of Godly logos. Benjamin talks, more specifically, of a 
“reflex des Wortes in Namen [reflex of Godly word in name]” (Sprache, 149).  
The status of the name-word would be pre-semiotic – or, rather, non-
semiotic: it is in this sense, I think, that Benjamin qualifies human naming-
language as pure language, reine Sprache (Sprache, 144). This purity of the name 
does not involve sacredness. It consists in a detachment of the human from 
phenomenic conditions of current communicative practices. It thus qualifies 
naming language as purely human – running through the multiplicity and 
particularity of human languages as systems of signs. It should be noted that 
Benjamin, echoing Humboldtian premises, sees the specificity of human 
language as residing in sound as a principle of form. The languages of things, he 
says, “sind unvollkommen, und sie sind stumm [are unaccomplished, and they 
are mute]”. He continues: “Den Dingen ist das reine sprachliche Formprinzip – 
der Laut – versagt [The purely linguistic principle of form, the sound, is denied 
to things]” (Sprache, 147) 1. Sound, as a principle of linguistic form, could be 
                                                   
1  Note the difference Sprache sees between painting or sculpture and poetry or religion as 
languages. The former, while being human, would remain closely dependent on principles of 
form which are also those of the languages of things. The latter would involve elements of a 
language exclusively human – and still only partly so, in the case of poetry (Sprache 147 and 156). 
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understood as prior to voice, as a means of communication: its crucial 
significance, for Benjamin, lies in the fact that it tells forms in ways that transcend 
the shapes or contours that mark languages of things as empirically identifiable 
formations.  
The relation between the name and the thing it names is, according to 
Benjamin, not arbitrary. This postulate distances him from Saussurian linguistics 
while linking him, again, to Humboldtian concerns. As opposed to Humboldt, 
however, Benjamin does not understand this as involving similarity or likeness 
of form1. We have already seen that the passage from the languages of things to 
human language involves translation. He also talks of Symbol – which I suggest 
we read in its Greek etymology (sum-bolhv, joining or coming together), having 
little to do with the notion of sign as carrier of signification. Sound would be the 
field of a juncture of essences of things as communicable: 
 
Das Unvergleichliche der menschlichen 
Sprache ist, dass ihre magische 
Gemeinschaft mit den Dingen immateriell 
und rein geistig ist, und dafür ist der Laut 
das Symbol. (Sprache, 147) 
Ce qui est incomparable dans le langage 
humain c’est que sa communauté magique 
avec les choses est immatérielle et 
purement spirituelle, et de ces caractères le 
son est le symbole. (OE, I : 152) 
 
In the Aufgabe essay, the figure of reine Sprache reoccurs and occupies a 
central position. It would be the language of truth (Wahrheit) or essentiality 
(Wesenheit) (Aufgabe, 49 and 52). Although of theological origins, it would be of 
vital philosophical interest. It would designate something that retains an actual 
or active potential in all human languages: a “schöpferisches Wort [creative 
Word]”, always “gegenwärtig in Leben [present or actual in life]”, kernel or 
nucleus (Kern) of processes and dynamics of linguistic transformation (51-51). As 
                                                   
1 Benjamin further elaborates on this crucial point in his later essay on Mimesis, which 
will be discussed below. 
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such, reine Sprache entertains tense and ambiguous relations to the communicable 
meaning of statements or texts – but would remain distinct from it:   
 
Allein wenn der Sinn eines Sprachgebildes 
identisch gesetzt werden darf mit dem 
seiner Mitteilung, so bleibt ihm ganz nah 
und doch unendlich fern, unter ihm 
verborgen oder deutlicher, durch ihn 
gebrochen oder machtvoller, über alle 
Mitteilung hinaus ein Letztes, 
Entscheidendes. (Aufgabe, 19 ). 
Mais s’il est permis d’identifier le sens 
d’une oeuvre langagière à celui de sa 
communication, il reste, proche de lui, et 
pourtant infiniment loin, caché sous lui ou 
plus manifeste, brisé par lui ou s’imposant 
avec plus de force, au delà de toute 
communication, un élément ultime, décisif. 
(OE, I : 258) ) 
 
The notion of communication (Mitteilung) is thus displaced, as we pass 
from the realm of essences, which the essay on Sprache addresses, to the one of 
history, which Aufgabe concentrates on. The same happens to the notion of 
expression (Ausdruck). Purely human language is what is meant (Gemeinte) by all 
distinct human languages as wholes – and in this sense, it itself expresses 
nothing, except for the very communicability of human essence: 
 
In dieser reinen Sprache, die nichts mehr 
meint und nichts mehr ausdrückt, sondern 
als ausdrucksloses und schöpferisches 
Wort das in alle Sprachen Gemeinte ist, 
trifft endlich alle Mitteilung, aller Sinn und 
alle Intention auf eine Schicht, in der sie zu 
erlöschen bestimmt wird.  (Aufgabe, 19 ). 
Dans ce pur langage qui ne vise et 
n’exprime plus rien, mais, parole 
inexpressive et créatrice, est ce qui est visé 
par toutes les langages, finalement toute 
communication, tout sens et toute 
intention se heurtent à une strate où leur 
destin est de s’effacer. (OE, I : 258) ) 
 
Let us further examine, by returning to the Sprache essay, the relations 
between the word as Name and the word as sign – what I suggest we call lexis. 
Through the Biblical fall from the paradisiac state to that of knowledge, 
humanity passes from its purely human reine Sprache to the multiplicity of 
systems of linguistic signs. Human language turns from medium to means: 
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Indem der Mensch aus der reinen Sprache 
des Namens heraustritt, macht er die 
Sprache zum Mittel (nämlich einer 
unangemessenen Erkenntnis), damit auch 
an einem Teile jedenfalls zum bloßen 
 Zeichen; und das hat später die Mehrheit 
der Sprachen zur Folge. (Sprache, 153) 
En abandonnant le langage pur du nom, 
l’homme fait du langage un moyen (une 
connaissance qui ne lui convient pas), par 
là même aussi, pour une part en tout cas, 
un simple signe; et de là sortirons plus tard 
le plus grand nombre des langues. (OE, I : 
160-161) 
 
It is quite significant that Benjamin retains for the semiotic word the term 
that he also uses for Godly logos – that is, Wort (which the French translation 
renders as mot). Benjaminian dialectics are at work. The semiotic lexis would be a 
parody of the Godly logos. It would involve the tragic-ironic dimensions of a 
hubris, coextensive with the emergence of subject/object relations. Humans 
would tend to attribute to their lexis a creative force analogous to the one of logos. 
They would thus substitute a human agency (seen as subject) for the figure of the 
divine creator (the very paradigm of a non-subject). Correlatively, human 
language would acquire the function of a means of signification, signifying 
things or events as if they were its objects: 
 
Das Wissen um gut und böse verläßt den 
Namen, es ist eine Erkenntnis von außen, 
die unschöpferische Nachahmung des 
schaffenden Wortes. Der Name tritt aus 
sich selbst in dieser Erkenntnis heraus: Der 
Sündenfall ist die Geburtsstunde des 
menschlichen Wortes in dem der Name nicht 
mehr unverletzt lebte, das aus der 
Namensprache, der erkennenden, man 
darf sagen: der immanenten eigenen 
Magie heraustrat, um ausdrücklich, von 
außen gleichsam, magisch zu werden. Das 
Wort soll etwas  mitteilen (außer sich 
Le savoir du bien et du mal abandonne le 
nom, c’est une connaissance extérieure, 
l’imitation non-créatrice du verbe créateur. 
Dans cette connaissance le nom sort de lui-
même : le péché originel est l’heure natal 
du verbe humain, celui en qui le nom ne 
vivait plus intact, celui  qui  était sorti du 
langage qui nomme, du langage qui 
connaît, on peut dire sa propre magie 
immanente, pour se faire magique 
expressément, en quelque sorte du dehors. 
Le mot doit communiquer quelque chose 
(en dehors de lui-même). Tel est réellement 
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selbst). Das ist wirklich der Sündenfall des 
Sprachgeistes. Das Wort als äußerlich 
mitteilendes, gleichsam, eine Parodie des 
ausdrücklich mittelbaren Wortes auf das 
ausdrücklich unmittelbare, das schaffende 
Gott-Wortes, und der Verfall des seligen 
Sprachgeistes, des adamitischen, der 
zwischen ihnen steht. (Sprache, 152-153) 
le péché originel de l’esprit linguistique. 
En tant qu’il communique à l’exterieur, la 
parodie par le verbe expressément médiat 
du verbe expressément immédiat, du 
verbe créateur, du verbe divin, et c’est la 
déchéance du bienheureux esprit 
linguistique, de l’esprit adamique, situé 
entre les deux.  (OE, I : 159-160) 
 
Although suffering an eclipse under the weight of semiotic figuration, 
purely human naming-language would persist as an Erbteil des Menschensprache: 
a common heritage for all historical human languages (Sprache, 144). The closest 
that current linguistic practices come to the human naming-language (or the 
instance in which they expose most clearly their common heritage) would be 
their use of proper names – in which humans address humans or, more 
accurately, languages name purely human communicability. 
The misprision of modern linguistics – or, in Benjamin’s terminology, of 
bourgeois theories of language – would be that it isolates the semiotic component 
of human languages as sole object of interest and eventual discord. Human 
language as a whole is thus seen as the organic ensemble of evolving national 
languages (for Humboldtian history) or as the field of structurally distinct sign-
systems (for Saussurian semiology). Benjamin, from his perspective, insists that 
purely human naming-language, even if obscured or unnoticed, remains a vital 
dimension of all human languages – and needs to be theorised as such. No 
human-linguistic formation would be adequately understood if seen solely as a 
sign-system – whether entirely arbitrary and conventional or somewhat 
depending on the objects it signifies. Neither would the problem be solved by a 
presumably mystical access to transcendental meanings:  
 
Das menschliche Wort ist der Name der 
Dinge. Damit kann die Vorstellung nicht 
Le verbe humain est le nom des choses. Ce 
qui exclut la conception bourgeoise selon 
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mehr aufkommen, die der bürgerlichen 
Ansicht der Sprache entspricht, daß das 
Wort zur Sache sich zufällig verhalte, daß 
es ein durch irgendwelche Konvention 
gesetztes Zeichen der Dinge (oder ihrer 
Erkenntnis) sei. Die Sprache gibt niemals 
bloße  Zeichen. Mißverständlich ist aber 
auch die Ablehnung der bürgerlichen 
durch die mystische Sprachtheorie. Nach 
ihr nämlich ist das Wort schlechthin das 
Wesen der Sache. (Sprache, 150) 
laquelle le mot n’aurait avec la chose qu’un 
rapport accidentel et ne serait qu’un signe 
des choses (ou de leur connaissance) posée 
en vertu d’une quelconque convention. Le 
langage ne fournit jamais de signes purs et 
simples. Mais le refus de la théorie 
bourgeoise du langage par une théorie 
mystique est également équivoque. Car 
selon une telle théorie, le verbe [the word as 
lexis] est absolument l’essence de la chose.  
(OE, I : 156) 
 
Benjaminian dialectics do assign a crucial importance to a theory of linguistic 
semiosis, including writing in its specificity, in connection not only to literature 
but also to art in general: 
  
Anderseits ist gewiß, daß die Sprache der 
Kunst sich nur in tiefster Beziehung zur 
Lehre von den Zeichen verstehen läßt. 
Ohne diese bleibt überhaupt jede 
Sprachphilosophie gänzlich 
fragmentarisch, weil die Beziehung  
zwischen Sprache und Zeichen (wofür die 
zwischen Menschensprache und Schrift 
nur ein ganz besonderes Beispiel bildet) 
ursprüglich und fundamental ist. (Sprache, 
156) 
D’autre part il est certain que le langage de 
l’art ne peut être entendu que dans sa 
relation la plus profonde avec la théorie 
des signes. Sans elle toute philosophie du 
langage, quelle qu’elle soit, demeure tout à 
fait fragmentaire, car la relation est 
originaire et fondamentale entre langage et 
signe (la relation entre le langage humain 
et l’écriture n’étant qu’un exemple tout à 
fait particulier). (OE, I : 164). 
 
A critical theory of linguistic signs would presuppose the awareness that no 
language is ever only a system of signs. In other words, a theory of signs (as well 
as a theory of their historical constitution and change) would be an indispensable 
part, but only a part, of the metaphysics of linguistic form. These metaphysics 
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would be epistemologically prior to the theory of language as semiosis. The 
relations between sign and signification (or figuration and meaning), on which 
deconstructive criticism insists, should be viewed under the more general 
perspective of the relations between the semiotic and the non-semiotic 
components of all Wort. 
Elements of such a theory are also present in fragments posthumously 
published under the title “Zur Sprachphilosophie und Erkenntniskritik [On the 
philosophy of language and the criticism of knowledge]”. Amongst them, there 
is the following passage, highlighted by Tiedemann: 
 
Wenn nach der Theorie des Duns Scotus 
die Hindeutungen auf gewissen modi 
essendi nach Maßgabe dessen, was diese 
Hindeutungen bedeuten, fundiert sind, so 
entsteht natürlich die Frage, wie sich von 
dem Bedeuteten irgendein Allgemeineres 
und Formaleres als sein und also des 
Bedeutenden modus essendi irgendwie 
abspalten lasse, um als Fundament des 
Bedeutenden zu Gelten. (GS, VI: 22-23). 
Si la théorie de Duns Scot a raison de dire 
que les signifiants se fondent sur certains 
modi essendi relatifs à ce que ces signifiants 
signifient, la question surgit évidemment 
de savoir comment on peut isoler du 
signifié quelque chose de plus universel et 
de plus formel que le modus essendi qui lui 
est propre et qui est donc propre au 
signifiant, pouvant ainsi passer pour le 
fondement du signifiant. (Tiedemann 1987, 
45-46) 
 
This modus essendi founding the relation between signifier and signified 
would be the essentially linguistic element that makes language into a kritisches 
Medium, articulating the very realms of the signifier and the signified. It would 
be the naming component of the lexis: the purely human dimension of every 
distinct human language. The same fragments identify, indeed, Name as the 
required linguistic mediation between signifying words and signified meanings – 
a mediation sustaining a mode of linguistic intentio proper to each human 
language as a whole, without which no relationship of phenomenological 
intention would be possible between signifier and signified: 
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Das Zeichen bezieht sich niemals auf den 
Gegenstand, weil ihm keine Intention 
einwohnt, der Gegenstand aber nur der 
Intention erreichbar ist. […] Kraft des 
Namens haben die Wörter ihre Intention 
auf den Gegenstand; sie haben durch den 
Namen an ihm teil. (GS, VI: 14). 
Le signe ne se rapporte jamais à l’objet, car 
il est sans intention, et l’objet ne peut être 
atteint que par l’intention. […] C’est par le 
nom que les mots visent l’objet ; c’est par le 
nom qu’ils en participent. (Tiedemann, 
1987, n. 46) 
 
Purely human naming-language would be the modus essendi characterising 
all human languages as distinct and interrelated systems of semiotic 
signification. 
 
 
B.3.4. Semiotic Mimesis 
 
Benjamin’s Mimesis essay is an elaborate comment on the relations 
between signifiers and signifieds in human languages: semiotic structures carry a 
non-semiotic dimension of purely human naming-language.  
Benjamin suggests, more particularly, that linguistic semiosis can be 
understood, as the title suggests (“Über das mimetische Vermögen”) as 
dependent on a faculty of mimesis. The reference to the antique use of the term 
in Aristotle and, especially, in Plato, is not gratuitous – and it corroborates the 
translation of the occasionally also used German Nachahmung into mimesis, rather 
than imitation1. The essay starts by assigning to mimesis a crucial role in nature1 
                                                   
1 We have already encountered, in the Sprache essay, the notion of Nachahmung. There, it 
concerned the semiotic lexis as a parody of Godly logos. In the Mimesis essay, attention, as I will 
try to explain, shifts to relations between semiotic words and purely human-linguistic names. 
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and, more specifically, in human life. Humans would possess the highest 
capacity to produce through likeness: “Die höchste Fähigkeit im Produzieren von 
Ähnlichkeiten aber hat der Mensch” (210)2. Human languages, in their historical 
evolution as systems of signs, would enact this faculty. This implies, of course, 
that linguistic signs are not entirely arbitrary. The essay on Mimesis raises two 
questions in this respect. What, in human languages, imitates what? What kind 
of likeness or resemblance joins the imitative offspring to the imitated prototype? 
The idiosyncrasy of Benjamin’s answers to these questions can be better 
appreciated if we compare them to Humboldt’s understanding of the non-
arbitrariness of linguistic signs.  
For Humboldt, words would be imitative copies of images or 
representations produced in human consciousness. Different possible ways of 
understanding the imitation of mental images by sound are examined in his 
Sprachbau treatise, all of which are based on the model of onomatopoetic 
similarities or analogies3.  
According to Benjamin’s Mimesis, the capacity of human language to 
produce resemblances “sich im Wandel der Geschichte verändert hat [has been 
altered in the course of history]” (211). The most important alterations would 
involve the gradual emergence and preponderance of a specific mode of 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 The idea of a mimesis is also central to Benjamin’s approach to art in general, as 
formulated in the paralipomena of his Kunstwerk. Art would be theoretically definable as a mode 
of mimetic connection to nature. As originally mimetic, artistic phenomena would thus be 
somewhat related to traditionally auratic cult practices. This relation, modern aesthetic ideology 
would misread as mystical rather than magical. 
 
2  All page citations in the present section refer to the essay the title of which I abbreviate 
as Mimesis. 
 
3 See section A.3.2 of this thesis – and, for more on this specific issue, Humboldt’s 
Sprachbau, chap. 10 (“Verheilung jeder Laute unter die Begriffe”). 
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linguistic mimesis, entailing non-sensuous resemblance (unsinnlichen Ähnlichkeit) 
between the linguistic sign and what it imitates: 
 
Dergestalt wäre die Sprache die höchste 
Stufe des mimetischen Verhaltens und das 
vollkommenste Archiv der unsinnlichen 
Ähnlichkeit: ein Medium, in welches ohne 
Rest die früheren Kräfte mimetischer 
Hervorbringung und Auffassung 
hineingewandert sind, bis sie so weit 
gelangten, die der Magie zu liquidieren. 
(Mimesis, 213) 
Ainsi le langage serait le degré le plus 
élevé du comportement mimétique et la 
plus parfaite archive de la ressemblance 
non –sensible: un médium dans lequel ont 
intégralement migré les anciennes forces 
de production et de conception 
mimétiques, au point de liquider les 
pouvoirs de la magie. (OE, II: 363)  
 
Like Humboldt, Benjamin brings up the example of onomatopoeia (212). 
He does not elevate it, however, to a paradigm for his theory, since human-
linguistic mimesis would not be reducible to onomatopoetic analogy or 
similarity. The linguistic sign would resemble what it imitates in a way that does 
not allow this resemblance to be directly perceived by the senses. Benjamin’s 
example of dances imitating constellations of stars is quite telling in this respect. 
The mimetic relation at stake is not one of similarity between the contours of 
human movement and the shape of celestial figures but, rather, one of 
“vollendeter Anbildung an die kosmische Seinsgestalt [perfect conformity to the 
cosmic figure of being]” (211). The very nature of what is being imitated by 
linguistic semiosis would disallow relations of similarity to phenomenic shapes 
or contours.  
I suggest that, for Benjamin, the mimetic relation occurs between linguistic 
semiosis and purely human-linguistic naming. The latter, as we have seen, has 
little, if anything, to do with individual consciousness and mental images. This 
would explain why linguistic mimesis can not involve analogical similarity to its 
prototype. If some kind of likeness or resemblance there is, between lexis and 
Name, it could only be, indeed, of a non-sensuous order. 
174 
B.3. Linguistic Humanness 
We can thus better understand on what grounds we are invited, by 
Benjamin, to risk questions that would otherwise sound quite naive: 
 
Ordnet man nämlich Wörter der 
verschiedenen Sprachen, die ein Gleiches 
bedeuten, um jenes Bedeutete als ihren 
Mittelpunkt, so wäre zu erforschen, wie sie 
alle – die miteinander oft nicht die 
geringste Ähnlichkeit besitzen mögen – 
ähnlich jenem Bedeuteten in ihrer Mitte 
sind. (Mimesis, 212) 
En rassemblant les mots qui signifient la 
même chose en diverses langues et en les 
ordonnant autour de leur signifié comme 
autour d’un centre commun, on pourrait 
examiner en quoi ces mots – qui souvent 
ne présentent pas la moindre ressemblance 
entre eux – sont tous semblables à ce 
signifié central. (OE, II : 361-362) 
 
The Bedeutete concerned would not be a mental image or a phenomenological 
representation of any sort. It would, rather, be the expression of an instance of 
human essence, expressed as communicable: non-semiotic Naming.  
We have, in Mimesis, the following comprehensive statement on the 
semiotic component of human language as mimetic: 
 
Alles Mimetische der Sprache kann 
vielmehr, der Flamme ähnlich, nur an 
einer Art von Träger, in Erscheinung 
treten. Dieser Träger ist das Semiotische. 
So ist der Sinnzusammenhang der Wörter 
oder Sätze der Träger, an dem erst, 
blitzartig, die Ähnlichkeit in Erscheinung 
tritt. (Mimesis, 213)  
Comme la flamme, la part mimétique du 
langage ne peut se manifester que sur un 
certain support. Ce support est l’élément 
sémiotique. Le sens tissé par les mots ou 
les phrases constitue ainsi le support 
nécessaire pour qu’apparaisse, avec la 
soudaineté de l’éclair, la ressemblance. 
(OE, II : 362)  
 
Semiosis, as a component of linguistic formations, would be the carrier 
through which non-sensuous resemblance to non-semiotic form may come to the 
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fore1. The realm of historical phenomena would thus entail the emergence of 
linguistic formations as substantiations of the double nature of human language: 
purely human-linguistic naming, telling the communicable essence of humanity, 
and semiotic constructs, enacting current communicative practices. The latter 
would be a non-imitative mimesis of the former. We could also understand this 
mimesis as a catastrophic fall to the condition of phenomenic existence. The 
catastrophe would be co-extensive with the emergence and persistence of 
formational remains, through which a perfected event of having named – that is 
of having been human – survives as a historic Gewesene. 
Note that the idea of mimesis also applies, in Benjamin, to relations 
between distinct semiotic fields of the same human language. Linguistic mimesis 
would govern, for example, the relations between orality, writing and their 
common intended Gemeinte: 
 
Kurtz, es ist unsinnliche Ähnlichkeit, die 
die Verspannungen nicht nur zwischen 
dem Gesprochenen und Gemeinten 
sondern auch zwischen dem 
Geschriebenen und Gemeinten und 
gleichfalls zwischen dem Gesprochenen 
und Geschriebenen stiftet. (Mimesis, 212)  
Bref, c’est une ressemblance non sensible 
qui associe [en tension] non seulement le 
dit et le sens visé, mais aussi l’écrit et le 
sens visé et pareillement le dit et l’écrit. 
(OE, II : 362) 
 
If there is mimetic relation between oral and written semiotic constructs, it is 
mediated by the relationship of both to purely human-linguistic non-semiotic 
naming.  
                                                   
1 The notion of carrier could very well be of theological origins. I am referring to early 
patristic Christian rhetoric configuring the relations between substances and essences. The figure 
of the flame carried by a torch has been used in connection to such problematics by Leontios 
Byzantios (1996, 62), for instance. I will return to the related issue of a prosopic hypostasis in the last 
chapter of my thesis.  
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 The reading of literary formations would thus presuppose a 
deconstructive awareness of tensions between signifiers and signifieds, tropes 
and meanings. Yet it would not be limited to such insights. It would further 
consist in the recognition of a presently perfected instance of human life, 
surviving as linguistic formation through changing and variable semiotic 
constructs, understood as mimetic catastrophes of the same naming event. The 
reading task would thus be neither a nostalgic return to Adamic purity, nor a 
teleological quest of messianic redemption. It would concern the present 
moment, the historic status of which would be at stake.  
Note that Gemeinte, in the above-quoted passage, is not necessarily sens 
visé. One should understand it, rather, in the sense that it acquires in Aufgabe: not 
a meaning intended by specific statements or words, but reine Sprache itself, 
intended by a given human language-whole. This is what, in linguistic semiosis, 
would be mimetic of linguistic naming. Let us further investigate this crucial 
point, by returning to the Aufgabe essay. 
 
 
B.3.5. Language-wholes 
 
A historic inquiry into linguistic human life should, accordingly, neither 
remain on the level of the universally human naming-language, nor directly 
investigate specific linguistic manifestations. It should address the intermediate 
level of the multiplicity of changing and variably interconnected human 
language-wholes. Benjamin, in Aufgabe, insists that translation pertains “auf die 
Sprache als solche, ihre Totalität” or “auf eine Sprache im ganzen” (Aufgabe, 16).  
Benjamin’s language-whole should not be confused with our current notion 
of a historical and semiotic system of linguistic signification. To avoid 
terminological confusion, I designate the latter as idiom. A Benjaminian language-
whole may or may not be empirically co-extensive with a historical and semiotic 
idiom. Benjamin occasionally uses, for instance, the term Muttersprache (mother-
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tongue) in order to designate the language of the translator. He also refers to 
English, French, German or Greek as distinct language-wholes. At the same time, 
Benjamin tends, in passages more theoretical or figurative, to regard as a 
language-whole the literary work itself -the Wort of the poet. We can assume that 
the grounds on which Benjamin understands human languages as wholes, are 
not the same as those on which historians or linguists delimit idioms.  
Central to the Benjaminian conception of a language-whole is the notion of 
Meinung, used as synonymous with the German Intention or with the Latin 
intentio. This visée, as Gandillac interprets in his French translation, would be the 
fundamental characteristic of a human language as a whole. Human language-
wholes would be distinct with respect to each other (as well as historically 
connectable to each other) because each involves a specific mode of intending: an 
Art des Meinens or Art der intentio 1. What is it that language-wholes intend? It 
would be purely human-linguistic naming-language: the reine Sprache. The 
multiplicity of modes of intending reine Sprache, would lay the überhistorische 
grounds on which human language-wholes are complementary with respect to 
each other – and, as such, historically connectable to each other: 
 
Vielmehr beruht alle überhistorische 
Verwandtschaft der Sprachen darin, daß in 
ihrer jeden als ganzer jeweils eines, und 
zwar dasselbe gemeint ist, das dennoch 
keiner einzelnen von ihnen, sondern nur 
der Allheit ihrer einander ergänzenden 
Intentionen erreichbar ist: die reine 
Sprache. Während nämlich alle einzelnen 
Elemente, sie Wörter, Sätze, 
Zusammenhänge von fremde Sprachen 
Toute parenté transhistorique entre les 
langues repose bien plutôt sur le fait qu’en 
chacune d’elles, prise comme un tout, une 
seule et même chose est visée qui, 
néanmoins, ne peut être atteinte par 
aucune d’entre elles isolément, mais 
seulement par la totalité de leurs intentions 
complémentaires, autrement dit : le pur 
langage. En effet, alors que, dans les 
langues étrangères les unes aux autres, 
                                                   
1 The phrases Art der intentio and Art des Meinens are interchangeable (c.f. Aufgabe, 18). 
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sich ausschließen, ergänzen die Sprachen 
in ihren Intentionen selbst. Dieses Gesetz, 
eines der grundlegenden der 
Sprachphilosophie, genau zu fassen, ist in 
der Intention, vom Gemeinte die Art des 
Meinens zu unterschieden. (Aufgabe, 13-14) 
 
 
tous les éléments singuliers, les mots, les 
phrases, les enchaînements s’excluent, ces 
langues se complètent dans leurs 
intentions mêmes.  Pour saisir exactement 
cette loi, une des lois fondamentales de la 
philosophie du langage, il faut, à 
l’intérieur de l’intention, distinguer ce qui 
est visé de la manière dont on le vise . (OE, 
I : 250-251) 
 
An overall Art of intending reine Sprache as a Gemeinte, makes a language-
whole – a distinct linguistic formation (Gebilde) out of a field of linguistic 
manifestations. In the terms of the Mimesis essay, we would have a mode in 
which a given range of semiotic constructs mimetically connects to a universally 
human naming-language. In more Aristotelian terms, we would have a 
formational primary essence, the emergence of which raises the issue of its 
purely human-linguistic secondary form or essence. 
Meinung and Intention, in this context, might be reconfigurations of Zweck 
(aim). The latter occurs in the introductory part of the Aufgabe essay: “aimed” 
was a “higher sphere” of life, beyond the realm of phenomena. The French 
translation of Meinung or Intention as visée or visée intentionnelle is thus not wholly 
out of place. Objections in this respect, raised by readers such as de Man, are only 
partly justified. Aufgabe is, indeed, markedly critical towards phenomenological 
approaches to language. De Man, though, is wrong when he altogether discards 
the notion of intention with respect to matters linguistic. Benjamin uses, as we 
have seen, both Intention and intentio. The Latin term suggests that he might be 
exploring conceptual tensions between the scholasticist and the 
phenomenological traditions: intentio would explain Intention. Note that the Latin 
etymology of intentio does not presuppose subjective consciousness at work: the 
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term denotes the exertion of force or effort in a certain direction, a tendency to 
reach some point of reference. Indexation1 would thus be better than visée.  
A field of semiotic manifestations would be a formational language-
whole, to the degree that it is recognisable as a distinct mode of indexing reine 
Sprache, the language immediately expressing the communicable essence of the 
human. Through the multiplicity or even infinity of such human languages, 
perfected modes of having named, that is, of having been human, would lead 
their historic survival – Überleben. 
We are thus invited to regard linguistic formations under a perspective 
that outdoes the historicist concentration on national linguistic idioms. 
According to the Benjaminian approach, national idioms could, of course, form 
language-wholes. The same holds, however, for different ensembles of linguistic 
or literary traditions, for diachronically identifiable genres, as well as for 
individual literary or other linguistic works. Linguistic differences connected to 
social usages and traditions could also lay the grounds for the emergence of 
language-wholes, cutting through idiomatic wholes and boundaries. It all 
depends on whether and how distinct modes of indexing purely human-
linguistic communicability are at stake. The Benjaminian notion of a language-
whole may thus comply with the Bakhtinian problematics of polyglottic 
linguistic practices: a Benjaminian language-whole may include manifestations of 
a multiplicity of languages defined according to historicist or formalist criteria2.  
                                                   
1 Recall the use of this term in Passagen (N3, 1), concerning the readability of a Bild as a 
historic index. In this fragment, it should be noted, intention is abandoned – see section B.3.2 
above. 
 
2 Bakhtine (1978), especially in his essay “Récit épique et roman”, applies his 
problematics to a comparison between the epic and the novelistic genres. A Benjaminian 
approach could very well adopt the theoretical premises of Bakhtine, without necessarily 
endorsing the reading of all epic tradition as inherently and inescapably monoglottic. 
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If literary genres, individual literary works, or even fragments of works 
are formational language-wholes, it is because, in a sense, they form their own 
language. Rather than exemplifying the spirit of a national language or 
expressing individual or collective subjects of cultural history, literatures would 
index (and address to all present moments) idiosyncratic loci of humanity. 
Through their persisting remains, the very communicability of human essence 
would be at stake, independently of historical and aesthetic taxonomies and 
categorisations. 
 
 
B.3.6. Ideational Form 
 
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel can be seen as a case-study in which a given literary 
formation (namely, the genre of German Baroque drama) is addressed as a 
language-whole – that is, from the point of view of its Art of indexing reine 
Sprache. The terms with which we are familiar from Sprache and Aufgabe are here 
displaced by those of a “metaphysics of form”. This section of my thesis will 
concentrate on the relatively autonomous essay to which we have already briefly 
referred and which introduces the treatise on Trauerspiel: its “Erkenntniskritische 
Vorrede [Epistemo-critical prolegomena]”1. It re-stages the key-notions of Wesen 
(essence), Form (form) and Phenomene (phenomena), in connection to Idee (idea) 
and Ursprung (origins) and Begriff (concept). 
“Das Trauerspiel […] ist eine Idee [The Trauerspiel is an idea]” (2182). The 
objective is to understand Trauerspiel as an idea – an idea that would also be, as 
                                                   
1 The title of Vorrede implicitly also refers us to the Benjaminian critique of the Kantian 
tradition. 
 
2 All page citations for German quotations in this section refer to Vorrede.  
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the title suggests, the origin or Urpsrung of the corresponding form. This 
presupposes the epistemological task that the Vorrede undertakes.  
At stake is thought that copes “nicht mit der Feststellung von Regeln und 
Tendenzen, sondern mit der in ihrer Fülle und konkret erfaßten Metaphysik 
dieser Forme [not with the ascertaining of rules and tendencies, but with the 
Metaphysics of this form grasped in its fullness and concreteness]” (228). 
Benjamin revisits, more specifically, the “Bereich der Wahrheit, den die Sprachen 
meinen” [realm of truth which languages regard]” (207). He presents us with the 
following definition of the domain of linguistic truth: “Die Wahrheit ist ein aus 
Ideen gebildetes intentionsloses Sein [Truth is a intentionless beingness, formed 
from Ideas]” (216). He further specifies that “Als ein Ideenhaftes ist das Sein der 
Wahrheit verschieden von der Seinsart der Erscheinungen [As ideational, the 
mode of being of truth is different from that of phenomenic manifestations]” 
(216). Linguistic truth, in the Vorrede essay, is the naming-language of the Sprache 
essay. The notion of idea aims at presenting the irreducibility of human language 
to its semiotic manifestations: 
 
Die Idee ist ein Sprachliches, und zwar im 
Wesen des Wortes jeweils dasjenige 
Moment, in welchem es Symbol ist. Im 
empirischen Vernehmen, in welchem die 
Worte sich zersetzt haben, eignet nun 
neben ihrer mehr oder weniger 
verborgenen symbolischen Seite ihnen eine 
offenkundige profane Bedeutung. Sache 
des Philosopher ist es, den symbolischen 
Charakter des Wortes, in welchem die Idee 
zur Selbstverständigung kommt, die das 
Gegenteil aller nach außen gerichteten 
Mitteilung ist, durch Darstellung in seinen 
Primat wieder einzusetzen. (Vorrede, 216-
L’idée est quelque chose qui relève de la 
langue et plus précisément, le moment 
dans l’essence du mot où celui-ci est 
symbole. Dans la perception empirique, où 
les mots se sont dégradés, ils ont un sens 
profane manifeste à côté de leur aspect 
symbolique plus ou moins caché.  C’est 
l’affaire du philosophe que de rétablir dans 
sa primauté, par la présentation, le 
caractère symbolique du mot, dans lequel 
l’idée se rend intelligible à elle-même, ce 
qui est l’opposée de toute espèce de 
communication tournée vers l’extérieur. 
(Préface, 33 ) 
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217) 
 
The term Idee renames what the Aufgabe essay configures as a mode of 
indexing reine Sprache, proper to a given language-whole. The quest for an idea 
probes the relations between the corresponding formation (as primary essence or 
emergent substance) and purely human language (as second essence1). The 
notion of idea is thus an epistemological device that sustains the critique of both 
historicist and formalist approaches to human language. It would be “falsch, die 
allgemeinsten Verweisungen der Sprache als Begriffe zu verstehen, anstatt sie als 
Ideen zu erkennen [false to understand the most universal references of language 
as concepts, instead of recognising them as Ideas]” (215). 
The metaphysics of form would entail a particular discursive Darstellung 
(way of presentation or exposition). One would need to cut through areas or 
fields of conceptual knowledge distributed by positivist or empiricist 
epistemology into compact and homogeneous disciplines. The presentation of 
the “unumschreibliche Wesenheit des Wahren [insurmountable essentiality of 
truth]” and of the “Gesetz ihrer Form [law of its form]” (208) would be 
fragmentary or discontinuous, compared to the coherence of conventional 
academic and scientific discourse. Contemplative thought rather than conceptual 
understanding would be at work: “Während der Begriff aus der Spontaneität des 
Verstandes hervorgehet, sind die Ideen der Betrachtung gegeben [While the 
concept proceeds from the spontaneity of understanding, ideas are given to 
contemplation]” (210). The task is also seen as one of disclosure or re-cognition. 
An idea would be a “Gegenstand der Entdeckung, einer Entdeckung, die in 
einzigartiger Weise sich mit dem Wiedererkennen verbindet [object of a 
disclosure or discovery tied in a singular manner with recognition]” (227). The 
possibility of an intuitive approach to truth is thus ruled out along with the 
                                                   
1 Recall my reading of the Aristotelian categories of prote and deutera ousia, as presented 
in section B.1.4. and further elaborated in B.3.2 and B.3.4 above. 
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deductive or inductive principles of scholarly reasoning (215-216). Platonische 
Anamnesis or Erinnern (recollecting) is, instead, suggested as the characteristic 
paradigm of philosophical contemplation (217).  
The Platonic tradition is thus a predominant reference for the Vorrede 
essay1. Benjamin investigates the prospect of a post-Platonic materialism, just as, 
in Programm, he investigated the prospect of a post-Kantian metaphysics of the 
human. When revisiting Kantianism, the quest was for a logical site that would 
save metaphysics from modern anthropology. When revisiting Platonism, we are 
in quest of a way of “saving the phenomena” from phenomenological premises.  
Let me examine more closely how Benjaminian ideas relate to phenomena 
– by which we should understand not only things or events as empirical realities 
but also, and even primarily, semiotic manifestations of human languages2. In 
other words: how semiosis relates to non-semiotic naming.  
The ambivalent platonic dictum of saving the phenomena (ta; 
fainovmena swvzein: ta phenomena sozein) acquires, in Vorrede, a position as 
                                                   
1 Recall the Platonic formulation of the issue of idea, not so much in the parabolic or 
mythical configuration of Phaedrus, as in the more argumentative discourse of the 7th epistle, 
342a-343c. Ideas acquire the status of an epistemological seuil of questionability. They occupy a 
level of thought that the philosopher should reach by questioning the validity of four current 
modes of knowledge: the word that designates, the definition that describes, the schematics that 
represent and the experience that perceives. The idea would be, quite simply and pervasively, 
what remains to be addressed as truth when all such modes have exhausted their relevance.  
It is highly significant, I think, that, contrary to what Tiedemann (1987, 73 et sq.) remarks 
with respect to other Benjaminian texts, the platonism of Vorrede does not involve reference to the 
notion of beauty. 
 
2 Matter, for Benjamin, is languaged – that is, always already formed and thus 
translatable through human naming. Note Tiedemann’s remark: 
“Le terme de ‘matière’ a une signification totalement différente chez Kant et chez 
Benjamin. Pour Kant, elle est tout à fait indéterminée, ‘abstraite’, elle est pour Benjamin l’ 
ens correctissimum,  déjà individualisé par les formes” (Tiedemann 1987, 39). 
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central as the one of ideas themselves. Ideas would not be structures or figures 
effacing, or otherwise transcending semiotic manifestations. On the contrary, 
they would be devices intending to save their specificity. The task of ideational 
inquiry is defined as an endeavour to “tief in alles Wirkliche zu dringen, daß eine 
objektive Intepretation der Welt sich drin erschlösse [penetrate so deeply in all 
reality, that an objective interpretation of the world might be uncovered]” (228). 
Phenomena would be saved through the intensive contemplation of their 
singularly objective phenomenicity – not through a phenomenological critique of 
their subjective perception or understanding: 
 
Für die wahre Kontemplation dagegen 
verbindet sich die Abkehr vom deduktiven 
Verfahren mit einem immer weiter 
ausholenden, immer inbrünstigern 
Zurückgreifen auf die Phänomenen die 
niemals in Gefahr geraten, Gegenstände 
eines trüben Staunens zu bleiben, solange 
ihre Darstellung zugleich die der Ideen 
und darin erst ihr Einzelnes gerettet ist. 
(Vorrede, 225) 
Dans la vraie contemplation, par contre le 
rejet de la démarche déductive 
s’accompagne d’un recours de plus en plus 
approfondi, de plus en plus fervent aux 
phénomènes, qui ne risqueront jamais 
d’être regardés avec stupeur aussi 
longtemps que leur présentation est aussi 
celle des idées, ce qui est la seule façon de 
sauver ce qu’ils ont de singulier. (Préface, 
43) 
 
Linguistic phenomena would be endangered by approaches that view 
them as disposable mediations between an empirically registered reality and a 
knowing consciousness. Linguistic semiosis would thus need to be saved from 
words assuming the function of concepts: conventional generic categories or 
universals. At the same time, Benjamin affirms that concepts are far from 
dispensable abstractions or disturbing disfigurations. They would be, on the 
contrary, indispensable to ideational critique. Let us follow more closely how this 
is the case.  
Concepts would disperse, isolate and arrange phenomena as objects of 
knowledge. They would thus be instances of catastrophes of phenomenic lives. 
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These catastrophes would be no more destructive than semiotic catastrophe at 
large. They would set the conditions under which ideational forms survive. The 
saving of phenomena can only occur as the re-arrangement or re-configuration of 
accomplished conceptual figures. In a typically Benjaminian dialectic twist, the 
saving of phenomena is viewed as involving the critical saving of their 
conceptual configurations. The following relevant passage can only be read in its 
entirety: 
 
In dieser ihrer Aufteilung unterstehen die 
Phänomene den begriffen. Die sind es, 
welche an den Dingen die Lösung in die 
Elemente vollziehen. Die Unterscheidung 
in Begriffen ist über jedweden Verdacht 
zerstörerischer Spitzfindigkeit erhaben nur 
dort, wo sie auf jene Bergung der 
Phänomene in den Ideen das Platonische 
ta; fainovmena swvzein es abgesehen 
hat. Durch ihre Vermittlerrrolle leihen die 
Begriffe den Phänomenen Anteil am Sein 
der Ideen. Und eben diese Vermittlerrolle 
macht sie tauglich zu der anderen, gleich 
ursprünglichen Aufgabe der Philosophie, 
zur Darstellung der Ideen. Indem die 
Rettung der Phänomene vermittels der 
Ideen sich vollzieht, vollzieht sich die 
Darstellung der Ideen im Mittel der 
Empirie. Denn nicht an sich selbst, sondern 
einzig und allein in einer Zuordnung 
dinglicher Elemente im Begriff stellen die 
Ideen sich dar. Und zwar tun sie es als 
deren Konfiguration. (Vorrede, 213-214) 
En subissant cette dispersion [les 
phénomènes] se soumettent aux concepts. 
Ce sont eux qui opèrent cette dissolution 
des choses en éléments. Ce n’est que 
lorsqu’elle s’est donné pour tâche de 
mettre les phénomènes à l’abri dans les 
idées – le ta; fainovmena swvzein de 
Platon – que cette différentiation en 
concepts échappe à tout soupçon de 
subtilité destructive. Leur rôle de 
médiateurs permet aux concepts des 
phénomènes de participer à l’être des 
idées. Et c’est le rôle qui les rend aptes à 
cette autre tâche, tout aussi primitive, de la 
philosophie : la présentation des idées. 
Tandis que s’accomplit ce sauvetage des 
phénomènes par l’intermédiaire des idées, 
la présentation des idées  se fait par la 
médiation de la réalité empirique. Car ce 
n’est pas en soi que les idées se présentent, 
mais uniquement par un agencement, dans 
le concept, d’éléments qui appartiennent à 
l’ordre des choses. Et ceci parce qu’elles en 
sont la configuration. (Préface, 30-31) 
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There is a figure that Benjamin uses in order to tell how ideational forms 
relate to and can be discerned through phenomenic formations: the figure of 
constellation – a figure for the very notion of figural form. Its use is explained in 
mostly negative terms1. The figure of constellation tells us what ideas are not – 
they are neither the conceptual schematisation nor the governing law of the 
corresponding phenomena: 
 
Die Ideen verhalten sich zu den Dingen 
wie die Sternbilder zu den Sternen. Das 
besagt zunächst: sie sind weder deren 
Begriffe noch deren Gesetze. (Vorrede, 214). 
Les idées sont aux choses ce que les 
constellations sont aux planétes. Cela veut 
d’abord dire ceci: elles ne sont ni le concept 
ni la loi. (Préface, 31) 
 
Ideas would not be structures of semantic potential underlying semiotic 
epiphanies2. Nor would laws of mechanical articulation or organic development 
be at stake3. Ideas would be “objective interpretations” of how finite phenomenic 
                                                   
1 One needs, perhaps, to revisit texts like Rilke’s sonnet on the constellation of the Reider 
(Die Sonette an Orpheus, I, XI) in order to investigate the problematic complexity of the figure of 
constellation, too often considered as self-explanatory. 
 
2 It is thus wrong to assume, as Mosès does, that ideas or Adamic names are “entités 
sémantiques originelles” acquiring the weight of “réalités ontologiques” (1992, 132). It is equally 
wrong to opt for the other side of the same coin and attribute to ideas an aesthetic status, 
affirming, for instance, that: “l’identification d’un phénomène comme originel dépend bien d’une 
intuition de type esthétique ; reconnaître qu’un phénomène est originel c’est porter un jugement 
du même ordre que celui qui consiste à affirmer qu’une certaine oeuvre d’art est belle” (136). 
 
3 One suspects that Heideggerian problematics concerning the phenomenological 
tensions governing the temporal emergence of the Seiend out of the Sein would also have to be 
discarded. See, in this respect, Tiedemann (1987, 57 et seq.) – who overly simplifies Heidegger, 
however. 
 
187 
B.3. Linguistic Humanness 
singularities mutually belong to each other – of how, in other terms, they connect 
to essences communicable: 
 
Während die Phänomene durch ihr 
Dasein, ihre Gemeinsamkeit, ihre 
Differenzen Umfang und Inhalt der sie 
umfassenden Begriffe bestimmen, ist zu 
den Ideen insofern ihr Verhältnis das 
umgekehrte, als die Idee als objektive 
Intepretation der Phänomene – vielmehr 
ihrer Elemente – erst deren 
Zusammengehörigkeit zueinander bestimmt. 
(Vorrede, 214-215) 
Tandis que les phénomènes déterminent, 
par leur existence, par leur être-commun et 
par leurs différences le champ et le 
contenu des concepts qui les embrassent, 
leur rapport aux idées est l’inverse, dans la 
mesure ou l’idée, interprétation objective 
des phénomènes – ou plutôt de leurs 
éléments – déterminent d’abord leur 
appartenance réciproque. (Préface, 31) 
  
The idea of mutual belonging implies, of course, the unity of a whole. 
Benjamin does not discard problematics of wholeness; he reconfigures them in 
ideational terms:  
 
Die Phänomene gehen aber nicht integral 
in ihrem rohen empirischen Bestande, dem 
der Schein sich beimischt, sondern in ihren 
Elementen allein, gerettet, in das Reich der 
Ideen ein. Ihrer falschen Einheit antäußern 
sie sich, um aufgeteilt an der echten der 
Wahrheit teilzuhaben. (Vorrede, 213). 
Cependant les phénomènes n’entrent pas 
intégralement dans le monde des idées, 
dans leur état empirique brut, encore mêlé 
de paraître, mais seulement à l’état 
d’éléments, sauvés. Ils se dépouillent de 
leur unité factice pour participer, une fois 
dispersés, à l’unité authentique de la 
vérité. (Préface, 30) 
 
Conceptual figures would attribute to phenomena their “singularity”. Ideas, on 
the other hand, would reconfigure their “totality”: 
 
Zwischen dem Verhältnis des Einzelnen 
sur Idee und zum Begriff findet keine 
Il n’y a pas d’analogie entre le rapport du 
particulier à l’idée et son rapport au 
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Analogie statt: hier fällt es unter den 
Begriff und bleibt was es war – Einzelheit; 
dort steht es in der Idee und wird was es 
nicht war – Totalität. Das ist seine 
platonische „Rettung“. (Vorrede, 227) 
concept : tantôt il tombe sous le concept et 
reste ce qu’il était – une singularité ; tantôt 
il se maintient dans l’idée et devient ce 
qu’il n’était pas – une totalité. Tel est son 
sauvetage platonicien. (Préface, 45) 
 
Let us now examine the degree and way in which ideas, in the fullness 
and concreteness of formational totalities, relate or connect to each other.  
 
 
B.3.7. Monadic Connections 
 
Benjamin introduces, in Vorrede, the notion of Monad, which he keeps as a 
crucial one up to his Begriff essay. If we were limited to Begriff, we would risk 
forgetting that monad is an attribute of idea1: “Die Idee ist Monad [The idea is a 
Monad]” (Vorrede, 228). It is, more specifically, a rhetorical device meant to tackle 
the problem of the historic relations between distinct ideational forms – or 
language-wholes. 
Each monad, Benjamin says, echoing Leibniz, “gibt in der eigenen 
verborgen die verkürzte und verdunkelte Figur der übrigen Ideenwelt [gives 
hidden in its own figure the abridged and obscure figure of the rest of the world 
of ideas]” (228). This statement may refer to the correlative proposition that 
linguistic formations inescapably index purely human naming-language – and 
are thus connected or connectable to each other.  
The following passage returns to a celestial figural pattern. This time ideas 
are not constellations, but suns. There would be “autonomy” and even “perfect 
isolation” between ideas and phenomena, as well as between ideas themselves, to 
                                                   
1 Benjamin thus remains quite close to Leibnizean Monadologie, the object of which, it 
should be recalled, is the notion of essence or substance in its relations to soul. 
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the degree that the perspective is one of empirical connections of “touch”. If, 
however, one passes to a different register of relations – such as the one of 
musical harmony – ideas may be seen as effectively related to each other:  
 
Und so bekennen die Ideen das Gesetz, das 
da besagt: Alle Wesenheiten existieren in 
vollendeter Selbständigkeit und 
Unberührtheit, nicht von den Phänomenen 
allein, sondern zumal voneinander. Wie 
die Harmonie der Sphären auf den 
Umläufen der einander nicht berührenden 
Gestirne, so beruht der Bestand des 
mundus intelligibilis auf der 
unaufhebbaren Distanz zwischen den 
reinen Wesenheiten. Jede Idee ist eine 
Sonne und verhält sich zu ihresgleichen 
wie eben Sonnen zueinander sich 
verhalten. Das tönende Verhältnis solcher 
Wesenheiten ist die Wahrheit. (Vorrede, 
217-218) 
Ainsi les idées témoignent-elles de la loi 
qui dit ceci : toutes les essences existent 
dans un état d’autonomie et d’isolement 
parfait, hors de l’atteinte des phénomènes, 
mais encore plus des autres essences. 
Comme l’harmonie des sphères repose sur 
le cours des planètes qui ne se touchent 
jamais, j’existence du mundus intelligibilis 
repose sur la distance infranchissable qui 
sépare les essences pures. Chacune des 
idées est un soleil, et entretient avec les 
autres idées le même rapport que les soleils 
entre eux. La relation musicale des essences 
est la vérité. (Préface, 34) 
 
History is a field in which relations occur between ideational monads. The 
term monad is, in fact, introduced in a passage that discusses the over-
determination of ideational totalities by and through the unlimited temporal 
perspective of history: 
 
Damit bestimmt die Tendenz aller 
philosophischen Begriffsbildung sich neu 
in dem alten Sinn: das Werden der 
Phänomene festzustellen in ihrem Sein. 
Denn der Seinsbegriff der philosophischen 
Wissenschaft ersättigt sich nicht am 
Ainsi la tendance de toute 
conceptualisation philosophique se définit 
à nouveau dans son sens ancien: établir le 
devenir des phénomènes dans leur être. 
Car le concept d’être de la science 
philosophique ne se rassasie pas du 
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Phänomen, sondern erst an der 
Aufzehrung seiner Geschichte. Die 
Vertiefung der historischen Perspektive in 
dergleichen Untersuchungen kennt, sei es 
ins Vergangene oder ins Künftige, 
prinzipiell keine Grenzen. Sie gibt der Idee 
das Totale. Deren Bau, wie die Totalität sie 
im Konstrast zu der ihr unveräußerlichen 
Isolierung prägt, ist monadologisch. Die 
Idee ist Monade. (Vorrede, 228) 
phénomène, il lui faut aussi consommer 
son histoire. Il n’y a pas en principe de 
limites à cet approfondissement de la 
perspective historique dans ce genre de 
recherches, que ce soit dans le passé ou 
dans l’avenir. C’est elle qui donne la 
totalité à l’idée. Sa construction, dans la 
mesure ou elle est marquée par la totalité 
en contraste avec son isolation inaliénable, 
est monadologique. L’idée est monade. 
(Préface, 46) 
 
The paradoxically simple figure of constancy – that is persistence – 
describes most tellingly the temporal status of an ideational monad: 
 
Also erfordert die Struktur der Wahrheit 
ein Sein, das an Intentionlosigkeit den 
schlichten der Dinge gleicht, an 
Bestandhaftigkeit aber ihm überlegen 
wäre. (Vorrede, 216). 
La structure de la vérité exige donc un être 
qui égale par son absence d’intentionalité 
l’être simple des choses, mais qui lui serait 
supérieure par sa constance. (Préface, 33) 
 
Benjamin’s monad is thus neither a pre-established nor an anticipated ontological 
entity – neither a founding nor a redeeming instance. It is permanently engaged 
in history, confronted with its concomitant phenomena: 
 
In jedem Ursprungsphänomen bestimmt 
sich die Gestalt, unter welcher immer 
wieder eine Idee mit der geschichtlichen 
Welt sich auseinandersetzt, bis sie in der 
Totalität ihrer Geschichte vollendet daliegt. 
(Vorrede, 226) 
Chaque fois que l’origine se manifeste, on 
voit se définir la figure dans laquelle une 
idée ne cesse de se confronter au monde 
historique, jusqu’à ce qu’elle se trouve 
achevée dans la totalité de son histoire. 
(Préface, 444) 
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The suggestion that a monad accomplishes its totality under the perspective of 
historical temporality, is coupled with the configuration of historical temporality 
as unlimited. This implies that there would be no foreseeable end to the process 
of totalisation of a monadic idea, no historical moment of completion or closure 
for its totality. Being historic under the perspective of a temporality unlimited 
means, for all practical and theoretical intents and purposes, being eternal – or 
aeonic, as I have previously suggested. “Die Ideen sind ewige Konstellationen 
[Ideas are eternal constellations]” (215). No figure of ultimately fulfilled 
temporality would thus be compatible with the historicity of ideational monads1. 
A monadic idea is also configured, in Vorrede, as an origin or Ursprung, 
with respect to the corresponding phenomena. We have already discussed this 
notion in connection to life and survival2. Ideational origins would be 
foundational beginnings of history as little as they are its ultimate ends3. They 
would be historic only in the sense of a pre- or post- historical Gewesene.  
The essay on Aufgabe, as well as, later on, the one on Kunstwerk, 
approaches the same issues by transposing them from the metaphysics of form to 
the history of formations. Benjamin’s notion of the original work of art, crucial to 
both these essays, is close to the one of the original status of persisting ideational 
forms. 
                                                   
1 Aeonic temporality precludes the figure of messianic ends. I cannot agree with 
Tiedemann (1987) when he remarks that Benjamin ventures to grasp 
“une relation entre le monde historique et le monde messianique. L’oeuvre d’art en son 
origine, là ou il oppose de façon autonome son univers au monde historique, fait entrer la 
relation refractée entre le monde historico-phénoménal et le monde achevé, dans une 
relation symbolique.” (89) 
 
2 See section B.2.2. The part of Vorrede entitled “Monadologie” comes, indeed, right after 
the one introducing and discussing the notion of “Urpsrung”. 
 
3 Benjamin’s aeonic temporality diverges the Heideggerian configuration of ontological 
historicity, within the setting of which poetry would disclose the original foundations of human 
and, more specifically, national beingness. 
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B.3.8. Lives of Languages 
 
 Monad and language-whole are equivalent notions. They both concern the 
same issue, namely, how fields of linguistic manifestations can be envisaged as 
autonomous formations connectable to each other in history. The Vorrede essay 
addresses the most general epistemological dimensions of the issue. The essay on 
the task of the translator, to which we now turn, turns more emphatically to the 
question of history. 
Already since the Sprache essay, Benjamin referred to translatability as a 
characteristic inherent to all languages: “ist die Übersetzbarkeit der Sprachen 
einander gegeben [the mutual translatability of languages is given]” (Sprache, 
151). Translation would be situated at the foundations of all linguistic theory, to 
the degree that it designates the historic dynamics of linguistic transformation:  
  
Die Übersetzung ist die Überführung der 
einen Sparche in die andere durch ein 
Kontinuum von Verwandlungen. 
Kontinua der Verwandlung, nicht 
abstrakte Gleichheits- und Ähnlichkeits-
bezirke durchmißt die Übersetzung. 
(Sprache, 151) 
La traduction est le passage d’un langage 
dans un autre par une série de 
métamorhposes continues. La traduction 
parcourt en les traversant des continus de 
métamorphoses, non des raisons abstraites 
de similitude et de ressemblance. (OE, I :  
157) 
 
In the Aufgabe essay, we pass from the relations between the universally 
human naming-language and languages of things, to the relations between 
different human languages1 in history. If the latter are seen as foreign to each 
                                                   
1 Unless otherwise specified, the term language will refer, from now on, to language-
wholes, in the sense discussed in section B.3.5. 
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other, then translation “nur eine irgendwie vorläufige Art ist, sich mit der 
Fremdheit der Sprachen auseinanderzusetzen [is only a, so to speak, provisional 
way to be mutually exposed to the foreignness of languages]” (Aufgabe, 14). 
Nonetheless, Benjamin also affirms that translation exposes the most general 
truth of an “innermost relationship of languages”: 
 
Alle zweckmäßigen Lebenserscheinungen 
wie ihre Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt sind 
letzten Endes zweckmäßig nicht für das 
Leben, sondern für den Ausdruck seines 
Wesens, für die Darstellung seiner 
Bedeutung. So ist die Übersetzung zuletzt 
zweckmäßig für den Ausdruck des 
innersten Verhältnisses der Sprachen 
zueinander.  (Aufgabe, 11-12) 
Tous les phénomènes de la vie qui ont une 
finalité, comme cette finalité même, sont en 
fin de compte au service, non pas de la vie, 
mais de l’expression de son essence, de la 
représentation de sa signification. Ainsi la 
finalité de la traduction consiste, en fin de 
compte, à exprimer le rapport le plus 
intime entre les langues. (OE, I :  248) 
 
A series of supplementary notions further qualify the nature of inter-
linguistic relations – and keep suggesting that languages are essentially non-
foreign to each other. Verwandtschaft, the German term currently naming 
historical affiliation or even kinship between languages or peoples is not 
avoided. Tendency is implied when Konvergenz is used. Stronger figures of 
affinity or unification occur in other passages, through such terms as ergänzen, 
versöhnen, and übereinkommen1. Connection (along with connectedness or 
connectability) is the term I suggest we use as the most general and inclusive one.  
Translative connections between different human languages would be 
enabled, according to Benjamin, on the grounds of the fact that language-wholes 
are different modes of indexing the same thing: reine Sprache. 
 
                                                   
1  See especially Aufgabe 16-17 
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Jenes gedachte, innerste Verhältnis der 
Sprachen ist aber das einer eigentümlichen 
Konvergenz. Es besteht darin, daß die 
Sprachen einander nicht fremd sondern a 
priori und von allen historischen 
Beziehungen abgesehen einander in dem 
verwandt sind, was sie sagen wollen. 
(Aufgabe, 12) 
Mais le rapport ainsi conçu, ce rapport très 
intime entre les langues, est celui d’une 
convergence originale. Elle consiste en ce 
que les langues ne sont pas étrangères les 
unes aux autres, mais, a priori et 
abstraction faite de toutes relations 
historiques, apparentés en ce qu’elles 
veulent dire.  (OE, I :  248) 
 
 Benjamin’s approach does not altogether discard historicist figures of 
linguistic evolution, including the one of common historical descent (Gleichheit 
der Abstammung: Aufgabe, 13). Nonetheless, it disputes the premises of historicist 
linguistics as it postulates that all human languages are essentially akin and 
potentially connectable to each other, independently from their historical ties.  
Connectability is, for Benjamin, so much a part of linguistic lives, that 
language-wholes are also seen as paradoxically incomplete – and engaged in a 
perspective of mutual harmonisation. This does not concern modes of 
phenomenic communication, proper to specific linguistic manifestations. It 
concerns the very ideas of their formational wholes, that is to different modes of 
indexing purely human language: 
 
Bei den einzelnen, den unergänzten 
Sprachen nämlich ist ihr Gemeinte niemals 
in relativer Selbständigkeit anzutreffen, 
wie bei den einzelnen Wörtern oder 
Sätzen, sondern vielmehr in stetem 
Wandel begriffen, bis es aus der Harmonie 
all jener Arten des Meinens als die reine 
Sprache herauszutreten vermag. So lange 
bleibt es in den Sprache verborgen. 
(Aufgabe, 14) 
Dans les langues prises une à une et donc 
incomplètes, ce qu’elles visent ne peut 
jamais être atteint de façon relativement 
autonome, comme dans les mots ou les 
phrases pris séparément, mais est soumis à 
une mutation constante, jusqu’à ce qu’il 
soit en état de ressortir, comme langage 
pur, de l’harmonie de tous les modes de 
visée. Jusqu’alors il reste dissimulé dans 
les langues. (OE, I : 251) 
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The common reference to reine Sprache runs through the monadic ideas of 
all language-wholes. Relations between such wholes can thus depend neither on 
a mechanistic, nor on an organicist model of kinship or foreignness, likeness or 
difference, life or death. This is one of the most crucial points in Benjamin’s 
historic philosophy of language. Inter-linguistic connectability presupposes 
difference in the most acute sense of the term – namely, monadic 
incommensurability. Language-wholes connect to each other very much like 
incompatible traditions of thought are brought together by Benjaminian dialect 
problematics. 
Benjamin also insists that über-historical connections between languages 
not only entail but also presuppose the historical Wandel (change) of each 
language as a whole (Aufgabe 12-13). The principle of these changes, Benjamin 
warns us, does not reside in conditions of subjective reception by different 
human generations (in der Subjektivität der Nachgeborenen). It would inhere in the 
very life of each language-whole (im eigensten Leben der Sprache und ihrer Werke). 
At stake would be a most powerful and productive historical process (einen der 
gewaltigsten und fruchtbarsten historischen Prozess). Only impotence of thought 
(Unkraft des Denken) could be blind to it. The original, for instance, would survive 
as a formation (here: Geformte) to the precise degree that the corresponding 
semiotic artefacts undergo alterations: 
 
Denn in seinen Fortleben, das so nicht 
heißen dürfte, wenn es nicht Wandlung 
und Erneuerung des Lebendigen wäre, 
ändert sich das Original. […] immanente 
Tendenzen vermögen neu aus dem 
Geformten sich zu erleben. (Aufgabe, 12-13) 
Car dans sa survie, qui ne mériterait pas ce 
nom si elle n’était mutation et renouveau 
du vivant, l’original se modifie. […] des 
tendances immanentes peuvent surgir à 
neuf de la forme créée. (OE, I : 249). 
 
The notion of Nachreife echoes the one of survival. The term connotes not 
so much maturation as over-maturation – not so much current Leben as Über-leben. 
It disputes the historicist distinctions between life and death, genesis and decay, 
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growth and degeneration. Wehen refers, accordingly, to the process of change 
marking the language of the translation: 
 
So weit ist sie [die Übersetzung] entfernt, 
von zwei erstorbenen Sprachen die taube 
Gleichung zu sein, daß gerade unter allen 
Formen ihr als Eigenstes es zufällt, auf jene 
Nachreife des fremdes Wortes, auf die 
Wehen des eigenen zu merken. (Aufgabe, 
13) 
La traduction est si loin d’être la stérile 
équation de deux langues mortes que 
précisément, parmi toutes les formes, celle 
qui lui revient le plus proprement consiste 
à prêter attention à la maturation 
posthume de la parole étrangère et aux 
douleurs d’enfantement de sa propre 
parole.  (OE, I: 250)  
 
As de Man remarks, the insistence of the French translation on douleurs 
d’enfantement (for Wehen) is not in Benjamin. He is also accurate, I think, when he 
marks the divergence between Nachreife and maturation: “it is by no means a 
maturing process, it is a looking back on a process of maturity that has finished, 
and that is no longer taking place” (Conclusions, 85). We are, indeed, dealing with 
pains that could be either those of birth or those of death. I would add that 
Gandillac’s maturation posthume is a very telling oxymoron, the tensions of which 
de Man overlooks when he emphatically retains the notion of death. “The 
translation [he says] belongs not to the life of the original, the original is already 
dead, but the translation belongs to the afterlife of the original, thus assuming 
and confirming the death of the original” (Conclusions, 85). This almost directly 
contradicts Benjamin’s explicit discarding of the figure of death at the beginning 
of the above-cited passage. This difference is not without important theoretical 
dimensions. If Überleben is seen as over-determined by the figure of death, the 
historic potential of a Gewesene is minimised or completely outdone: human life, 
together with history, assumes the status of a “purely linguistic complication”.  
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B.4. TRANSLATIVE HISTORY 
 
B.4.1. Formations: Reproduced 
 
The notion of reproduction is central to Benjamin’s essay on Kunstwerk1. 
The title of the French version suggests that the essay concerns the effects of 
mechanical reproduction (reproduction mécanisée) on the work of art – and there 
are important parts of the essay that deal with just that. The German title, with its 
emphasis on reproducibility (technischen Reproduzierbarkeit) is more accurate. The 
essay investigates reproducibility as a characteristic of artistic or literary 
originals: “Il est du principe de l’oeuvre d’art d’avoir toujours été reproductible” 
(Kunstwerk, 140). 
Benjamin’s problematics about reproducible originality are comparable to 
philological problematics about the transmission of originals: the question is the 
same, but the epistemic conditions of its formulation and approach are 
drastically different. For Benjamin, an original formation, by its very nature as 
ideational form, entails and even presupposes changes of the corresponding 
semiotic artefacts – including changes of the very modes of its reproduction. 
Such changes acquire, in a sense, a positive historical value: it would be only 
through them that the original idea can persist. For philology, change through 
transmission retains the charge of scribal negativity as opposed to authorial and 
philological authority: original cultural forms persist in spite of the inadequacy 
and variability of the means of their recording. Benjamin’s approach disputes the 
validity of historical principles of textual formness. 
                                                   
1 As I have already specified, this abbreviation refers to Benjamin’s own French version of 
his essay on “L’oeuvre d’art...” which I will be quoting, as published in Ecrits Français (1991). The 
“Paralipomènes” that the French edition adds to the main essay are translated by the editors; 
quotations from these “Paralipomènes” will be accompanied with the German original from 
Benjamin’s GS, III. 
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There is an important relation between the Kunstwerk essay and the 
Aufgabe one. Because of its reproducibility, an original can persist as the same 
formation and lay its claim to its translative transposition. The postulate of 
reproducibility as an essential attribute of all works of art is thus the counterpart 
of the postulate of translatability as an essential attribute of certain literary 
works. 
We have already discussed passages from the paralipomena of Kunstwerk, 
concerning the criticism of the modern aesthetic and mystical approach to art 
and literature1. In connection to this issue, mimesis is also brought up as central 
to Benjaminian concerns: 
 
Die Kunst ist ein Verbesserungsvorschlag 
an die Natur, ein Nachmachen, dessen 
verborgenstes Innere ein Vormachen ist. 
Kunst ist, mit andern Worten, vollendende 
Mimesis. (GS, III, 3, 1047) 
L’art est une tentative d’amélioration de la 
nature, une imitation, qui dans son fond le 
plus caché consiste à servir d’exemple. En 
d’autres terms, l’art est une mimesis 
parachevant la Nature. (Benjamin 1991, 
181) 
 
The Kunstwerk essay can, indeed, be read as a distant sequel of the essay 
on Mimesis2: the notion of reproduction reconfigures the one of mimesis in terms 
closer to dialectic materialism. The persistence of an original formation through 
reproduction can be seen as involving mimetic operations. Reproduction takes 
place through the mimesis, by a series of semiotic constructs, of a persisting 
ideational form. Reproductions of an original formation would be piling up as 
mimetic instantiations of the same idea. The fact that every reproduced construct 
is an imitation of a previous one, would only be the historical manifestation of 
                                                   
1 See section B.1.3 above. 
 
2 This essay was discussed in section B.3.4. 
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the mimesis of the original idea by both. Essentially copying (or editing) would 
be irreducible to the phenomenological dependence of the copier (or editor) on 
previous copies (or editions).  
Recall that Benjaminian mimesis does not necessarily presuppose 
imitative similarity. It mainly involves non-sensuous resemblance – of a kind 
specific to human-linguistic manifestations. Mimetic reproduction thus cuts 
through the historicist alternative between absolute likeness to an original and 
falsification or disfigurement. The persistence of a literary formation would, in 
fact, necessitate variance and change at the level of the corresponding semiotic 
corpi. Accordingly, the notion of the persisting reproducible original does not 
contradict but, on the contrary, presupposes the one of the varying reproductive 
copy. Originality would thus be of a formation, the emergence and survival of 
which involves the occurrence of a series of historic occurrences. We could even 
say that originality is an on-going historic event. Changing and variable 
constructs reproducing the same formation1, would all be equally original 
mimetic instantiations of the corresponding ideational form.  
The question of the kinds of semiotic variance and changes that sustain 
the mimetic reproduction of the same original formation, remains, of course, a 
crucial one. Benjamin’s approach to this problem, in Kunstwerk, is based on the 
schema of dialectic tensions between different modalities of artistic reproduction, 
akin to corresponding socio-political orders of artistic production. Traditional 
orders would involve manual reproduction. This would be relatively limited and 
marked by the work as unique manifestation and presence. Modernity would 
                                                   
1 As I have already specified (see section B.1.4), I keep the term formation to designate a 
linguistic substance from the point of view of its constancy or persistence as an ideational form – 
or as a mode of indexing the Gewesene of purely human-linguistic communicability. The English 
formation would thus be equivalent to the German Gebilde or Geformte of Benjamin’s Aufgabe 
essay. I will be using the term construct to refer to the changing and variant semiotic 
instantiations or enactments, through which an original formation is reproduced. 
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involve mechanical reproduction, emerging within the wider setting of what we 
could call de-territorialisation of human relations. Different media and 
techniques of reproduction would entail different extents and kinds of semiotic 
changes and variations marking reproductive process. The essay concentrates on 
painting and drawing as juxtaposed to photography and cinematography. 
Nevertheless, its approach is also applicable to the relations between manuscript 
and printed (or, eventually, electronic) reproduction of linguistic works. It could 
also hold for the relations between an initially oral semiotic emergence 
(reproducible “manually” through successive performances) and its 
reproduction via (the more “mechanical” process of) writing.  
What mostly interests us here is how changes in modalities of 
reproduction affect the persistence of an original formation. The essay on 
Kunstwerk stresses the implications of each such modality on what Benjamin 
identifies, elsewhere, as readability. Crucial in this respect is the notion of aura as 
applied to traditional works of art: “une singulière trame de temps et d’espace: 
apparition unique d’un lointain, si proche soit-il” (Kunstwerk, 144). The 
traditionally reproduced work of art would retain an auratic cult-value 
connecting art to magic and ritual. This value would not allow the original (or its 
manual copies) to be addressed as entirely accessible or transparent to the 
beholder, listener or reader. It induces and necessitates immersion into a realm of 
auratic presence1. Modern reproducibility would be the tendency towards the 
decay or destruction of traditional aura. A new kind of value is attributed to art 
or literature. It would be a value of exposition, entailing the accessibility of the 
work of art (or of its reproduced and eventually re-articulated fragments), 
however far its original manifestation may have been. Reading would no longer 
be contemplative or immersive. It would mobilise, instead, human observation, 
perhaps even the absent-minded observation of a “faculté d’adaptation 
                                                   
1 Recall the Byzantine manuscript, in which marginal scholiastic reading is directly 
appended to the poetic corpus. 
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polytechnique” (Kunstwerk, 159). It would thus potentially involve a kind of 
intensified critical awareness or attention. Watching a cinema movie (as opposed 
to the contemplation of a painting in a museum) would be paradigmatic of such 
new modalities of reading1.  
The corresponding developments would not jeopardise the persistence of 
the original formation. Its ideational form would persist through changing 
conditions affecting its value and use.  
Let me add that the implications of such changes are evaluated by 
Benjamin in terms explicitly political: 
Mais dès l’instant ou le critère d’authenticité cesse d’être applicable à la 
production artistique, l’ensemble de la fonction sociale de l’art se trouve 
renversé. A son fond rituel doit se substituer un fond constitué par une 
pratique autre: la politique. (Kunstwerk, 146) 
The passage from manual to mechanical reproduction would potentially 
acquire a “fonction cathartique” (143) allowing for an eventual “emancipation de 
l’œuvre d’art de son existence parasitaire dans le rituel” (146). This should not be 
understood as automatically occurring with the emergence of mechanical 
reproduction. It would rather be a tendency with respect to which different social 
and intellectual fractions of modernity react in different ways, under different 
conditions. Furthermore, the schema does not only concern differences between 
distinct phases of historical development; its dialectic entails tensions marking 
art in general, in all its manifestations2.  
                                                   
1 Respectively, one could compare the editorial reading of the modern philologist to the 
scribal reading of the Byzantine copier. On a different level, the difference would be analogous to 
the possession and reading of a copy of a modern standard edition in our office, as compared to 
our approach to a Byzantine manuscript in the corresponding section of a library. 
 
2 I am not sure that Tiedemann’s critique of the Benjamin’s dialectic as more or less 
simplistic (1987, 109 et seq.) is wholly justified: This critique echoes analogous Adornian 
reservations with respect to the Kunstwerk essay. It is not my objective, however, to engage in this 
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The aesthetisation, not only of art, but of politics itself, could be the 
paradoxical outcome of the corresponding tensions. Recall that Benjamin sets the 
modern abstract-magical conception of art (whether in the case of mysticism or 
of formalist aestheticism) as one of the major targets of his critique. If there is 
emancipation or katharsis, it is not only with respect to the realm of traditional 
cult, but also and perhaps primarily with respect to the idealised modern image 
of its “cultural heritage”. Benjaminian problematics dismiss all kinds of non-
dialectic nostalgia or oblivion of traditional aura, while probing the historic 
conditions of historic survival of artistic works and forms. 
 
 
B.4.2. Formations : Changing 
 
 Literary formations persist as eventually translatable originals, through 
changing and variant constructs. In the following two sections, I will further 
inquire into the distinction between originals and translations. The latter, for 
reasons of terminological clarity, could be called translata – reserving the term 
translation for the operations of the translative event.  
What kind of semiotic changes or variance do not substantially affect a 
formation – and, consequently, enable its persistence as an original? What kind 
of changes would entail the emergence of a formation related to another through 
translation?  
Derrida (1985) contests the Benjaminian distinction between originality and 
translation1. He sees it as related to institutional practices negotiating the modern 
                                                                                                                                                       
discussion. I will present my own view of how the notion of traditional or auratic readability 
may, indeed, be in need of further elaboration later in my thesis.  
 
1 Derrida (1985) and de Man (1986) differ from the point of view of their strategies with 
respect to the Benjaminian paradigm. Derrida exposes and even underscores dimensions that he 
judges to be problematic blind spots of the Benjaminian approach to language, whereas de Man is 
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values of authenticity and creativity. Benjamin’s distinction, however, resists 
Derridian critique. His Aufgabe essay is little, if at all, concerned with the issue of 
social appropriation and institutional evaluation of literary formations in terms 
of authenticity or creativity. Self-sameness refers to ideational forms, 
independently of the conditions of their phenomenological production and 
reception. By erasing the distinction between the original and the translatum, 
Derrida implicitly disputes the grounds on which Benjamin retains and 
reconfigures it – which are those of theorising language and literature under the 
metaphysical perspective of linguistic life as human and historic.  
What makes two constructs reproductive instances of the same formation 
would not be the intention of a copier, editor or publisher. It would, rather, be 
the fact that they are both recognisable as mimetically enacting the same 
ideational form. What turns a construct into a translatum with respect to an 
original, would not be the intention or mediation of a translator, reading the 
latter from the perspective of a different idiom. It would rather be the fact that 
the two constructs are recognisable as entertaining a specific kind of connection 
at the level of their respective formations.  
In other words, original and translatum are relational notions. Any semiotic 
construct is an original, if viewed from the persistence of its formation as 
reproducible and translatable. Any construct would be a translatum, if its 
formation entertains translative connections to another language-whole. The 
question is, what defines the specificity of a translative connection. I suggest that 
the term recollection is crucial in this respect. Any linguistic construct would be a 
translatum with respect to another if the formation of the one connects to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
more interested in appropriating or domesticating Benjamin within the setting of deconstructive 
or rhetorical criticism. 
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formation of the other in terms of recollective toils1. The relation at stake would 
thus be a historic one. 
From an empirical point of view, of course, there would be no formations 
entirely unmarked by recollective connections to preceding ones. Nonetheless, 
the theoretical problem of the specificity of translative connections retains its 
interest. Benjaminian translation designates a range of relations of linguistic 
connectability which are neither those sustaining the constancy of original forms 
nor those entailing the emergence of novel ones. This translative neither-nor 
(neither conservation nor change) would be an allegory for the Benjaminian 
understanding of historic occurrences: those through which the past is 
recollected (instead of being either reproduced or superseded) by the present. 
Benjaminian translative history would thus cut through the modern alternative 
between, on the one hand, a determinant past, functioning as the source of what 
springs out of it and, on the other hand, an indeterminate present, constructing 
its own past according to its novel perspectives. 
A linguistic formation would persist through reproduction when semiotic 
changes or variance are more or less limited to the level of the materiality of the 
signifier. This does not exclude the possibility of reproduction through more 
drastic changes affecting the idiomatic or compositional components of a 
construct. 
For translation to occur, a change of idiom is, in principle, the crucial 
condition – while basic elements of the compositional component should remain 
unchanged. According to Benjamin, however, translation occurs between 
different language-wholes, not between different idioms. Consequently, not all 
events of inter-idiomatic transposition are necessarily translative. Nor do intra-
                                                   
1 If one wanted to generalise the notion of recollection, one could distinguish, of course, 
mimetic recollection, accounting for the persistence of original linguistic formations, from 
translative recollection, accounting for their transposition onto translative ones. Definitions only 
serve to index a theoretical question – not to solve it. 
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idiomatic transpositions exclude the possibility of translative occurrences. 
Changes of the materiality of the signifier, for instance, could be historically 
translative.  
Furthermore, changes or variations of the compositional component of an 
original construct, would not necessarily preclude translative connections. 
Benjamin’s approach signals the affinity between translative work and a 
philosophy of knowledge that disputes the primacy of criteria and principles of 
empirical analogy and likeness between mental images (Aufgabe, 12). It also 
compares translation to romantic literary criticism, given the ironic awareness of 
the latter (15-16). One can surmise that various kinds of reading work (exegetical 
or hermeneutic commentary, for instance) may entail translative connections 
with the formation that is being read – independently of idioms at work. One 
could even view philological treatises (such as Wolf’s Prolegomena) as formations 
largely translative of their material. Correlatively, one could critically re-
examine, from a historic point of view, the kind of connections that “literary 
translations” entertain to their postulated original. Most crucial, for our 
purposes, would be the exact kind of connections that sustain a manuscript 
tradition. Independently of the idiom of the societies or scholarly communities in 
which the corresponding documents are produced, their constructs could be 
reproductions of the same original formation (in spite of their differences) or 
translative transpositions of it (in spite of their similarities). 
Let us better investigate how Benjamin’s Aufgabe essay describes the 
specificity of translative transpositions and connections. 
 
 
B.4.3. Formations: Translative 
 
In the following passage from Aufgabe, original poetry is distinguished 
from translation on the grounds of the Intention of the corresponding linguistic 
formations. Recall that Benjamin’s notion of intention applies to languages as 
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wholes. One should thus understand writer and the translator as referring to non-
anthropological discursive instances.  
 
Ihre [i.e. the translation’s] Intention geht 
nicht allein auf etwas anderes als die der 
Dichtung, nämlich auf eine Sprache im 
ganzen, von einem einzelnen Kunstwerk 
in einer fremden aus, sondern sie ist auch 
selbst eine andere: die des Dichters ist 
naive, erste, anschauliche, die des 
Übersetzers abgeleitete, letzte, ideenhafte 
Intention.  (Aufgabe, 16) 
Non seulement son intention vise autre 
chose que ne le fait celle de l’oeuvre 
littéraire, à savoir une langue dans son 
ensemble à partir de l’oeuvre d’art 
singulière écrite en une langue étrangère , 
mais elle même est autre : l’intention de 
l’écrivain est naïve, première, intuitive, ; la 
sienne est dérivée, ultime, idéelle. (OE, I :  
254) 
 
The distinction between a primary or naïve, and an ultimate or ideational 
intention, concerns the degree to which a formation regards the historic 
perspective. Translation would maintain a “Rictung auf ein letztes, endgültiges 
und entscheidendes Stadium aller Sprachfügung [direction towards an ultimate, 
definitive and exclusive stage of linguistic juncture ]” (14) 1. What runs through 
the toils of translation would be “das große Motiv einer Integration der vielen 
Sprachen zur einen wahren [the great motive of an integration of many 
languages into a true one]” (16). The “Sehnsucht nach Spracheergänzung 
[longing for language-juncture]” (17) would situate translation between art and 
philosophy, disconnecting it from both purely artistic and strictly scholarly 
concerns. 
The above formulations seem to suggest that the translatum could, in a 
sense, be viewed as historically determinant with respect to the original. This 
would lead us (and has, indeed led many readers of Benjamin) to the largely 
                                                   
1 All page citations for quotations of Benjamin in German, in the rest of this chapter, refer 
to Aufgabe – unless otherwise specified. 
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historicist idea that the past is formed (or “constructed”) according to the 
perspective of the present1. Benjamin would thus propose a constructivist, so to 
speak, critique of the deterministic view of history – a critique analogous to the 
one that is often, quite misleadingly, also attributed to Nietzsche.  
This is inaccurate. Recall Benjamin’s initial discussion of translatability: 
“Wenn Übersetzung eine Form ist, so muß Übersetzbarkeit gewissen Werken 
wesentlich sein [If translation is a form, then translatability must be essential to 
certain works]” (10). It is the original language-whole, which calls for translative 
connections. Translatabilty, as an essential attribute of any original literary work 
is the historic potential of a Gewesene: a challenge of recollection raised by an 
indexed instance of perfected human-linguistic communicability. The form of the 
original (or, in the terms of the Vorrede essay, its idea) sets the law of its eventual 
translative transpositions:  
 
Übersetzung ist ein Form. Sie als solche zu 
erfassen, gilt es zurückgehen auf das 
Original. Denn in ihm liegt deren Gesetz 
als dessen Übersetzbarkeit beschlossen. 
(Aufgabe, 9) 
La traduction est une forme. Pour la saisir 
comme telle, il faut revenir à l’original. Car 
c’est lui, par sa traductibilité, qui contient 
la loi de cette forme. (OE, I :  245) 
 
The translative present follows the original past. More accurately: “geht 
die Übersetzung aus dem Original hervor. Zwar nicht aus seinem Leben so sehr 
denn aus seinem Überleben [translation proceeds form the original. Of course 
not so much from its life as from its survival] (10). Benjamin does not hesitate to 
use, in this respect, rhetorical figures of organicist connotations. He states, for 
instance, that translation does not abandon the concern to “den Samen reiner 
Sprache zur Reife zu bringen [bring the seed of pure language to ripeness]” (17). 
                                                   
1 See, for example, Mosès (1992), for whom Benjamin’s history would be a “fonction du 
présent de l’historien” (95). 
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De Man is right, of course, when he exposes how such figures clash with (and 
must be read as ultimately outdone by) the Benjaminian reconfiguration of their 
logic and images. The following passage, in which Benjamin describes in detail 
the nature of translative connections, is quite telling in this respect. Translation, 
as we have seen, would regard the realm of innermost connections between 
languages. In so doing, it can hope neither to reveal (offenbaren), nor to establish 
or constitute (herstellen) such connections. It would be a highly idiosyncratic 
human-linguistic mode of exposing them (Darstellungsmodus): 
 
So ist die Übersetzung zuletzt zweckmäßig 
für den Ausdruck des innersten 
Verhältnisses der Sprachen zueinander. Sie 
kann dieses verborgene Verhältnis selbst 
unmöglich offenbaren, unmöglich 
herstellen; aber darstellen, indem sie es 
keimhaft oder intensiv verwirklicht, kann 
sie es. Und zwar ist dieses Darstellung 
eines Bedeutenen durch den Versuch, den 
Keim seiner Herstellung ein ganz 
eigentümlicher Darstellungsmodus, wie er 
im Bereich des nicht sprachlichen Lebens 
kaum angetroffen werden mag. Denn 
dieses kennt in Analogien und Zeichen 
andere Typen der Hindeutung als die 
intensive, das heißt vorgreifende, 
andeutende Verwirklichung. – Jenes 
gedachte, innerste Verhältnis der Sprachen 
ist aber das einer eigentümlichen 
Konvergenz. (Aufgabe, 12) 
Ainsi la finalité de la traduction consiste, 
en fin de compote, à exprimer le rapport le 
plus intime entre les langages.  
Il lui est impossible de révéler, de créer ce 
rapport caché lui-même ; mais elle peut le 
représenter en le réalisant en germe ou 
intensivement.  
Et cette représentation d’un signifié par 
l’essai, par le germe de sa création, est un 
mode de représentation tout à fait original, 
qui n’a guère d’équivalent dans le 
domaine de la vie non langagière.  
Car cette dernière connaît, dans les 
analogies et les signes, d’autres types de 
référence que la réalisation intensive, c’est 
à dire anticipatrice,, annonciatrice. – Mais 
le rapport ainsi conçu, ce rapport très 
intime entre les langues, est celui d’une 
convergence originale. (OE, I :  248) 
 
The translative Darstellungsmodus is a specific mode of reference or, more 
accurately, of deictic (Hindeutung) enactment (Verwirklichung), further qualified 
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as: tentative (Versuch) rather than definitive; elementary or tendential (keimhaft) 
rather than total or complete; and, finally, intensive, anticipatory and suggestive 
(intensive, vorgreifende, andeutende). This is how, through its connection to 
translation, the original form “hindeutet als auf den vorbestimmten, versagten 
Versöhnungs- und Erfüllungsbereich der Sprachen [points to the announced, 
forbidden realm of reconciliation and fulfilment of languages] ” (15). What is 
impossible to reach is thus also inescapably indexed as pertinent for the historic 
lives of languages. Translative connections would liberate an otherwise enclosed 
or exiled instance of purely human language:  
 
Jene reine Sprache, die in fremde gebannt 
ist, in der eigenen zu erlösen, die im Werk 
gefangene in der Umdichtung zu befreien, 
ist die Aufgabe des Übersetzers. (Aufgabe, 
19) 
Racheter dans sa propre langue ce pur 
langage exilé dans la langue étrangère, 
libérer en le transposant le pur langage 
captif dans l’oeuvre, telle est la tâche du 
traducteur. (OE, I :  259) 
   
What is it exactly that reine Sprache is a prisoner of, hidden in the semiotic 
construct of a non-translated original literary work? It is a certain kind of 
meaningfulness or signification, which would be alien to purely human-
linguistic communicability:  
 
Ist jene letzte Wesenheit, die das reine 
Sprache selbst ist, in den Sprachen nur an 
Sprachliches und dessen Wandlungen 
gebunden, so ist sie in den Gebilden 
behaftet mit dem schweren und fremden 
Sinn.  (Aufgabe, 19) 
Si cette ultime essence , qui est bien le pur 
langage lui-même, dans les langages n’est 
liée qu’ à du langagier et à ses mutations, 
dans les oeuvres [rather : dans les 
formations] elle est affligée du sens lourd 
et étranger. (OE, I :  258) 
 
Signification is that from which translation saves the phenomena of the original 
formations. Recall the terms of the Vorrede essay: ideas are contemplative shelters 
that save the phenomena. The task of translation would be to read and mobilise 
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the idea of the original formation: its semiotic mode of indexing purely human 
naming1. 
Benjamin also uses, in connection to the above, the notion of symbol – 
which we have already encountered in the essay on Sprache. In current linguistic 
phenomena, Benjamin says, reine Sprache is present or active in two possible and 
quite different ways – either as the symbolising element (das Symbolisierende), or 
as the symbolised one (das Symbolisierte): 
 
[…] das ist jener Kern der reinen Sprache 
selbst. Wenn aber dieser, ob verborgen 
und fragmentarisch, dennoch gegenwärtig 
im Leben als das Symbolisierte selbst ist, 
so wohnt er nur symbolisiert in den 
Gebilden. (Aufgabe, 19) 
[…] c’est le noyau même du pur langage. 
Mais si celui-ci, même caché ou 
fragmentaire, est présent pourtant dans la 
vie comme le symbolisé même, il n’habite 
dans les oeuvres que symbolisant.  (OE, I : 
258) 
 
In finite linguistic formations (endlichen Gebilden der Sprache) the nucleus of 
reine Sprache is attached to (and concealed or fragmented by) a mechanism of 
semiotic signification. Human language thus means or symbolises what the sign 
signifies. Translative deixis would expose the historic dynamics of languages (im 
Werden des Sprachen selbst) and thus enable reine Sprache to be recognised as the 
Gemeinte intended by the original formation as a whole. Translation is thus the 
task of turning linguistic manifestations from symbolising constructs into 
symbolised forms, via historic transposition: 
 
Von diesem sie zu entbinden, das La libérer de ce sens, du symbolisant faire 
                                                   
1 This, I think, is the direction in which the answer should be sought to the question that 
Derrida (1985) identifies as a central one for Aufgabe: what is there à traduire? Derrida 
subsequently investigates the relations between such notions as form, symbol and truth to what he 
calls “noms aux bords de la langue”.  
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Symbolisierende zum Symbolisierten 
selbst zu machen, die reine Sprache 
gestaltet in der Sprachbewegung 
zurückgewinnen, ist das gewaltige und 
einzige Vermögen der Übersetzung. 
(Aufgabe, 19) 
le symbolisé même, réintégrer au 
mouvement de la langue le pur langage 
qui a pris forme, tel est le prodigieux et 
l’unique pouvoir du traducteur. (OE, I :  
258) 
 
 
B.4.4. Translative Reading 
 
 When translation occurs, something happens to the readability of an 
original formation. Enacted translatability makes the original stand as differently 
readable. More specifically, the readability of the original is brought under the 
light of a historic potential. Translation functions, in this sense, as an effectively 
historic reading of the original: a reading of its ideational form. By reading one 
should not understand the perception or reception of the original by the 
differently languaged mind of the translator. What reads the original is the 
occurrence of the translatum standing by its side. Let us further inquire how the 
readability of the original formation is affected by translative reading – that is, 
how Benjamin’s historic configuration of translation dovetails into his 
epistemological problematics about artistic forms as ideas. 
Recall Benjamin’s “law” of the distinction between the indexed meaning 
(or Gemeinte) and the mode (or Art) of indexing it. Translation copes with the 
implications of this law. I should point out that the law applies both to specific 
semiotic manifestations and to languages as a formational whole. The example 
that Benjamin gives in Aufgabe, in order to illustrate his point, concerns semiotic 
manifestations: specific words, in their respective languages (such as Brot and 
pain) index the same thing (bread) but only according to a regime of signification 
proper to the corresponding language. In an analogous way, Benjamin says, 
formations as language-wholes index the same thing but according to their mode 
of indexing. The thing, in this case, would be: reine Sprache. The analogy between 
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the two levels of linguistic life, should thus not be drawn too far1. Specific signs 
index meanings through the relations between signifiers and signifieds. 
Language-wholes index their own, purely linguistic reference. This idiosyncratic 
indexing, mechanisms of semiotic signification risk dissimulating: 
 
Bei den einzelnen, den unergänzten 
Sprachen nämlich ist ihr Gemeinte niemals 
in relativer Selbständigkeit anzutreffen, 
wie bei den einzelnen Wörtern oder 
Sätzen, sondern vielmehr in stetem 
Wandel begriffen, bis es aus der Harmonie 
all jener Arten des Meinens als die reine 
Sprache herauszutreten vermag. So lange 
bleibt es in den Sprache verborgen. 
(Aufgabe, 14) 
Dans les langues prises une à une et donc 
incomplètes, ce qu’elles visent ne peut 
jamais être atteint de façon relativement 
autonome, comme dans les mots ou les 
phrases pris séparément, mais est soumis à 
une mutation constante, jusqu’à ce qu’il 
soit en position de ressortir, comme 
langage pur, de l’harmonie de tous ces 
modes de visée. Jusqu’alors il reste 
dissimulé dans les langues. (OE, I : 251 
 
The mode in which a language-whole indexes reine Sprache would be 
manifested only through a distinctly translative reading of how its semiotic units 
index their own meanings: 
 
                                                   
1 The “bread” example can lead to misreadings (exemplified by de Man) according to 
which the distinction between Gemeinte and Art des Meinens concerns semiotic relations between 
signified and signifier (or between sign and reference). This is most evident in Zohn’s English 
translation of the relevant passage: Gemeinte is rendered by “intended object” (Benjamin 1968, 74). 
It is object that is problematic here, not intention, to which de Man draws his corrective attention. 
Signs can be seen as indexing “objects”, but language-wholes index reine Sprache.  
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Denn dieser erschöpft sich nach seiner 
dichterischen Bedeutung fürs Original 
nicht in dem Gemeinten sondern gewinnt 
diese gerade dadurch, wie das Gemeinte in 
die Art des Meinens in dem bestimmten 
Worte gebunden ist.  (Aufgabe, 17) 
Car, selon sa signification littéraire pour 
l’original, ce sens ne s’épuise pas dans ce 
qui est visé, mais acquiert justement cette 
signification par la manière dont ce qui est 
visé est lié, dans le mot déterminé, au 
mode de visée. (OE, I : 256) 
 
The translative task is thus to pass from mechanisms of semiotic signification to 
ideational forms – without losing from sight either the analogy or the difference 
between these two levels of linguistic life.Semiotic signification involves tensions 
between the signified and the signifier. Benjamin refers to the former as Sinn and 
to the latter as Form1, Gefühlsten2 (which should be close to rhetoric) or Syntax (in 
the wider sense of morphology and structure). The tensions are such that, as 
Benjamin describes at length, if one tries to follow the Sinn, one needs to change 
Form – and if one closely reproduces the latter, one risks losing the former.   
Translative reading would be governed by “einer theorie, die anderes in 
der Übersetzung sucht als Sinnwiedergabe [a theory which is looks in translation 
for things other than the iteration of meaning]” (17). The quest for meaning 
would not be translative reading, to the degree that it does not probe semiotic 
tensions in a way that would expose or liberate the Art in which the original 
formation indexes pure language. Translative reading should, instead, 
concentrate on Syntax. More accurately, it should address Wort, instead of Satz: 
 
Das vermag vor allem Wörtlichkeit in der 
Übertragung der Syntax, und gerade sie 
C’est ce que réussit avant tout la littéralité 
dans la transposition de la syntaxe; or, c’est 
                                                   
1 Form is juxtaposed to Sinn in the last part of Aufgabe (18). The term, in this context, is 
used in a loose sense, closer to shape or contour.  
 
2 Tonalité affective, says Gandillac in OE,  for this term of Benjamin’s Aufgabe (17). 
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erweist das Wort, nicht den Satz, als das 
Urelement des Übersetzers. Denn der Satz 
ist die Mauer vor der Sprache des 
Originals, Wörtlichkeit die Arcade. 
(Aufgabe, 18) 
elle, précisément, qui montre que le mot, 
non la phrase, est l’élément originaire du 
traducteur. Car si la phrase est le mur 
devant la langue de l’original, la littéralité 
est l’arcade. (OE, I : 257) 
   
What exactly could Wort be, as the ur-element that enables reading to reach over 
the walls of Satz? In what sense is Benjaminian translation literal or Wörtlich?  
There has been a tendency to consider that, in accordance with Benjamin’s 
interest in fragments, Wörtlichkeit means concentrating on the individual words1. 
This would bring Benjamin extremely close to Humboldtian linguistics. Recall 
how Humboldt’s “inner linguistic form” involves, indeed, not only morphology, 
syntax and rhetoric, but also the formation of isolated words. I here cite a 
relevant passage, already partially discussed: 
 
Der Begriff der Formen der Sprachen 
dehnt sich weit über die Regeln der 
Redefügung und selbst über die der 
Wortbildung hinaus, insofern man unter 
der letzteren die Anwendung gewisser 
allgemeiner logischer Kategorien des 
Wirkens, des Gewirkten, der Substanz, der 
Eigenschaft, u. s. w. auf die Wurzeln und 
Grundwörter versteht. Er ist ganz 
eigentlich auf die Bildung der 
Grundwörter selbst anwendbar, und muss 
in der That möglichst auf sie angewandt 
werden, wenn das Wesen der Sprache 
wahrhaft erkennbar sein soll. (Sprachbau, 
The concept of the form of language 
extends far beyond the rules of word-order 
and even beyond those of word-formation, 
insofar as we mean by these the 
application of certain general logical 
categories, of active and passive, 
substance, attribute etc., to the roots and 
basic words. It is quite peculiarly 
applicable to the formation of the basic 
words themselves, and must in fact be 
applied to them as much as possible, if the 
nature of the language is to be truly 
recognisable.” (Language,  51) 
                                                   
1 Derrida (1985) is an example of such a misreading. 
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59) 
 
De Man provides us with an important insight into how Benjaminian 
problematics diverge from Humboldtian linguistics. Benjamin’s Wort would be 
referring us to the very notion of Art des Meinens as opposed to Meinen:  
Satz in German means not just sentence, in the grammatical sense, it 
means statement […] the most fundamental statement, meaning, the most 
meaningful word, whereas word (Wort) is associated by Benjamin with 
Aussage, the way in which you state, as the apparent agent of the 
statement.  (Conclusions, 88) 
Wort would thus have very little, if anything, to do with Humboldtian 
lexical units. It would also resist the Wolfian principles of textual formness. The 
Benjaminian objective would be to identify and critically appreciate elements that 
guard the idea of a linguistic formation against its textual reformation. 
De Man proceeds (Conclusions, 87-88) to further translative interpretations 
of the Benjaminian distinction between Gemeinte and Art des Meinens. It would be 
equivalent to those between vouloir dire and dire, meaning and saying, hermeneutics 
and poetics or stylistics, logos and lexis, statement and syntax, symbolised and 
symbolising, meaning and trope. The relation between the two poles in all these 
conceptual couples would be that of a fundamental “nonadequation” (or 
“discrepancy”, or “disjunction”) between signifier and signified, marking “any 
work to the extent that that work is a work of language” (86). De Man well 
exposes the failing mechanisms of semiotic signification: 
Therefore the distinction between symbol and symbolised, the 
nonadequation of symbol to a shattered symbolised, the nonsymbolic 
character of this adequation [i.e. the fact the symbols cannot actually 
accomplish an effective sym-ballein] is a version of the others and indicates 
the unreliability of rhetoric as a system of tropes which would be 
productive of meaning. Meaning is always displaced with regard to the 
meaning it ideally intended – that meaning is never reached. (Conclusions, 
91) 
The problem with de Man’s approach is that it limits its perspective to the 
level of semiosis – which, according to Benjamin, is only one of the basic 
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components of human-linguistic life. Benjamin’s Wort is no more de Man’s dire 
than it is Humboldt’s Grundwort or Wolf’s forma textus. It is ideational form read 
out of semiotic mechanisms, naming-language read out of word-language. 
Translative Wörtlichkeit is the reading of lexis as mimesis of Name. 
One of the clearest indications of the resistance of the problematics of 
Aufgabe to de Man’s dialectics is the following. Not all of the antithetical 
polarities brought up by de Man accurately correspond to what Benjamin 
discusses. There is one, in particular, with which de Man actually reverses 
Benjamin’s figuration. De Man (Conclusions, 86) projects the distinction between 
Gemeinte and Art des Meinens on the one between logos and lexis. Benjamin, 
however, identifies Wort not with lexis, but with logos: “Auch im Bereiche der 
Übersetzung gilt: ejn ajrch``/ h\n oJ lovgoß, im Anfang war das Wort” 
(Aufgabe, 18). This is the Wort that translation reads in the original: the logos of a 
Name. 
Benjamin does bring up a notion close to de Manian disjunction, namely, 
Gebrochenheit (refractability); but Benjamin’s Gebrochenheit, occurs between 
language as a semiotic construct and language as an ideational form, or between 
language as a historical phenomenon and language as historic life – not between 
different components internal to semiotic phenomenicity. Translative reading 
would expose the disjunction and confront its challenge.  
Only under such a translative perspective would tensions of signification 
on the level of semiosis be significantly readable: they would expose the 
occurrence of historic connections between languages. As long as this perspective 
is inactive, the original remains in a state where purely semiotic tensions tend to 
be neutralised:  
 
[…] das Verhältnis des Gehalts zur 
Sprache völlig verschieden ist in Original 
und Übersetzung. Bilden nämlich diese im 
ersten eine gewisse Einheit wie Frucht und 
[…] le rapport de la teneur au langage est 
tout à fait différent dans l’original et dans 
la traduction. En effet, si, dans l’original, 
tendeur et langage forment une certaine 
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Schale, so umgibt die Sprache der 
Übersetzung ihren Gehalt wie ein 
Königsmantel in weiten Falten. Denn sie 
bedeutet eine höhere Sprache als sie ist 
und bleibt dadurch ihrem eigenen Gehalt 
gegenüber unangemessen, gewaltig und 
fremd. Diese Gebrochenheit verhindert 
jene Übertragung, wie sie zugleich 
erübrigt. (Aufgabe, 15) 
unité comparable à celle du fruit et de sa 
peau, le langage de la traduction 
enveloppe sa teneur comme un manteau 
royal aux larges plis. Car il renvoie à un 
langage supérieur à lui-même et reste 
ainsi, par rapport à sa propre teneur, 
inadéquat, forcé, étranger. Ce caractère 
impropre1 empêche tout transfert et, en 
même temps, le rend inutile.(OE, I : 252-
253) 
 
Translative reading would not simply deconstruct the original. The 
deconstructive moment would only be a first step, providing the material in 
which effective historic transposition can take place. The tensions of signification, 
which de Man records, are only relevant as elementary indexes of the idea that 
there is to recollect.  
De Man insists that “it is impossible to do hermeneutic and poetics at the 
same time” (Conclusions, 88). Wolf would have little difficulty to accepting this 
statement. So would Benjamin. The specificity of the Benjaminian approach 
resides in the additionally postulated possibility (or even urgency) to do a 
philosophical history of literature, which would be neither hermeneutics nor 
poetics. To signal this possibility would be the task of the translator, who toils the 
metaphysics of human-linguistic forms. 
By reducing language to its semiotic nature, de Man resists the historic 
perspective on both humanness and language, which Benjaminian metaphysics 
insist on probing. De Man concentrates on the discrepancy between, on the one 
hand, the human intention of producing and communicating meaning and, on 
the other, the resistance of language to such an intention. It would follow that  
                                                   
1 Rather: "this refracted condition". 
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“language is not in any sense human” (Conclusions, 87). More specifically, “the 
inhuman is: linguistic structures, the play of linguistic tensions, linguistic events 
that occur, possibilities which are inherent in language independently of any 
intent or any drive or any desire we might have”  (Conclusions, 96). De Man 
seems to overlook the fact that this would be inhuman, indeed, only if the 
modern anthropological and phenomenological definition of humanity were 
taken for granted. The Benjaminian suggestion that de Man refuses to read, is 
that the fallacy of this definition, far from exhausting problematics concerning 
the relations between language and human history, transposes them to a 
different field of theoretical and practical work, which has always been wide 
open.  
The translative configuration of language is concomitant with the 
reconfiguration of the human as historic. The language at stake would be neither 
the cultural language of historicism, ideally restored in philological textual 
constructs, nor the purely semiotic language of which deconstruction exposes the 
resistance to historical canonisation. 
 
 
B.4.5. Translative Writing 
 
In the last part of the Aufgabe essay (17 et seq.), Benjaminian metaphysics 
undergo a very practical twist. The issue is not only how to read the original but 
also how to operate the writing of the translatum that presents this reading – 
how the translating language articulates its own formation, connecting to the one 
of the original. The following passage suggests, in a tone wholly endorsed by de 
Man, that there can be no guidelines for the translative task: 
 
Erscheint die Aufgabe des Übersetzers in 
solchem Licht, so drohen die Wege ihrer 
Lösung sich um so undurchdringlicher zu 
Dès lors que la tâche du traducteur 
apparaît sous cette lumière, les chemins de 
son accomplissement risquent de 
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verfinstern. Ja dieses Aufgabe: in der 
Übersetzung den Samen deiner Sprache 
zur Reife zu bringen, scheint niemals 
lösbar, in keiner Lösung bestimmbar. 
(Aufgabe, 17) 
s’obscurcir de façon d’autant plus 
impénétrable. Disons plus : de cette tâche 
qui consiste à faire mûrir, dans la 
traduction, la sémence du pur langage, il 
semble impossible de jamais s’acquitter, il 
semble qu’aucune solution ne permette de 
la définir.  (OE, I :  253) 
 
The task of the translation would be as inevitable as its clear and definitive 
solution is impossible. Consequently, Benjamin’s problematics, although 
addressing methodological or even technical concerns (how to translate), are not 
an argument in favour of a Wörtlich (word by word or literal) translation. We 
have, rather, an inquiry about the very meaning of Wörtlichkeit. Benjamin 
ventures to identify the linguistic marks that might allow us to recognise an 
emergent formation as the translative transposition of the Wort of an original 
idea. Since languages constantly change, these marks cannot be of likeness or 
resemblance between semiotic constructs. They involve relations of accord 
between linguistic formations at the level of their respective Arten of indexing 
reine Sprache: 
 
[…] so muß, anstatt den Sinn des Originals 
sich ähnlich zu machen, die Übersetzung 
liebend vielmehr und bis ins einzelne 
hinein dessen Art des Meinens in der 
eigenen Sprache sich anbilden […]. 
(Aufgabe, 18) 
[…] ainsi, au  lieu de s’assimiler au sens de 
l’original, la traduction doit bien plutôt, 
amoureusement et jusque dans le détail, 
adopter dans sa propre langue1 le mode de 
visée de l’original […]. (OE, I :  257) 
 
                                                   
1 Rather : “form itself in its language according to”. 
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The semiotic construct of the translatum should become a medium of 
transparency allowing the original to be read under the historic perspective of 
pure language:  
 
Die wahre Übersetzung ist 
durchscheinend, sie verdeckt nicht das 
Original, steht ihm nicht im Licht, sondern 
läßt die reine Sprache, wie verstärkt durch 
ihr eigenes Medium, nur um so voller aufs 
Original fallen. (Aufgabe, 18) 
La vraie traduction est transparente, elle ne 
cache pas l’original, ne l’eclipse pas, mais 
laisse, d’autant plus pleinement, tomber 
sur l’original le pur langage, comme 
renforcé par son propre médium. (OE, I :  
257) 
 
Benjamin also uses metaphors of sound and, more specifically, resonance, 
in formulations that express, through their syntactical meanders, the complexity 
of the play of reflections and deflections that should mark translative 
transparency. Regarding the meaning of the original, the translator’s language 
should set itself in motion. It should let resound, not the intention of a meaning, 
via repetition, but the harmonious or complementary connection of its own 
linguistic Art of indexing to that of the original: 
 
Dagegen kann, ja muß dem Sinn 
gegenüber ihre Sprache sich gegenlassen, 
um nicht dessen intentio als Wiedergabe, 
sondern als Harmonie, als Ergänzung zur 
Sprache, in der diese mitteilt, ihre eigene 
Art der intentio ertönen zu lassen. 
(Aufgabe, 18) 
En revanche, sa langue peut et même doit, 
face au sens, se laisser aller, afin de n’en 
pas faire résonner l’intention sur le mode 
d’une restitution, mais afin de faire 
résonner son propre mode d’intention, en 
tant qu’harmonie, complément de la 
langue dans laquelle cette intention se 
communique. (OE, I : 257) 
 
In the language of the translatum the resonance of the original echoes itself as a 
calling cry. Translation becomes the site of a historic realm of connections 
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between languages as wholes, standing outside the phenomenic forest of 
signification:  
 
Die Übersetzung aber sieht sich nicht wie 
die Dichtung gleichsam im innern 
Bergwald der Sprache selbst, sondern 
außerhalb desselben, ihm gegenüber, und 
ohne ihn zu betreten, ruft sie das Original 
hinein, an denjenigen einzigen Orte hinein, 
wo jeweils das Echo in der eigenen den 
Widerhall eines Werkes der fremden 
Sprache zu geben vermag. (Aufgabe, 16) 
La traduction, cependant ne se voit pas, 
comme l’oeuvre littéraire, pour ainsi dire 
plongée au coeur de la forêt alpestre de la 
langue ; elle se tient hors de cette forêt, face 
à elle, et, sans y pénétrer, y fait résonner 
l’original1 au seul endroit chaque fois où 
elle peut faire entendre l’echo2 d’une 
oeuvre écrite dans une langue étrangère.  
(OE, I : 254)3 
  
The translatum should let itself be marked by a significant perturbation of its 
idiomatic normality. The very borders between historically distinct idioms would 
thus be at stake:  
 
Um ihretwillen bricht er morsche 
Schranken der eigenen Sprache: Luther, 
Voss, Hölderlin, George haben die 
Grenzen des Deutschen erweitert. 
(Aufgabe, 19) 
Pour l’amour du pur langage, il brise les 
barrières vermoulues de sa propre langue : 
Luther, Voss, Hölderlin et George ont 
élargi les frontières de l’allemand. (OE, I :  
259) 
 
                                                   
1 Rather : “makes the original cry out”. 
 
2 Rather : “the echo of the reverberation”. 
 
3 I owe the awareness of the complex play between resonances or cries, echoings and 
reverberations, marking Benjamin’s figuration, to my discussions with Christine Bétrisey. 
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Let us return to the “royal plies” in which the Sprache of the translatum 
envelops its Gehalt. This, as we have seen1, is the figure of a condition of 
refractability that derpives the translatum of the “fruit-to-skin unity” between 
Sprache and Gehalt, which characterises the original. It is also an additional figure 
for the Wehen of an emergent language-whole that undergoes the shock of its 
historic connection to the Nachreife of a persisting original. The figure tells us that 
the language of the translatum is marked by an idiosyncratic interplay between 
the meaning of words and their syntactical arrangement. The interplay would 
perturb the very mechanisms of semiotic signification of the translating language 
– the capacity or propensity of its signs to signify. The tendency to reduce human 
language to the communicational function of its semiotic nature would thus be 
countered. This tension would index that the essence of a purely human-
linguistic naming is also inescapably at work in linguistic manifestations.  
In translation, we have two different linguistic constructs. The one 
transposes into its language elements of the other’s language. This transposition, 
according to Benjamin, should be Wörtlich. Let us then ask again: for a Wörtlich 
transposition to occur, which elements of an original semiotic construct should 
be transferred unaltered and which should undergo one or the other kind of 
alteration? Recall, in this respect, the principle of the impossibility or irrelevance 
of analogical likeness. Likeness of syntax or rhetoric would be no better 
guarantee for the occurrence of translative transpositions, than semantic 
equivalence between isolated words.  
Let us first examine what happens with meaning (Sinn). We have seen 
that, according to Benjamin, translation allows its language to be detached from 
semnatic concerns: “dem Sinn gegenüber ihre Sprache sich gegenlassen” (18). 
Detachment does not mean total disregard or indifference. Aufgabe insists on 
inquiring into the significance that Sinn retains for translative connections to 
originals. Benjamin proposes similes involving the figure of touch (berühren): in 
                                                   
1 See my quotation from Aufgabe (15) in section B.4.4. 
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the case of Hölderlin, translation would touch sense the way the wind touches an 
aeolian harp (21). A more abstract figure is at work when translation is said to 
touch meaning the way a tangent touches a circle. The touch would be on an 
infinitely small point. It would, nevertheless, determine the direction that the 
tangent takes – a direction that loses, of course, much of its significance under the 
perspective of infinity:  
 
Wie die Tangente den Kreis flüchtig und 
nur in einem Punkte berührt und wie ihr 
wohl diese Berührung, nicht aber der 
Punkt, das Gesetz vorschreibt, nach dem 
sie weiter ins Unendliche ihre gerade Bahn 
zieht, so berührt die Übersetzung flüchtig 
und nur in dem unendlich kleinen Punkte 
des Sinnes das original, um nach Gesetze 
der Treue in der Freiheit der 
Sprachbewegung ihre eigenste Bahn zu 
verfolgen. (Aufgabe, 19-20) 
De même que la tangente ne touche le 
cercle que de façon fugitive et en un seul 
point et que c’est ce contact, non le point, 
qui lui assigne la loi selon laquelle elle 
poursuit à l’infini sa trajectoire droite, ainsi 
la traduction touche l’original de façon 
fugitive et seulement dans le point 
infiniment petit du sens, pour suivre 
ensuite sa trajectoire la plus propre, selon 
la loi de la fidélité dans la liberté du 
mouvement langagier. (OE, I :  259) 
 
This ambiguous role of meaning (touched rather than transferred, 
infinitely minimised rather than either changed or preserved) would have to be 
enacted, in the translatum, through the interplay between the choice of words on 
the paradigmatic axis, and their syntactical arrangement on the syntagmatic one. 
Assuming we are dealing with a translative change of idiom, morphemic units 
should change, so that their semantic value may remain in touch with the words of 
the original. Furthermore, the translatum would need to somehow upset the 
signifying function of its chosen words, so that its language resists a “fruit-to-
skin” semiotic unity and deploys its “royal plies”. Syntax could do the job, if 
used in a way that prevents morphemic units from wholly assuming and acting 
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out their semantic value. In other words, there would have to be a certain degree 
and kind of syntactic misplacement of words. The translative formation would 
thus expose the refraction between language as a semiotic construct and 
language as purely human – between word as lexis and word as Name. This 
would, in turn, expose the irreducibility of human language to semiotic 
signification and communication practices. The emergence of a somewhat failing 
signifying mechanism would symbolise the occurrence of a historic connection 
accomplished on the grounds of purely human-linguistic communicability.  
While choosing words that are in touch with (instead of being the semantic 
equivalent of) the words of the original, the translator would also have to follow 
(instead of either mechanically imitating or organically adapting) the syntax of 
the original. What matters most would thus be the exact kind and degree of the 
resulting syntactic misplacement of words, and the ensuing perturbation of the 
signifying function of semiosis in the translatum. This very perturbation is what 
would connect the specific translatum to the specific original. Through distinct 
degrees and kinds of semiotic perturbation, the language of translatum would 
thus enact its historic connectability with respect to the language of the original. 
Needless to add, this strategy directly outdoes philological principles of 
textual formness. Benjaminian translation contradicts the philological restoration 
of semiotic constructs as cultural forms of compositional coherence and idiomatic 
consistency.  
Literary originals or, as Benjamin puts it, “all great literary works” would 
be formations that induce or provoke the most telling historic disturbances of the 
languages in which they are transposed through translation. This is the sense in 
which such works would be translatable par excellence (übersetzbar schlechtin: 21) – 
the interlinear translation of the manuscript tradition providing the archetype of 
their translatability: 
 
Denn in irgendeinem Grade enthalten alle 
großen Schriften, im höchsten aber die 
Car, à quelque degré, tous les grands 
écrits, mais au plus haut degré les Saintes 
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heiligen, zwischen den Zeilen ihre virtuelle 
Übersetzung. Die Interlinearversion des 
heiligen Textes ist das Urbild oder Ideal 
aller Übersetzung. (Aufgabe, 21) 
Ecritures, contiennent entre les lignes leur 
traduction virtuelle. La version 
interlinéaire du texte sacré est l’archétype 
de toute traduction. (OE, I :  261-262) 
 
Benjamin is saying that, in the case of works of great literary potential, all 
translative enterprises would confront and expose, even if only malgré-soi, the 
irreducibility of human language to its semiotic nature and the overhanging 
question of its essence as purely human-linguistic communicability. They would 
have to deal with the provocative model of the philologically and historically 
suspect inter-linear translation that occurs, for instance, in the Byzantine 
manuscripts of Homer – a translation that, often, does little more than tell how its 
original makes no phenomenological sense.  
I will return, in my next section, to the issue of translatability of “great 
literary works” and of the sacred texts as their paradigm. One could just further 
try, at this point, to present examples. With the Gospel, as quoted in Aufgabe, we 
have a very characteristic case, indeed, in which translation inevitably 
problematises the function of its own words as signifying vehicles. In the 
following English version, the word word sounds so misplaced that the use of 
logos in its place would make little difference. What matters is that the 
perturbation persists, as English strives to tell what was in the beginning, and 
was with God, and God was it, and of which all was made which has been made: 
In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and God was 
the word. The same was in the beginning with God. All things are through 
the same made and without the same is nothing made, which is made. 1 
 Word can very well translate both the Biblical logos and the Homeric e[poß 
(epos). It would not exactly be the right word in either case; and the correlative 
                                                   
1 Gospel according to John, literal translation from Luther’s version, in Carol Jacobs (1993, 
141). 
 
226 
B.4. Translative History 
perturbation would be of a different kind in each case; yet it would be the right 
word, well misplaced, from a translative perspective.  
We are thus driven back to the “naïve” question of Benjamin’s essay on 
Mimesis: in what way, different words, differently placed, in different languages, 
could all bear mimetic, non-sensuous resemblance to some kind of a common 
name? 
 
 
B.4.6. Assessing the Possibility 
 
In spite of Benjamin’s postulate of the “absolute translatability” of certain 
literary or sacred linguistic works, de Man presents Benjamin’s challenge as 
residing in the suggestion that “it is impossible to translate ” (Conclusions, 74). 
This idea of the impossibility of translation has become a commonplace in 
translation studies and is, indeed, very often attributed to Benjamin1. We are thus 
too prone, I think, to do away with the corresponding theoretical issue (the issue 
of the conditions enabling the occurrence of effectively translative connections) at 
the very point at which (as in the case of Benjamin) its poignancy becomes most 
perplexing. It is one thing to admit, together with most translators and theorists 
of translation, that the passage from one language to another does not allow a 
“perfect” transfer – whatever idea (usually a positivist one) of perfection one has 
in mind. Benjamin would be less interesting, had he simply re-discovered a basic 
                                                   
1 Derrida, in his own account of Aufgabe, is more sophisticated, but actually insists on the 
same: Benjamin would be saying that languages are, perhaps, traductibles (inviting or claiming 
translation) while remaining non-traduisibles (impossible to translate) (1985, 247). The task of the 
translator would thus be both inevitably undertaken and impossible to accomplish, echoing the 
Biblical paradigm according to which “Dieu impose et interdit a la fois la traduction” (214). At the 
same time, Derrida does envisage the occurrence of translation as an event historic, however rare: 
“Une traduction qui arrive, qui arrive à promettre la reconciliation, à en parler, à la désirer, une 
telle traduction est un événement rare” (235). 
 
227 
B.4. Translative History 
fact of linguistic life. It is a different thing to insist on the hypothesis that a 
certain kind of translation, under certain conditions, is not only inevitable but 
also possible, precisely on the grounds of the impossibility of a “perfect” transfer 
between different languages. This is what Benjamin does as he investigates the 
non-historicist and non-aestheticist premises and implications of the occurrence 
of translative events.  
 Why is there de Man’s (highly informed and critically sophisticated) 
resistance to the Benjaminian postulate of translatability? The thorny issue, I 
think, is the status that Benjamin attributes to translation as a paradigmatic 
historic event. The resistance to translatability is a resistance to understanding 
language as historic – and, ultimately, to the notion of history as it persists 
beyond historicist premises.  
De Man is, of course, perfectly aware of the stakes. The discussion 
following his lecture expresses this awareness quite tellingly: 
I think that what is implied, that what occurs, for example, is – translation 
is an occurrence. At the moment when translation really takes place, for 
example Hölderlin’s translations of Sophocles, which undid Sophocles, 
undid Hölderlin, and revealed a great deal – that’s an occurrence. That’s 
an event, that is a historical event. […] In Hölderlin, translation occurs. 
Most of the translations that are in the market are not translations in 
Benjamin’s sense. When Luther translated, translated the Bible, something 
occurred – at that moment, something happened – not in the immediate 
sense that from then on there were wars and then the course of history 
changed – that is a by-product. What really occurred was... translation. 
[…] I realise this is difficult – a little obscure and not well formulated. But 
I feel it, that there is something there. Something being said there which is 
kind of important to me, which I think... which isn’t clear. (Conclusions, 
104)  
Let us briefly probe the grounds on which de Man argues for the 
“impossibility of translation”. I will not insist on the rather secondary (if not 
altogether irrelevant) argument that de Man’s rhetoric uses as it invokes flagrant 
translation mistakes made by Benjamin’s most competent English and French 
translators (Zohn and Gandillac, respectively). This concerns the phenomenology 
of reading: the state of mind that necessitates misreading (in a sense more 
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elementary that de Man’s theoretical notion of blindness suggests) not as an 
impediment but as a precondition of reading. It affects the notion of translation 
no more than the copying mistakes of the scribe may affect the notion  of 
reproduction. De Man’s Conclusions comes closer to the point, I think, when he 
comments on Benjamin‘s statement according to which “steht […] die 
Übersetzung mitten zwischen Dichtung und der Lehrer [translation stands half-
way between poetry and doctrine]” (Aufgabe, 17)1. De Man systematises and 
highlights the Benjaminian analogy between translation, philosophy and 
criticism – an analogy that also involves history.   
Translation would be akin to philosophy (or to a certain kind of 
philosophical awareness) and criticism (especially the irony-sensitive literary 
theory of the Romantics) because in all three cases, thought realises the 
impossibility of approaching through relations of likeness the object it postulates 
as its original or primary source. History would confront the same conundrum: 
Because all these activities are derived from original activities they are 
therefore singularly inconclusive, are failed, are aborted in a sense from 
the start because they are derived and secondary. Yet Benjamin insists that 
the model of their derivation is not that of resemblance or imitation. […] 
All these activities – critical philosophy, literary theory, history – resemble 
each other in the fact that they do not resemble that from which they 
derive. (Conclusions, 83-84) 
What fails, in fact, are the modern premises of generation or derivation 
through relations of representational analogy. These premises are, indeed, 
criticised by Benjamin as fallacious. The awareness of their fallacy, Benjamin also 
says, is the condition enabling theory to probe the possibility of different kinds of 
historic relations enacted through language. Translatability would be a paradigm 
in this respect. 
                                                   
1 The statement occurs in the context of Benjamin’s comments on the language of poetic 
truth that Mallarmé would long for.  
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Towards the closure of Aufgabe (20-21) Benjamin further explores his 
notion of translatability by examining whether and how specific kinds of 
formations are, indeed, translatable. Translatability is clearly presented as a 
matter of degree. The degree to which an original is translatable would depend 
on the degree to which its formation is readable as a mode of indexing reine 
Sprache. According to this criterion, translatable would be those original works 
that current translative practices view as most difficult or even impossible to 
translate –  namely, works of higher literary status:  
 
Je höher ein Werk geartet ist, desto mehr 
bleibt es selbst in flüchtigster Berührung 
seines Sinnes noch übersetzbar. Dies gilt 
selbstverständlich nur von Originalen. 
(Aufgabe, 20) 
Plus une oeuvre est de haute qualité, plus 
elle reste, même dans le plus fugitif contact 
avec son sens, susceptible encore d’être 
traduite. Cela ne vaut, bien entendu, que 
pour les textes originaux. (OE, I :  260) 
  
In the case of original literary works, Benjamin is saying, translatability 
presupposes that their formation reaches beyond currently communicable 
statements and includes, attached to or hidden under the signifying weight of 
such manifestations, an element of pure linguistic communicability. This, we 
may surmise, is what makes their meaning difficult or impossible to transfer; it 
would also be what renders the idea of their language-whole eminently 
translatable.  
Things become more complicated in the case of formations that are 
readable as the outcome of translative operations – which Benjamin also 
considers. He does not at all exclude the translatability of translata. Indeed, he 
uses its example as a stepping stone allowing him to pass to the crucial issue of 
the absolute translatability of great literary or sacred works.  
Originals would be non-translatable if over-burdened by semiotic 
signification. Translata, on the contrary, would be non-translatable if altogether 
deprived of signifying consistency: 
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Übersetzungen dagegen erweisen sich 
unübersetzbar nicht wegen der Schwere, 
sondern wegen der allzu großen 
Flüchtigkeit, mit welcher der Sinn an ihnen 
haftet.  (Aufgabe, 20) 
Les traductions, en revanche, se révèlent 
intraduisibles, non parce qu’elles seraient 
trop chargées de sens, mais parce qu’elle le 
sont de manière trop fugitive.  (OE, I :  260-
261) 
 
Earlier in his essay, Benjamin commented upon a different but related 
point; namely, the non-translatability of a specific element present in all 
translated texts. This element would be the very gesture of translative 
transposition, exposing the kernel of reine Sprache that inhabits the language of 
the original, and perturbing the language of the translatum:  
 
Genauer läßt sich dieser wesenhafte Kern 
als dasjenige bestimmen, was an ihr selbst 
nicht wiederum übersetzbar ist1. Mag man 
nämlich an Mitteilung aus ihr entnehmen, 
soviel man kann, und dies übersetzen, so 
bleibt dennoch dasjenige unberührbar 
zurück, worauf die Arbeit des wahren 
Übersetzers sich richtete. Es ist nicht 
übertragbar wie das Dicherwort des 
Originals weil das Verhältnis des Gehalts 
zur Sprache völlig verschieden ist in 
Original und Übersetzung.  (Aufgabe, 15) 
Pour donner une définition plus précise de 
ce noyau essentiel, on peut dire qu’il s’agit 
de ce qui, dans une traduction, n’est pas à 
nouveau traduisible. Car, autant qu’on en 
puisse extraire du communicable pour le 
traduire, il reste toujours cet intouchable, 
sur lequel porte le travail du vrai 
traducteur et qui n’est pas transmissible 
comme l’est, dans l’original, la parole de 
l’écrivain, car le rapport de la teneur au 
langage est tout à fait différent dans 
l’original et dans la traduction. (OE, I :  
252) 
 
                                                   
1 The English version by Zohn overlooks the wiederum. An element that is said by 
Benjamin to be not re-translatable, is thus reconfigured by the translator as not translatable at all 
(Benjamin 1968, 75) 
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The non-translatable translative gesture may or may not affect the 
translatum in its entirety. This sets the degree to which a translatum is 
translatable1. The translatability of the translatum presupposes that the 
corresponding formation deploys itself beyond the translative gesture per se; that 
its signifying component is not entirely governed by the indexation of purely 
human language.  
If originals risk suffering from an excessive presence of signifying 
mechanisms, translata risk suffering from their excessive absence. The danger of 
this excess is always present, Benjamin warns – especially when the gesture of 
translation has been a particularly poignant one. Hölderlin’s translations of 
Sophocles, Benjamin notes, provide us with examples of translata so deeply 
impregnated with the very gesture of translation, so entirely governed by the 
concern of historic connectability between language-wholes, that they are 
themselves non-translatable. They would thus be archetypes of a translative form 
(Urbilder ihrer Form: 21) exemplifying the risk run by all events of translative 
connection: 
 
Die Sophokles-übersetzungen waren 
Hölderlins letztes Werk. In ihnen stürzt 
der Sinn von Abgrund zu Abgrund, bis es 
droht in bodenlosed Sprachtiefen sich 
verlieren.  (Aufgabe, 21) 
Les traductions de Sophokle furent les 
dernières oeuvres de Hölderlin. Le sens y 
tombe de précipice en précipice, jusqu’à 
risquer de se perdre dans les gouffres sans 
fond de la langue. (OE, I :  261) 
 
The danger is to have language deprived of its human-historic potential. 
“Aber es gibt ein Halten [but there is an arrest]” Benjamin hastens to add. There 
                                                   
1 One can thus agree with Derrida (1985) when he states that “il n’y a pas de traduction 
de la traduction, voilà l’axiome sans lequel il n’y aurait pas «la tâche du traducteur” (239. This is 
only if one understands traduction as the translative gesture itself, not as the translatum as a 
formational whole. 
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is a further “Urbild oder Ideal aller Übersetzung [prototype or ideal of all 
translation]”, designated by the absolute interlinear translatability of sacred texts: 
 
Aber es gibt ein Halten. Es gewährt es 
jedoch kein Text außer dem heiligen, in 
dem  der Sinn aufgehört hat, die 
Wasserscheide für die strömende Sprache 
und die strömende Offenbarung zu sein. 
Wo der Text unmittelbar, ohne 
vermittelnden Sinn, in seiner Wörtlichkeit 
der wahren Sprache, der Wahrheit oder 
der Lehre angehört, ist er übersetzbar 
schlechthin.   (Aufgabe, 21) 
Mais il existe un point d’arrêt. Aucun texte 
ne le garantit, cependant, hors du texte 
sacré, où le sens a cessé d’être la ligne de 
partage entre le flot du langage et le flot de 
la Révélation. Là où le texte, 
immédiatement, sans l’entremise du sens, 
dans sa littéralité, relève du langage vrai, 
de la vérité ou de la doctrine, il est 
absolument traduisible. (OE, I :  261) 
 
Sacred linguistic works would be paradigms of how linguistic formations 
resist their reduction to the phenomenology of the production and reception of 
the corresponding semiotic artefacts – and thus trigger the metaphysics of their 
essential form. This, perhaps, is what the very notion of sacredness, along with 
the one of absolute translatability, strive to seize. It would also be what makes 
sacred works prototypes for all great, that is eminently translatable, literature1.  
Literature would be the field of most effectively translatable formations – 
that is, of formations that most tellingly claim historic connectability. The reading 
of literature would thus be a matter of indistinguishably historic and 
metaphysical toils – rather than of either historical or aesthetic ones. Linguistic 
formations would be literary to the degree that they induce intensive connections 
between perfected and emergent modes of purely human-linguistic 
communicability. They would be formations that expose in a most compelling 
way that human language is not limited to semiotic mechanisms of cultural 
                                                   
1 In this (and only in this) sense, literature could be naming linguistic sacredness. 
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communication – and that it thus survives textual restoration. Being utterly 
readable and translatable, literary texts would make human-linguistic history 
without being read as by-products of processes of becoming. As such, they 
would even stand beyond the very distinction between original and translation. 
Their originals may very well have been translations, just as their translations can 
live on as translatable originals. They would be, in either case, eminently 
translatable: never altogether erasing semiotic phenomenicity, but also never 
wholly reducible to its signifying mechanisms. 
In-between the two extremes of impossible and absolute translatability, 
there would be the immense variety and multiplicity of translative events of 
historic connectability. The space between the sacred and the Hölderlinian 
archetypes would be that of their possibility – as well as of its risk. 
Let us return to de Man in order to inquire more closely into his resistance 
to Benjamin’s problematics: his rejection of the possibility of translation is the 
counterpart of his critique of the notion of history in its relations to human 
language. Towards the end of his Conclusions, de Man presents us with the 
following statement: 
Now it is this motion, this errancy of language which never reaches the 
mark, which is always displaced in relation to what it meant to reach, it is 
this errancy of language, this illusion of a life that is only an after-life, that 
Benjamin calls history. As such, history is not human, because it pertains 
strictly to the order of language; it is not natural, for the same reason: it is 
not phenomenal, in the sense that no cognition, no knowledge about man 
can be derived from a history which as such is a purely linguistic 
complication; and it is not really temporal either, because the structure 
that animates it is not a temporal structure. Those disjunctions in language 
do get expressed by temporal metaphors but they are only metaphors. The 
dimension of futurity, for example, which is present in it, is not temporal 
but it is the correlative of the figural patterns and the disjunctive power 
which Benjamin locates in the structure of language. (Conclusions, 92) 
One can only agree with some of the points that de Man makes – such as 
the non-phenomenic status of the Benjaminian notion of history or the non-
historicist status of the corresponding idea of temporality. It does not follow, 
however, that history is an “illusion” of life that would be “only” after-life. If 
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figuration there is, figures would be instances of life indistinguishably linguistic 
and historic: nothing justifies the tendency to address them as “only” metaphors. 
 My suggestion is that the stakes, being eminently philosophical, are also 
political. There are some indications in this respect at the closing statements of de 
Man, in the discussion that follows his lecture. It is affirmed that “Benjamin’s 
concept of history is ‘nihilistic’ in Nietzsche’s sense of the term” (Conclusions, 
103). This could be accurate, provided one further inquires into the nature and 
implications of this nihilism. These are briefly discussed by de Man in a passage 
concerning the Benjaminian understanding of translation as a historic event: 
Understand by nihilism a certain kind of critical awareness which will not 
allow you to make certain affirmative statements when those affirmative 
statements go against the way things are. Therefore there is not in 
Benjamin at this point, a statement about history as occurrence, as that 
which occurs, as events that occur. (Conclusions, 104)  
The issue seems to be the degree to which nihilism is compatible with affirmative 
statements about history. De Man’s “impossibility to translate” echoes his 
dismissal of this compatibility. Benjamin’s Aufgabe, in my sense, is an inquiry into 
its conditions. Translation, as an instance of human-linguistic connectability, 
becomes the paradigm of a historic event – it does not occur instead of history, 
but as history itself. “Translation is an occurrence” is a “statement about history 
as occurrence” – and a statement affirmative enough.  
The issue of temporality is also brought up in an early essay of Benjamin, 
akin to his work on Trauerspiel: “Trauerspiel und Tragödie”. In it, he juxtaposes 
historical to mechanical temporality. In both cases, time would be Form. The form 
of mechanical time would be empty measurement of transformations. The one of 
historical time would involve Erfüllung or Ausfüllung – filling-up, rather than 
fulfilment. The occurrence of events would be what fills-up the infinite form of 
historical temporality:  
 
Die Zeit der Geschichte  ist unendlich in 
jeder Richtung und unerfüllt in jedem 
Le temps historique est infini dans toutes 
les directions, et non rempli à chaque 
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Augenblick. Das heißt es ist kein einzelnes 
empirisches Ereignis denkbar, das eine 
notwendige Beziehung zu der bestimmten 
Zeitlage hätte, in der es vorfällt. Die Zeit ist 
für das empirische Geschehen nur eine 
Form, aber was wichtiger ist, eine als Form 
unerfüllte. Das Geschehnis erfüllt die 
formale Natur der Zeit in der es liegt nicht. 
(GS, II, 1, 133-134). 
instant. Ce qui veut dire qu’il n’est aucun 
événement empirique pensable qui ait un 
rapport nécessaire au moment déterminé 
où il se produit. Le temps, pour ce qui 
arrive empiriquement, n’est qu’une forme 
mais, et c’est plus important, une forme en 
tant que telle non remplie. L’événement 
remplit la nature formelle du temps dans 
laquelle il ne se situe pas. (Benjamin 1985, 
255-256) 
 
The above has little to do with de Man’s sense of history or time as a figure that 
would be “only” metaphor. Benjamin’s historical Form is prior to rhetorical 
semiosis. It would be the aeonic realm of essentially human-linguistic 
communicability, incessantly filled-up by linguistic formations, connectable to 
each other: indexed ideational forms substantiating the essence of accomplished 
lives, independently from dynamics or dialectics of birth, growth and decay1.  
Translation enacts an infinity of possible modalities of filling-up historical 
time with connections between perfected and emergent instances of human-
linguistic life. What more does its paradigm tell us with respect to the notion of 
history? What happens to the original past as a translatable Gewesene? What 
happens to the reading and translating Jetztzeit? 
 
 
                                                   
1 Benjamin distinguishes and compares different modes of temporal filling-up, such as 
the tragic and the Biblical one, as well as the allegorical one of the German Trauerspiel. 
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B.4.7. Is there a Vessel? 
 
Let us discuss a figure that Benjamin uses and which has attracted a lot of 
attention amongst readers and commentators of Benjamin, including de Man1. 
The passage in which it occurs follows Benjamin’s remarks on how the 
translation of the Wort differs from (or is even incompatible with) an imitative 
transfer of Sinn. It explains how translation enacts “triftigeren Zusammenhängen 
[linkages more valid or effective]” than those of transferred meaning. Such 
linkages occur through the relations that the original and the translative 
language-wholes entertain to reine Sprache. The figure likens reine Sprache to a 
broken vessel. This triggers the age-old question of the degree to which 
translative events are historical steps towards a reconstruction or restoration of 
the vessel of a universal human language. 
Here is the relevant passage (partly already discussed in a different 
context2) and its French translation. I provide in parentheses de Man’s 
corrections to the English translation of Zohn, which also hold for the French 
version.  
 
Wie nämlich Scherben eines Gefäßes, um 
sich zusammenfügen zu lassen, in den 
kleinsten Einzelheiten einander zu folgen, 
doch nicht so zu gleichen haben,  
 
 
so muß, anstatt den Sinn des Originals sich 
ähnlich zu machen, die Übersetzung 
Car, de même que les débris d’une vase, 
pour qu’on puisse reconstituer le tout [in 
order to be articulated together, not glued 
together], doivent s’accorder [must follow 
one another, not match] dans les plus petits 
détails, mais non être semblables les uns 
aux autres, ainsi, au lieu de s’assimiler au 
sens de l’original, la traduction doit bien 
                                                   
1 De Man’s reading of this figure follows very closely Jacobs (1993). 
 
2 See section B.4.5 above. 
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liebend vielmehr und bis ins einzelne 
hinein dessen Art des Meinens in der 
eigenen Sprache sich anbilden, um so 
beide wie Scherben als Bruchstück  eines 
Gefäßes, als Bruchstuck einer größeren 
Sprache erkennbar zu machen. (Aufgabe, 
18) 
plutôt, amoureusement et jusque dans le 
détail, adopter [form itself according to, not 
incorporate] dans sa propre langue le mode 
de visée de l’original, afin de rendre l’un et 
l’autre reconnaissables comme fragments 
[fragments as broken parts, not simply 
fragments as parts] d’un même vase, comme 
fragments d’un même langage plus grand. 
(OE, I :  256-257) 
 
Effectively translative connections, in the Benjaminian sense of the term, 
occur when the language of the translatum accords itself to the way in which the 
language of the original indexes pure language. Under the perspective of 
translation, the two language-wholes would thus be exposed as somewhat 
complementary on the grounds of purely human-linguistic communicability. 
They would be recognisable (erkennbar) as two broken fragments of a vessel, 
connecting to each other and forming a new fragment of the vessel – a fragment 
differently shaped and broken, suggesting in its own way the idea of the vessel 
and liable to its own connections to other fragments. The Erkennbarkeit at stake 
should be understood as analogous to the precarious and anticipatory, deictic 
Darstellungmodus that Benjamin has attributed to the translative gesture1. The 
vessel of the indexed reine Sprache stands in no position of temporal succession 
with respect to the accomplished ideational connection between its fragments. 
We are expected to assume neither that it has already existed in the past, nor that 
it will be wholly reconstituted in the future. The emergence of the new, 
translative fragment is not a step or a stage, following from previous ones or 
entailing succeeding ones, in procession. Benjaminian problematics clearly 
exclude such a view of matters human-linguistic; yet he insists that language 
                                                   
1 Recall the relevant passage cited and commented in B.4.3. 
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cannot disengage itself from the historic prospect of Sprachfügung (linguistic 
juncture): 
 
Übersetzung also, wiewohl sie auf dauern 
ihrer Gebilde nicht Anspruch erheben 
kann und hierin unähnlich der Kunst, 
verleugnet nicht ihre Richtung auf ein 
letztes, endgültiges und entscheidendes 
Stadium aller Sprachfügung.  (Aufgabe, 14) 
Ainsi la traduction, encore qu’elle ne 
puisse prétendre à la durée de ses 
ouvrages, étant en cela sans ressemblance 
avec l’art, ne renonce pas pour autant à 
s’orienter vers un stade ultime, définitif et 
décisif de toute construction verbale1. (OE, 
I : 252) 
 
This persistence of a deictic translative intentio (which is not the same as a 
phenomenological intention) is elsewhere seen as the große Motiv einer Integration 
der vielen Sprachen zur einen Wahren, the Sehnsucht nach Spracheergänzung, or even 
a den Samen reiner Sprache zur Reife zu bringen2. 
 De Man is right when he corrects the English translator of Benjamin’s 
essay, by remarking that the imagery of an initially whole vessel or of its gradual 
reconstitution in the future is not in Aufgabe. He is wrong (and in a sense, 
relapsing in the error he criticises) when he insists that we have a somewhat 
metonymic pattern in which the original is an initial fragment and the translatum 
the outcome of its further fragmentation. By turning the false imagery of a 
gradual reconstitution of a vessel into the equally false one of its continuous 
fragmentation, de Man misreads negative ontology into Benjamin’s metaphysics: 
What we have here is an initial fragmentation; any work is totally 
fragmented in relation to this reine Sprache, with which it has nothing in 
common, and every translation is totally fragmented with respect to the 
                                                   
1 Rather : “of all linguistic juncture”. 
 
2 These figures are from Aufgabe (16-17) have already been discussed, especially in section 
B.4.3. 
 
239 
B.4. Translative History 
original. The translation is the fragment of a fragment, is breaking the 
fragment – so the vessel keeps breaking, constantly – and never 
reconstitutes it; there was no vessel in the first place, or we have no 
knowledge of this vessel, or no awareness, no access to it, so for all intents 
and purposes there has never been one. (Conclusions, 91) 
De Man continues by inferring that, since there is no eventual reconstitution of 
the vessel of reine Sprache, the very notion of reine Sprache is irrelevant with 
respect to literary language: “Reine Sprache, the sacred language, has nothing in 
common with poetic language, poetic language does not resemble it, poetic 
language does not depend on it, poetic language has nothing to do with it”  
(Conclusions, 92). De Man thus reads Aufgabe as a statement that outdoes the 
pertinence of one of its central notions; but things could be quite different. 
Precisely because reine Sprache is not something that was either there in the past 
or will be there in the future, the deictic relation of linguistic formations to it, 
may retain a crucial pertinence for a metaphysics of historic form. Precisely 
because reine Sprache neither resembles, nor depends on the linguistic formations 
that index its essence, it may have a lot to do with all linguistic occurrences: as if 
by miracle or magic (in einer wunderbar eindringlichen Weise: Aufgabe, 15). 
Benjamin’s Aufgabe is a critical investigation of the idiosyncratic pertinence of the 
notion of purely human-linguistic communicability, with respect to a theory of 
language as human and historic.  
One could add that de Man’s problematics are themselves far from clearly 
non-religious – although working in a direction different from the one in which 
Benjamin strives to guide his own concern for theology. In the following passage, 
for instance, de Man retells the story of the Fall in Odyssean terms:  
This movement of the original is a wandering, an errance, a kind of 
permanent exile if you wish, but it is not really an exile, for there is no 
homeland, nothing form which one has been exiled. Least of all is there 
something like a reine Sprache, a pure language, which does not exist 
except as a permanent disjunction which inhabits all languages as such, 
including and especially the language one calls one’s own. What is to be 
one’s own language is the most displaced, the most alienated of all. 
(Conclusions, 92)  
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If reine Sprache could be said to exist, it would not be only as a disjunction but 
also as a support of triftigeren Zusammenhängen: junctures or connections historic 
rather than historical. Perhaps there are no homelands, but homeness there will 
have been – making history. 
 
 
B.4.8. Living Past 
 
The failure that, according to de Man, marks translation would be 
exemplified by its effect on the original – as a category attributed to literary texts. 
This effect would be largely destructive, in three interrelated ways: 
disarticulation or dismemberment with respect to the very idea of an original 
whole; de-canonisation with respect to the role of the institution of literature; 
prosaification or de-sacralisation with respect to the value assigned to the 
corresponding text. All three aspects could also apply to the notion of the past as 
conceived by historicism – the notion of a tradition of which the original would 
be the synecdochic figure. Let me discuss each of de Man’s points in turn. 
The following passage (which is about the implications of translation, but 
also of philosophical and literary criticism) concerns the figure of disarticulation:  
They disarticulate, they undo the original, they reveal that the original 
was already disarticulated. They reveal that their failure, which seems to 
be due to the fact that they are secondary with respect to the original, 
reveals an essential failure, an essential disarticulation which was always 
already there in the original. They kill the original by discovering that the 
original was already dead.  (Conclusions, 84) 
Benjamin does say that each translative transposition operates on certain aspects 
or parts of the original, at a specific moment. Other translations of the same 
original would address, in different moments, different aspects. Ironically, the 
original would be transposed, in parts, to a condition that somehow better 
safeguards its wholeness: 
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Denn jede Übersetzung eines Werkes aus 
einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt der 
Sprachgeschichte repräsentiert hinsichtlich 
einer bestimmten Seite seines Gehaltes 
diejenigen in allen übrigen Sprachen. 
Übersetzung verpflanzt also das Original 
in einem wenigstens insofern – ironisch – 
endgültigeren Sprachbereich, als es aus 
diesem durch keinerlei Übertragung mehr 
zu versetzen ist, sondern in ihm nur immer 
von neuem und andere Teilen erhoben zu 
werden vermag. (Aufgabe, 15) 
Car toute traduction d’une oeuvre 
appartenant à un moment déterminé de 
l’histoire de la langue, eu égard à un aspect 
déterminé de la teneur propre à cette 
oeuvre, représente les traductions dans 
toutes les autres langues. La traduction 
transplante l’original sur un terrain – 
ironiquement – plus définitif, dans la 
mesure où l’on ne saurait plus le déplacer 
de là par aucun transfert, mais seulement, 
vers ce terrain, l’élever toujours à nouveau 
et en d’autres parties. (OE, I :  253) 
 
Exposing the language-whole of the original as historically incomplete would be 
the condition enabling translative transposition onto a higher sphere of linguistic 
life, in which the language of the original connects to other languages, indexing 
the perspective of a purely human linguistic realm:  
 
In ihr (Übersetzung) wächst das Original 
in einem gleichsam höheren und reineren 
Luftkreis der Sprache hinauf, in welchem 
es freilich nicht auf die Dauer zu leben 
vermag, wie es ihn auch bei weitem nicht 
in allen Teilen seiner Gestalt erreicht, auf 
den es aber dennoch in einer wunderbar 
eindringlichen Weise wenigstens hindeutet 
als auf den vorbestimmten, versagten 
Versöhnungs und Erfüllungsbereich der 
En elle l’original croît et s’élève dans une 
atmosphère, pour ainsi dire plus haute et 
plus pure, du langage, où certes il ne peut 
vivre durablement et qu’il est en outre loin 
d’atteindre dans toutes les parties de sa 
forme, vers laquelle cependant, avec une 
pénétration qui tient du miracle, il fait au 
moins signe, indiquant le lieu promis et 
interdit où les langues se réconcilieront et 
s’accompliront1. (OE, I :  252) 
                                                   
1 Rather : “the announced and forbidden site of reconciliation and accomplishment of 
languages”. 
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Sprachen. (Aufgabe, 14-15) 
 
De Man could also be referring to the Benjaminian suggestion according 
to which the translative perspective exposes the refractability or 
Gebrochenheit that disturbs the “skin-to-fruit unity” of current signification 
mechanisms. Recall that Benjamin’s refraction refers to the relations between the 
semiotic and the non-semiotic or the historical and the historic dimensions of 
language lives – not to tensions internal to semiosis itself1. Under the light of the 
translative perspective, all linguistic semiotic constructs are exposed as the 
phenomenic ruins of perfected instances of purely human-linguistic 
communicability. The original may indeed be dismembered or disarticulated as a 
semiotic construct, but only in a way entailing the emergence of a surviving 
ideational monad. Translative gestures would thus be events of historic 
recollection of phenomenically ruined but essentially perfected forms of 
linguistic humanness. 
The role of the original with respect to the institution of canonised 
literature, is discussed in the following, rather confused part of de Man’s lecture, 
affiliating translation to romantic literary criticism. The confusion lies, quite 
significantly, in the fact that de Man oscillates between the imagery of freezing 
canonisation and the one of mobilising de-canonisation: 
The translation canonises, freezes the original and shows in the original a 
mobility, an instability, which at first one did not notice. The act of critical, 
theoretical reading performed by a critic like Friedrich Schlegel and 
performed by literary theory in general – by means of which the original 
work is not imitated or reproduced but is to some extent put in motion, 
de-canonised, questioned in a way which undoes its claim to canonical 
authority – is similar to what a translator performs.  (Conclusions, 83) 
“Claim to canonical authority ” is the main issue. Translation, in 
Benjamin’s sense, does crucially affect such claims. It contests their legitimacy, to 
                                                   
1 See section B.4.4 above. 
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the precise degree that they involve reference to a literary “cultural heritage” 
standing at the origins or foundations of a historical tradition. In so doing, 
translation opens the space for a different kind of claim: historic recollection 
displaces historical memorability. Historic recollection would, indeed, have little 
to do with historical monumentalisation or with other devices of canonical 
remembrance of things past. 
The original would be, indeed, both “frozen”, as a persistent formation 
and “put in motion” as a knot of linguistic survival. By assuming an authority 
that has little to do with institutional canonisation, it would claim the topical 
moment of a different kind of actuality. Snatched out of the processions of 
cultural heritages, it would assume the status of a site on the grounds of which 
the very idea of a historic heritage is constantly and urgently at stake. It would 
no longer stand at the origins of historical evolution because, by persistently 
claiming re-collection, it would undo stories of becoming. It would no longer 
provide the figural foundations of human cultures or civilisations, because its 
perfected presence would state and re-state how the human resists such 
taxonomies. Its survival would cut through memories of institutionalised 
traditions. The category of the original, in short, would become a figure for how 
historical past turns into historic Gewesene. 
In the following passage, de Man links de-canonisation to prosaification 
and, ultimately, to de-sacralisation: 
The translation is a way of reading the original which will reveal those 
inherent weaknesses of the original, not in the sense that the original is 
then no longer a great work or anything, or that it wouldn't be worthy of 
admiration or anything of the sort but in a much more fundamental way: 
that the original is not canonical, that the original is a piece of ordinary 
language, in a way – prosaic, ordinary language – which as such belongs 
as much to that category as to the category of the original. It is 
desacralised. Decanonised, desacralised, in a very fundamental way. If 
you then think of the original as being Dante or Pindar, and you put that 
next to the way in which those authors are constantly sacralised – then 
you started from the notion of George, as the one who sacralises the 
notion of the poet – then you would see, in a sense, what happens to the 
original. (Conclusions, 98) 
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Benjamin, as we have seen, explicitly discards mystical aestheticism – 
together with the alternative of a positivist reduction to socio-cultural 
determinants. Translation would break with the status of literature as an icon – 
as well as with the iconoclasm of cultural phenomenology. It would thus present 
us, as de Man puts it, with “ certain disjunctions, certain disruptions, certain 
accommodations, certain weaknesses, certain cheatings, certain conventions” 
proper to all modern idealisations (or trivialisations, for that matter) of literature. 
In this sense, the original would, indeed, undergo a shock of “prosaification” and 
“de-sacralisation” exposing the “ordinary” status of its language. At the same 
time, one would have to revise one’s very understanding of language as 
“ordinarily” human. We would have to acknowledge the presence, in all 
linguistic manifestations, of a perplexing non-semiotic element: the Name in the 
lexis. We would, accordingly, have to envisage the possibility and need of a 
metaphysics of form, over-determining historical and aesthetic approaches to all 
genres of human language, whether poetic or prosaic, secular or theological. 
 
 
B.4.9. Living Present 
 
De Man insists with particular emphasis on how language, at work in 
translation, reaches an abyss that threatens all linguistic life: 
Translation, to the extent that it disarticulates the original, to the extent 
that it is pure language and is only concerned with language, gets drawn 
into what Benjamin calls the bottomless depth, something essentially 
destructive of language itself.  (Conclusions, 84) 
As he specifies elsewhere in his essay, a “mise en abyme structure” (86) would be 
inherent in all works of language. This postulate is strictly correlative to that of 
the impossibility of translation – which implies, as we have already seen, the 
attribution to historical life of the status of an illusive linguistic complication. 
Language is the abyss into which history falls, the “present” being as moribund 
as the “past”. How much of this is also in Benjamin? 
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The above quoted passage refers to the closing part of Benjamin’s Aufgabe, 
where translatability is discussed in relative detail. It draws, more specifically, on 
Benjamin’s highlighting of the risk of the Hölderlinian translative gesture: “In 
ihnen stürzt der Sinn von Abgrund zu Abgrund, bis er droht, in bodenlosen 
Sprachtiefen sich zu verlieren. Aber es gibt ein Halter (Aufgabe, 21)1. The issue of 
translatability implies the more general one of the capacity of the present 
moment to make historic sense – that is to claim recollection for its own 
formations.  
Benjamin insists, indeed, that there is a specificity marking translation 
with respect to its capacity to endure. The original persists, but translation cannot 
guarantee the durability of its own formations (Aufgabe, 14). The problem would 
lie in the provisional or temporary status that is proper to the translative mode of 
exposition (Darstellunsgmodus): 
 
Damit ist allerdings zugestanden, daß alle 
Übersetzung nur eine irgendwie 
vorläufige Art ist, sich mit der Fremdheit 
der Sprachen auseinanderzusetzen. Eine 
andere als zeitliche und vorläufige Lösung 
dieser Fremdheit, eine augenblickliche und 
endgültige, bleibt den Menschen versagt 
oder ist jedenfalls unmittelbar nicht 
anzustreben.  (Aufgabe, 14) 
C’est concéder par là même, il est vrai, que 
toute traduction est une manière pour ainsi 
dire provisoire de se mesurer à ce qui rend 
les langues étrangères l’une à l’autre. Une 
solution de cette extranéité qui soit plus 
que temporelle et provisoire, qui soit 
instantanée et définitive, voilà ce qui est 
refusé aux hommes, ou, du moins, vers 
quoi ils ne peuvent tendre dans 
l’immédiat.  (OE, I :  251-252) 
 
In the following passage, the translative gesture is presented as a momentary 
enactment of the translating language, condemned to perish within the bodenlosen 
Sprachtiefen of a Hölderlinian abyss: 
                                                   
1 This passage has been more extensively quoted, along with its French translation, in 
section B.4.6 above. 
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Ja, während das Dichterwort in der 
seigenen überdauert, ist auch die größte 
Übersetzung bestimmt, in das Wachstum 
ihrer Sprache ein-, in der erneuten, 
unterzugehen. (Aufgabe, 13) 
Disons plus : alors que la parole de 
l’écrivain survit dans son propre langage, 
le destin de la plus grande traduction est 
de s’intégrer au développement de la 
sienne,  et de périr quand cette langue s’est 
renouvelée. (OE, I :  250) 
 
Do the above mean that the translative language-whole (that is, the present 
moment as a recollecting instance) would be necessarily deprived of historic 
Überleben? Benjamin’s problematics about the translatability of the translatum1 
suggest that the answer to the question should be a mitigated negative one. The 
non-durability of translation concerns the translative gesture itself – which, as we 
have seen, would not be re-translatable. The formation resulting from the 
translative task, however, constitutes a new topos of human-linguistic life, with 
its own potential of reproductive and translative survival. The non-translatability 
of the translative gesture, along with the eventual translatability of the translative 
formation as a new language-whole, jointly condition the historic status of 
presently emergent translative events.  
The non-translatability of the translative gesture means that the 
translation cannot establish itself as a permanent historic link enabling the future 
to reach back to the original or to otherwise re-connect to it. The older original 
would persist as the Gewesene it has been, still unforgettable and still to recollect, 
thus over-powering, in a sense, the events of its translations. The translatability 
of the translatum means that the latter could assume the status of a new original 
formation, allowing new kinds of translative connections to the linguistic 
Gewesene indexed by its own language-whole. These new connections would 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 See B.4.6. above. 
 
247 
B.4. Translative History 
have something to do with the preceding originals, but only in a highly 
indeterminate way, disallowing the establishment of chains of derivation or 
continuity. Translative events would thus be present occurrences enacting 
historical kinship, but not establishing a lineage; provoking historical 
connections, but not propelling historical continuity; recollecting history, but not 
storing historical memory. They would be refractions of or deviations from the 
lives of their originals – tracing the trajectories of their own survival1. 
If one transposes the paradigm of translation to history at large, one could 
formulate the following suggestions as to the pattern of a translative human-
linguistic historicity.  
Consider, to begin with, that all present linguistic emergences are at least 
partly translative – that is somewhat marked and perturbed by connections, if 
only punctual and little systematic, to persisting older formations. There would 
be no Jetzt free from recollective connection to some surviving Gewesene. 
Through its recollective dimension, historic Jetztseit would not build up 
chains of historical continuity: its own gestures of recollection would not be 
further recollectable. Its emergence would be monadic: it would not add up to 
stored precedents, analogous to the ones implied by the notions of 
phenomenological memory and knowledge. Human life would thus not be 
historically evolving through the conservation or transference, in and via 
different languages, of some given form of cultural or civilisational nucleus. It 
would be enacted, instead, through a multiplicity of linkages between singular 
events of recollection addressing cumulated instances of perfected past. No such 
event would be determined by its precedents or determinant with respect to 
analogous ensuing events. No present would lay foundations on which a past 
                                                   
1 Recall the vessel figure discussed in section B.4.7. Every translative linkage would be a 
fragment of reine Sprache, but the succession of linkages would not add up to a gradual 
reconstitution or approximation of the whole. Each reconstituted fragment would index 
humanness from its own aspect or angle, telling an irrevocable but also non-appropriative and 
non-appropriable way of establishing connections between modalities of having been human. 
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would be remembered by its future. The empty form of historic temporality 
would always remain to be re-filled anew. 
This I suggest as an admittedly unclear image, alternative to the one of de 
Man’s abyss, of how events of human-linguistic life would occur as historic, 
according to the paradigm of Benjamin’s translation. There would be recollective 
gestures, venturing to articulate connections to topoi of perfected humanity, each 
gesture projecting its novel field of perfectedness and connectability onto a 
horizon of unlimited temporality: constantly changing topographies, with no 
topological principle ever providing the rationale of emergent differences, unions 
or intersections. 
The past, although unable to sustain itself as a historical tradition, acquires 
a status somewhat more imposing than the present. This would only be the past 
as Gewesene – aeonic rather than historical. Much the same way as the Homeric 
mortals, humans would be irresistibly advancing in time by following their dead 
in the only future possible – one common to all and delimited by the very event 
of death. Only the angel of history, while also facing the same amassed multitude 
of the dead – that is ourselves, beholders of the painting that Benjamin has 
commented on – would be just as irresistibly drawn by time in some other, 
somewhat opposite direction.  
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PART C. HOMERIC QUESTIONS 
 
 
C.1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
C.1.1. Categories 
 
The last part of Vorrede (228 et seq.) is a critique of approaches to German 
baroque drama, from the standpoint of a Benjaminian metaphysics of form. 
Benjamin argues against schools of historical-literary thought, which would fall 
short of a philosophical inquiry on the historic specificity of the German 
Trauerspiel – a rather marginal and little appreciated literary genre. This 
specificity, he says, is obscured or erased when the corresponding form is simply 
seen as a decadent or awkward attempt to imitate the tradition of Greek tragedy 
and the modern principles of Aristotelian poetics. The same would hold when 
this failure is explained or excused as a symptom of historically justifiable 
cultural deficiencies. Benjamin criticises, more generally, the scholarly quest of a 
relation of Einfühlung (empathy) to a form that is proven (and should be 
addressed as) highly resistant to scholarly literary taste. He discards, quite 
polemically, all tendency to intellectually domesticate literature from the 
perspective of a present pretending to have direct access to  its past: 
 
Wie ein Kranker, den im Fieber liegt, alle 
Worte, die ihm vernehmbar werden, in die 
jagenden Vorstellungen des Deliriums 
verarbeitet, so greift der Zeitgeist die 
Zeugnisse von früheren oder von 
entlegenen Geisteswelten auf, um sie an 
sich zu reißen und lieblos in sein 
selbstbefangenes Phantasieren 
einzuschließen. Gehört doch dies zu seiner 
Comme un malade fiévreux qui traduit 
tous les mots qu’il entend dans les images 
déchaînées de son délire, l’esprit du temps 
se saisit des documents des cultures les 
plus éloignées dans le temps et dans 
l’espace pour se les approprier et les 
enfermer brutalement dans les phantasmes 
égocentriques. Sa marque caractéristique: il 
ne saurait y avoir de style nouveau, de 
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Signatur: kein neuer Stil, kein unbekanntes 
Volkstum wäre aufzufinden, das nicht 
alsbald mit voller Evidenz zu dem Gefühl 
der Zeitgenossen spräche. (Vorrede, 234) 
civilisation inconnue qui ne parle 
immédiatement, de toute évidence, à la 
sensibilité contemporain. (Préface, 53) 
 
This critical overview, in Vorrede, is founded by a preceding discussion of 
current epistemological principles, such as those of inductive and deductive 
reasoning – to which I now turn. 
As I have already suggested, one can establish significant connections 
between Benjamin’s historic metaphysics and Aristotelian problematics about 
categories1. A formation of any sort would be a primary essence (or substance): a 
phenomenic emergence, out of formlessness, of a hypostasis subject to the 
attribution of categories of second essence (or essential form in a strict sense of 
the term). When a formation is identified as human-linguistic, categories of 
second essence are being attributed to it. A human-linguistic formation would 
essentially be a mode of semiotic indexation of pure naming. The quest for the 
idea of such a formation would be a further gesture of categorial attribution, 
aiming at describing and re-telling how this indexation takes place. The idea 
would thus specify how essentially human-linguistic form is attached to the 
formation: no literary formation would be essentially human and linguistic 
without being a specific mode of human-linguistic communicability. The task of 
Benjaminian metaphysics of form is to recognise and describe the specificity 
ideational component of a literary formation. This presupposes the critical 
disputation of predominant epistemological problematics: ideas of literary 
formations should involve the use of categories proper to the question of human-
linguistic essence.  
The study that Vorrede introduces, intends to discuss the very notion of 
Trauerspiel as an idea proper to formation of the genre identified by this term. 
                                                   
1 See section B.1.4. above. 
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Recall: “Das Trauerspiel, im Sinn der kunstphilosophischen Abhandlung ist eine 
Idee [The Trauerspiel, in the sense of treatise of art-philosophy, is an idea]“ (2181).  
How does Benjamin’s philosophy of art differ, in its epistemological and 
methodological dimensions, from conventional literary history? More 
specifically, what does Benjamin do with the historical-aesthetic concepts2 that 
work as “universals” – that is, as categories attributable to “individuals” or 
“particulars” and defining their affiliation to species and genera, according to 
principles of deductive abstraction or inductive empiricism? How does the 
metaphysics of form turn such concepts into ideas? In what sense does it make 
the corresponding terms work differently than they do in current literary 
history?  
The wahre Kontemplation of a Benjaminian idea is a theoretical endeavour 
intensely concentrating on the task of “saving the phenomena”3. It is concerned 
not with the observation of abstract rules or empirical tendencies but “mit der 
ihrer Fülle und konkret erfaßten Metaphysik dieser Form [with grasping the 
metaphysics of this form in its fullness and concreteness]” (228). The same task 
accounts for the “Wesen eines Kunstgebietes [essence of a domain of art]” under 
                                                   
1 All page citations in the present section will refer to Vorrede – unless otherwise 
specified. 
 
2 Historical concepts would be those implying the application of temporal or 
periodological schemas to cultural entities (from races or nations to social groups and, ultimately, 
individuals). Homer would thus essentially be a particular instance of “pre-classical Greek 
Antiquity”. Aesthetic (or, more specifically, for our purposes, poetic) would be concepts 
distinguishing different kinds of cultural manifestations or literary languages, in terms of genres, 
for instance. Homer would thus essentially be “epic poetry”. The juncture of historical and 
aesthetic categories would entail historic-aesthetic conceptual constructs such as oral tradition – or 
baroque and romanticism. 
 
3 Recall our discussion of this in section  B.3.6. 
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a perspective turned, so to speak, towards phenomenic externality rather than 
towards internal domains such as the one delimited by psychological concepts: 
 
Dies geschieht vielmehr in einer 
durchgebildeten Darstellung seines 
Formbegriffs, dessen metaphysischer 
Gehalt nicht sowohl im Inneren befindlich 
als wirkend zu erscheinen und wie das 
Blut den Körper zu durchpulsen hat. 
(Vorrede, 220) 
Cela devient possible, au contraire, par 
l’analyse élaborée du concept de sa forme, 
dont le contenu métaphysique doit être 
montré moins à l’intérieur de celle-ci que 
dans son effet, comme le sang qui irrigue 
le corps . (Préface, 37 ) 
 
Benjamin discards the deductive attribution of universals to ranges of 
phenomena, which would thus form a pseudo-logisches Kontinuum (223). His 
criticism is also and perhaps mainly addressed against what he sees as two 
equally false alternatives. The first would be the one of inductive empiricism for 
which Burdach’s nominalism would opt. Benjamin considers Burdach’s rejection 
of the realist understanding of universalia in re as partially justified, “soweit sie 
gegen die Hypostasierung von Allgemeinbegriffen geht [to the degree that it 
counters the tendency to hypostasise general concepts]” (221). He also argues 
that Burdach’s turn to radically inductive reasoning expresses an aporetic 
reservatio mentalis, methodologically unsound: it would be blind to the very 
nucleus of a critical epistemology, namely the platonic task of a “Darstellung der 
Wesenheiten [presentation of essentialities]” (221). Although concepts like 
Baroque or Renaisssance may, indeed, have little to do with existing 
anthropological entities they cannot, Benjamin says, be discarded or blurred in 
favour of inductive uncertainties. The second rejected alternative is Croce’s 
aesthetic intuitionism, erasing all possible mediation between specific 
manifestations of art and the general idea of art. Benjamin acknowledges the 
interest of Croce’s concentration on concrete phenomena but criticises his 
tendency to deprive  “die Kunstphilosophie ihrer reichsten Ideen wie des 
Tragischen oder des Komischen [the philosophy of art of its richest ideas such 
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the tragic and the comic]” (224). In response to a Crocean remark on the eventual 
significance of such concepts, Benjamin elaborates the epistemological status of 
his own notion of Idee as a Monad and an Ursprung (235 et seq.). 
The solution to the epistemological problem is sought, by Benjamin, in the 
direction not of a rejection but of a reconfiguration of established historical-
aesthetic concepts. Recall that ideas save phenomena by saving their initial 
conceptual configurations. The quest of an ideational form presupposes, 
accordingly, not the erasure of the concepts that have hitherto governed literary 
history, but the outdoing of their status as conceptual categories. The task of a 
historic philosophy and of a metaphysics of form is exercised on grounds always 
already laid by the conceptual operations that have provided thought and 
language with notions such as those of Renaissance or Baroque, tragedy, comedy 
or Trauerspiel. “Was aber solche Namen als Begriffe nicht vermögen, leisten sie 
als Ideen [What such names cannot do as concepts, they manage to do as ideas]” 
(221). 
The task would not be to form new words but to critically reconfigure and 
jointly re-enact old ones. The whole history of philosophy would be reducible to  
“die Darstellung von einigen wenigen, immer wieder denselben Worten – von 
Ideen [the presentation of a small number of words, always the same – of ideas]” 
(217). These words, reconfigured as ideas, would be the inescapable elementary 
particles, the finite multitude of which constitutes the population of ideational 
forms: 
 
Denn die Ideen bilden eine unreduzierbare 
Vielheit. Als gezählte – eigentlich aber 
benannte Vielheit sind die Ideen der 
Betrachtung gegeben. (Vorrede,  223) 
Car les idées sont une multitude 
irréductible. Elles sont données à la 
contemplation comme multitude 
dénombrée – mais à proprement parler 
dénommée. (Préface, 41 ) 
 
As historical-aesthetic concepts, theoretical terms would strive to name generic 
universals qualifying and categorising particulars or individuals. The same 
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words, when applied, as ideas, to formational substances, would expose monadic 
indexations of perfected instances of essentially human-linguistic life, irreducible 
to either empirical constructs or abstract-mystical entities.  
The ideational shift is not a magical gesture of re-naming. It entails 
idiosyncratic reading work. The historical-aesthetic category of Trauerspiel, for 
instance, acquires the status of an ideational Ursprung when its language (or the 
Art des Meinens of the corresponding formation) is read as allegorical. This means 
that an epistemic  shift analogous to the one operated with respect to the term 
Trauerspiel is at work with respect to allegory.  
What are the methodological implications of such transpositions? The 
transposition from concept to idea changes the epistemic status of the 
corresponding term. A Benjaminian idea does not classify things: it  is an Idee 
nicht klassifizierend. Ideas, in other words, would not work as generic categories 
ordering phenomena into logically structured classes of entities and expressing 
the common denominator of the corresponding structures: 
 
Sie bestimmt keine Klasse und enthält jene 
Allgemeinheit, auf welcher im System der 
Klassifikationen die Jeweilige 
Begriffsstuffe ruht, die das Durchschnitts 
nämlich, nicht an sich. (Vorrede, 218 ) 
Elle ne détermine aucune classe et ne 
contient pas en elle-même cette 
universalité qui dans le système des 
classifications fonde le degré conceptuel 
correspondant à chacune d’entre elles, 
c’est-à-dire à la moyenne. (Préface, 35-36 ) 
 
Nevertheless, an idea would emerge as a certain kind of totality, out of 
phenomenic manifestations. Conventional literary history would obscure the 
very status of the corresponding unity, through intellectual operations of 
deductive or inductive dispersal and re-arrangement, and through schemas of 
temporal evolution or development: 
 
Von der literarhistorischen unterscheidet 
eine solche sich am auffallendsten darin, 
Pareil traité se distingue du traité 
d’histoire littéraire essentiellement parce 
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daß sie Einheit da voraussetzt, wo jener 
Mannigfaltigkeit zu erweisen obliegt. Die 
Differenzen und Extreme, welche die 
literarhistorische Analyse ineinander 
überführt und als Werdendes relativiert, 
erhalten in begrifflicher Entwicklung den 
Rang Komplementärer Energien und die 
Geschichte erscheint nur als der farbige 
Rand einer kristallinischen Simultaneität. 
(Vorrede, 218 ) 
qu’il présuppose une unité là ou ce dernier 
doit montrer la diversité. Les différences et 
les extrêmes que l’analyse historico-
littéraire amalgame et relativise en les 
présentant dans leur devenir accèdent, 
dans leur développement conceptuel, au 
rang d’énergies complémentaires, et 
l’histoire n’apparaît plus que comme la 
frange colorée d’une simultanéité 
cristalline. (Préface, 35 ) 
 
Semiotic constructs (or, more generally, the semiotic component of 
languages) are, of course, always readable as symptoms or traces of historically 
situated conditions of human life. Nonetheless, the formation that they enact 
through their multiplicity and variety, is not. It involves a mode of indexing pure 
language, which is aeonic rather than temporal, historic rather than historical: 
 
Und so wie jede, auch die 
ungebräuchliche, die vereinzelte 
Sprachform gefaßt zu werden vermag 
nicht nur als Zeugnis dessen, der sie 
prägte, sondern als Dokumente des 
Sprachlebens und seiner jeweiligen 
Möglichkeiten, enthält auch – und weit 
eigentlicher als jedes Einzelwerk – jedwede 
Kunstform den Index einer bestimmten 
objektiv notwendigen Gestaltung der 
Kunst. (Vorrede, 230 ) 
Et de même que chaque forme 
linguistique, même inhabituelle, même 
singulière, peut être vue non seulement 
comme un  témoignage de ce qui l’a 
façonnée, mais aussi comme un document 
sur la vie de la langue et de ses possibilités 
à l’époque, il y a aussi dans toute forme 
artistique, quelle qu’elle soit – et bien plus 
authentiquement que dans une œuvre 
particulière – l’ index d’ une figuration 
précise, objectivement nécessaire de l’art . 
(Préface, 48 ) 
 
With respect to any field of semiotic manifestations, the task would be to 
recollect or recognise the ideational form that would stand at their historic 
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Ursprung. Reading would be equivalent to the restoration or re-instatement of 
such origins, but only in a way that clearly distinguishes it from the philological 
recovery of textual formness: 
 
Im nackten offenkundigen Bestand des 
Faktischen gibt das Ursprüngliche sich 
niemals zu erkennen, und einzig einer 
Doppeleinsicht steht seine Rhythmik offen. 
Sie will als Restauration, als 
Wiederherstellung einerseits, als eben 
darin Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes 
andererseits erkannt sein. (Vorrede, 226 ) 
L’origine ne se donne jamais à connaître 
l’existence nue, évidente du factuel, et sa 
rythmique ne peut être reconnue que dans 
une double optique. Elle demande à être 
reconnue, d’une part comme une 
restauration, une restitution, d’autre part 
comme quelque chose qui est pas lui – 
même inachevé, toujours ouvert . (Préface, 
43-44 ) 
 
A further methodological problem occurs at this point. It concerns a 
predicament that haunts the dialectics of deductive reasoning and inductive 
research. Which semiotic constructs can be addressed as belonging-together to 
the same original formation – be it a single literary work or a whole genre such as 
the Trauerspiel?  
Ideational unity is not conceptual homogeneity. The metaphysics of form 
work at the sites of tensions and uncertainties that deductive and inductive 
reasoning erases or neutralises. They address ideational totalities as the challenge 
of joined extremes: 
 
Was aber solche Namen als Begriffe nicht 
vermögen, leisten sie als Ideen, in denen 
nicht das Gleichartige zur Deckung, wohl 
aber das Extreme zur Synthesis gelangt. 
(Vorrede, 221 ) 
Ce que de tels noms ne peuvent faire en 
tant que concepts, ils y parviennent en tant 
qu’idées: elles ne sont pas le refuge du 
semblable, mais la synthèse des extrêmes. 
(Préface, 39 ) 
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 The notion of extremes is crucial to Benjaminian methodology. It implies 
that semiotic constructs that fail to make textual or otherwise conceptual unity, 
may very well be readable as instances of the same formation, mimetic 
enactments of the same ideational form. It also identifies ideational tension, 
instead of structural harmony, as the very locus of reading. It would be as 
tension between extremely incongruous semiotic instances, that a perfected 
ideational totality persists, leading its idiosyncratic life, aeonically confronting 
the realm of an unlimited temporal perspective. The metaphysics of its form 
would thus necessarily involve a certain kind of historical research: 
 
Die philosophische Geschichte als die 
Wissenschaft vom Ursprung ist die Form, 
die da aus den entlegenen Extremen, den 
scheinbaren Exzessen der Entwicklung die 
Konfiguration der Idee als der durch die 
Möglichkeit eines sinnvollen 
Nebeneinanders solcher Gegensätze 
gekennzeichneten Totalität heraustreten 
läßt. Die Darstellung einer Idee kann unter 
keinen Umständen als geglückt betrachtet 
werden, solange virtuell der Kreis der in 
ihr möglichen Extreme nicht abgeschritten 
ist. (Vorrede, 227 ) 
L’histoire philosophique, considérée 
comme science de l’origine, est la forme 
qui fait procéder des extrêmes éloignées, 
des excès apparents de l’évolution, la 
configuration de l’idée, c’est à dire la  
totalité où de telles oppositions peuvent 
co-exister d’une manière qui fasse sens. On 
ne pourra en aucun cas estimer réussie la 
présentation d’une idée aussi longtemps 
qu’on n’aura pas parcouru virtuellement le 
cercle des extrêmes qu’elle peut contenir. 
(Préface, 45 ) 
 
Each extreme would enact a different aspect of the persisting formation, 
indispensable to its monadic totality. It would be a semiotic catastrophe, which 
has to be addressed in its historic specificity and in its eventually tense 
articulation with preceding or ensuing catastrophes. Tensions such as these 
provide the dubious grounds for the persistence of the formation and the 
survival of its original ideational form. In this sense, the very givenness of a 
formation is somewhat problematic: it only painstakingly emerges as a historic 
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event in and through the accumulation of often disparate manifestations, many 
of which might appear bizarre, weak, awkward, decadent or otherwise deficient 
in pertinence. The corresponding research might result in bodies of material 
which strongly resemble the pedantic or trivial character of philological inquiries 
– but have nothing in common with a historicist quest for a corpus of typical 
similarities enveloping a paradigmatic average1. The ideational perspective is 
what gives to Benjaminian philology its historic-monadological line of escape2. 
Under this perspective, the fragment acquires the singular importance that 
Benjamin has attributed to it3. Yet it would be wrong to suppose that the 
Benjaminian use and valorisation of fragments undoes or erases problematics of 
wholeness or totality – that is, on ideas as monads connecting to each other in 
history. A fragment acquires its significance as a most characteristic extreme 
instance of some ideational form. It does not only cut through conceptual 
constructs but also paves the way to the contemplation of ideational totalities. In 
Vorrede Benjamin repeatedly stresses that an entire domain of art or literary genre 
can be as living a formation as any particular work – if not even more so4. Note 
the following remark on the notions of comedy and tragedy: 
 
Denn auch wenn es die reine Tragödie, das 
reine komische Drama, das nach ihnen 
benannt werden dürfte, nicht geben sollte, 
Car à supposer même qu’il n’y ait ni 
tragédie pure, ni comédie à quoi elles 
puissent donner leur nom, ces idées 
                                                   
1 The paradigm of the corresponding research work, as well as of the fragmentary and 
provisional way in which the idea might locally shine out of the amassed material, is provided by 
Passagen. The formation at stake would be the one of Parisian 19th century humanity. 
 
2 Recall the discussion of the relations of Benjamin to philology in B.1.1. 
 
3 See, on this point, the insightful analysis of Arendt (1968). 
 
4 “Die Idee einer Form [...] ist nichts weniger Lebendiges als irgendeine Konkrete 
Dichtung [The idea of a form... is not less living than any concrete work of poetry]” (230). 
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mögen diese Ideen Bestand haben. Dazu 
hat eine Untersuchung ihnen zu verhelfen, 
die nicht in ihrem Ausgangspunkt an alles 
dasjenige, was je als tragisch oder komisch 
mag bezeichnet worden sein, sich bindet, 
sondern nach Exemplarischem sich 
umsieht, und sollte sie auch nur einem 
versprengten Bruchstück diesen Charakter 
zubilligen können.  (Vorrede, 224 ) 
peuvent néanmoins exister. Elles doivent 
être aidées en cela par une étude qui ne 
s’attache pas à partir de tout ce qu’on a 
jamais pu qualifier de tragique ou de 
comique, mais qui cherche l’exemplaire, 
quitte à ne reconnaître cette qualité qu’ à 
des fragments éclatés.  (Préface, 42 ) 
  
Ideational epistemology addresses the topoi of conventional historical or 
aesthetic topography in order to probe the corresponding topology. What idea 
could there be in such concepts as tragedy, Baroque, epic tradition, Greek Antiquity, 
European literature – or in an author’s name? What idea could join Baudelairian 
poetry to trivial newspaper announcements or commercial advertisements? The 
quest may address aleatory and fragmentary, seemingly unrelated and 
chronologically or culturally disparate semiotic constructs, the unity of which 
has been completely blurred or erased by conventional historical-aesthetic 
categorisations and taxonomies.  
 
 
C.1.2. History Matters 
 
Before revisiting the Homeric Question, let us further consider the kind of 
significance that Benjamin’s epistemology attributes to the description and 
positioning of semiotic constructs according to current conventional historical-
aesthetic categories. If only ideas are at stake, why would it matter to situate the 
initial emergence and subsequent persistence of formations with respect to 
conventional historiographical and aesthetic schemas? Why would it matter to 
know that recent philological, older Renaissance Humanist, and still older 
Byzantine, Roman, Hellenistic and classical Greek times have produced one or 
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the other stratum of the presently extant remains of the Homeric language? 
These questions should be understood as concerning, not the overall validity of 
the corresponding terms or categories, but the exact kind of their pertinence. 
For historicism, historical-aesthetic conceptual categories acquire their 
significance as universals pertaining to the classification and arrangement of 
cultural forms that would be the essence of all linguistic manifestations. For the 
Benjaminian metaphysics of form, some of these concepts, reconfigured as 
essential ideas, sustain, as we have seen, the quest for historic forms. The rest 
would retain an essential significance only with respect to the semiotic 
component of the formation – that is, with respect to the production and 
reproduction of semiotic constructs through which the formation persists as an 
original. With respect to the formation as a whole and, more particularly, to its 
surviving idea, they would acquire a status perhaps very close to what the 
Aristotelian Organon designates as contingency or occurrence – kata; to; 
sumbebhkovß (kata to sumvevikos)1. They would pertain, in other words, to events 
that have marked the life and survival of the formation by conditioning the 
semiotic constructs that have been mimetically indexing its idea. They would 
identify and describe the characteristics of each of the semiotic catastrophes 
(contingent occurrences or crucial accidents) through which a perfected idea of 
human-linguistic communicability can still be recollected as a Gewesene of one’s 
own Jetzseit. 
Specific modalities of semiotic catastrophe might enact particularly 
significant aspects of the formation as a whole. The historical and aesthetic 
categories, which serve to describe the corresponding semiotic constructs, might 
be usable as means to better circumscribe these aspects – and thus to further 
illuminate the indexed idea. Benjamin’s historic metaphysics involve, 
accordingly, the meticulous recording of accurately dated and situated ranges or 
fragmentary instances of such constructs. The task presupposes that one 
                                                   
1 See also section B.1.4. above.  
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constantly keeps in mind and exposes through reading the distinction, as well as 
the connection between the semiotic and the purely human-linguistic nature of 
literary formations. 
It should be noted that the same aesthetic or historical categories may 
acquire different significance for differently situated semiotic events. The 
attribution of a category of national or cultural identity, for instance, would have 
different implications, depending on the wider historical setting in which the 
construct at stake has occurred. Greek would be applicable to the language of 
semiotic material ranging from Homeric to modern times, but the attribution of 
this category would have a drastically different bearing, depending on the 
historical moment and the corresponding function of Greek as a medium of 
communication. 
Recollective reading reaches to the historic origins of perfected modes of 
human-linguistic life by paving its way (instead of simply cutting) through 
amassed instances of semiotic constructs and correlative conceptual clusters. No 
present moment could thus avoid being modern in its very recollection: it always 
entails further semiotic and conceptual catastrophes of ideational forms. The 
metaphysics of form would thus be critical in a double sense. On the one hand, 
they would upset received notions and practices concerning the relations of the 
present to its “cultural heritage”. On the other hand, they would undermine the 
authority of conceptual and categorial orders – ultimately, of semiosis as such, 
and of its cultural determinants. In this sense, a philosophical history of literature 
would open the “site of the logical possibility of metaphysics”1 onto the field of 
political and ideological struggles.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 Recall Benjamin’s Programm  and our discussion of it in section B.2.4. 
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C.2. HOMER 
 
C.2.1. A Homeric Idea 
 
There is, today, a mass of different kinds of semiotic constructs carrying, 
in whole or in fragments, scripta that have long been and are still considered as 
forming two poems debatably labelled “Homeric”1. Their ensemble can be 
distributed chronologically, depending on the time of emergence and the 
conditions of preservation of the corresponding material: Homeric citations in 
antique authors, Hellenistic and Roman papyri, Byzantine codices, early 
Humanist printed editions, modern philological ones and, finally, more recent 
versions, electronically registered. Byzantine codices present us with the oldest 
extant specimens of an Iliad and an Odyssey as relatively standardised 
compositional wholes, which have sustained the notion of a Homeric “vulgate”2: 
most of the preceding documents or versions can be seen as fragments or 
variants of the corresponding linguistic corpi. The notion of vulgate thus provides 
the basis on which has been raised and debated the issue of the variance that 
marks different scripta, both synchronically (among corpi of the same epoch) and 
diachronically (among historically successive strata of material). There would be 
variance on a multiplicity of levels: material and technical characteristics of the 
scribal signifier, morphological and syntactical or metrical norms of the 
                                                   
1 Halsam (1997, 59) notes that, although there must have been, throughout antiquity and 
the Middle Ages, very few owners or even readers of a “complete” Homer in scroll or codex, “at 
all periods there is a strong sense of each [Homeric] poem as a whole and this was not 
compromised by their physical fragmentation”. 
 
2 The Iliad and the Odyssey are the two components on which this thesis concentrates, as 
the core of a Homeric poetic formation. The problematics could also apply to an extended range 
of scripta including Batrachomyomachia and the Hymns. The formation at stake would be a 
different one, but the problems concerning its readability as Homeric would be the same.  
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corresponding idiom, aspects of the articulation and extent of the compositional 
wholes.  
The Homeric Question has been the question of the identification of the 
exact range and kind of scribal material that can validly be addressed as properly 
Homeric. It asks whether and how the present moment (which has always been a 
moment of reproduction and translation of Homer, from the point of view of a 
language more or less non-Homeric) may intervene and change the semiotic 
material it has received from the past. Why and to what extent could or should 
one change the Homeric thing that has been there? The theoretical dimensions of 
the issue include the epistemic status of the very notion of Homer and of the 
corresponding category of Homericity. One can reform the received material, so 
that it complies with one’s idea of Homericity; one can keep the material more or 
less the same, but revise the idea of Homericity. 
We have already seen how the modern philological debate of the Question 
has been negotiating these two alternatives on the grounds of historicist 
anthropological premises. Homericity would be a historical category attributable, 
as a category of essence, to the cultus vitae expressed by the composer of the 
poems – their authorial agency, whether collective or individual. There could be 
nothing essentially Homeric that would not be also, primarily and just as 
essentially, archaic Greek. The philological qualification of scripta as properly 
Homeric thus implies figural transpositions from cultural era or epoch, to author 
or producer and, finally, to product or offspring. Aesthetic categories, articulated 
around the central notions of traditional poetry and epicity, provide further 
criteria for what the philologically minded scholar expects and intends to read as 
the literary vestigium of Homeric culture. 
Under the perspective of Benjaminian metaphysics, the Homeric Question 
would be the question of the survival of Homer as an idea – that is as a mode of 
having indexed purely human language and thus as a form original, in the pre-or 
post-historical (that is, historic) sense of the term. Epistemologically prior to all 
Homeric semiotic material, would be a Homeric formation or language-whole, 
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substantiating the Homeric idea. All corresponding semiotic constructs, including 
the supposed initial emergences of such constructs as oral or written poetry of early Greek 
antiquity, would be readable as phenomenic instantiations or enactments, 
necessarily changing and variable, of this formation. 
The Homeric Question would thus designate the task of turning the name 
of Homer from concept to idea. The question would be analogous to one that 
Benjamin has formulated in his essay on Mimesis. By considering the entirety of 
signifiers that, under different conditions of linguistic life, have instantiated the 
same thing, and by arranging them around their common centre, how can we 
investigate what makes these signifiers akin to their central signified1? The 
signifiers would be the Homeric semiotic constructs; standing at the centre of 
their field (rather than either at the beginning or the end of a chain) would be 
Homer; we would accordingly be investigating Homericity. This means 
investigating how Homer has managed to survive as a human-linguistic idea 
through variable and changing semiotic catastrophes – rather than debating 
whether Homer has existed as an individual or collective author of given literary 
works.  
The use of the term Homer, as a name of the idea at stake is preferable to 
others, to the precise degree that no corresponding human entity can be 
positively known to have existed. Its ideational shift counters both the 
alternatives that historicist problematics have set as the only valid ones – namely, 
to either discard the idea of Homericity under the pretext that Homer has been a 
historical invention, or to hypostasize it as the figure of a historically original 
authorial agency. 
Homer, as an idea2, would be prior to historical or aesthetic concepts that 
have served to delimit Homericity  – such as Greek antiquity, epic poetry or even 
                                                   
1 I am paraphrasing a passage already cited, in section B.3.4., from  Mimesis (212). 
 
2 As an idea, Homer is an “it”. 
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literature, whether oral or written. Homer, as well as the Homeric formation as a 
language-whole, would thus be essentially neither ancient Greek, nor Roman, 
Hellenistic, Byzantine or Modern philological; it would be essentially neither oral 
poetry nor written tradition. It would be any or all of these if we understand 
them as conceptual contingencies (symvevikota): significant or even crucial 
accidents that have marked the survival of the idea and the persistence of the 
formation through semiotic artefacts. 
The surviving form of Homer would be, not the common past, but the 
perfected present shared by what we know as a series of successive moments or 
eras. It would be the Gewesene of each respective Jetztseit – archaic, classical and 
hellenistic Greece, Rome and Byzantium, Western modernity, and other, 
unknown or unpredictable historical sites. It would stand beyond and be 
engaged in the corresponding ventures of reproduction and translation of the 
Homeric formation. A historic Ursprung: something like a terminus post quem, 
with respect not to the connected knots of a historical chain, but to the chain itself 
and to each of its knots separately – including its initial and its future ones. 
As such, Homer would upset the topography of cultures or civilisations 
seen as a series of vehicles through which a common tradition is being preserved 
and transmitted. It would not lie at the foundations of historical becoming 
involving dialectic tensions between conservation and novelty. It would not be 
situated at the historical beginnings of a literary history that would have either 
followed or deviated from it. The historic condition of having been there does not 
comply with figures of historical narration telling stories of cultural kinship or 
divergence, continuity or rupture, tradition or modernity. 
Let us rethink the kind of relations that each different Jetztseit in the life of 
the Homeric idea has entertained with the Gewesene of the Homeric idea. One 
should start with the very language-whole that indexes the idea: the idiom with 
which the extant Homeric semiotic material is co-extensive. 
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C.2.2. Homeric Greek 
 
Since we have no remains of the Homeric language other than the 
Homeric scripta, the Homeric literary formation is a language-whole in a very 
literal sense of the term: it coincides with the remains of a whole linguistic idiom.  
One way of starting an inquiry into the idea of Homer, would be by re-
thinking the Homeric idiom as a “dead” language. This presupposes the critical 
appreciation of the figure of death applied to languages. Let me insist on the 
reasons for which the figure of dead language may present an interest for our 
purposes, in spite of its historicist connotations. What would be the historic 
significance of a historical distinction of languages in terms of dead and living 
ones? Would living languages relate to each other in ways different from those in 
which they connect to dead ones? The figure of death may have a lot to do with 
survival in the sense of Überleben. 
Differences between languages concern, to begin with, their morphology, 
syntax and semantics – as well as rhetorical and literary custom and practices. 
They also involve techniques and methods of oral or scribal semiotic production 
and reproduction. They involve, furthermore, the very status of a given language 
as a medium of communication and, more particularly, its role as a medium of 
local, national or oecumenic status. These differences work differently, 
depending on the degree and way in which the distance of death has been 
established between them. 
The distinction between dead and living languages concerns the degree to 
which living human beings use language as a medium of current 
communication. A language would be dead when no longer spoken or written as 
such a medium. The extant instances of a dead language constitute a finite 
semiotic corpus. The corresponding language-whole, in other terms, persists only 
through toils of reproduction and translation, undertaken by different living 
languages that connect to it over the specific kind of distance that the figure of 
death ventures to grasp.  
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How does the condition of linguistic death compare to linguistic 
foreignness? Is a dead language more foreign than a living one, or could it, under 
certain conditions, undo the notion of foreignness? The distance between living 
languages, foreign to each other, could be considered as largely controllable, if 
not surmountable, through processes of ascertained knowledge and 
familiarisation. The distance between a dead language and a living one excludes 
the control of on-going usage. Death of a language means that recollection 
intervenes and over-determines memory and experience as means through 
which one gains access or connects to the language concerned. In this sense, the 
reading of a dead language is necessarily translative – and its translation is 
exclusively based on reading.  
I suggest that we should not understand the figures of death or 
foreignness as topographic devices arranging the historical positioning of 
differences between past and present cultures. They would refer, rather, to 
modes of distances, each entailing or enabling distinct kinds of historic relations. 
The figure of death sets the conditions under which forms of perfected Gewesene 
fill-in an otherwise empty Jetztseit. Consequently, it transposes language to a 
status that might mitigate the applicability of the figure of foreignness.  
Let us further consider in more detail the linguistic environments within 
the setting of which the Homeric language-whole has been persisting as dead – 
or, in terms closer to Benjamin, has been surviving as perfected. How has 
Homeric Greek related to other varieties or dialects of Greek, to classical or 
medieval and early modern Latin and, finally, to modern Western national 
languages? I will only briefly survey the kinds of distances marking the relations 
of these languages to the Homeric language, insisting on how the figures of 
death and foreignness may be helpful in this respect 1.  
                                                   
1 I will not examine here the crucial role of Arabic, which has been decisive with respect 
to classical Greek (especially in the way in which it must have remoulded the mediation of 
Byzantine Greek) but does not directly concern Homer. For an overview of this issue see the 
contribution of Rémi Brague in Droit (1991).  
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One should start with the following basic observation. Homeric language 
has been addressed as somewhat antiquated (that is not currently living) from 
the standpoint of all the languages in the living environment of which Homeric 
poems were produced and read. Homeric language, in other words, has been 
always-already somewhat dead – even for linguistic environments with respect 
to which it was not foreign.  
The relations between the Homeric language and other forms of Greek, 
within the setting of archaic Greek linguistic life, remains, as we have seen, an 
open issue. Recall, in this respect, the resistance of the Homeric language to the 
historicist approach based on the distinction and taxonomy of different Greek 
“dialects” 1. Although it tends to abandon the notion of kunstsprache, recent 
philological research, insisting on the notion of dialect, observes that an 
idiosyncratic distance of relative antiquation must have been separating the 
Homeric language from all varieties of locally used Greek in pre-classical 
Greece2.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 See section A.4.4. above. 
 
2 Halsam (1997) remarks the following: 
“This revered panhellenic possession formed a central part of Greek education and 
crucially employed as dialect which, while displaying an obviously Ionic character 
overall, was distanced from all contemporary varieties by its generally archaic “feel” and 
the integration of “foreign” elements of non-Ionic origin.” (194)  
An equivalent phenomenon would be at work at the level of the initial alphabetic 
recordings and subsequent transliterations of the Homeric poems. Halsam further remarks that 
the earliest texts, written in archaic local alphabets and transcribed into the standard orthography 
of the 5th century B.C. must have entailed multiple problems of spelling and annotation, 
especially of unfamiliar or archaic forms. 
Problems analogous to the above may concern modern languages as well. Such seems to 
be the case of medieval vernaculars. Cerquiglini (1989) insists on the formative role of the 
manuscript literary tradition with respect to oral idioms. He correlatively criticises the primacy 
attributed to the notion of historically and geographically identifiable oral “dialects”, as 
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The Homeric idiom was also charged with a distinct aura of historic 
distance at the age of classical Greece. The non-local character of the Homeric 
language-whole (often qualified as “panhellenic”) must have been accentuating 
this tendency, as Greek continued to evolve at the level of local city-cultures. The 
story of the Pisistratedean recension, of dubious historical credibility as it may 
be, strongly suggests that the Homeric language-whole was addressed as 
somehow situated outside the realm of current life: it had to be somehow re-
collected1. Democritus’ attested treatise on the epic language (of which we only 
know the title) could be considered as an indication of the fact that Homeric 
Greek had been raising, at least since the 6th century, problems of compatibility 
                                                                                                                                                       
obscuring the determinant role of the written tradition with respect to emergent vernaculars (see 
especially p. 87). 
 
1 Wolf quotes a number of antique and medieval sources as credible witnesses 
corroborating the general hypothesis of an initially oral and subsequently compiled Homeric 
poetry, in a note to his Chapter XXXIII (PRE, 137, n.5). These range from Cicero and Pausanias to 
Aelian and Suidas, without excluding the otherwise dubious Eustathius. Wolf does not consider, 
however, the highly problematic issue of the very meaning of the different terms used by his 
sources to name the exact kind of operation at stake: sunqevtein, sunavgein, sullevgein, 
suntavssein, ajqroivzein... The only extant sources that describe in detail the operations of 
the “recension” attributed to Pisistratus are grammarian scholia to an extant manuscript of the 
Dionysius Thrax. Wolf (PRE, 140 et seq., n. 9) quotes the relevant passages only in order to 
condemn its flagrant lack of proper historical sense while also admitting that “this is the one 
grammarian who explicitly confirms that the first text was prepared by Pisistratus”. We could 
also quote here, from the English translation of Prolegomena, the shorter of these passages: 
“[Pisistratus] wished the poetry of Homer to be preserved. He proposed a competition at 
public expense, had heralds announce it, gave safe conduct to those who knew how to 
reveal the poems of Homer and wished to do so, and established a reward of one obol for 
each line of verse. In this way he brought together all the versions, and gave them to wise 
and understanding men.” (PRE, 140-141). 
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with living Greek, although not necessarily of understanding1. This did not 
prevent Homer from, not simply remaining familiar to living Greek but actually 
providing the main reference of classical Greek linguistic and cultural paedeia. 
In Alexandria and other cities of Hellenistic culture, older Greek, starting 
with Homer, acquired the institutionalised status of a historically distanced but 
perplexingly non-foreign language2. The transposition of Greek to the status of 
an oecumenic language of culture and commerce must have played a crucial role 
in this respect. The emergence and development of Greek grammar and metrics, 
based on Homeric and classical Greek alike, testifies to this effect. So do the 
reforms and changes of methods of scribal annotation, as well as the whole 
enterprise of textual canonisation which is known to have been the task of 
Alexandrian scholars and librarians. Note that, although no translation of Homer 
is known to have been produced by Hellenistic Greek, much of the Alexandrian 
scholia to Homer, as recorded in the Byzantine tradition, are translative rather 
                                                   
1 I am referring to  “Periv  JOmhvrou h[ ojrqoepoivhß kai; glwssevwn [On Homer 
or on the correct use of words and languages]” (Democritus 68 A 33, xi, i)  as cited by Pfeiffer 
(1986) who also remarks: 
“The wording of this title suggests a distinction between a ‘straight’ epic diction and the 
obsolete words needing explanation; this would be no startling novelty, as the 
correctness of Homer’s use of the Greek language and the difficulty of his rare vocables 
were discussed at least from the sixth century on.” (42) 
 
2 Pfeiffer (1968) remarks that Greece, together with its Homer, began with the 
Alexandrians, to acquire a status that could be considered as very close to that of an antiquity: 
“Their incomparably precious heritage had to be saved and studied. This was felt to be, 
first of all, a necessity for the rebirth and future life of poetry, and secondly an obligation 
to the achievements of past ages which had given birth to the masterpieces of Hellenic 
literature. The relation of the new generation to the past was entirely different from that 
of Aristotle, the whole perspective of literary criticism was changed.” (102) 
According to Lamberton (1997, 44) Hellenistic readers admired in Homer “its distance in time, its 
strangeness”. 
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than editorial in character1. At the same time, Homer was persistently considered 
as paradigmatic with respect to Greek language as a whole2. 
Romans can be seen as the first to venerate Homeric Greek, not only as a 
distinctly old language, but also as one that required learning, analogous to that 
of foreign languages. With them, Homer becomes translatable in the current 
sense of the term – into Latin3. In the Eastern part of the empire, Greek (gradually 
substituted for Latin as an official language) acquires a new oecumenic character 
–as the language not only of scholarship but also of religion. It undergoes 
idiomatic tensions and changes, entailing its division between, on the one hand, 
the common and Scriptural versions of a koine and, on the other, tendencies 
imitative of old attic Greek. The status of old Greek changes accordingly. Its 
antiquated character is accentuated, but so are strategies and practices that 
disallow its configuration as either dead or foreign. Byzantine scholars (whether 
ecclessiastic or secular) are known to have developed, more generally, a highly 
                                                   
1 Greek in Hellenistic times became, it should be recalled, a language of translation par 
excellence, in a process that led to the emergence of Biblical Greek of the Old and, later, of the New 
Testament. Classical Greek does not seem to have practised translation as we know it. 
 
2 Lamberton (1977) remarks that up to Roman times, “to know Greek was to have read 
Homer” (45). 
 
3  For insightful remarks on the specificity of the Roman mediation with respect to 
antique Greece, see Droit (1991) especially the contribution of Jacques Brunschwig. The latter 
insists not only on the technical aspects of the Roman mediation, but also on its crucial 
implications on the level of ideology or mentality with respect to the notion of cultural tradition. 
According to Brunschwig, Latin common sense, applied on matters cultural and linguistic, breaks 
with the hermetism marking previous Greek approaches to tradition: the dead acquire an interest 
only as a drastically distant reality, losing much of the idiosyncratic actuality with which their 
survival was vested in pre-Roman Greek times. 
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ambiguous relationship to the pagan linguistic tradition1. Old Greek language 
and literature becomes the object of a learning, the peculiarity of which is only 
partially, but significantly enough, rendered by its qualification as “rhetorical”2. 
At the same time, techniques and methods of copying, storing and reading old 
documents change significantly – especially around the 9th century3. 
                                                   
1 Jaeger (1961) remarks that the Byzantine approach to Homer, if not to Greek antiquity in 
general, was a “necessity having something to do with the fact that the continuity of life depends 
on form – something very hard for the pure intellect with its historical blind spot, to grasp” (127-
128, n. 6). The study concludes as follows: 
“For all of them the Greek tradition was the ultimate cultural link. It is wrong to ask 
whether they always preserved the exact shade of meaning of the classical Greek 
archetype. What they preserved were certain basic tendencies of the classical mind 
around which the ideas of their own age could crystalize. Their wrestling with the 
classical heritage evolves in certain historical stages, which clearly show an architectural 
logic in their gradual progress. The Hellenistic element constitutes its intellectual 
medium and determines its dialectical rhythm, a great historical rhythm that will always 
remain one of the reasons for our inexhaustible interest in the subject.” (185) 
A more mitigated or critical approach to the question of the degree to which continuity 
can be said to have been established between pagan Greek and Christian Byzantine paedeia is 
expressed by Lemerle (1971), who considers Jaeger “exagérément optimiste” (43, n.1). 
 
2 Lemerle (1971) proposes the following complex appreciation of Byzantine rhetoric, as a 
mode of literacy specific to Byzantine scholarship and education: 
 “Ainsi la rhétorique est un ensemble de procédés et de conventions, empruntés à 
l’hellénisme classique et surtout à l’hellénisme alexandrin, qui ont procuré au troisième 
hellénisme, celui de Byzance, un mode d’expression littéraire qui lui est propre. Nous 
sommes donc ici en présence d’un système de référence au passé, qui est chargé de 
signification, et qu’il ne faut réduire ni à un archaïsme arbitraire, ni à une vaine parure de 
lettré. La rhétorique byzantine représente l’autre aspect du langage. Elle s’ apparente à un 
langage d’initiés. Elle appartient à ce monde des signes,  qui double et transcende celui 
des formes, et qui et l’autre face du réel. Nous retrouvons alors cette distinction, que les 
auteurs byzantins ont si souvent énoncée, les artistes si souvent exprimée, entre l’univers 
sensible, ·ÈÛıËÙﬁ˜ qui nous enveloppe, et l’ univers intelligible, ÓÔËÙﬁ˜, dont l’accès 
exige une préparation et presque une initiation. Et ainsi nous découvrons, dans la paideia, 
l’un des caractères profonds et essentiels, de la mentalité et de la civilisation byzantine.” 
(307). 
 
3 See, amongst others, the Dumbarton Oaks Colloquium on Byzantine books and bookmen 
(1975). 
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Within this setting, Homer becomes the object not only of systematic 
scribal reproduction, but also of exegetical and lexicographic work, as well as of 
translation. The latter never circulates autonomously. It is either appended to the 
original (as interlinear translation) or integrated into treatises of exegetical 
commentary, such as the Eustathian ones – to which we will return. One could 
see, in such translative practices, the index of linguistic strategies dealing with 
new kinds of historic distances, without subsuming them under the figure of 
foreignness1.  
With Humanist modernity, Homeric Greek gradually passes, as we have 
seen, to the position of a language of  “antiquity” – and is thus drastically cut 
from the evolving Greek language and its continuing life. Homer, in other words, 
gradually occupies a field marked by joined or alternating distances of both 
death and foreignness2. The early Humanist editing and reading of Homer must 
                                                   
1 Byzantine translations of Homer, very little studied until today, provide us with a most 
interesting case through which the difference between death and foreignness of languages may 
be highlighted and appreciated. This difference is somewhat blurred for speakers of modern 
European languages, especially since European scholarship started forgetting the crucially 
mediating role previously assumed by Biblical, medieval or even modern Greek, in the modern 
learning of antique or Homeric Greek. The Byzantine scholar was in a better position to perceive 
how certain aspects or dimensions of Homeric Greek remain obscure or enigmatic, even when 
there is perfect current knowledge of the language. In other words, Byzantine translations may be 
better informed than modern ones, with respect to the issue of a historic distance between 
languages dead and living, irreducible to the distances between languages simply different or 
foreign to each other.  
 
2 As Grafton notes, historians have tended to view Humanistic scholarship as having 
been profoundly transformed “after the French revolution, by the rise of a new German 
hermeneutics and historiography which learned from the radical changes of its own time to see 
the past as a genuinely foreign country” (1991, 3). Grafton’s work, opting for a reassessment of 
the Humanist tradition, investigates the degree to and ways in which such changes had been 
already at work at least since 1600.  
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have been conditioned by the oecumenicity of neo-Latin European scholarship 
resisting, but also integrating, the dynamics of vernacularisation of national 
languages1. The advent of Wolfian philology occurs as the culmination of a 
gradual process through which both Homeric and classical Greek are placed in a 
drastically new environment of linguistic and academic life. The 
institutionalisation of modern national-state languages is coupled with the 
emergence and development of their academic and largely inter-national or even 
trans-national idioms. Academic philology (the field in which Latin has persisted 
the most, as a linguistic mediation between Homer and modernity) postulates its 
valid access to properly Homeric language and form, while national literatures 
domesticate the Homeric tradition through literary translation2. This is the 
setting that undergoes, today, the still aporetic tensions of a post-modern 
globalisation – which has not yet clarified its own kind of distances and 
connections with respect to its Homeric Gewesene. 
 
 
C.2.3. Homeric Persistence 
 
There would be two fields of linguistic life and work, through which the 
Homeric idea has been leading its survival and enacting its communicability. The 
first is of the reproduction and circulation of semiotic constructs constituting the 
                                                   
1 Latin persisted as the main language of translation of Homer, after modern vernacular 
languages had proven their own translative potential with respect to other languages. The 
phenomenon could, perhaps, be largely accounted for as a strategy through which the historical 
distance of Homer was somewhat mitigated via the mediation of a language more akin to the 
very idea of antiquity. The same strategy could be partly at work in the case of the persistence of 
Latin with the field of modern  philological editing. 
 
2 For an interesting overview of the immensely rich and populated space of translations 
of Homer into modern English, see Steiner and Dykman (1996). 
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Homeric original. The second is of translation generating other formations, 
recollecting the Homeric idea. Each living linguistic environment would enact, 
through its own modalities of reproduction and translation, the specific kinds of 
historic distances through which it addresses the Homeric language-whole. The 
offspring of the reproductive and translative work of every Jetzt would pass on to 
succeeding generations – but would not be necessarily suitable for or compatible 
with their own conditions of relating to the Homeric Gewesene.  
Different kinds of distances would be at work, to begin with, through the 
different regimes of reproduction – techniques and methods of recording and 
copying, storage and circulation of the Homeric poems. Through these regimes, 
the Homeric idea would be carried over from one environment of living 
languages to the next. Carried over implies persistence through semiotic change 
and variance, not transmission in spite of them. Each regime would be a means of 
tackling specific readability problems proper to the kind of distance that 
separates the corresponding Jetzt from its Homeric Gewesene. This would affect 
all levels of semiotic work: modes of coping with the relations between the 
compositional whole and its parts, ways of dealing with linguistic morphology 
and structure, means to produce the signifier and its material support.  
The Alexandrian regime is often seen as substantially departing from an 
older model of document composition. For the latter “the written text is a given 
sequence of letters, whose articulation is effected by the reader in the act of 
reading” (Halsam 1997, 57). If  “letters alone constitute the text: all else is 
interpretation” (ibid.). Alexandrian and post-Alexandrian regimes of copying 
and editing have introduced novelties each of which has turned the reading of 
Homer into a different kind of interpretative practice. Consider, for instance, the 
difference between being encouraged or discouraged, by the scribal artefact, to 
read a noun-epithet complex as two grammatically related morphemes – or, at a 
different level, to read the Iliad or the Odyssey with or without a division into 
distinct rhapsodies.  
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One should envisage the possibility that questions such as the Homeric 
one are largely stimulated by changes in regimes of semiotic reproduction 
destabilising long-standing readability traditions – starting with the passage 
from practices of oral transmission to technologies of written copying. The 
corresponding developments may have a lot to do with the Benjaminian 
juxtaposition between immersive-contemplative reading (proper to the aura of 
traditional reproducibility) and polytechnic or critical-observational reading 
(induced by mechanical reproducibility) – however simplistic this schema may 
be1. The modern philological criticism of the Byzantine vulgate could be partially 
understood as coping with the challenge of readability, with which the remains 
of manuscript tradition presented the era of mechanical reproducibility. 
Historicist premises (combined as they are with aesthetic ones) could be related 
to strategies of resistance to the ideologically destabilising implications of new 
technologies of semiotic reproducion. The idea of a textually restored Homer 
could be a substitute for the traditional auratic authority of manuscript Homer2; 
its elaboration and application would be working towards the neutralisation of 
tensions inherent in the modern institution of literature3.  
                                                   
1 See section B.4.1. abaove. The schema is, I think, quite questionable. As I will try to 
show later, Byzantine readings of Homer comply very little, if at all, with the “contemplative” or 
“immersive” mode of reading that the manuscript “aura” is supposed to entail. One should 
investigate the possibility of the very notion of “aura” (or of equivalent figures) actually being a 
by-product of a modern misreading of traditional oral or scribal reproductive practices. 
 
2 Cerquiglini (1989) speaks of an “idéalisation moderne de l’aura manuscrite” operated 
by philology, especially with respect to medieval literature (24). 
 
3 Historical hermeneutics at large may be seen as a strategy to reconfigure the ideal of 
auratic or contemplative reading under conditions of mechanical reproducibility. The alternative 
theories and practices of close reading, including the deconstruction of a postulated textual 
construct, expose the impasse of this tradition, without, however, effectively probing the 
historical conditions of its exhaustion. 
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Each moment and site of reproduction and re-occurrence of the Homeric 
original can thus be seen as having received from the past and transposed to the 
future punctual solutions to readability enigmas that only turn into further 
enigmas – conditioning the Homeric claim to translation. 
In a strict sense of the term, translation only concerns the systematic 
transposition of the Homeric idiom to a different one. In a wider sense of the 
term, it would concern a great part of all exegetical work on Homer, as well as of 
the variety of recorded and edited Homeric scholia1 and of philological 
commentary appended to modern editions of Homer. 
Recall that translative toils, according to Benjamin, entail the emergence of 
new ideational formations that are historically connected to the original one (in 
the sense in which Übersetzung configures historic connectedness) but may also 
have their own life as distinct originals. They would be themselves (to a certain 
degree, under certain conditions and in certain ways) reproducible and 
translatable. What Benjamin excludes is the further translation of the translative 
gesture as such: no translative recourse to the Homeric original can found its 
historic effectiveness on the mediation of previous translative toils. This has 
important implications as to whether and how Homeric scholiastic or exegetic 
material, produced in a given linguistic environment, can be put to translative 
use by succeeding ones. Benjamin’s theory provides an explanation to the fact 
that this only occurs to a very limited extent indeed2.  
                                                   
1 Nagy (1977, 116-117) presents an overview and classification of the different classes of 
Homeric scholia. The scholia majora include the marginalia initially edited by Villoison and are of 
a predominantly editorial or hermeneutic concern. The scholia minora include papyrus and 
interlinear rather than marginal commentary, but also glossaries and lexica, as well as running 
paraphrases of Homer. 
 
2 Recall that the Alexandrian marks, on the margins of papyri, remain unreadable as to 
their exact rationale and editing presuppositions or implications. Also recall that modernity, 
starting with Pope and exemplified by Wolf, has not managed to read the Byzantine scholia and, 
more generally, the toils of old exegetes or grammarians, as anything more or less than a 
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The specific historic significance that the Homeric language assumes, as 
old or foreign, for the different languages that connect to it, defines the kind of 
recollective operations that govern translative toils. Each translative connection 
would tell the kind of distances its language experiences and deals with. 
Classical attic Greek, when translating Homeric Greek, operates a historic 
connection of a nature very different from the one operated by Hellenistic or 
Byzantine Greek. Homer is differently old in each case. So does classical Latin, as 
compared to Humanist neo-Latin, or to modern national languages. Homer is 
differently foreign in each case. Such differences do not simply entail different 
translative formations but also presuppose different modalities of translation, 
different ways of undertaking the translating task – eventually unreadable or 
incommensurable to each other. At stake are not only different social and 
intellectual horizons but also, and primarily, different kinds of historic distances 
between the translating present moment and its translatable Gewesene, not 
necessarily co-extensive with chronological positions and cultural affiliations – 
distances involving the significance of linguistic death as compared to linguistic 
foreignness1.  
Let me return, now, to the figure of linguistic death. A literary Gewesene 
would survive by undergoing multiple deaths, involving, for the living, various 
                                                                                                                                                       
perplexing and eventually disposable muddle. An analogous attitude is expressed, today, by 
literary translators with respect to older philological work.  
 
1 The difference between death and foreignness may mark translations of Homer into the 
same modern  idiom. One of the ways to appreciate and understand how Pope’s Homer differs 
from Pound’s translation in “Canto I”, would be, I think, to consider that the former domesticates 
foreignness whereas the latter recollects death. Or, to put it more mildly: the dimension of 
linguistic foreignness is more pronounced in Pope, whereas linguistic death is preponderant in 
Pound.  
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modalities of mimesis and recollection1. The dead engage in the dynamics of 
their survival only those living instances that effectively confront the challenge of 
their specific Gewesene: they are only dead to living ones – one’s own dead. 
The difference between historicism and Benjamin, in this respect, is the 
following. Historicism assumes that one’s own dead have and will have 
necessarily always been one’s own: there would be no Homer, other than the one 
lying at the foundation of Western literary tradition. The Benjaminian 
metaphysics of form highlight the poignancy and weight of recollective toils, as 
well as the political nature of their occurrence. The field of historic connections to 
Homer would have to be understood as constantly open to drastic changes, in 
the perspective of a linguistic life essentially aeonic – unlimited historic 
temporality always remaining to be filled-in.  
Überleben, in the case of formations such as the Homeric one, may thus 
have more to do with on-going emergences of linguistic lives, than with 
submerged historical depths. Its transformations take place in different, largely 
                                                   
1 The Homeric Question shows the problem of death, in matters linguistic or literary, to 
be much more complicated than we sometimes suspect. I am not sure that “post-modern” critics 
and theoreticians would be so keen on announcing the death of “authors”, “literatures” or 
“cultures”, let alone “history” as such, had they taken seriously into consideration the precedent 
of the death of languages such as the Homeric one. Death appears, in fact, to be far from 
condemning the dead to indifference or oblivion, as most of the death-announcements 
complacently seem to postulate. On the contrary: the issue of the appropriation of the dead 
always risks opening new and unexpected fields of problems and work. In fact, it is only the 
death of a language that may turn texts into practically inexhaustible fields of reading work, 
more or less independently of their current literary value. The more such reading remains close to 
mourning (or to foretelling, which could be the same) the less it runs the risk of falling into a 
“recycling” routine, which buries the very issue of readability, together with that of recollection, 
under the economics of “use”. 
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unpredictable directions and ways, depending on a variety of events of 
enchaînement to the Homeric Gewesene1. 
The two next sections of the present chapter will address the persistence of 
a Homeric formation as our own original. 
 
 
C.2.4. Saving the Scripta 
 
As we have seen while discussing Vorrede, the dispersion operated by 
conceptual taxonomies of phenomena would be presupposed but also undone by 
the Benjaminian inquiry into ideational forms as monadic totalities. Homer as an 
idea would, accordingly, save the phenomena of Homeric scripturae (in the 
entirety of their pile and the singularity of each of its lumps) from their historical 
and aesthetic conceptualisation and criticism – and, more precisely, from the 
Wolfian idea of textual formness. Directly related to this task, is the Benjaminian 
notion of semiotic reproduction, as opposed to the philological notion of 
transmission. Both of these notions presuppose that there is an original – but they 
configure originality in highly different ways. 
Philological transmission involves the figure of an authoritative original act 
of poetic or artistic creation of which all forms, except textual ones, are 
necessarily dubious (including its initial fragmentary oral expressions). The 
figure of the authorial creation, coupled to philological criticism, acquires the 
positive status of a restorable agency of truth, freed from the defects marking the 
disfiguring mediation of either oral or scribal negativity. Oral performance and 
                                                   
1 Homer could be presently undergoing a shift of survival, for instance, as the Gewesene of 
linguistic formations such as Walcott’s Carribean Omeros. This might very well be an additional 
knot or lump crucial enough to involve, potentially, the change of the topography of Homeric 
idea as we know it. Omeros actually anticipates the emergence of an original that is somewhat 
being translated without having been read. 
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scribal copying would be both governed by phenomenological tensions between 
faithfulness and falsification with respect to a culturally original form. This form 
would stand alone at the beginning of the temporal chain of its transmission – 
and would emerge in its properly historical validity only at the modern closure 
of the chain. The ensuing variance marking semiotic constructs is seen as 
incompatible with the idea of the textual stability and self-sameness of an 
original text. Textual restoration thus occurs largely in spite of or against the 
grain of the necessary but also necessarily obscuring mediation of techniques and 
methods of performing a song, copying a manuscript or printing a book. The 
historicist intellect has to cut through such vestigia, by imposing its own critical 
sense of historical formness as textual1. 
For Benjamin, as we have already seen, it is not in spite of, but through 
reproductive change and variance that an idea leads its life and survival2. 
Benjaminian reproduction involves the understanding of methods and techniques 
of transmission as modalities of mimesis of an ideational form. This pre-or post-
historical idea would be the essential origin of the series of semiotic constructs, 
                                                   
1 See Cerquiglini (1989) for a critique of the philological critique of the manuscript 
tradition. Cerquiglini attributes a crucial importance to the “variance essentielle dont la 
philologie, pensée moderne du texte, n’a vu que maladie infantile, désinvolture coupable ou 
déficience première de la culture scribale, et qui est seulement un excès joyeux ” (42). The theory 
of an original act of authorial genius would be concomitant with the philological ideal of a “ texte 
sûr ”: “ La thèse de la copie comme dégénérescence présuppose un original sans faute ” (90). More 
generally, modernity would entail the combined elaboration of the notions of original authorship 
and philological critique, centred around the ideal of stabilised and invariant textuality : 
“Le texte comme pierre d’achoppement, de quelque regard qu’on l’examine, semble une 
des valeurs de notre Modernité. Origine du discours critique, car il pose crucialement la 
question de l’origine (qui l’énonce, ou le transmet, dans quelles conditions et à quelles 
fins ?), défi et garant du commentaire, car il est la matérialité même (publié sous le 
contrôle de l’auteur ou du philologue, imprimé, joint au trésor sacré de la bibliothèque).” 
(18) 
 
2 See section B.4.1. above. 
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all of which would be equally original – or, perhaps more accurately, equivalent 
instantiations of historic originality. Expressions such as original copy would not 
be oxymoronic. The performers or scribes phenomenologically repeat or copy a 
previous semiotic construct; their activity, however, would be essentially 
mimetic of a surviving ideational form, re-emerging as persisting formation. If 
one could identify an instance of initial formational emergence, its moment 
would have the function of an inaugural mimetic event. It would be what 
provided linguistic life with a first instantiation of an emergent idea, the 
construct of which has triggered the process of reproduction through further 
mimesis. The idea itself, taking place in history, sets the formational grounds on 
which different sites and moments of on-going linguistic life enact different 
aspects or parts of its unlimited historic perfectedness1. In this sense, originality 
is an on-going historic event: semiotic catastrophes make up the field of its life, 
not of its demise. 
Under the perspective of such a metaphysics of ideational form, the piled-
up semiotic constructs of Homeric poetry would all be dated and historically 
specific, but also original Homeric occurrences – readable or recognisable as 
instantiations of the same idea. The idea itself can, in turn, only be identified or 
                                                   
1Cerquiglini (1989) has insisted on the non-applicability of the philological concept of 
textuality to the manuscript tradition of medieval literature. As écriture en acte, rather than as 
recording of oral precedents, manuscript literature would actively form the language it enacts, 
through the continuous remaniement of its semiotic enactments: “L’oeuvre scribale est un 
commentaire, une paraphrase, le suplus du sens, et de langue, apporté à une lettre 
essentiellement inaccomplie. On comprend que le terme de texte soit mal applicable à ces oeuvres” 
(59). 
Cerquiglini also examines more recent philological paradigms, which he compares to the 
traditional or dominant one. Bédier sees the manuscript tradition as an evolving form of life 
comparable to a “ rhizome confus et flasque ” as opposed to a “ belle arborescence orinnée ” (96). 
His model, however, based on the organic paradigm of early 20th century  biological taxonomies, 
would still involve the quest of a single textual construct as the invariant original. 
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described as a device that saves the phenomena of semiotic reproduction. No 
historically bygone cultus vitae provides the reference with respect to which the 
authenticity of the constructs can be measured. This does not mean that 
performers, scribes or editors invent or generate an idea otherwise 
indeterminate. The specificity of the Benjaminian quest for an ideational 
Ursprung resides in how it cuts through the alternative between historicist 
determinism and cultural relativism – as well as through the alternative between 
deductive and inductive epistemology.  
When Alexandrian librarians copy “non-Alexandrian poems, of much of 
which they did not themselves approve” (Grafton 1985, 34), by adding word-
separation, punctuation and rhapsodic divisions, they produce Alexandrian 
semiotic constructs. When Byzantine monks copy pagan writings of “outside 
wisdom”, by changing the script of their received manuscripts, making paper 
codices out of parchment, and adding marginalia, they produce Byzantine 
linguistic constructs. Accordingly, modern philology, when editing its own 
textual Homer, produces modern texts. The corresponding constructs would also 
all be, essentially, mimeses of the Homeric idea. Even if we somehow had extant 
traces of archaic oral performances of Homeric poems1, there would be no reason 
to consider them as more (or less) original than their written recordings. They 
would stand as additional constructs, of the same ideational form, presenting us 
with different aspects of its life and survival.  
In this sense, Benjamin’s approach outdoes the figure of original 
authorship. A kind of analogous relativisation is also paradoxically at work, as 
we have seen, in the Wolfian paradigm: the philologically restored text would 
represent the proper form of historical Homericity, even more validly than the 
initial songs of Homer would have done. For Wolf, the supreme instance of 
formness resides in a temporal moment of cultural origins dovetailing into an 
                                                   
1 This, as we will shortly see in more detail, is what the “oral theory” of Homer seems to 
be in quest of, when inquiring into contemporary oral epic practices. 
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equally temporal moment of textual reformation: philological textuality saves the 
figure of original authorship against all mediation of performative and scribal 
negativity. Benjamin’s idea as historic Ursprung, is intended to shelter temporal 
travail against all historicist figurations of cultural beginnings and textual ends. 
Let us consider, in this respect, the following hypothesis. Let us suppose 
that the Homeric compositional whole, as we have it, is the offspring of a 
compilation of disparate and fragmentary Homeric scripta, operated by medieval 
scribes, possibly monks of the early Byzantine period. Our extant Byzantine 
manuscripts would be copies of archetypes composed by such scribes on the sole 
grounds of their mastery of, and interest in, the grammar and rhetoric of 
Homeric fragments to which they had access. I am not suggesting that such a 
hypothesis is a historically plausible one. It is not1. I am just wondering what the 
effects or implications of its hypothetical plausibility would be. Would or should 
it seriously perturb our present appreciation of the extant scripta as Homeric? 
Historicism would give a clearly positive answer to this question. Benjaminian 
metaphysics would involve an answer more mitigated, if not altogether contrary. 
There would be no significant reason, indeed, from a historic point of view, to 
consider that a Byzantine enactment of the Homeric language-whole as a 
compositional whole is in any sense less or more Homeric than a fragmentary 
Homer that would have preceded it. The same idea would survive and the same 
formation would persist, under different conditions and modalities of semiotic 
enactment. 
The old myth of the “Pisistratedean recension” concerns the originality of 
Homeric semiotic constructs. Recall that, as the little credible scholiast testifies, 
Pisistratus managed to form the Homeric corpus in its original entirety by, not 
simply asking, but actually paying anyone who had Homeric verses in his 
                                                   
1 Our hypothesis would sound more plausible had no Hellenistic or Roman Homeric 
papyri been discovered – which would allow the Wolfian suspicion against the authority of the 
manuscript tradition as a whole to be taken somewhat more at face value. 
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possession or knowledge, to contribute them in view of the first integral written 
recording of Homer. This could be an ironically informed allegory of the very 
enigma of Homeric originality1. The myth tells us that this originality does not 
depend on the processes and mechanisms of the initial emergence of Homeric 
scripta. There would be something essentially Homeric about these scripta, which 
goes well beyond the phenomenic conditions of their production. The idea of 
Homer would invalidate all criticism informed by historicist or, more generally, 
phenomenological concerns.  
The Benjaminian notion of mimetic reproduction disputes the notion not 
so much of creativity as of invention – along with the correlative ones of social 
construction. By being the persistent object of creative mimesis, the Homeric idea 
would allow for very little, if anything, to have been invented in the history of its 
life and survival, whether by archaic Greek singers of by modern interpretative 
communities2. The crucial challenge would be how to grasp, at our specific 
                                                   
1 Nagy (1997) attributes to this story the status of a historically paradigmatic myth: 
“It can also be argued that such a story is characteristic of a type of charter myth, attested 
not only in other archaic Greek traditions but also in those of a wide variety of different 
cultures, that serves to explain the genesis of a centralised oral tradition in the 
metaphorical terms of written traditions, so that the gradual evolution of an oral tradition 
into a centralised institution is imagined by the myth as an instantaneous re-creation of a 
lost or at least obsolete archetype of an ultimate Book.” (109) 
 
2 In this sense, one would have to be critical towards the following contemporary account 
of the Homeric Question, which does, otherwise, present us with an extremely insightful and 
concise description of the phenomenological dimensions of the issue and their understanding by 
a post-philological awareness: 
“Composed of the inventions of rhapsodes over a span of time we can only attempt to 
quantify, along with the literary interpolation of poets, of politicians and ultimately of 
textual critics such as Crates of Mallos, the poems that lay before the unknown creators of 
the vulgate incorporated their own history. Those nameless editors carved them down 
and shaped them into the poems we know, finally a manageable and uniform oeuvre, 
with an author named Homer, who had a biography, an iconography, a style, a view of 
the world. Sophisticated and critical biographies of this poet came into existence and 
prefaces were written to introduce the first-time reader to his life, ideas and importance. 
In the schools of the Hellenistic world, the Homer of the subsequent  European literary 
tradition was invented. From that point, as Greek paideia spread through the Roman 
world, we can talk of interpretive communities, conflicting claims about the meaning of 
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moment of Homeric survival, this “Protean thing” (Halsam, 1979, 56): how to 
discern it out of the field of variant and even polyglottic mimetic enactments, all 
of which would claim the status of a generalised originality1. 
A debatable suggestion, in this respect, would be, I think, that the 
Byzantine vulgate be considered as a field of semiotic mimesis, which presents us 
with most significant instantiations of the Homeric formation: even if, and 
perhaps because, they would be extreme ones.2 
                                                                                                                                                       
the poems and about the wisdom of Homer, its scope, its contemporary relevance.” 
(Lamberton, 1997, 34) 
 
1 This question is connected but not reducible to the one of a post-philological edition of 
Homer. The latter has recently been raised in terms that could combine with problematics I have 
exposed.  
Contemporary Homeric studies seem to opt for a rehabilitation of the manuscript 
tradition in its entirety, especially in its Byzantine form – as opposed to the typically Wolfian 
tendency of its devaluation. Nagy (1997) for instance, opts for an inclusive edition, from which no 
part of the manuscript tradition would be absent: 
“As of this writing, Homeric scholarship has not yet succeeded in achieving a definitive 
edition of either the Iliad or the Odyssey. Ideally, such an edition would encompass the 
full historical reality of the Homeric textual tradition as it evolved through time, from the 
pre-classical era well into the medieval.” (101) 
His “evolutionary model” aims at accounting for “a plethora of different authentic 
variants at different stages (or even at any one stage) in the evolution of Homeric poetry as an oral 
tradition; variations in the textual tradition would reflect different stages in the transcribing of this 
oral tradition” (111). 
In the field of medieval literature and philology, Cerquiglini (1989) formulates quite 
provocative suggestions in favour of a rehabilitation of manuscript traditions in their entirety. All 
variant versions of a given work would fall under a regime of “authenticité généralisée” and 
would have to be recorded and accounted for. The method of doing so would not be to strive for 
the “phanstasme du fac-similé” (112). It would, rather, have to exploit the potential of electronic 
media since “l’ordinateur, par son écran dialogique et multidimensionnel, simule la mobilité 
incessante et joyeuse de l’écriture médiévale” (114). 
  
2 In recent editorial practices, there are tendencies towards minimalist editorial 
intervention on the vulgate, as exemplified by the recent edition of Thiel (Homer, 1991-1996). 
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C.2.5. Homeric Extremes 
 
I now turn to the methodological problem of how to delimit a range of 
semiotic material, which would be most tellingly readable with respect to Homer 
as an idea claiming recollection on behalf of a currently living language. For, 
although Homer survives as the field of Homeric semiotic constructs in its 
entirety, any specific connection to its Gewesene on the part of a Jetzt presupposes 
the re-arrangement of the field. 
The issue would be how to avoid relapsing into what Benjamin has 
criticised as the false alternative between inductive empiricism and deductive 
abstraction. This aporetic alternative sets the grounds on which the philological 
tradition has oscillated between exhaustive recension and hypothetical 
emendation, venturing either to record the entire range of variant manuscript 
readings or to reconstruct a single original archetype.  
The issue of variance (in all its levels and extents, from the materiality of 
the signifier to the articulation of compositional wholes) can only be effectively 
addressed in conjunction with critical problematics concerning the very nature of 
the identity that varies. For Wolf, what varies is the tendency to reach a textus 
that has not yet managed to acquire its proper stability. Its invariable form would 
be definable according to principles of textual coherence and cohesion, enabling 
the knowledge of the past as cultural and historical. For Benjamin what varies is 
the enactment of a formation that can only persist through variation. Its 
persisting ideational wholeness would consist in the Art in which its language 
                                                                                                                                                       
According to Halsam (1997), this “‘conservative edition’ destined to be highly influential” (100), 
treats the Byzantine manuscripts “not merely as textual vehicles but more holistically as historical 
documents” (92). Thiel privileges the medieval vulgate as juxtaposed to older readings. His 
edition is based on a relatively limited, selected range of Byzantine manuscript material, while 
drastically reducing its apparatus criticus. 
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indexes purely human-linguistic communicability. When confronted with a 
given corpus of semiotic material (such as a Byzantine manuscript) Wolfian 
philology asks whether it is readable as a historically valid text. When confronted 
with the same, Benjaminian metaphysics ask whether it provides access to 
extremes that would be significant as to the essential form of a surviving 
Homeric idea. 
The entirety of Homeric semiotic phenomena is only condemned to 
monumentalised oblivion by the impossible task of their exhaustive reading. It 
could be saved by the extraction and reading of those semiotic instantiations, in 
which the corresponding ideational whole would be most crucially and even 
precariously at stake. The overall form of the Homeric idea would thus emerge, 
neither through an exact mapping of its semiotic topography, nor through the 
identification of an average of tendencies summarising a presumed topological 
principle. It would do so through the critical delimitation of and contemplative 
concentration on specific sites of semiotic ruins, concretely dated as to the 
conditions of their catastrophic emergence, each offering a crucial insight onto 
particular aspects of a persisting language-whole. Such aspects would have to be 
extreme instances of substantiation, which enact the ideational monad of the 
Homeric formation not in their structural uniformity, but in their articulative 
tension. The Benjaminian idea is not formed as an abstract entity, to the shape or 
figure of which a scholarly intellect could gain speculative access. Its monadic 
totality consists in the very intensity through which instances, often incompatible 
or incongruous, of semiotic phenomenicity, are recognisable as enactments of 
what has enabled their bringing-together – of Homer. What matters more is the 
uncertainty of likeness and difference, connection and disjunction between 
different constructs – rather than the constructs themselves.  
Extreme sites of the Homeric formation could be small parts or fragments 
of compositional wholes. They could also include larger units – ranging from 
individual rhapsodies, to the Iliad and the Odyssey as a single poetic body. The 
Homeric formation could thus be envisaged as significantly enacted in tensions 
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between highlighted lines or even word-clusters. It would also consist in the 
tensions between an over-all narrative and the problematic status of its poorly 
articulated joints. Homer would be the disturbing outburst, imminent at any 
given point of an otherwise easily summarised narration, of problems confronted 
by scholiastic or philological exegetical commentary.  
Homeric extremes should also include readability challenges presented by 
the very materiality of extant Homeric semiotic corpi. An initial concentration on 
philological standard editions should be coupled with the experience of reading 
Homer in manuscript codices or even papyri. One would thus have to dispute an 
important component of the philological notion of transmission, namely, the 
presupposition that the material aspects of the signifier are purely technical in 
nature, presenting us, at most, with problems of paleographic deciphering1. The 
challenge of manuscript readability should be considered, instead, as involving 
important aspects of the Homeric idea: in an age of mechanical or electronic 
reproducibility, it would claim translation along with the Homeric idiom and its 
compositional articulation. 
One of the most crucial specificities of ideas such as the Homeric one, 
would consist in how they exercise and accustom us to a reading of linguistic 
forms as fields of uncertainty-tensions – not textually interwoven structures2. 
                                                   
1 On the grounds of these traditionally philological premises, transliteration into a 
different alphabet would also be envisaged as an equally neutral device of transmission, without 
implications as to reading. This conception marks, indeed, to a considerable degree, the electronic 
reproduction of antique texts. 
 
2 The ideational totality of the Odyssey, for instance, could be seen as enacted by the fact 
that its formation is one which could-or-could-not include the Nekyias as we have them, could-or-
could-not end at the closing of the 23d rather than with its 24th rhapsody. The very possibility of 
regarding both the Iliad and the Odyssey as one formation is perhaps more interesting and telling, 
ideationally, in its uncertainty, than any effort to determine the historical truth-value of such a 
hypothesis. There would also be uncertainty, of course, as to a number of morphological 
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This would not be far from how the Alexandrian scholar and the Byzantine 
scribe have addressed their own scripta. The Alexandrian sigla as well as the 
Byzantine scholia could be better understood as markers of uncertainty, than as 
guidelines of exegetical illumination or editorial emendation. Needless to add, 
modern philological research has also practically, even if often malgré-soi, 
sustained a host of uncertainty-knots constitutive of the Homeric formation – and 
remain extremely valuable as such, in their plethora.  
 In short, a basic methodological precondition for the reading of Homeric 
scripta as an original formation would be to resist their reduction to a historically 
and aesthetically restructured textual form. One would have to disengage the 
Homeric language-whole from postulated norms of oral or scribal, antique, 
medieval or modern, poetic or epic poetics and semiotics. It is only by swimming 
through the ocean of historical and aesthetic categories, that one can eventually 
consider their pertinence. 
I will survey, in my following sections, two very different cases of 
approaches to the readability and translatability of the Homeric language-whole. 
Neither of these approaches pretends to re-construct the stories of the Iliad or the 
Odyssey, investigates the conundrum of its semantics, or elaborates principles of 
editorial reproduction. They are of interest to us as non-Wolfian endeavours to 
address the Homeric Art of indexing human-linguistic communicability – and to 
eventually engage in a historic connection to it, through translation or translative 
exegesis and criticism. The first is the pre-philological, Byzantine case of 
Eustathian commentary. The second is our contemporary, largely post-
philological approach that has been labelled oral theory of Homer.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
components and the role of grammatical, syntactical or metrical rules with respect to their 
semantic value – or as to the exact position of repeated lines. 
 
276 
C.3. Reading Homer 
C.3. READING  HOMER 
 
C.3.1. Old Strangeness 
 
I want to review, very briefly, the tradition that has mostly suffered 
effacement under the procession of philological awareness: the Byzantine 
reading of Homer. Byzantine is, of course, a generalising historical concept – and 
should, as such, be used with reservation. I understand it as an initial means of 
naming a certain stage of life of the Greek language, within the setting of which 
the historic condition of Homer changes with respect to both its Alexandrian and 
Roman precedents. The Homeric language persisted as one of non-foreignness 
while gradually acquiring intensified dimensions of oldness. Byzantine editing 
and commentary of Homer is a field in which the readability of the Homeric 
language-whole, involves its translatability in ways more marked than in the 
case of Alexandrian Greek and quite different from Latin. Tensions of closeness 
and distance between Byzantine and Homeric Greek are particularly ambiguous, 
exposing how oldness, advancing to the point of an imminent death, can resist 
foreignness: Homer would be to Byzantine Greek, an ageing stranger, not a 
foreigner. 
These tensions could be considered as analogous to those involved in 
Benjamin’s notion of aura: “apparition unique d’un lointain, si proche soit-il” 
(Kunstwerk, 144). Homeric language would not be foreign; it would remain 
proche; but its lointain would also be particularly pronounced; it would be getting 
older and older. The same is perhaps implied by our current notion of the 
Byzantine approach to older Greek language as predominantly rhetorical1.  
The Byzantine reading of Homer could, in this sense, be considered as a 
particularly interesting extreme instance of Homeric survival. It is well 
exemplified as such by Eustathius, Bishop of Thessaloniki (1193-1197). His 
                                                   
1 See Lemerle (1971) as discussed in the footnotes of section C.2.2. 
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Homeric Commentarii (1960; 1971) is a running line-by line commentary on the 
Iliad and the Odyssey, inextricably grammatical, historical, rhetorical, and 
exegetical, including a translative paraphrase for each commented passage of the 
original. It originally bears the enigmatic title Parekbolaiv, which has been 
insightfully but inaccurately translated as Compilations. The Greek title denotes 
digression of para-digression, as well as flowing trends, as of a river – without it 
being clear whether the flowing is out of a source or into an ocean.  
Eustathius’ Commentarii has functioned as a crucial mediation between 
Homer and its modern readings – something like a manual for the learning of 
Homeric language and culture, acknowledged as indispensable by early 
Humanist scholarship, and forgotten or somewhat erased as such by the modern 
classicist. A careful reading of his text can easily identify a great multititude of 
points on which most modern commentaries, up to now, follow him closely1. 
Based on Eustathius’ Preface (Prooivmion) to his Commentarii on the Iliad, I will 
venture to recall, very briefly, how Eustathius understands the Byzantine 
moment of Homeric translative readability. His standpoint, it should be 
remarked, upsets the Benjaminian distinction between the immersive-
contemplative character of traditional approaches to the work of art, and the 
observational distantiation that would characterise modern reading. His case 
thus suggests that one should critically revise Benjaminian dialectics. I could 
tentatively qualify the Eustathian reading as one of playful amazement, 
disengaged interest, or enchanted resistance: the old, getting older, remains 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 Allen (1931) remarks that the influence of Eustathius, after the editio princeps of the 
Commentarii, in 1542-1550, “was very great, as may be seen in any apparatus criticus”. 
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readable as perplexingly familiar. Translative connections are constantly at stake 
in the very closeness of this reading1. 
The oldness of the Homeric language is attested by the term palaioiv 
(perhaps quite close to veterans) which Eustathius, together with most Byzantine 
scholars of his times, uses to qualify all instances of Homeric, classical or 
Hellenistic Greek paganism. On the other hand, well demarcated neighbourhood 
is implied by the equally standard term of “outside wisdom” (e[xw sofiva, 12), 
through which pagan Greek values are seen by the Byzantines as separate from, 
or strange with respect to, the realm of Christian beliefs. Eustathius very 
characteristically configures this neighbouring oldness as a historic, rather than 
historical issue. He briefly summarises stories and hypotheses about the 
hypothetical times and sites in which Homer, as an individual, might have 
existed. He disqualifies all of them as irrelevant to his task. The question of 
whether Homer has sung or written his poetry is accordingly disregarded. It is as 
a historically indeterminate figure that Homer is assigned by Eustathius the 
position of a “spermatic origin” (spermatikw``ß ajrchv, 6) and “hegemony” 
(kaqhghthvß, 6) with respect to poets at large.  
From the very outset of his preface, Eustathius uses the figure of an 
Odyssean travelling through mythological strangeness as an allegory of reading 
                                                   
1 Browning (1992) summarises as follows the ambiguously historical relation that the late 
Byzantine scholar entertains with Homer, involving a constant interchange between commentary 
and translation: 
“For Eustathius the Iliad is in one sense a contemporary text. He often illustrates or 
explains a point by citing a word or expression from the colloquial Greek of his own time 
or a feature of contemporary life [...] Yet viewed from another standpoint, the Iliad 
belongs to a remote past. Words have changed their meanings, and the reader must be 
alert to these semantic changes. He goes on (comm. on Iliad 1.25) to give a list of words 
whose meanings have changed since Homer’s time.” (143-144). 
 
2 Page citations will refer to the Preface of Eustathius’ Commentarii to the Iliad (Eustathius 
1971, vol. I: 1-8). For block quotations, references to line numbers, preceded by a colon, will be 
added after page numbers. Translation is my own, unless otherwise specified. 
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relations to Homer. Homer would be the singing of Sirens, to which the reader 
reacts with restrained but acknowledged awe, ultimately, but far from 
absolutely, resisting their seduction. It is the Byzantine present, not the Homeric 
past, that holds the position of the Ithaka that the Byzantine reader aims at 
recovering. Homer would rather be the Oceanus itself, which constantly risks 
keeping one away from home: 
If one were to resist the dominion of the Homeric Sirens, it would be good 
for one to cover his ears with wax or find recourse to some other means, 
so that one may avoid seduction [wJß a]n ajpofuvgei tov qevlghtron]; 
were one not to resist but, rather, to encounter the singing, I think that one 
would not easily circumvent the encounter, however tightly one may be 
chained, nor would one be able to be happy after having circumvented it; 
for if we consider that, as there are certain sights, like the seven are said to 
be, there are also hearings that are worth revisiting [ejpistrofh`ß a[xia], 
then one would have to count among them the Homeric poetry, which no 
old sage that I know of declined to taste, especially amongst those who 
drew upon outside wisdom [th`ß e[xw sofivaß][…]. (1: 1-9)  
Homeric mythology thus provides Eustathius with figures for 
perfectedness, not death – and for conditions of attractive strangeness, not 
foreignness. Note the ambiguity with which, in the following passage, the figure 
of flowing combines with that of influence and the figure of strangeness with 
that of hospitality: 
 […] for all rivers and all springs and all fountains come out of Oceanus, as 
the old word has it; and so it is out of Homer that flows, if not all, at least a 
lot of influence on the word [lovgou ejpirrohv] of the sages; for no one of 
those who have ventured through the above, in what they say about 
nature or about ethos or simply about verbal expression of anything, in 
whatever way one conceives of it all, has visited the Homeric locus 
without having been offered hospitality [ajxenagwvghtoß]; instead, all 
have resided under its roof, others in order to spend there the rest of their 
lives and continue to be fed on its meals, others in order to satisfy some 
immediate need and take along with them some useful part of its words. 
(1: 9-16) 
In old Greek, xevnoß is a stranger, not a foreigner: the hosted one. It is 
noteworthy that Homer offers hospitality to the Byzantine reader, not the 
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reverse. Homer is the one who is visited – and who hosts in hospitable ageing 
strangeness.  
The value that Eustathius attributes to the distant locus of Homeric poetry 
is one of accommodation and usefulness rather than of ritual or cult. The poems 
are said to be a basic utility (basiko;n pra`gma) full of goods (gevmousa ... 
kalw`n) for such arts and sciences as philosophy, rhetoric, strategic skill, moral 
education and, finally, history as educational experience. Allegorical 
interpretation would be a stratageme allowing the Byzantine reader to profitably 
confront the paradox of a fruitful access to an otherwise strangely perfected past. 
Reading would thus gain access to a realm of perennial synchronicity, in which 
historic oldness acquires its presently engaging multifaceted actuality: 
 […] and as for the venerable things that accompany history, no one could 
deprive them of the Homeric art, whether it be polytropic experience 
[polupeirivaß], pleasure of hearing, spiritual education [yucavß 
paideuvein], elevating to virtue or whatever the historian is praised for; 
and, granted, the abundance of myth, creates the risk of seductive 
amazement [kivndunoß ejsti; tou` qaumavzesqai], but Homeric myths 
are not mainly for entertainment but constitute, rather, the shadows or 
screens of noble concepts [ejnnoiw`n eujgenw`n skiaiv eijsin h[ 
parapetavsmata]; […]. (2: 10-15) 
Eustathius insists that the Homeric actual thing (pra`gma) is usable in a 
multiplicity of ways or purposes. His formulations cannot help but remind us of 
Odysseus’ poluvtropon: “poluvcrhston ei\nai crh`ma thvn ÔOmhrikh;n 
poivhsin [Homeric poetry being of a use multiply usable]” (2). The polytropic 
use of Homer would involve translative connections as reading would have to be 
informed by the various exegetical digressions to which Homer leads the reader: 
[…] my aim is rather to furnish useful ideas for prose writers who wish to 
make use of appropriate rhetorical subtleties, procedures helpful to those 
who wish to imitate the poet and admire him for his skill, words mostly 
for prose use, but sometimes hard, rugged and poetic, which call for 
etymological explanation, maxims, by which Homeric poetry is adorned, 
factual information drawn not only from Homer but from other sources, 
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too, myths both in their pure form and allegorically interpreted, and a 
myriad other things both beautiful and useful. (3: 12-22)1  
The poetics which Eustathius elaborates in the rest of his preface, present 
poetry in general as a mixture or intermingling of truths and lies or myths and 
facts, that a moderate reader should confront as such, by combining a rhetorical 
analysis with allegorical exegesis2. One should neither obscure the Homeric coil 
with excessive allegorical schemas, nor wholly neglect the “ÔOmhrika; pterav 
[…] ajnagwgikou`` u{youß [Homeric wings … of anagogical heights]” (4).  
Eustathius also ponders on the unity of the Homeric scripta as a whole. As 
if explicitly contesting principles of textual formness, he tells us that the Homeric 
work (e[rgon) does not impose on the reader a closely-knit texture or continuity. 
It should be envisaged, instead, as composed of parts quite autonomous with 
respect to each other, allowing the reader to advance at ease or according to 
convenience:  
Compared  to other cases, the work that we have at hand does not extend 
in body and style in a unified and continuous sequence [katav sunevceian 
ajdiavstaton], which would wear out the interlocutor in a continuous 
stress with no refuge; rather, each useful piece lies there as such and on its 
own [e{kaston tw``n crhsivmwn kaq∆ auJto ; ijdiva/ kei``tai], so 
that once this is completed, one can start anew passing on to a next one. 
Thus, those who go through this writing can often rest as if finding a 
refuge.  (3: 28-33) 
Let me add that Eustathius affiliates his reading task to a specific 
dialogical setting. He says that he does not address instances of high and 
sophisticated authority but friends of conversational intercourse (“ouj pro;ß 
megistavnwn tinw`n ejpetavcqhmen, oJpoi`av tina plavttontai oiJ komyoiv, 
ajlla; pro;ß fivlwn oJmilhtw`n”), for the sake of a formative implication in 
reading (“ajgwgh; kai; diatribh; anagnwvsewß”, 3).  
                                                   
1 Translation of Browning (1992). 
 
2 Browning (1992, 142-143) elaborates on this specific point. 
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In short, for Eustathius, Homeric readability entails a conversational and 
polyvalent translative task, constantly changing registers and jumping from 
exegetic commentary to allegorical interpretation. His commentary enacts this 
approach through its continuous interplay between paraphrase and novelistic re-
writing1. The original formation he has provided us with (often regarded, since 
Pope and Wolf, as a dispensable monstrosity2) is paradigmatic of the distances 
that separate Byzantine reading both from the imagery of a traditionally 
contemplative reading and from the practice of historically informed criticism. 
 
 
                                                   
1 The following description, by Lemerle (1971),  of the commentary of Arethas to the 
manuscripts of his own library, could also largely apply to the style and articulation of 
Eustathius’ Commentarii: 
“Mais s’ agit-il proprement de scolies? Plutôt du commentaire perpetuel comme on disait 
autrefois, d’un lecteur qui dialogue avec son auteur. Réagissant toujours très vivement au 
texte qu’ il a sous les yeux, Arethas explique, applaudit, blâme, s’indigne, invective 
remplissant les marges et les bas de pages qu’il demandait à ses calligraphes de ménager 
très larges.” (239) 
Very much like Arethas, Eustathius had before his eyes a Byzantine Homeric manuscript 
including Alexandrian scholia. His translative rather than reproductive reading must have 
involved continuous reaction to and intercourse with both Homer and the scholia. 
 
2 The philological reservation  towards Byzantine reading is echoed in the following 
description, by Lemerle (1971), of our own aporetic reaction to the way in which Byzantines have, 
more generally, related to their old Greek precedents:  
“Nous sommes choqués par l’usage qu’ils font, pendant l’époque que nous avons 
considérée, des grandes oeuvres que nous aimons: ils les lisent peu, ils se contentent 
aisément de florilèges, de recueils de citations, de glossaires, de commentaires, de 
manuels; ils ne cherchent pas l’esprit [...]. Souvent leur érudition nous surprend: mais, à 
bien regarder, la littérature antique est-elle pour eux autre chose qu’un vaste magasin 
d’accessoires, au service d’ une “rhétorique” savante et compliquée?” (306) 
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C.3.2. Non-textual Scripta 
 
Byzantine Homer could be the survival of the Homeric language-whole 
through a historic distance of imminent death but resisted foreignness. Modern 
philology, diverting from the Byzantine precedent, would enact relations of a 
differently structured field of historic distances with respect to Homer, 
negotiating new modalities of death along with diversified conditions of 
foreignness. I turn now to the “oral theory” of Homer, as an example of a 
somewhat post-philological approach to the Homeric language-whole – one that 
has decisively perturbed, if not displaced, the Wolfian paradigm since the 1960s. 
It could be seen as standing at the point of exhaustion of the modern national-
academic philological paradigm. Homer, persisting in the scripta of modern 
philological reproduction, assumes the position of a death that should be 
differently recollected – and a foreigner that should be differently addressed. 
 The oral theory of Homer has been considered as having made “the most 
important single discovery about Homer during the past half-century, the 
decisive proof that the poems are oral compositions” (Dodds 1954, 13). Although 
the standardised label “oral theory” also suggests as much, I do not think that 
this would in any sense summarise the significance of the corresponding 
approach to Homer. Equally authoritative witnesses, in fact, have been 
persistently arguing that there is “no decisive argument against the composition 
of the Iliad and the Odyssey in writing” (Pfeiffer 1968, 25, n. 1).  
The interest that the oral theory of Homer presents us with does not lie in 
its views on the historical problem of the initial emergence of Homeric poems1. 
From that point of view, it always risks turning into a quite conventional neo-
unitarian stand: a compromise between the analytic hypothesis of originally oral 
Homeric poems and the unitarian defence of the transmitted vulgate. The crucial 
                                                   
1 According to what I suggest in this section and elaborate in the following ones, my use 
of the term oral theory implies quotation marks.  
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insight of the approach is, instead, the opening of a distinct perspective on the 
issue of readability of the Homeric scripta. This perspective diverges, most 
significantly, from the very terms of the traditional philological debate. It 
involves, more specifically, the elaboration of the following, often implicit double 
premise. Primo, Homeric scripta (in their modern-philological version, but also as 
the Byzantine vulgate that sustains it) would be validly readable documents as 
they stand. In this sense, the analytical task of textual reconstruction would be 
superfluous, if not wholly misleading. Secundo, the reading of the scripta should 
be operated on grounds other than those of textual formness. In this sense, the 
unitarian position on the Homeric Question is also disputed.  
According to oral theorists, the very idiosyncrasy of the Homeric scripta, 
as we have them, instead of being corrected away, could and should be 
addressed as an object of reading, however problematic or even ineffective such 
a reading may prove to be. Almost everything that the analyst wanted to emend, 
and the unitarian philologist was willing to excuse, is turned into a readable 
form, the main interest of which lies in its eccentricity. Principles of textual 
formness should be bracketed, so that the form at stake exposes its readability 
challenge – eventually affecting our notion of poeticity or even of literature at 
large. 
What we have is thus a reading practice addressing scripta from the point 
of view of non-textual principles of linguistic formation. The historical question 
of the degree and way in which, analogous principles are at work in social 
settings of oral poetry is, in my view, supplementary and even secondary to the 
main issue. In the case of Homer, the reference of oral theorists to the paradigm 
of oral poetry could, in fact, be considered as figural. It would be a metaphor, 
largely catachrestic in status, standing for non-textuality – given the lack of more 
appropriate conceptual devices. I will later discuss in detail how this use of 
orality, as it combines with historical or pseudo-historical problematics, may 
neutralise crucial insights of the theory. I will first concentrate on the insights 
themselves.  
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Note that the exact level or aspect of the Homeric formation on which oral 
theorists situate their reading is not easy to define in conventional terms. As we 
will see, it is neither a “linguistic” analysis of the Homeric idiom, nor an inquiry 
on the “content” of Homeric discourse. I intend to investigate, more specifically, 
whether and how this reading addresses the Wort of a formation as translatable 
language-whole; whether and how it exposes aspects of an ideational form 
indexing purely human-linguistic communicability.  
I will be concentrating on Lord (1960) and Peabody (1975)1. Lord’s Singer 
of Tales could be considered as paradigmatic with respect to Homeric studies 
since the 1960s – perhaps in a sense close to how Wolf’s Prolegomena functioned 
with respect to older philological problematics2. It is particularly marked by a 
terminology that limits its insights in a historicist direction. Peabody’s Winged 
Word presents us with somewhat deviant problematics, driving oral theory to its 
most interesting extremes. Although it is mainly based on a reading of Hesiod, it 
has a direct bearing on Homer: an epic idea emerges as a language-whole wider 
and more varied than the strictly Homeric one.  
 
 
                                                   
1 Respectively abbreviated as Lord and Peabody.  
 
2  Wolf puts to new use material relatively peripheral with respect to the Homeric texts, 
while also establishing direct relationships between the field of classics and other academic 
disciplines such as history, Biblical studies and, eventually, literary studies. Lord’s work also 
involves the introduction and valorisation of new material. It includes empirical research on 
contemporary Yugoslav oral poetry. It thus connects Homeric studies to the field of oral literature 
at large or even of cultural ethnology or anthropology. It should be recalled that Lord continues 
and accomplishes a project methodologically anticipated and delimited by the work and early 
publications of Parry (1971), which only gradually opened to the perspective of the comparative 
investigation of contemporary poetic traditions. Peabody, although following Lord closely and 
explicitly, avoids systematic reference to the field of contemporary oral poetry.  
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C.3.3. Mimetic Formation 
 
Lord states the paradox of Homeric readability as follows: 
It is a strange phenomenon in intellectual history as well as in scholarship 
that the great minds herein represented, minds which could formulate the 
most ingenious speculation, failed to realize that there might be some 
other way of composing a poem than that known to their experience. 
(Lord, 11) 
This “other way of composing” a poetic whole Lord sees as occurring under 
historical conditions of oral poetic tradition. Disregarding this configuration, we 
could concentrate on the issue that Lord acknowledges as being at stake: 
“Change and stability – these are the two elements of the traditional that we 
must try to comprehend. What is it that changes and why and how? What 
remains stable and why?” (Lord, 102). The issue, in other words, would be the 
nature of a formational whole that can only be reproduced as such through 
constant alteration of its semiotic enactments. The notion of textuality, together 
with problematics of historical originality, would be signalling our blindness 
with respect to the peculiarity of the oral-traditional mode of linguistic life: 
Our real difficulty arises from the fact that, unlike the oral poet, we are not 
accustomed to thinking in terms of fluidity. We find it difficult to grasp 
something that is multiform. It seems to us necessary to construct an ideal 
text or to seek an original, and we remain dissatisfied with an ever-
changing phenomenon. (Lord,100) 
 Lord’s figure of oral tradition names the specificity of a regime of linguistic 
reproducibility. The emphasis, as Lord explicitly states, should be on the notion 
of tradition (designating a whole mode of linguistic life) rather than on orality 
(designating the nature of the linguistic medium). A correlative key-notion is the 
one of performance. We can keep this notion by insisting on its etymological 
connection to form, while bracketing its references to the phenomenon of oral 
recitation. It would name the emergence and persistence of linguistic formations 
through events in which different components of linguistic life (components 
which the textual paradigm separates) merge into a single process. As Lord 
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remarks, “we are dealing with a particular and distinctive process in which oral 
learning, oral composition, and oral transmission almost merge; they seem to be 
different facets of the same process” (Lord, 5). 
Performative events could be instances of mimesis of something that 
survives, not in spite but through or as change and fluidity of semiotic constructs. 
Although the notion of mimesis is not used by Lord, it is suggested by his 
explicit insistence on the fact that oral tradition does not rest on memory and 
memorisation on the part of the performing composer1: 
To the superficial observer, changes in oral tradition may seem chaotic 
and arbitrary. In reality this is not so. It cannot be said that ‘anything goes’ 
Nor are these changes due in the ordinary sense to failure of memory of a 
fixed text, first, of course, because there is no fixed text, second because 
there is no concept among singers of memorization as we know it, and 
third, because at a number of points in any song there are forces leading in 
different directions, any one of which the singer may take. (Lord, 120.) 
This implies that the substance of a given formation is necessarily 
connected but also irreducible to the materiality of its semiosis. Lord could be 
confronting this problem when he proposes that one should distinguish between, 
on the one hand, the “wording” of any particular performance of a song, and, on 
the other, the “essence” or the “general idea of the story” which delimits the 
identity of the song at stake: 
We think of change in content and in wording; for, to us, at some moment 
both wording and content have been established. To the singer the song, 
which cannot be changed (since to change it would, in his mind, be to tell 
an untrue story or to falsify history) is the essence of the story itself. His 
idea of stability, to which he is deeply devoted, does not include the 
wording, which to him has never been fixed, nor the essential parts of the 
story. He builds his performance, or song in our sense, on the stable 
skeleton of narrative, which is the song in his sense. […] Yet there is a 
                                                   
1 This counters the commonplace phenomenological problematics approaching 
traditional poetry as mainly involving dynamics of a verbomoteur status or as fundamentally 
resting on the use of mnemotechnic linguistic devices and strategies – on which Ong (1982) and 
Havelock (1986), amongst others, particularly insist. 
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basic idea or combination of ideas that is fairly stable. We can say, then, 
that a song is the story about a given hero, but its expressed forms are 
multiple, and each of these expressed forms or tellings of the story is itself 
a separate song, in its own right, authentic and valid as a song onto itself. 
We must distinguish then two concepts of song in oral poetry. One is the 
general idea of the story, which we use when we speak in larger terms, for 
example, of the song of the wedding of Smailagic Meho, which actually 
includes all singings of it. The other concept of song is that of a particular 
performance or text, such as Avdo Mededovic's song, the Wedding of 
Smailagic Meho, dictated during the month of July, 1935. (Lord, 99-100) 
I will return, shortly, to Lord’s notion of the “stable skeleton of narrative” or, 
more generally, the “story”. What interests us, at this point, is the very quest of 
the grounds on which the identity of a poetic formation would rest.  
Stability through fluidity implies relations of recognisable likeness 
between semiotic constructs, which have nothing to do with the textual model of 
semiotic similarity: 
 […] the two songs are recognizable versions of the same story. They are 
not close enough, however, to be considered exactly alike. Was Zogic 
lying to us? No, because he was singing the story as he conceived it as 
being like Makic's story, and to him, word for word and line for line are 
simply an emphatic way of saying like. (Lord, 28)  
The notion of recognition, in the above quotation, could be considered as 
significantly displacing memory. The notion of a non-exact likeness could be very 
close Benjamin’s non-sensuous resemblance1.  
An immediate implication of Lord’s problematics is that there would be 
neither an original version of a given song, nor an author of such an original. An 
event of initial performance may be conceivable and its performer may even be 
identifiable – but this would not make this performance into an original, nor its 
performer into an author. The very nature of the formation at stake is what 
precludes the relevance of such notions. Lord stresses the impasse of the 
textually biased notion of original authorship – whether individual or collective: 
                                                   
1 Recall section B.3.4. above. 
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Actually, only the man with writing seems to worry about this, just as 
only he looks for the non-existent, illogical and irrelevant original. Singers 
deny that they are the creators of the song. They learned it from other 
singers. We know now that both are right, each according to his meaning 
of song. To attempt to find the first singer of a song is as futile as to try to 
discover the first singing. And yet, just as the first singing could not be 
called the original, so the first man to sing a song cannot be considered its 
author, because of the peculiar relationship, already discussed between 
his singing and all subsequent singings. From that point of view a song 
has no author but a multiplicity of authors, each singing being a creation, 
each singing having its own single author. This is, however, a very 
different concept of multiple authorship from that, or more properly 
those, in general use among Homerists. (Lord, 102)  
Peabody insists, along with Lord, that traditional poetic performance does 
not involve memorisation of previous performances. Each performance would, 
rather, be the re-enactment of what has already been enacted: “an oral tradition 
does not retrieve acts from the past; it performs actions that were also performed 
in the past” (Peabody, 430, n. 16). Peabody further understands the precedents of 
each occurrence of a given song as historically non-determinate. At stake would 
be a “truth” that each performance would “phenomenalise”. This would 
presuppose “remembrance” in a sense that Peabody explicitly distinguishes from 
“memorisation” and connects it to “recollection”. On the grounds of this notion 
of recollected truth, Peabody displaces Lord’s notions of story and skeleton of 
narrative: 
Song is remembrance of songs sung. As remembered experience, song is 
the result, not of deliberate memorisation but only of recollection. Song, 
accordingly is to be associated with the interpretation of signs; that is, 
with meaning. Song is the conscious, phenomenalised aspect of the oral 
compositional process. Song can sometimes be identified in traditional 
compositions as a plan of themes, or as a skeleton of narrative, or as a 
basic idea; but more simply, song is what the singer remembers as the 
truth. This memory functions as a cybernetic control from which a singer 
will not deliberately depart.  (Peabody, 216) 
Peabody’s approach invalidates the very figure of a singer-audience 
communication chain – if not the notion of semiotic communication at large. At 
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stake would be, not authorial inventions or intentions, but instances of 
historically and phenomenologically indeterminate “traditional thought”: 
The thought of an oral tradition – the significant structures of its 
informational data – lies in the linguistic texture of its songs. A singer 
effects, not a transfer of his own intention, but a conventional realisation 
of traditional thought for his listeners, including himself. This thought 
does not originate with any one individual; rather, it has been organised 
and has accumulated during millenia of cultural experience. This thought 
is realised and phenomenalised, however, by individuals at particular 
moments of time. This description does not correlate with our common 
understanding of communication if that term is taken to imply a pipe-line 
transfer of information from singer to listener. (Peabody, 176) 
Performative instances of traditional thought acquire, in Peabody, a status quite 
comparable to that of ideationally self-sufficient language-wholes: 
For the traditional listener, who may be a bard himself, traditional songs 
constitute a complete sign world in which nothing extraneous (i.e. 
environmental or individualistic) occurs and in which there are no lacks or 
needs – a world, in this respect, of ideal self-sufficiency. (Peabody, 172.) 
The completeness of each sign-world would not be equivalent to the one of a 
world-view or an otherwise structured set of beliefs, attitudes or modes of 
thought. The connection of each performance to the truth of its idea would be 
one of an on-going life, impossible to stabilise – as the prospect of the next 
performance is constantly imminent. The “entire thought of a tradition is never 
sung” (Peabody, 179), since “every song is true but no song is ever the complete 
and permanent truth” (177). We could, perhaps configure the same as a 
surviving Gewesene.  
Formations of the Homeric type would persist through variable but 
equally valid constructs, all of which would be mimeses of an idea perfected in 
terms of a historically non-determinate tradition. Through each of its per-
formative instantiations, the idea at stake would emerge as addressable in its 
essential self-sufficiency; every semiotic instance would index the survival of its 
communicational perfectedness, but no instance would exhaust it. With each 
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performance, the dynamics of human-linguistic communicability would expose 
their historic potential anew.  
 
 
C.3.4. Linguistic Substance 
 
Form acquires a central importance in Lord. It refers to the level of 
elementary linguistic units, as well as to their assembly in larger units: 
The practice of oral narrative poetry makes a certain form necessary; the 
way in which oral epic songs are composed and transmitted leaves its 
unmistakable mark on the songs. That mark is apparent in the formulas 
and in the themes. It is visible in the structure of the songs themselves. 
(Lord, 141) 
 Formula is a key-concept in oral theory. Its emergence and hegemony, already 
implicitly suspected by Lord and further criticised or mitigated in more recent 
developments of oral theory, exposes the difficulty of thinking form in non-
textual terms.  
The presence of formulas as a lever of articulation of poetic compositions 
has been considered as the safest indication or even proof of the fact that the 
corresponding semiotic construct conforms to principles of traditional, if not oral, 
literary life. The term designates semantic units (mainly complexes of words 
making up a half or a whole line) standardised as means to meet the demands of 
given metrical norms or constraints. Lord reminds us of its definition by Parry as 
“a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical 
conditions to express a given essential idea” (Lord, 4). Assembled formulaic units 
form themes: "Following Parry, I have called the groups of ideas regularly used 
in telling a tale in the formulaic style of traditional song the "themes" of the 
poetry” (68). On the grounds of formulaic compositional principles, metrics 
would assume the structural and generative function of a poetic “grammar”:  
Without the metrical restrictions of the verse, language substitutes one 
subject for another in the nominative case, keeping the same verb; or 
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keeping the same noun, it substitutes one verb for another. In studying the 
patterns and systems of oral narrative verse we are in reality observing the 
grammar of poetry, a grammar superimposed, as it were, on the grammar 
of the language concerned. (Lord, 35-36) 
The idea that formulaic grammar is superimposed on an otherwise natural 
linguistic order, echoes a textual bias – the premises of which have been haunting 
discussions and tensions over the notion of formula itself. These discussions have 
been, tellingly enough, centred on the issue of the degree to which the use of 
formulas would be compatible with genuine poetic creativity – the degree to 
which a formulaic singer can also be viewed as a “poet”. How far would 
formulas be quasi-mechanical means to comply with metrical regularities? 
Would they, perhaps, also allow a choice of words according to their purely 
semantic or otherwise artistic value? Lord is significantly ambiguous in this 
respect. There are passages in which he suggests that formulaic grammar is more 
restrictive or mechanical than current linguistic grammar: 
Or, to use another figure, the formula is the offspring of the marriage of 
thought and sung verse. Whereas thought, in theory at least, may be free, 
sung verse imposes restrictions, varying in degrees of rigidity from 
culture to culture, that shape the form of thought. Any study of formula 
must therefore properly begin with  consideration of metrics and music, 
particularly by the young singer first becoming aware of the demands of 
his art. (Lord, 31) 
At the same time, Lord sees formulaic regularity as resisting the textual notion of 
mechanical repetition:  
We may otherwise think of the formula as being ever the same no matter 
from whose lips it proceeds. Such uniformity is scarcely true of any 
elements of language; for language always bears the stamp of its speaker. 
The landscape of formula is not a level steppe with a horizon which 
equalizes all things in view, but rather a panorama of high mountains and 
deep valleys and of rolling foothills; and we must seek the essence of 
formula at all points in the landscape. (Lord, 31) 
Lord insists that formulas are not repetitive clichés. The singer, he says, 
“depends less and less on learning formulas and more and more on the process 
of substituting other words in the formula patterns” (Lord, 36) thus constantly 
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creating new formulas “by putting new words into old pattern” (43). Elsewhere 
in his work, the notion of a pre-established metrical schema imposing formulas 
as mechanical devices, is further mitigated. The hexametric structure is likened, 
not to a poetic grammar superimposed on natural language, but to the grammar 
of an entire language-whole that should be understood as paradigmatic with 
respect to language in general:  
A style thus systematized by scholars on the foundation of analysis of 
texts is bound to appear very mechanical. Again we may turn to language 
itself for a useful parallel. The classical grammar of language, with its 
paradigms of tenses and declensions, might give us the idea that language 
is a mechanical process. The parallel, of course, goes even further. The 
method of language is like that of oral poetry, substitution in the 
framework of grammar. (Lord, 35) 
The young singer, Lord affirms, learns his art “like a child learning words, or 
anyone learning a language without a school method; except that the language 
here being learned is the special language of poetry” (22).  
If formulaic regularity is the grammar of a specific mode of linguistic life, 
then formulas are simply the words of oral poetry – while words are its letters. 
The issue, in other terms, is whether and how a Wort proper to the Homeric 
language might be readable through what we are accustomed to perceiving and 
interpreting as word in the current sense of the term1. Peabody drives oral theory 
                                                   
1 For a concise and detailed summary of the on-going debate on the formula, see Russo’s 
(1997) contribution to the New Companion to Homer (250 et seq). One of the most interesting 
insights on the matter seems to be Nagler’s, who insists that the very principle of metrical 
equivalence defining a formula remains rather unclear, if not epistemically undefinable. His 
problematics about the “generative nature of the formula” suggest that formula could be 
configuring something close to the non-semiotic Benjaminian Name. He seems, however, to 
confuse platonic idealism with phenomenology, form with Gestalt. Russo presents his views as 
follows: 
“Such open-endedness is not merely descriptive but has a theoretical centre, an abstract, 
pre-verbal mental template for which no English term exists and which may be called 
Gestalt. It is closer to the concept called sphota by Sanskrit grammarians and has looser 
resemblances to the Platonic Idea, the Jungian archetype, and the Levi-Saussurian 
structural model of myth. It is at this level of phenomena that the true formula exists, as a 
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further in this direction, as he explicitly discards both the idea of purely metrical 
constraints and the problematics of semantic value of units identified according 
to textual principles of morphology and semantics. He rethinks the formula. He 
sees it as referring to what would be better understood as elementary linguistic 
substances, largely accounting for the specificity of the Greek epic language-
whole.  
Peabody reminds us, to begin with, that the hexameter “was invented 
long after the event to describe existing fact and it does not necessarily identify 
elements that played any operative role in the actual process by which traditional 
verses were composed” (Peabody, 17). Formulas would not be aggregates of 
words used to fit pre-established metric necessities. They would be different 
kinds of elementary lectic units, reproducible in ways that make them look like 
clusters of word-units, in the textual sense of the term. Rather than words 
combined and made to fit the metrical formal unit of a colon, formulas would be 
grammatically indeterminate elementary substances, which actually generate the 
metrical regularity that they are supposed to conform to:  
Cola exist not as intervals between prescribed caesuras but as groups of 
closely associated syllables. These groups of syllables, whose form is that 
of their traditional linguistic substance, create the phenomena of caesuras 
                                                                                                                                                       
mental potentiality; all the actual verbalisations made by the reciter are called 
“allomorphs” of this one entity.” (251)  
Russo himself arrives at interesting concluding suggestions, stressing the need to 
acknowledge and investigate the specific literary status that repetition acquires in Homer, as 
opposed to our modern  sense of textual creativity: 
“Anyone who reads Homer in Greek becomes eventually aware that repetition is 
constantly at play, some of its forms being more immediately evident that others. The 
uniquely satisfying effect that Homeric style has upon us derives from our perception, at 
different levels ranging from fully conscious to subliminal in varying degrees, that 
patterns of sentence, phrase, word, rhythm, and sound are repeatedly returning, and 
recalling one another with a subtlety that defies precise definition and classification. It is 
this refusal of the formulaic to be defined and classified, and its increasing identification 
with the organised functioning of language on multiple levels simultaneously, that the 
studies of the sixties and seventies successfully, even if sometimes unintentionally, 
brought to light.” (252) 
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as they join in sequence to form utterance periods or verses. When the 
colon is considered as a group of syllables one is no longer dealing with 
theoretical or abstract form but with the actual substance of language. 
(Peabody, 70)  
Through the extremely wide, albeit finite, variety of their possible combinations, 
these “lexical elements” would generate the colonic pattern that makes up what 
has subsequently been read as a dactylic hexametric line1: 
Language does not often occur as a random sequence of simple signs. It 
occurs in syntactic periods compounded of sign units. In the Greek epos 
traditional sign units that are at once metrical, formulaic, and lexical units 
join in traditional ways to form utterance periods. Even if these colonic 
units are more extended than what we ordinarily call single words, they 
characteristically function like single lexical elements. (Peabody,118) 
From the point of view of the phenomenology of its production, the 
semiotic construct of a performance would emerge according to dynamics proper 
to the process of utterance of its epic Worten. A series of formational levels, from 
elementary to more complex ones are articulated to each other: from cola and 
lines to stanzaic phrases and periods, and from there to larger units of stanza-
development and themes. The process is not understood as the gradual 
succession of elements adding up to syntagmatic completeness. Each level 
(starting with the one of the very first uttered unit) contains, in a sense, a 
formational core the elaboration of which generates the higher or more complex 
ones:  
The degree of precision (the scale) to which a semantic period is focused 
or realized (made phenomenologically real) depends on the number of 
restrictive elements added to the initial utterance. […] The semantic scope 
of the stanza is generally established with the first lexical element uttered, 
but subsequent elements and clauses reduce this scope and make its 
reference specific. […] Once a full semantic period (a stanza) has been 
                                                   
1 The idea of a line basically structured not in terms of six metrical feet but in terms of 
four colonic units, indistinguishably rhythmic and semantic, has been advanced by Frankel since 
1926 (Russo 1997, 240) 
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realized, no single clause period within it (no mater how syntactically 
independent) is semantically independent. (Peabody, 127)  
A given thematic expansion or variation could thus be a gesture of repetition, 
elaboration or diversion with respect to a previous lectic or thematic cluster. It 
could also be one of correction of and compensation for a previous occurrence of 
an erratic twist. The overall process would be one of limps and lingerings, 
constantly re-focusing and controlling circumstantial occurrences, including 
alliterative and rhythmic ones1. 
 
 
C.3.5. Formational Wholes 
 
Let us now turn to the epic song as a formational whole. What relations 
would there be, between the whole that persists through varying performances, 
and the parts that these performances may be differently enacting and 
connecting to each other? 
The notion of story is central to Lord’s understanding of formational 
wholeness. “The stable skeleton of narrative” constitutes, as we have seen, the 
basic formative drive underlying the various performances of a recognisable 
song. Idea serves, in Lord, as synonymous to story. Recall: “Yet there is a basic 
idea or combination of ideas that is fairly stable” (Lord, 100). The elements that 
the story assembles and runs through would be the themes. Their articulation 
into a song, however, is not pictured as the orderly arrangement of a whole, 
through systematic assembling of parts. It is, rather, seen as the result of 
compositional work striving with the disturbing potential of distinct themes that 
have a “semi-independent life of their own” (94). More precisely: “at a number of 
points in any song there are forces leading in different directions, any one of 
                                                   
1 See especially Peabody’s description and analysis of different levels of compositional 
articulation (159; 219). 
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which the singer may take. If his experience of a particular song is weak, either as 
a whole or at any part, the force in a direction divergent from the one he has 
heard may be strongest” (120). Each theme would be a knot at which there is “a 
pull in two directions: one is toward the song being sung and the other is toward 
the previous uses of the same theme” (94). These directions are elsewhere 
specified as involving a “tension of essences” (97).  The story-idea would be an 
essence of a higher level, imposing its own unity as the grounds on which 
thematic tensions are resolved and the song emerges as a stable and identifiable 
compositional whole. The reconstruction of the story becomes the object of a 
reading that circumvents the philological task of emended textual uniformity:   
If one cannot reconstruct an original text, and if one cannot reconstruct 
with any degree of exactness the myriad thematic complexes which the 
poem has shown in the past, one can, I believe, reconstruct a basic form, a 
more or less stable core of the story. (Lord, 219)  
Lord also takes into consideration the shortcomings of this rather 
Procrustean solution to the problem – a solution that does not effectively displace 
the Wolfian conception of textual formness. He observes, for instance, that the 
“grand scale of ornamentation” is a component of the whole, as important as the 
story itself, deserving analogous reading attention. He also acknowledges that 
the former upsets the “close-knit unity” and relative self-sufficiency of the latter 
(148).  
Peabody’s approach tends to break more clearly with the philological 
conception of textual wholeness. Recall that songs, for Peabody, are 
remembrances of the truth of songs sung. This truth would not lie in the 
narrative skeleton of a story. Story, in Peabody, acquires an eventual importance 
only as a tentatively efficient or “cybernetic control” – not as the conceptual 
construct, the form of which would be repeated or imitated. Peabody insists that 
the song “is not an ideal, a mental model which the singer strives to imitate; it is 
a control, a flange, that keeps him on the track” (217). As such, “the song pattern 
[…] is not a generative, substantive feature of traditional thought”. It follows that 
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the “intrusion of a song pattern into a composition does not necessarily have 
anything to do with the unity of that composition” (260). 
Stories thus lose much of the significance that is usually attributed to them 
as drives or grounds of formational wholeness. Even more importantly, 
Peabody’s perspective turns the phenomenic compositional unit of a song into 
the most variable component of an essentially persisting poetic formation. “The 
phenomenalized surface of meaning associated with song is not unimportant, 
but it is the least stable aspect of the tradition, unreasonable as that may seem to 
us” (Peabody, 218). The poetic formation, at the level of its phenomenic enactment 
in semiotic wholes, would thus be flexible or even always necessarily incomplete 
– and thus never actually fragmentary, in a strict sense of the term.  
“A traditional composition grows in mounting levels (from clauses to 
stanzas, to passages, to sections) until one unit stands realized on the topmost 
level, whatever level that may be” (Peabody, 195). Contingency entails the 
uncertainty of the overall phenomenon of performance, and sets the very point at 
which a performance stops and the song emerges as a semiotic construct. The 
topmost level realised by a compositional occurrence cannot be foretold, nor 
understood in terms of the degree to which completeness has been reached. It 
would be the eventful result of a performative activity that Peabody describes, 
very tellingly, as made of “anaphoric patterns of association and varied 
repetition” (182).  
Lord’s “tensions of essences” would thus not be resolved on the stable 
grounds of a narrative wholeness. The essential wholeness of an epic formation 
would even consist in such tensions, marking the uncertainty of the knots that 
connect the parts of its performative enactments. The result would be what 
philological poetics venture to emend and poetic translations strive to 
domesticate. As Peabody remarks, “the surrealism that we sense is due largely to 
the synthetic compression that our analytic techniques effect when applied to a 
recorded text” (Peabody, 257).  
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The reading that Peabody proposes, contesting such techniques, would 
work by almost reversing philological historicae rationes: “One will do better 
tripping the text of the Works & Days down to its first eight verses than arguing 
the first ten away from the remainder of the text” (Peabody, 264). Such a post-
philological reading would expose the reader’s language to the specificity of the 
Greek epic formation of traditional truth. It could be very close to translating an 
ideational form indexing a perfected mode of human-linguistic communicability.  
Approaches such as those of Lord and, especially, Peabody have been 
supported by a systematic reference to the figure of traditional oral poetry. 
Nevertheless, nothing prevents their theoretical insights from applying, in spite 
of their pseudo-historical rhetoric, to the overall process of emergence and 
reproduction of the Homeric scripta. The latter would constitute the tradition of a 
poetic formation, persisting through variance and change of its semiotic 
instances, in ways analogous to those suggested by the imagery of oral 
performance. The notion of performance could, indeed, be extended so that it 
also covers events of copying or editing of scribal material1. The Byzantine 
vulgate would mark a topmost level of compositional activity, reached under 
conditions that have driven the Homeric formation to some of the most engaging 
extremes. 
One would have to read Homeric scripta as varied instances of mimetic 
recollection, rather than as supports of historical memory. Their language would 
consist in units and articulations that categories and analytical tools of 
conventional linguistics may fail to adequately account for. Their formational 
unity would be variably formed through tense and uncertain junctures between 
                                                   
1 Note Finnegan’s (1977) suggestion that the element of “performance” might be more 
present in written literature, especially poetry, than we usually tend to suspect (273). This agrees 
with the suggestions of Cerquiglini (1989, 60) concerning the manuscript tradition of medieval 
poetry: many features usually assumed to be oral in origin may very well be proper to 
manuscript writing and copying itself. 
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utterly fragmentary, but solid parts and pervasively totalising, but precarious 
wholes. 
 
 
C.3.6. The Historicist Bias 
 
Oral theorists tend to outdo their insights on the issue of Homeric 
readability through their insistence on the historicist schema of orality – more 
specifically, of oral tradition as historically specific cultus vitae. Written traditions 
would succeed oral ones as distinct cultural realms in history; if the latter persist, 
they would only do so through remains that fail to ascertain their historical 
actuality. The point I want to make is that the challenge that the readability of 
formations like the Homeric one may present to reading is thus paradoxically 
neutralised. Oral theory would save Homer from the principles of textual 
formness only in a way that also allows these principles to be sheltered against 
the eventually disturbing implications of a translative reading of Homeric 
eccentricity. The case of Lord is quite characteristic in this respect. 
Lord returns to the basic Wolfian hypotheses according to which the oral 
composition of the Homeric poems has occurred in a cultural realm of orality, 
essentially untouched by the invention and development of writing. His answer 
to the correlative question, of how the passage to written transcripts occurred, is 
very different from Wolf’s – so much so, that it can be characterised as almost 
pseudo-historical. He advances, in this respect, a hypothesis the figure of which 
has proven as tenacious as it is simple – or even simplistic. Through oral 
dictation, a practically illiterate Homeric bard passes on to a freshly literate scribe 
a specimen of oral performance, which is faithfully transposed to writing. The 
Homeric “oral dictated texts” would significantly differ from the “autograph oral 
texts” of literate bards or from “transitional texts” produced by “non-descript 
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hybrids”1 in cases of oral traditions developing along and influenced by written 
ones2. The fact that, according to this schema, writing had not affected the 
Homeric oral tradition, is seen by Lord as having enabled the purely oral 
character of Homeric poetry to be retained through the dictating performance 
and be registered as such by the scribe. The possibility of a series of recording 
events, entailing different kinds of transcripts, circulating and affecting further 
performances and recordings, is not taken into consideration. The effects of the 
very situation of dictation on performance are acknowledged but minimised3. 
The possible effects of different waves of alphabetic transcription are overlooked. 
                                                   
1 Lord elaborates on this point, pp. 124-130 and summarises, pp. 149-150. 
 
2 Peabody does not contest Lord’s overall conception of a historical gap between oral and 
written traditions. Nevertheless, he situates Homer in a rather ambiguous or border-line position 
in this respect. The era of Greek epic orality would be a stage of maturity of techniques of 
composition and performance of a much broader tradition, the beginnings of which are traced 
back to the Mesopotamia of the 3rd millennium B.C. Homer (as opposed to Hesiod) would be 
situated at the closing of this tradition and the opening of a new one. His poems would be closer 
to hybrids, significantly affected by Athenian cultural policies of the 6th century. See especially 
Peabody, 504, n. 127. 
 
3 Lord acknowledges, of course, that the dictating performance must have displayed 
certain peculiarities or even anomalies, as compared to normal performances. The specificity or 
unusualness of the circumstances would have altered its temporal deployment:  
“In a way this was just one more performance for the singer, one more in a long series. 
Yet it was the strangest performance he had ever given. There was no music and no song, 
nothing to keep him to the regular beat except the echo of previous singings and the 
habit they had formed in his mind. Without these accompaniments it was not easy to put 
the words together as he usually did. The tempo of composing the song was different, 
too. Ordinarily the singer could move forward rapidly from idea to idea, from theme to 
theme. But now he had to stop very often for the scribe to write down what he was 
saying, after every line or even after part of a line. This was difficult, because his mind 
was far ahead. But he accustomed himself to this new process at last, and finally the song 
was finished.” (Lord, 124.) 
In spite of the above, there would be no change of poetics at this critical point of passage 
from orality to writing (128). 
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The issue of the exact mechanisms of further written reproduction of the initial 
transcript, as well as the one of the standardisation of a vulgate, are not 
addressed. The extant manuscripts are assumed to have somehow directly 
descended from the initial recording, retaining its basic characteristics.  
The advent of literacy is thus seen as enabling the quasi-automatic scribal 
conservation of the basic features of oral poeticity. At the same time there would 
occur a drastic marginalisation of oral tradition, preventing the merging or 
mutual influence between the norms of the new culture and the remains of the 
old. As a result, oral tradition was not actually transmitted in a strict sense of the 
term: “Oral tradition did not become transferred or transmuted into a literary 
tradition of epic, but was only moved further and further into the background, 
literally into the back country, until it disappeared” (Lord, 138).  
Written traditions would preserve Homer, but only as the remains of a 
distant past, the actuality of which is drastically neutralised. Homeric orality 
would thus be not only dead and foreign, but also incongruous to living literary 
norms. Homer is pushed even further in the position attributed to it by the 
Wolfian figure of historical tenebrae. Wolfian historicae rationes persist in the 
background of Lord’s rationale. The problem, however, is no longer the 
deficiency of the transmission mechanisms, but the historical gap between 
written and oral literary traditions.  
The above have crucial implications with respect to the reading of the 
Homeric poems – the degree and the way in which their readability is enacted. 
On the one hand, the issue is re-stated and re-affirmed as an open one: one should 
venture to address Homeric poetry in the specificity of its language. On the other 
hand, the actual tackling of Homeric readability is somehow seen as historically 
impossible. The eccentricity of non-textual language can be acknowledged and 
even described; its historical circumscription, however, prevents its challenge 
from spilling over and upsetting the order of textual formness. An equivalent 
historical bias is echoed in Peabody when, on the grounds of the “fundamental 
difference between the semantic behaviour of oral utterance and the semantic 
303 
C.3. Reading Homer 
behaviour of written statement” (127), it postulates that epic orality is “far more 
important to users than interesting to onlookers” (208).  
The paradox of the oral-theoretical standpoint is also expressed by the 
current tendency to regard oral theory as strictly concerning the production of the 
Homeric artefact. The question of the “so what?” of oral theory with respect to 
the reading of Homer remains characteristically pending. Answers tend to be 
sought in the direction of the phenomenology of reception of originally oral 
artefacts1. I would suggest that one should rather start by checking the historicist 
bias implicit in the very distinction between orality and writing as historical 
categories. 
 
 
C.3.7. Non-textual Form 
 
Oral theory can be better appreciated, in its insightful implications on the 
readability of the Homeric scripta, if one considers its use of the notion of orality 
as a rhetorical device. Its status would be catachrestic, and the corresponding 
                                                   
1 The New Companion to Homer is quite characteristic in this respect. The “so what?” 
question is explicitly raised by Foley (1979) in his article on the “Oral tradition and its 
implications”, where he criticises oral theorists for their “virtually exclusive attention to 
composition at the expense of reception” (164). The article concludes by insisting on the quest of 
an approach to reading and poetics at large, which would make oral rhetoric “fit the world of the 
reader” (173). Very characteristic is also the case of Bakker (1997). His essay proposes a radically 
oralist approach. Homeric diction would be transcribed “special speech”, analysable through a 
“discourse analysis” that would understand Homeric language as the direct expression of an 
individual “flow of consciousness”, “never meant to be read” (292). 
In a different setting, Havelock (1986) stresses the need to re-read both archaic and classic 
Greek texts with an eye to the overtones of their oral background. He maintains that modern 
textual academic bias has led to a systematic mis-translation of the texts of epic tradition. At the 
same time, archaic orality is seen by Havelock as practically inaccessible to the modern reader – 
that is, as untranslatable: “classic orality is untranslatable” (96). 
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problematics pseudo-historical; they would reflect the lack of better terms for 
what is actually at stake. At stake, I think, is the possibility of understanding how 
literary language, independently of its semiotic status, presents us with the issue 
of form in ways not complying with historicist principles of textual formness.  
Wolf, as we have seen, paradigmatically indexed principles of textual 
formness through his detection of the defects of the Homeric scripta. 
Compositional coherence and idiomatic consistency would have to be discerned 
in and further imposed on the scripta, so that they assume a form readable as 
properly historical. Such problematics echo the modern metaphysics that Derrida 
(1968) has identified as logocentric. They involve the postulate that language, if 
adequately formed, can provide access to truth, transcending the disturbing 
mediation of signifying mechanisms – of the signifiant. The linguistic sign could, 
in other words, be driven to a condition of transparency and presence with 
respect to its presumed meaning – the signifié. In the case of philology, the 
signified truth would be a cultural form, while the disturbing and dispensable 
signifier would be the semiotic constructs of the transmission chains. 
Let us take for granted, for the purposes of my present argument, 
Derrida’s use of the term logos1 and concentrate on the metaphysics that it has 
been made to stand for. What I would like to critically discuss, in this respect, is a 
supplementary but determinant aspect of the Derridean notion of logocentrism – 
namely, the phonocentric bias that is supposed to be its most typical and perhaps 
most crucial correlative: 
[…] logocentrisme: métaphysique de l’écriture phonétique (par exemple 
l’alphabet) qui n’a été en son fond – pour des raisons énigmatiques mais 
essentielles et inaccessibles à un simple relativisme historique – 
l’ethnocentrisme le plus original et le plus puissant […]  (Derrida 1968, 
11). 
                                                   
1 If the metaphysics concerned are those of Western modernity, ratio would depict their 
specificity more accurately – including the ratiocentric misreading or mistranslation of Greek 
logos. Derrida, following Heidegger, has the tendency to generalise his suggestions applying 
them to “Western” metaphysics at large.  
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 Logocentrism would involve a certain kind of readability attributed to 
writing (especially to, and through the model of alphabetic writing). It would 
consist in reading the written sign as if it referred to an oral one, through which 
truth emerges in its postulated presence. More specifically, the written word 
would be read as a “signe signifiant un autre signifiant, signifiant lui-même une 
vérité éternelle, éternellement pensée et dite dans la proximité du logos présent” 
(27). Gramma would thus be made, on logocentric premises, to echo or to 
represent phone, while the latter would be idealised as the medium par excellence 
in which logos presents itself as transcendental meaning. Logocentric 
metaphysics would, accordingly, attribute to the paradigm of oral linguistic 
communication a privileged significance: 
Le système de ‘s’entendre-parler’ à travers la substance phonique – qui se 
donne comme signifiant non-exterieur, non-mondain, donc non-
empirique ou non-contingent – a dû dominer pendant toute une époque l’ 
histoire du monde à partir de la différence entre le mondain et le non-
mondain, le dehors et le dedans, l’ idéalité et la non-idéalité, l’ universel et 
le non-universel le transcendental et l’ empirique etc. (Derrida 1968, 17). 
Writing would acquire a dominated position, from the site of which, its practice 
would also inevitably resist the metaphysics of voiced logos: 
Telle est la situation de l’ écriture dans l’ histoire de la métaphysique: 
thème abaissé, réprimé, déplacé mais exerçant une pression permanente 
obsédante depuis le lieu où il reste contenu. Il s’ agit de biffer une écriture 
redouteé parce qu’ elle rature elle-même la présence du Propre dans la 
parole. (Derrida, 1986, 381) 
Écriture would involve the perplexing dimension of a textualité, the intricacies of 
which would constantly tend to deconstruct the conceptual schemas and 
dialectics of logocentric discourse. Derrida thus retains the term text, but turns it 
against the very principles of formness with which Wolf identifies it. 
Throughout this thesis, I have been critical with respect to the term text – 
and I have understood this reservation as including the Derridean or, more 
generally, post-modern use of the term. Let me elaborate on this point. 
306 
C.3. Reading Homer 
 The debate on the Homeric Question, from Wolf to oral theorists, 
suggests that there is a crucial significance, indeed, to the very separation of 
orality from writing, as notions referring to historically and epistemically distinct 
realms of human-linguistic life. On the grounds of this typically modern 
separation writing, rather than orality, has actually been privileged as a linguistic 
form enabling privileged access to historical truth. The figure of written 
textuality has provided the paradigm for linguistic formness at large. According 
to this paradigm, relations between phone and gramma have been understood as 
historical – and phone has been idealised. Logocentrism, in other words, has been 
based on a graphocentric, rather than phonocentric bias1. In the case of Wolf, for 
instance, textual writing assumes a historically valid formative role with respect 
to all kinds of linguistic vestigia – including pre-textual scribal practices as well as 
oral precedents. As we have seen, Wolf’s restored textuality aims at recovering 
oral originals no more than it aims at returning to archetypal written documents: 
it exposes the historical form that both these linguistic regimes would obscure or 
hide. In the case of oral theory, orality acquires a specificity, the readability of 
which is neutralised under the acknowledged weight of written literary 
traditions.  
                                                   
1 Stock (1983) analyses the passage to literacy and written culture, situated  at the 
scholasticist closing of the European middle-ages. He reminds us that the emergent modern 
metaphysics of language was moulded according to the acute textual awareness of Scripturae and 
to the corresponding reading experience. We can surmise that the modern understanding of 
relations between logos and phone involved the transposition, to the idea of voice, of a figure of 
consistency and immediate presence, the prototype of which resided in textualisable scribal 
constructs. From a more theoretical perspective, Agamben describes as follows the inherent 
connection between phonocentrism and graphocentrism: 
“La métaphysique, en effet, ne signifie pas simplement le primat de la voix sur le 
gramma.  Si la métaphysique est la pensée qui pose à l’origine la voix, il est également 
vrai que cette voix est pensée, depuis le début, comme supprimé, comme Voix. Définir 
l’horizon de la métaphysique simplement par la suprématie de la ÊˆÓ‹ signifie penser la 
métaphysique sans la négativité qui lui est consubtantielle. La métaphysique est toujours 
déjà grammatologie et celle-ci est fondamentalogie, au sens où est attribué au gramma (à 
la Voix) la fonction d’un fondement ontologique négatif.” (Agamben 1982, 81-82) 
307 
C.3. Reading Homer 
The joint gesture of the idealisation of phone and the historicisation of 
orality can thus be considered as a rhetorical device through which principles of 
textual formness extend their validity over the domain of linguistic semiosis at 
large. We could, in fact, easily reverse the Derridean statement about the position 
of writing. Such would be the condition of orality, in the modern sense of the 
term: a figure repressed through its monumental idealisation, displaced to the 
margins of historical formness, and permanently obsessing or even destabilising, 
from there, the textual paradigm of linguistic formations. 
The hypothesis that the relations between scribal and vocal signs involve 
historically distinct realms of oral and written traditions, needs to be questioned 
as such. The notion of textuality presupposes and sustains this schema. This is 
why it should be used with extreme care. It cannot, in any case, provide the 
conceptual support of an effective critique of modern metaphysics. Its use by 
Derridean deconstruction has, more often than not, been accompanied by a 
simplified conception of orality, taking the logocentric historical idealisation of 
phone for granted. Disputing these premises, one should understand human-
linguistic form as running through the fundamentally textual distinction between 
oral and written cultures. Phone and gramma could be different media of 
linguistic semiosis, differently enacted under different contingencies – but also 
elements proper to essentially human-linguistic life in all its manifestations, 
cutting through historical categorisations of cultural realms of orality and 
writing.  
One of the most significant contributions of the oral theory of Homer lies 
in how it has exposed a challenge of readability that invalidates, not only the 
reading of writing in terms of textual formness, but also the correlative 
idealisation of the figure of orality. None of these two kinds of linguistic signs 
would permit us to expect that meaning can immediately present itself through 
language. Relations of signs to human-linguistic essence would always be 
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enacted in gestures or processes of non-analogical mimesis, refracted indexation 
and toilsome recollection – necessitating an analogous awareness on the part of 
all reading. Homer thus exemplifies how the issue of readability can be raised in 
non-textual terms for both vocal and scribal semiotic constructs – which might 
enable us to theoretically probe the very relations between scribal and vocal 
semiosis. 
 
 
C.3.8. Linguistic Traditions 
 
According to the Benjaminian paradigm of literary formations, semiosis at 
large, whether scribal or vocal, would be the mimetic enactment of ideational 
forms, indexing instances of the naming-language of purely human-linguistic 
communicability, under historically conditioned contingencies of 
communication. Naming-language has been understood by Benjamin on the 
grounds of the Biblical allegory of Adamic condition. His insistence on the role of 
sound as a formational principle suggests that figures such as those of phone or 
voice could be retained – provided we understand them in the sense of the pre- or 
non-semiotic addressive potential proper to the communicability of human 
essence1. Both scribal and vocal signs would involve this potential – an essential 
element of all manifestations of human-linguistic life.  
Literary formations would persist as historic precisely because they would 
be irreducible to their semiotic carrier, in any of its modalities. A surviving mode 
of indexing purely human language would be at stake in all semiotic 
instantiations of a persisting formation, whether vocal or scribal – especially in 
constructs that stand as extremes particularly revelatory of the corresponding 
idea. Questions would thus arise, such as: What specific aspects of the idea are 
liable to be brought to the fore by the different kinds of semiotic constructs that 
                                                   
1 See our discussion of Benjamin’s Sprache in B.3.2. 
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reproduce it? In what ways and under which conditions does each kind attain its 
moment of readability? 
In the case of Homer, the problem of the connections between scribal and 
vocal semiosis remains a crucial one, but it should not be solved on the grounds 
of a historicist separation between cultural realms of orality and writing1. Scribal 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 The separation between orality and writing as distinct historical realms has been under 
systematic criticism, both in the field of Homeric studies and in the wider one of oral or 
traditional poetry. According to Foley (1997), in his contribution to the New Companion to Homer, 
there would be:  
“a very gradual (and never complete) shift from one technology to the other, with a 
continuing persistence of oral traditions and their expressive strategies long after the 
appearance and adoption of literacy for certain activities […]. In this spirit it is wise to 
discard absolute categories of oral versus written and to conceive of the Iliad and the 
Odyssey as oral-derived traditional texts.” (163).  
As Russo (1997) remarks, in his contribution to the same volume, the notion of a 
specifically and exclusively oral Homeric poetry was mitigated since the 1960s, by studies 
situated in the Parry-Lord tradition, which kept revising the nature and semantic value of the 
formula – such as those of Hainsworth and Hoekstra, for instance. 
Finnegan (1977), addresses the broader field of oral poetic cultures. The study opts for the 
“denial of a clear-cut differentiation between oral and written literature” since “the oral/written 
distinction, so far as it exists, is more like a continuum, or perhaps a complex set of continuums” 
(272). Cerquiglini (1989), addressing mostly medieval literature, insists that the manuscript 
tradition is a factor in the formation (not in the simple expression or reproduction) of an 
emergent language – a factor as determinant as oral tradition may be.  
For a concise general overview regarding the relations between orality and writing, see 
Ong (1982). Ong retains the distinction between “primary oral cultures” entirely foreign to 
writing and literate cultures combining written traditions with oral practices. The former are 
rather grossly identified as governed by the “psychodynamics” of a “verbomotor life-style” (36; 
68) corresponding to a unified and centralized economy favouring interiorization (71). The 
introduction and expansion of literacy and writing technologies are seen as drastically 
“restructuring consciousness” (see especially chap. 4). The picture gets more complicated and the 
analysis becomes more sophisticated when Ong attributes to orality tensions and complexities 
that are often considered as limited to writing: “looking back from the break made by writing, 
one can see that the pipeline is broken even earlier by spoken words, which do not themselves 
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and vocal practices, oral and written semiotic constructs, would constantly 
entertain, between them, relations over-determined by the mimetic connection of 
both to a perfected ideational form. Historical changes affecting the 
reproducibility of literary works could entail the passage from one kind of 
semiosis to the other, especially from vocal to scribal reproduction – and, 
eventually, to the field of electronic semiosis. There would be no reason to 
overrule the possibility that written transcription has functioned, under given 
conditions, as a means to record and reproduce oral constructs – just as oral 
performances may reflect developments occurring in scribal copies1. Both kinds 
of semiosis would, in any case, be affected by a more general trend towards what 
Benjamin has identified as mechanical reproducibility – each in its own degrees, 
means and ways. The readability of each instance of semiotic reproduction 
would be determined not only by the difference between the vocal and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
transmit an extramental world of presence as through a transparent glass” (167). 
 
1 A few remarks could be added here on  the complicated issue of the relations between 
Homer and writing and, more specifically, Greek alphabetic writing. This discussion has 
interesting implications with respect to the question of alphabeticity itself, in its relations both to 
a general theory of language and to the history of “Western civilisation”. Aspects of these 
implications have been brought to the foreground by the otherwise exaggerated havoc provoked 
by Bernal’s Black Athena (1987) – see also footnotes of section A.1.3 above. 
For an account of the long-standing debate on Homer and writing, see Lorimer (1948). 
For an interesting recent development see Powell (1991), and the abridged version in Powell’s 
contribution to New Companion to Homer (1997). Powell returns to the argument that the Greek 
alphabet was invented for the sake of recording hexametric poetry – initially formulated in 1952 
by H. T. Wade-Gery in The poet of the Iliad. The historical aspects of Powell’s study, pertaining to 
the dating of the emergence of Homeric poetry and of the Greek alphabet may be questionable, 
although tellingly illustrated. What would mostly interest us would be  his, technical rather than 
theoretical, inquiry on how the Greek-alphabetic phonography was specifically adapted to the 
reproduction and circulation, not of human voice or orality in general, but of epic oral poetry in 
particular. 
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scribal medium, but also by parallel developments of technological levels and 
modes of mechanicity, affecting both media1. 
History would be a field in which vocal or scribal constructs, along with 
the emergent electronic ones, deploy their specificity as different media of 
reproductive mimesis, each constantly upsetting the self-sufficiency of the others. 
Through complex reproductive trajectories, formations would persist, making 
history. This means that the notion of tradition would retain its importance, if 
appropriately reconfigured, over and above the distinction between different 
media of semiotic reproduction, or the separation of corresponding cultural eras. 
Traditions would be formations persisting, through semiotic change and 
variance, as reproducible and translatable originals. As such, they would be 
carried over (and, in a sense, would carry, rather than be carried by) historical 
settings or cultural eras. The Gewesene of a formational tradition would have only 
contingent relations to individual or collective agencies of authorship, copying or 
editing, as well as to historical or aesthetic conceptual constructs. The kind of life 
that a tradition bears, would thus significantly differ, depending on the historical 
conditions through which it emerges and persists – such as those marking old 
and new ways of territorialisation and globalisation. Nonetheless, the survival of 
its instance of human-linguistic communicability, would not depend on these 
conditions – it would rather underlie or even over-determine them. 
Throughout modernity, principles of textual formness have moulded, not 
only our way of addressing antique literature, but also current practices of 
literary composition and publication. One can envisage the possibility that a 
different sense of linguistic formation, partly arising from the revisiting of old 
literary formations and partly from the challenge of newly emergent traditions, 
                                                   
1 The Benjaminian distinction between traditional or auratic and mechanical or 
expositional reproduction could be further elaborated in this respect. This should be in the 
direction of mitigating its simplistic dialectics, as well as of accounting for the specificity of 
electronic reproducibility and its ambiguous relations with both scribal and vocal registers. 
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might presently entail a different understanding of the facts of literary life. This 
should include our more recent literary past1 as well as the deployment of 
current literary practices – under conditions in which the distinction between the 
oral and the written tends to be practically invalidated by novel media of 
linguistic semiosis. 
                                                   
1 The Shakespearean original, for instance, may have emerged as tradition through 
processes comparable to those of the Homeric one. Both the Homeric and the Shakespearean 
originals would persist as reproducible and translatable, but neither the Homeric nor the 
Shakespearean idea would be reducible to a historically identifiable moment or era of 
anthropological life. 
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PART D. PROSOPA 
 
D.1. HUNCH-BACKING 
 
D.1.1. Intended Ends 
 
I now turn to the significance of theological problematics with respect to a 
critical theory of language and history. As we have seen, Benjamin, in Programm, 
designates the quest for a “logical site of metaphysics” as crucial to a critique of 
Kantian anthropology1. This quest would involve a post-Kantian approach to 
religious experience and theological thought, along with the reconfiguration of 
the idea of the human. The quest persists, albeit in more ambiguous terms, up to 
Benjamin’s later writings. Recall the introductory section of Begriff, in which the 
role of theology is likened to the one of a disfigured hidden expert: a 
hunchbacked dwarf (buckliger Zwerg) who can pull the strings of the puppet 
chess-game of ideological conflicts, so that historical materialism invariably wins. 
Recall Passagen (N8, 1) where theology assumes, with respect to tasks of historic 
recollection, an analogous position, marked by a double interdiction. We are 
forbidden, Benjamin says, both to erase its role and to bring it to the fore, without 
some kind of conceptual accommodation:   
 
[…] aber im Eigedenken machen wir eine 
Erfahrung, die uns verbietet, die 
Geschichte grundsätzlich atheologischen 
zu begreifen, so wenig wir sie in 
unmittelbar theologischen Begriffen zu 
schreiben versuchen dürfen. (Passagen, 
589) 
[…] mais nous faisons, dans la 
remémoration, une expérience qui nous 
interdit de concevoir l’histoire de manière 
fondamentalement athéologique, même si 
nous n’avons pas, pour autant, le droit 
d’essayer d’écrire avec de concepts 
immédiatement théologiques. (Benjamin 
                                                   
1 See section B.3.4 above. 
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1993, 489) 
 
Benjamin is telling us that our understanding of history cannot follow modernity 
and its juxtaposition of Humanist anthropology to phantasms or figures of 
religious life or theological thought. One can thus not start from a fundamentally 
non-theological position. The explicit use of theological problematics is also 
disallowed. The reasons for this second interdiction could be various. They could 
be of an epistemological order: theory would have to retain its conceptual 
autonomy with respect to theology. They could also be related to the effects of 
the modern division of scholarly labour: this division has entailed a condition of 
quasi-illiteracy of secular intellectuals with respect to the expertise of theology in 
matters of language and history. The second interdiction could, most 
importantly, be due to the very nature of the first one – that is, to the very way in 
which theology assumes its continuous presence with respect to theory. This 
presence should not be the theology that modernity has rebuilt as its own 
counterpoint. 
 The Aufgabe essay exemplifies how steps could be made towards 
assigning to theological problematics their due place in theory. Paul de Man is 
very helpful, I think, in exposing the complexity and delicacy of the issue. He 
actually opens and closes his lecture with relevant remarks. From the outset, he 
takes his distance from approaches that criticise Benjamin for having regressed to 
a pre-modern spiritualism or mysticism. He does the same with approaches that 
praise Benjamin for having reattributed a revelatory sense of sacredness to poetic 
language, forgotten or obscured by modernity. De Man is very accurate, in my 
sense, when he thus reads Aufgabe against its misreading as a “religious 
statement of the fundamental unity of language” (Conclusions, 90). A gesture very 
characteristic of such a misreading is the one that understands the deictic 
reference of translative gesture to reine Sprache as implying figures of messianic 
teleology and redemption. The passage in Aufgabe, which could most easily lend 
itself to such a misreading is the following: 
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Wenn aber diese derart bis an 
messianische Ende ihrer Geschichte 
wachsen, so ist es die Übersetzung, welche 
am ewigen Fortleben der Werke um am 
unendlichen Aufleben der Sprachen sich 
entzündet, immer von neuen die Probe auf 
jenes heilige Wachstum der Sprachen zu 
machen: wie weit ihr Verborgenes von der 
Offenbarung entfernt sei, wie gegenwärtig 
es im Wissen um diese Entfernung werden 
mag. (Aufgabe, 14) 
Mais, lorsqu’elles [les langues] croissent de 
la sorte jusqu’au terme messianique de 
leur histoire, c’est à la traduction, qui tire 
sa flamme de l’éternelle survie des oeuvres 
et de la renaissance indéfinie des langages, 
qu’il appartient de mettre toujours 
derechef à l’épreuve cette sainte croissance 
des langues, pour savoir à quelle distance 
de la révélation se tient ce qu’elles 
dissimulent, combien il peut devenir 
présent dans le savoir de cette distance. 
(OE, I: 251) 
 
I suggest that the initial clause, introduced by Wenn, be read as 
hypothetical rather than temporal. Benjamin would thus be saying the following. 
If (or, even better, to the degree that) we think of the whole process of growth of 
languages from the perspective of a messianic end, translation assumes a very 
distinct function: it resists or even outdoes the transposition of this perspective 
within the field of human history. Translation, we are being emphatically 
reminded, depends on eternal (ewigen) or endless (unendlichen) survival of 
languages. Through its occurrence, the distance would be probed between the 
concealment of reine Sprache in linguistic phenomena and the prospect of its 
revelation. The knowledge of this distance (not its extinction or minimisation) 
would enact the ambiguous role of the element of reine Sprache in the very task of 
translation. The passage further suggests that reine Sprache is not a sacred 
language. It is the element of human-linguistic communicability, which 
constantly operates a separation between the historical realm of linguistic 
manifestations and the realm of messianic redemption. This entails a double 
interdiction, analogous to the one we encounter in Passagen. It disallows both the 
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rationalist erasure of the messianic from history, and its theocratic inscription 
into history. 
One can thus agree with de Man when he observes that “History, as 
Benjamin conceives it, is certainly not messianic, since it consists in the rigorous 
separation and acting out of the sacred from the poetic” (Conclusions, 92). Yet one 
cannot extend one’s agreement to de Man’s ensuing remark, according to which 
“reine Sprache, the sacred language, has nothing in common with poetic language 
[…] poetic language has nothing to do with it”. There is actually both a 
misreading and a misinterpretation in this statement. There is misreading in 
qualifying reine Sprache as sacred language. There is misinterpretation in 
understanding the “rigorous separation of the sacred from the poetic” as 
entailing the total irrelevance of sacredness (as well as of humanness) with 
respect to issues linguistic (as well as historical). We have already discussed the 
relevance of reine Sprache as purely human language, along with the issue of the 
possibility of translation1. Let us concentrate on the significance of sacredness – 
and of the messianic.  
One has to account, somehow, for the persistence, in Aufgabe, of concepts 
or arguments indexing theological problematics – and de Man refuses to do so. 
Recollection and survival are seen by Benjamin as ultimately regarding God’s 
thought or recollection (Gedanken Gottes, 10). Later in Aufgabe, a solution to the 
problem of the foreignness in languages (other than the precarious translative 
one) is seen as depending on the Wachstum der Religionen. Religious growth 
would enable the maturation, in all languages, of the seed of a higher language: 
“in den Sprachen den verhüllten Samen einer höheren reift” (14). All this could 
be related to the closing remarks on the perfect translatability of sacred texts, in 
their paradigmatic resistance to historical conditioning2. 
                                                   
1 See sections B.4.6. and B.4.7. above. 
 
2 See sections B.4.6. and B.4.9 above. 
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For Benjamin, human language cannot be confined to anthropological 
schemas of historical or cultural phenomenology; neither is it a mechanism of 
semiotic figures, of which ideas such as those of the human and the sacred would 
be the rhetorical by-products. Language inherently involves both the idea of 
human history and the question of its limits. As such, it fills-up the realm of 
otherwise empty temporal forms with different configurations of the constantly 
pending issue of the relations between the human and the non-human, the 
historic and the sacred. In this sense, there is, indeed, as de Man points out in 
conclusion, little room for the periodological schemas that breed the Humanist 
understanding of modernity. Yet de Man is wrong when he suggests that the 
currently viable alternative to theocracy can only be the understanding of 
language as a rhetorical structure entailing political history as its result and 
displacing all reference to the relations between the sacred and the human: 
For we now see that the nonmessianic, nonsacred, that is the political 
aspect of history is the result of the poetical structure of language, so that 
the political and poetical here are substituted in opposition to the notion 
of the sacred. To the extent that such a poetics, such a history, is 
nonmessianic, not a theocracy but a rhetoric, it has no room for certain 
historical notions such as the notion of modernity, which is always 
dialectical, that is to say, an essentially theological notion. (Conclusions, 93) 
Language is central to how Benjaminian metaphysics, Demanian 
deconstruction and Gadamerian hermeneutics understand the specificity of a 
post-modern theoretical awareness. Its centrality has different implications in 
each case. Gadamer, in his approach to language, retains the concealed, yet 
persistent historicist overtones of Heideggerian ontology. De Man rejects 
ontological historicism, but can only do so by erasing human history and politics 
under the poetics of semiotic phenomenicity. Benjamin, in his concern for 
linguistic historicity, insists not only on the separation but also on the mutual 
pertinence between the human and the sacred – as fundamental to both politics 
and poetics.  
It is solely on the grounds of a presumed modernity that religion and 
theology have assumed the status of a theocratic over-determination of human 
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history – in juxtaposition to its Humanist emancipation. Language, as 
understood by Benjaminian metaphysics, questions the notion of modernity (a 
gesture that de Man endorses) and exposes, accordingly, the fallacy of the very 
dialectics of Humanism and theocracy (an implication that de Man fails to 
address). The task would be to rethink the relations between the human and the 
sacred, beyond the modern premises of this polarity. There has been and still is a 
non-anthropological way to think the human, just as there has been and still is a 
non-theocratic way to think the sacred. Language would be the field of a 
politically mattering mutual separation and juncture of both these elements with 
respect to history. 
Even the notion of spirit (Geist) can be expected to persist under the 
Benjaminian perspective. It does so, joined to the idea of nihilistic politics, in 
Benjamin’s early “Theologisch-politisches Fragment”, the opening paragraph of 
which de Man cites in support of his conclusions. Let us also ponder on this 
fragment, with respect to which de Man no longer simply overlooks or misreads 
but actually hides. This short text bears explicitly on how the messianic may 
acquire some kind of pertinence with respect to the worldly, while remaining 
strictly separate from it. Here is the passage, as de Man translates it: 
 
Erst der Messias selbst vollendet alles 
historische Geschehen, und zwar in dem 
Sinne, daß er dessen Beziehung auf das 
Messianische selbst erst erlöst, vollendet, 
schafft. Darum kann nichts Historisches 
von sich aus sich auf Messianisches 
beziehen wollen. Darum ist das Reich 
Gottes nicht das Telos der historischen 
Dynamis; es kann nicht zum Ziel gesetzt 
werden. Historisch gesehen ist es nicht 
Ziel, sondern Ende. Darum kann die 
Ordnung des Profanen nicht am Gedanken 
Only the messiah himself puts an end to 
history, in the sense that it frees, 
completely fulfils the relationship of 
history to the messianic. Therefore, 
nothing that is truly historical can want to 
relate by its own volition to the messianic. 
Therefore the kingdom of God is not the 
telos of the dynamics of history, it cannot 
be posited as its aim; seen historically it is 
not its aim but its end, its termination; 
therefore the order of the profane cannot 
be constructed in terms of the idea of the 
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des Gottesreiches aufgebaut werden, 
darum die Theokratie keinen politischen 
sondern allein ein religiösen Sinn. Die 
politische Bedeutung der Theokratie mit 
aller Intensität geleugnet zu haben ist das 
größte Verdienst von Blochs ‘Geist der 
Utopia‘. (Benjamin 1989d, 203) 
sacred. Therefore theocracy does not have 
a political but only a religious meaning. To 
have denied the political significance of 
theocracy, to have denied the political 
significance of the religious, messianic view, to 
have denied this with all desirable 
intensity is the great merit of Bloch’s book 
The Spirit of Utopia. (Conclusions, 93) 
 
I underlined what de Man well translates but refuses to read. I italicised a 
paraphrase that de Man adds to the original, to support his interpretation. The 
issue, in this passage, is the denial of the political significance not of religious 
problematics in general, but of their theocratic configuration. Theocracy would 
be an understanding of history and politics based on the prospect of 
reconstructing human reality in accordance with figures of messianic 
transcendence. Benjamin seeks a different way of understanding how the mutual 
pertinence (Beziehung) between the sacred and the profane would be possible or 
opportune. 
In his comments on the passage, de Man insists on how Telos (very much 
like the English end) connotes both purpose and termination. The German 
original is unambiguous in this respect. Positing messianic redemption as a 
purpose (Ziel) in history, Benjamin says, is a misprision, since this actually 
implies positing the termination (Ende) of history. The messianic cannot be 
pertinent as a purposefully intended objective of human politics. De Man’s 
excursus is, in fact, revelatory. It reminds us of the ambiguity of Benjamin’s 
notion of Intention in the Aufgabe essay – and of de Man’s discarding of the 
notion. One could, indeed, try to understand the messianic as an object of 
linguistic Intention. Recall that Aufgabe inquires into how reine Sprache is indexed 
by linguistic manifestations without ever being reached or even purposefully 
intended as such. In an analogous way, the messianic could be indexed by 
historical phenomenicity, to the precise degree that this indexing hinders the 
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building (aufbauen) of human history according to volitional prospects of 
messianic endings.    
De Man hides the immediate sequel to the quoted paragraph. The 
fragment continues, in fact, by affirming that the mutual pertinence of the 
profane and the messianic is one of the most fundamental points on which 
philosophy of history has still a lot to teach us. “Die Beziehung dieser Ordnung 
auf das Messiansche ist eines des wesentlichen Lehrstücke der 
Geschichtsphilosophie” (Benjamin 1989d, 204). Benjamin goes on to probe the 
issue. He does so, as the title of the essay suggests, in terms fragmentary or even 
cryptic – which do not enable anything more than an initial contemplation of 
what may be at stake. The two orders, profane and messianic, are pictured as two 
arrows pointing in different directions and charged with their respective 
potential – Dynamis. The two directions would tend to diverge, rather than to 
converge. They would still entertain between them relations of mutual influence 
or echoing, analogous to those between two forces following lines that never 
meet, tracing opposite trajectories. The profane would thus remain separate from 
the messianic, but would also be a category most pertinent with respect to the 
issue of its closeness: “Das Profane also ist zwar keine Kategorie des 
[messianisches] Reichs aber eine Kategorie, und zwar der zutreffendsten eine, 
seines leisesten Nahens” (ibid.).  
Benjamin further suggests that there might be a way in which the profane 
sustains or carries the Dynamis of the messianic – the latter being co-extensive 
with accomplished happiness for humans. Human history would involve a 
double potential of restitutio (reinstating, recalling): spiritual and worldly. 
Spiritual restitutio would involve the integritas of immortality. Worldly restitutio 
would (cor)respond (entspricht) to it, by involving, instead, the aeonic ruining 
(Untergang) of the very pastness of the past (Vergängnis): 
 
Der geistlichen restitutio in integrum, 
welche in die Unsterblichkeit einführt, 
Au mouvement spirituel de la restitutio in 
integrum qui conduit à l’immortalité, 
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entspricht eine weltliche, die in die 
Ewigkeit eines Untergang führt und der 
Rhythmus dieses ewig vergehenden, in 
seiner Totalität vergehenden, in seiner 
räumlichen, aber auch zeitlichen Totalität 
vergehenden Weltlichen, der Rhythmus 
der messianischen Natur, ist Glück. Denn 
messianisch ist die Natur aus ihrer ewigen 
und totalen Vergängnis. (Benjamin 1989d, 
204) 
correspond une restitutio séculière qui 
conduit à l’éternité d’un anéantissement, et 
le rythme de cette réalité séculière 
éternellement évanescente, évanescente 
dans sa totalité spatiale, mais aussi 
temporelle, le rythme de cette nature 
messianique est le bonheur. Car 
messianique est la nature de part son 
éternelle et totale évanescence. (OE, I, 264-
265) 
 
It is important, I think, to understand Untergang as ruining, rather than as 
anéantissement; and Vergängnis as presently perfected rather than as simple past. 
The Wolfian quest of the prisca et genuina forma of the Homeric idea could be seen 
as the misplacement of a task of spiritual restitutio in integrum onto an Untergang 
that can only be recollected through a weltliche restitutio. The latter can only take 
place as an event of historic, that is, perfected temporality: not exactly eternal nor 
simply transient, but eternally passing away; not exactly total, but passing away 
in its spatial and temporal totality. This would be the temporal and spatial 
coordinates of a historically aeonic Gewesene.  
Recollecting the historic Untergehen: if translation is the task with respect 
to poetic originals, nihilism is the task at the level of world politics – “die 
Aufgabe der Weltpolitik, deren Methode Nihilismus zu heißen hat” (Benjamin 
1989d, 204.) 
This would be Benjamin’s history – occurring, as political and translative, 
at the point at which phenomena echo most intensively the messianic realm, 
while remaining most separated from it. Messianic echoing would be what 
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safeguards the persistence of human Untergang1 – preserving, instead of 
terminating, the very possibility of historic events.  
Anthropic formations would be neither spirit nor matter; they would be 
the co-substantiation of these two essentially different natures. Literary 
formations would, accordingly, be neither purely human-linguistic naming nor 
phenomenic semiosis; they would be the mode in which the latter, as substantial 
language-whole, indexes the former. I turn to the theological notion of hypostasis 
and its relations to prosopon. 
 
 
D.1.2. Anthropic  Prosopon  
 
I have been using the term formation as a translation of Benjamin’s Gebilde. 
The term, applied to literary language, designates the historic constancy of an 
ideational mode of indexing (Art des Meinens) purely human-linguistic 
communicability, instantiated through varying semiotic constructs. Benjamin’s 
problematics of Idee, concern the historic status of a formation as Ursprung. A 
formational idea would be an original Gewesene addressed by Jetzseit. I would 
now like to further investigate and differently configure the theoretical and 
methodological implications of the notion of formation. One way of doing so, 
would be to return to the topoi of Aristotelian problematics about categories and 
follow certain aspects of their fortune in the field of theology. 
I have understood formation as equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of 
primary essence (prote ousia). It would correspond to the initial step in the 
                                                   
1 One should read, in connection to this, the essay of Hölderlin at the beginning of which, 
the notion of Untergehen occurs in connection to the one of fatherland: “Die untergehende 
Vaterland [...]”. Then one could pass on to Hölderlin’s “Andenken” and try to read what remains, 
“was bleibet”, under a Benjaminian rather than a Heideggerian perspective. Then return to the 
Odyssean nostos and its Ithaka. 
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process of categorisation, which enables things to acquire the status of a 
phenomenic hypokeimenon. Formations would thus be subject to the attribution of 
further categories: those defining what they essentially are, on the level of a 
second essence (deutera ousia), and those designating their contingent properties 
(kata to symvevikos)1.  
Homer, as an idea, would designate the primary essence of a formation: 
identify it as a specific mode of indexing its purely human-linguistic second 
essence and open it to the attribution of categories of historical or aesthetic 
contingency. 
We are already beyond Aristotle and into the field of initially neo-platonic 
and eventually Christian theological conceptualisation, when we consider that 
formation comes very close to what has been called hypostasis in Greek and is 
accurately translated into Latin as substantia – and from there as substance. I have 
suggested that substance be retained as equivalent to prote ousia; essence, in a strict 
sense of the term, could be considered as synonymous with deutera ousia.  
One of the aspects of Christian theological tradition which presents a 
particular interest for my notion of formation is the following. A hypostasis may be 
one and indivisible, while multiple second essences (also referred to as fuvseiß 
or natures) may be involved in the corresponding substantiation, clearly distinct 
and even incongruous with respect to each other. Such could be the case, for 
instance, of Christ as one of the three hypostaseis of the Trinity of the New 
Testament2: the hypostasis of the Son would be unitary, although involving the 
co-substantiation of a divine and a human nature. Recall the question of the 
double nature of human language as semiotic communication and pure 
                                                   
1 See my initial exposition of these problematics in section B.1.4. 
 
2 I am referring to the solution that the “dogma of Chalcedona” (A.D. 451) advanced with 
respects to the relevant theological debates. 
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communicability1. A further element of theological problematics that could relate 
to Benjaminian ones is, indeed, the way in which the notion of hypostasis relates 
to the question of communicability. This is strongly connoted in a further term 
used by Christian theology (and particularly influential within its Eastern and, 
later, Orthodox tradition) to identify the status of all three Godly hypostaseis. I am 
referring to the notion of provswpon (prosopon), which has been considered as the 
translative equivalent of (but remains, in my sense, quite distinct from) the Latin 
persona and the corresponding terms of modern European languages2.  
I am interested in probing this notion in connection to problematics 
concerning literary formations – and, more specifically, their unitary persistence 
as well as their readability and translatability. In what respect could it be useful 
or insightful for us to understand the status of a literary formation as prosopic? 
This implies the possible transposition of a theological concept onto our field of 
literary theory. I will venture to operate the transposition, not by drawing 
directly on theological debates, but by exploring how the notion of prosopon has 
already been transposed from the question of divine to the one of human 
hypostasis. My paradigm for this initial transposition is the theologian V. Lossky 
                                                   
1 See mainly section B.3.4. of the present thesis. 
 
2 The work of Leontios Byzantios (1966), situated in the 5th century A.D., is widely 
acknowledged as fundamental with respect to the notion of prosopon in its relation to debates and 
problematics over the double nature and unitary hypostasis of Christ.  
I suggest that we keep the Greek term prosopon instead of using its Latin or modern 
European equivalents. The term indicates my distances with respect to the extremely wide field 
of modern uses and misuses of the notions of persona or personne in the philosophy of law, politics 
and ethics (including the trend known as personalisme) as well as, more recently, in literary, 
especially narratological theory. 
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and, more precisely, his essay on the “Notion théologique de la personne 
humaine” (1967)1. 
Lossky’s is actually a double task. He explores, on the one hand, how 
theological contemplation can extend its domain of applicability. In view of such 
an extension, notions such as the ones of hypostasis and prosopon might have to 
undergo conceptual modifications. On the other hand, he considers the 
implications of his gesture, with respect to the very notion of the human as an 
object of study. His transpositional gesture does not simply bridge theological 
and anthropological problematics; it also disputes the adequacy, if not the 
validity, of conventional anthropological conceptualisations of the human.  
Lossky starts by presenting the notion of a prosopic hypostasis, as it 
emerged through early ecclessiastic debates on the unitary hypostasis and the 
double nature of Christ. The notion of prosopon should be a device enabling us to 
conceive and understand how a hypostasis can be in two natures without either 
becoming divisible itself or merging the two into a single whole. Transposed to 
the case of humans, the notion of prosopon should, accordingly, allow us to 
envisage a unitary singularity proper to every human being, given the double 
nature, spiritual and bodily, which its hypostasis substantiates. In other words, 
the human prosopon should designate characteristics different from those that 
make up either of the two components of human nature. Lossky is thus driven to 
the formulation of the crucial question of his essay, concerning the specificity of 
the notion of prosopon and, more precisely, its distinction from the 
anthropological notion of the human individual: 
                                                   
1 For relatively recent surveys of the uses of the notion of prosopon see Meyerson (1973) 
and  Carrithers et al. (1985). My way to Lossky has largely been traced through the reading of 
Gianaras (1982) and, especially, Ramphos (2000). The relations between the approach I present 
here, and Levina’s often emphatically phenomenological notion and theory of visage (see, for 
instance, Levinas 1974), deserve further investigation. 
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[…] dans quel sens devra se faire la distinction entre la personne or 
l’hypostase humaine et l’homme en tant qu’individu ou nature 
particulière. Qu’est-ce que doit signifier la personne par rapport à 
l’individu humain? (Lossky 1967, 117) 
Lossky investigates the very specificity of the substantiation of humans as 
prosopic formations, connected to but also distinct from forms proper to spiritual 
immutability, as well as to forms of phenomenic transience. He thus engages in a 
critique of previous attempts to identify or define the notion of human prosopon 
on the grounds of concepts referring to the spiritual or bodily nature of humans. 
He takes critical distances, to begin with, from the highly influential tradition of 
Boece’s definition of the human prosopon as individually substantiated rationality 
– or, more specifically, substantia individua rationalis naturae (Lossky 1967, 116). 
He continues by also discarding, on equivalent grounds, definitions of the 
human prosopon based on the neo-platonic concentration on nou``ß (nous) or on 
the modern psychological notion of yuchv (psyche). 
An initial step which, Lossky suggests, could help us to identify the 
specificity of the status of a human prosopon, would be to consider the kind of 
question to which one answers when designating a prosopon (a procedure 
echoing Aristotle’s argumentation in Categories). This would not be the question 
quid? to which one answers by further qualifying the nature of a substance. It 
would rather be the question quis?: “or, à la question quis on répond par un nom 
propre, qui seul peut désigner la personne” (Lossky 1967, 116). The proper name 
would thus be the sole attribute of which humans would be subjects as prosopa1. 
In other words, at stake, in the notion of prosopon would be the issue of the very 
communicability of human essence.  
In accordance to the above, Lossky suggests the following way of 
understanding the specificity of a prosopic human hypostasis : 
                                                   
1 Recall, from section B.3.2. that, according to Benjamin’s Sprache, the proper name would 
be the most significant survival of purely human naming-language in linguistic semiotic 
practices. 
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Dans ces conditions il nous sera impossible de former un concept de la 
personne humaine, et il faudra se contenter de dire; la personne signifie 
l’irréductibilité de l’homme à sa nature. “Irréductibilité” et non ”quelque  
chose d’irréductible” ou “quelque chose qui rend l’homme irréductible à 
sa nature”, justement parce qu’il ne peut s’agir ici de “quelque chose” de 
distinct, d’une “autre nature” mais de quelqu’un qui se distingue de sa 
propre nature, de quelqu’un qui dépasse sa nature, tout en la contenant, 
qui la fait exister comme nature humaine par ce dépassement et, 
cependant, n’existe pas en lui-même, en dehors de la nature qu’il 
“enhypostasie” et qu’il dépasse sans cesse. (Lossky 1967, 118)1 
The term prosopon would thus be closer to a figure than to a concept. It 
configures the necessarily asymptotic relation between, on the one hand, the 
emergence of humans as hypokeimena and, on the other, elements making up the 
spiritual and bodily essence of human beings. It indicates the irreducibility of 
substantiated humanness not only to contingent attributes but also to categories 
of second essence. It can only be defined as this very irreducibility – something 
quite close to a Derridean supplement, without which humans would be 
aggregates of spiritual and material forms.  
                                                   
1  The cited passage closes with a reference to Heidegger that we can only very briefly 
comment on here: 
“J’aurais dit “qu’il extasie”, si je ne craignais qu’on me fasse a reproche d’introduire une 
expression qui rappelle trop “le caractère extatique du Dasein” chez Heidegger après 
avoir critiqué d’autres qui se sont permis de faire des rapprochements pareils.” (Lossky 
1967, 118) 
The divergence between Lossky and Heidegger resides, perhaps, in a point that can also 
be crucial for the distinction between Benjaminian and Heideggerian thought, in spite of 
terminological likeness. According to Lossky (1967), the problematics of the irreducibility of 
prosopic hypostasis are rather obscured by the conceptual schemas of Heideggerian ontology, 
including the basic distinction between Beingness and being, or essence and existence: 
“Si le nouveau domaine de l’inconceptualisable, parce qu’irréductible à l’essence, s’ouvre 
à un Maxime le Confesseur dans la notion de l’hypostase créée, ce n’est pas dans la 
distinction Thomiste de l’essence et de l’existence – distinction qui pénètre jusqu’au fond 
existentiel des êtres individuels – que l’on trouvera la solution ontologique du mystère de 
la personne humaine. […] Le niveau sur lequel se pose le problème de la personne 
humaine dépasse donc celui de l’ontologie, telle qu’on l’entend habituellement.” (120-
121) 
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If we insist on further specification, we can have recourse, again, to the 
notion of communicability. Recall that, according to Benjamin’s Sprache, the 
linguistic essences of things are identical to their spiritual essences to the degree 
that the latter are communicable; as such, languages as wholes communicate 
nothing but the very communicability of the corresponding spiritual essence1. 
The proposition that human prosopon is the irreducibility of the human to its own 
nature, would mean, accordingly, that no human is ever only itself, always being 
itself as communicable – a self involving linguistic propensity and eventually 
bearing a proper name. The following further suggestions could be advanced 
with respect to the human prosopic hypostasis. 
A prosopon would emerge and persist as capacity to address and be 
addressed. This addressing can only be of other prosopa – or of otherness as 
prosopic. It would be fundamentally and primarily the prosopon and only the 
prosopon of one, which is engaged when one emerges as an addressive challenge 
or takes up the addressive challenge of another. 
A prosopon would thus trigger connections or relations that we could, 
perhaps, further configure as conversational, provided that the term be 
understood as closer to its Greek equivalent of sun-omiliva (sunomilia: a 
gathering in intercourse) than to its modern sense of discursive exchange. It 
would be a source of value attributable to linguistic toils, for which criteria of 
epistemological, aesthetic, economic or, more generally, socio-psychological 
bearing cannot account.  
We could also configure the prosopon as a kind of intelligence, to the 
degree that one reads in this term an inter-esse or an inter-legere, rather than its 
phenomenological significance, whether anthropological or technological. A 
prosopon would thus set the conditions of a political neg-otium, exposing how 
different modes of categorial attribution are ceaselessly and inescapably at stake. 
                                                   
1 See especially sections B.3.2. and B.3.3. of the present thesis. 
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A prosopon would have no unity or identity, except in terms that 
constantly upset the presumed self-sufficiency of both spiritual constancy and 
material mutability. It would only persist as the precarious formation of mimetic 
and recollective toils unaccountable in terms of subjective intentions or desires, 
projections or memories. It would be humanity: linguistic-historic. 
 
 
D.1.3. Prosopopoetic Language 
 
By configuring a literary formation as a prosopic hypostasis we would 
dispute anthropological figures and premises: prosopon displaces, to begin with, 
the anthropological understanding of the human.  
The prosopon of a given literary formation as primary essence or 
substantial hypostasis would be its ideational form: the Art or mode in which, 
variable semiotic constructs index, qua language-wholes, purely human-linguistic 
communicability. The prosopon of a linguistic formation would be, in other terms, 
a mode of co-substantiating the two essentially distinct natures involved in any 
human-linguistic manifestation – without this compromising either the unity of 
the formation or the distinctness of its essences. I am referring to the spiritual 
nature of a pure naming-language, telling humanness as communicable, and the 
idiosyncratically material nature of semiosis as a medium of communication. The 
configuration of linguistic formations as prosopa would also indicate the 
irreducibility of linguistic life to either of its two natures. There would be 
something in linguistic formations as substantiated hypokeimena, which 
transcends, and perhaps even over-determines, how categories of second essence 
(such as spirit and matter, human-linguistic purity and semiosis) as well as 
categories of contingency (such as those designated by historical or aesthetic 
concepts) are attributable to them.  
The historic life of the prosopic ideational form proper to a formational 
language-whole would be marked by the features we have already discussed as 
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proper to a human prosopon. It would consist in a way of addressing (and of 
being addressable by) other language-wholes, equally prosopic in status. The 
reading of a literary formation, in other words, would not involve reception by 
cultural subjects of history, any more that its occurrence involves analogous 
subjects of production. Addressed as a matter of conversational intelligence 
would be the indexation of the very issue of purely human-linguistic 
communicability – its interest as such, prior to any current communicational 
concerns. The corresponding conversational tasks would involve, as we have 
seen, the reproduction of semiotic constructs as well as the translative intercourse 
with the Art in which reine Sprache has been indexed. At stake, in such tasks, 
would be the survival of the prosopic addressing, which is substantiated in the 
formation. The stakes would be historic and, as such, political. 
According to the above, the Art proper to the language-whole of a literary 
formation could be further qualified by the (largely catachrestic but perhaps 
useful) transposition of a term designating a basic figure in classical rhetoric; 
namely, prosopopoeia. The ideational form of a persisting formation would be 
describable and analysable as prosopopoetic figuration.  
Language-wholes would form themselves as prosopa, claiming their 
recollection by other, equally linguistic prosopa. Prosopopoeia would thus be the 
occurrence of an addressive propensity entailing historic connectability between 
languages as wholes. Its status would be prior to the semantic value of specific 
semiotic manifestations, such as individual words or elaborate statements. It 
would also be prior to rhetorical discrepancies between semiosis and semansis. 
What de Man understands as tensions constituting the very nature of semiotic 
constructs, would depend on how this nature is co-substantiated with the one of 
pure communicability, in the prosopon of the corresponding language-whole. 
For the purposes of this argument, one should not understand prosopopoeia 
as an anthropomorphic metaphor, that is, as a rhetorical trope attributing 
anthropological characteristics to non-human entities. One could consider, 
instead, that the anthropological configuration of human beings presupposes 
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figural transpositions deriving from and depending on the prosopic status of 
human language-wholes. 
The above may lead to a further insight into translation and translative 
connections as historic. 
As we have seen, translation involves modes of indexation that 
characterise the language-wholes of the original and the translatum. In other 
terms, translative would be events through which one linguistic prosopon 
emerges as an addressive engagement in conversational intercourse with 
another. The translative connection to the prosopon of the original as a Gewesene 
would entail the emergence, in Jetztseit, of human-linguistic otherness as prosopic. 
Through translation, human languages would thus be enacted as prosopic 
formations – rather than as systems subject to norms of idiomatic or cultural 
formness. 
We can thus better understand the Benjaminian insistence on the 
disturbing effects that the translative gesture has on the language of the 
translatum. Recall how the task of a Wörtlich translation involves, for the 
translatum, a drastic disturbance or even disfiguration of its structures or norms 
of semiosis and semansis1. Through the interplay between syntax and 
morphology, translation would entail a sense of semiotic perturbation – or 
displacement. This disturbance would be what brings to the fore the issue of 
indexation of reine Sprache. Brought to the fore would be, in other terms, the 
irreducibility of human language, as historic formation, to either of the two 
components of linguistic life – historically conditioned semiotic structures and 
purely human-linguistic communicability. The perturbation of semiotic 
normality would be the mark through which the language of the translatum 
exposes the prosopopoetic toils of connection between different instances of 
human-linguistic life – not as idioms foreign to each other but as prosopa distinct 
with respect to each other. 
                                                   
1 See section B.4.5. above. 
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In translation, a given challenge of prosopic addressing is transposed: this 
transposition is closer to transfiguration than to transference or to transmission. 
The translative gesture as such remains non-translatable1. It does not survive in 
the on-going life of the translatum as a new original. Consequently, human-
linguistic history is not conceivable as built up through a chain of translative 
connections. In other words, prosopic connectability between human language-
wholes entails unique historic events, involving the distinctness of the prosopa 
immediately concerned, none of which merges into or is represented by the 
other. There would be no transmissible cultural or anthropological entity 
sustaining a process of either mechanical stability or organic development. 
If literature is language most prone to translative connections (as well as 
most resistant to simple trans-idiomatic transfer of meaning or syntax) then 
literature is language most challengingly exposing its prosopic potential. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 See sections B.4.6 and B.4.9. above. 
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D.2. HEROIC EPOS 
 
One of the reasons for which works like the Homeric poems retain a 
crucial significance is that their conditions of survival expose with particular 
intensity the challenge of prosopopoetic readability proper to all literary 
formations. Their form emerges as a per-formative event of addressive 
propensity, irreducible to either semiotic constructs or conceptual abstractions. 
This emergence is a claim of recollection addressed by a human-linguistic 
Gewesene that retains its drastic, that is, historic distances with respect to all 
Jetzseit. Reading turns into an endeavour to recognise the distinctness of a 
prosopon – to effectively address the idea proper to its characteristic mode of 
indexing pure linguistic humanity.  
No reading of Homer would be free from the translative challenge that the 
Homeric original presents. The challenge would be there, whether one 
systematically transposes Homeric Greek into a given living idiom or does so 
sporadically, in an exegetical or critical commentary of the Homeric idea1. The 
reading of Homer would, in either case, be co-extensive with the emergence and 
eventual persistence of a new linguistic prosopon, recollecting itself through its 
connection to the Homeric one. Living language-wholes would be made, by this 
very reading, to tackle the problem of their own historic presentness, by 
figuratively filling-in the schemas of distances, of death or foreignness2, through 
                                                   
1 From this point of view, one has to be critical towards recent tendencies in classical 
studies, often labelled “theoretical” – with further qualifications ranging from “marxist” or 
“feminist” to “deconstructive” [for a brief overview see Peradotto (1997)]. They invariably 
bracket, if not the issue of the original altogether, at least the one of its translative challenge. They 
read Homer as if it were a modern or post-modern text, written in a well-known foreign 
language. In this sense, they continue and intensify a tendency that, as we have seen, inheres in 
traditional philology.  
 
2 Recall our discussion of these notion in section C.2.2 above. 
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which they connect to their Homeric precedent. Reading Homer means enacting 
one’s own linguistic practices as prosopopoetic emergences – which may entail 
not only perturbations of semiotic norms but also changes in the very status of 
languages as communicational media.  
In this sense, the reading of literatures Homeric detaches itself from the 
setting of a historicist Altertumswissenschaft while connecting to issues raised by 
what has been called emergent literature1. Any effective reading of Homer, today, 
should be expected to have, on the language of the reader, effects comparable to 
the tensions that have been marking English, for instance, as it passes from the 
status of a national or international vernacular to the status of a global linguistic 
medium2.  
                                                   
1 The notion of emergent literature connotes the problem of the readability of literary 
formations that are written in modern European languages in ways that upset the modern 
function and status of these languages as national ones. For a presentation of the corresponding 
theoretical and political implications see Godzich (1994).  
 
2 For the specificity of the case of English as it evolves in the realm of post-vernacular 
linguistic life see Godzich (1999a). The article is particularly interesting in how it connects the 
evolving status of languages as media of communication to the more general issue of the function 
of language with respect to human thought and practices: 
“Parler ici et aujourd’hui d’un anglais mondial c’est dire que le millénaire de la 
vernacularisation tire à sa fin, c’est à dire que s’instaure de manière perceptible un autre 
dispositif, un nouvel agencement de rapports entre la symbolisation et la communication, 
et que ce nouveau dispositif entraîne inévitablement des transformations d’ordre 
politique, de nouvelles manières de concevoir la relation au territoire, et la création de 
nouvelles collectivités.’’ (39) 
At stake in these transformations would ultimately be something close to what I 
understand as historic recollection: “le mode d’une mémoire à venir et non celui d’une mémoire à 
préserver” (44).  
Exemplary, both with respect to the translation of Homer in general and with respect to 
the workings of English is, in my sense, the case of Ezra Pound’s “Canto I”. The Canto translates, 
in a Benjaminian sense of the term, an extreme instance of the Homeric formation, into an English 
emphatically turned towards its own poetic tradition, while reaching well beyond its modern-
national configuration. It thus effectively assumes the consequences of a translative connection to 
the Homeric prosopon. The recent case of Derek Walcott and his Omeros is also particularly 
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If we want to tentatively designate the specificity of the readability 
challenge addressed to contemporary languages by the Homeric prosopon, we 
could borrow a concept quite current in historical and aesthetic approaches to 
Homer – namely, epic hero. We would do so in order to check the potentiality of 
turning such a concept into an idea.  
Heroic would be the mode in which the Homeric formation indexes the 
communicability of human essence. In doing so, it would have very little, if 
anything, to do with anthropological notions of traditional heroism. It would be 
primarily attributable to the prosopon of Homer as a language-whole. The stories 
of Homeric human figures as heroes would have to be understood as rhetorical 
constructs conditioned by the prosopopoetic figuration proper to the language 
they are told in. Epic, it should be recalled, comes from the Greek and, indeed, 
Homeric e[poß - word or story or language. As for hero, it comes from the 
equally Greek and Homeric h{rwß – applying not only to excelling warriors but 
also to Pheakian humanity, if not to mortals at large. Heroic epos would thus be 
equivalent to human language.  
The heroic characteristic of Homeric language could reside in how this 
language raises the issue of prosopon at the very edge of the passage from the 
chaotic battlefield or ocean of phenomenic non-distinctness, to the precarious 
affirmation of human-linguistic form. There would be struggle: for the very 
emergence of the human as a primary substance, confronting the prospect of 
fatally accidental occurrences – touched or marked, perhaps, but still unsheltered 
                                                                                                                                                       
instructive. Its English tries its own limits as the literary idiom of a globalised language, as it 
ventures to sustain a connection to its own Homer – persistently recollective, even if only 
distantly translative in the strict sense of the term.  
Medieval and modern Greek is a linguistic field particularly interesting from the point of 
view of the potential effects of translative connections to one’s Homeric Gewesene. Through its 
life, distances of oldness or death become increasingly significant while distances of foreignness 
are constantly mitigated. One could compare, in this respect, Byzantine interlinear translations 
with modern ones – such as the one of Kazantzakis-Kakridis or the more recent one of Maronitis. 
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by categories. The emergence would be, in other words, out of nowhere and into 
no-place. This is how Homeric language has, indeed, persisted with respect to all 
the linguistic environments that have preserved and translated it – anticipating 
but also resisting the incessant work of configuration of its essence in conceptual 
terms, aesthetic or historical. It has been, in a sense, cutting time and space 
coordinates, challenging the validity and integrity of temporal and spatial figures 
of formness. It has also, in a sense, been itself cut by such co-ordinates: the 
wholeness of its formation has been invariably marked by accidental occurrences 
or interruptions – very much like the ones Peabody has described with respect to 
the ever-unstable topmost level of songs sung. Uncertainty has reigned supreme 
over what all this may be about or where it might be heading. What persists, ce 
qu’il y a, would be the idea of a perfected Gewesene, addressable as the only 
certainty possible. This certainty of having been there, confronting the 
uncertainty of everything, save one’s obstinate addressive propensity, would 
constitute the heroic idiosyncrasy of the prosopon proper to the Homeric 
formation as a language-whole, as well as to the human figures it forms as 
heroes1. 
                                                   
1 The heroism of Homeric language and figures should not be understood as expressing 
temporal moments of historical beginnings. It pertains to instances of humanity always already 
historically perfected. Things like Homer – or  Achilles and Odysseus, for that matter – are, 
perhaps, not very far from what the following tells us about its own things – emergences out of 
our  post-modern Jetztseit: 
“Choses et non déchets, car il n’y a déchets que dans la perspective d’un sujet. Et quelque 
part, parmi ces choses, il y a cette entité curieuse qui n’est pas encore ou déjà plus le sujet, 
qui n’assume pas encore ou déjà plus le poids du monde, mais qui en reçoit les 
pulsations, les intensités, et qui tente, elle aussi, de persister. Ni être ni étant, hors de 
l’ontologie comme de l’ontique, elle se trouve dans un monde dont elle fait partie, non 
pas en tant qu’ange déchu ou surhomme en devenir, mais en tant que persistance qui 
cherche à préserver ses énergies et d’en capter d’autres. Car son emplacement dans 
l’indécidable ne l’immobilise pas, bien au contraire. Il la contraint en mouvement, un 
mouvement dans un espace non cartographié et même pas orienté, un mouvement pour 
lequel la vitesse et la célérité sont bien plus importantes que la direction.” (Godzich 
1999b, 41) 
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We would be as far from figures of conventionally heroic valour or 
nostalgia, as we are from a language telling the cultus vitae of archaic nations. The 
aristeia of the Iliadic prosopon would be heroic because it consists in the capacity 
of warriors to address each other and their Gods in speech, through battle 
turmoil1. The polytropon of the Odyssean prosopon would be heroic because it 
consists in the capacity to address, out of oceanic waves, figures of both extreme 
foreignness and extreme familiarity2.  
Emergences, seducing foes or hosts, planning the fall of cities or the 
murder of suitors, only to announce the hazard of their own imminent re-
submersion in a realm of foretold unrest3. 
 
Exhausted rather than accomplished, this thesis cannot conclude 
otherwise than by stating the obvious. We need to keep on doing what others did 
                                                   
1 In the Iliad, Aeneias addresses Achilles before their duel: 
there are revilements to tell between us both 
a great lot, not even a hundred-oar ship would carry the burden. 
turnable  is the tongue of humans, and therein lots of tellings 
of all sorts, and of words lots of ground hither and thither. 
and whatever word you have said, such will you overhear. 
(Iliad, XX, 246-250, my translation) 
 
2 In the Odyssey, Alkinoos (in-between oceanic foreignness and Ithakian familiarlity) 
addresses Odysseus at the banquet: 
over you is form of words, within you organs of excellence. 
like a bard have you outworded the tale 
of all Argives and of your own wretched suffering 
(Odyssey, XI, 367-369, my translation) 
 
3 One can restart with the clusters of Homeric words which configure the human as 
a[nqrwpoß. Qumo;ß, in its junction to yuch;, could mean mind and soul – why not? How are they 
separable in the figure of a dying human? Novstoß, in its junction to patrivß gai`a, could mean 
return to fatherland – why not? How does this story make the name of a returning human? [Epea, 
in its junction to kleva, could mean words and glories – why not? How do they bring about 
encounters of conversational interest in recollection? 
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before us: reproduce and translate our Homer – and assume the consequences as 
to who, or what, or how we will have been, living human languages, out of Homer. 
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